Buka hatene

Compreender   Timor-Leste 2013

Mengerti

Understanding

Volume II

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Lia Maklokek – Prefácio – Foreword – Prakata

Ensaiu sira ne'ebe tama volume ida ne'e mak sira ne'ebe uluk-liu aprensenta iha Konferensia Timor-Leste Studies Association (TLSA) nian konaba *Understanding Timor-Leste 2013,* realize iha Universidade Nacional de Timor-Lorosa'e (UNTL), Liceu Campus, Avenida Cidade de Lisboa, Dili, Timor-Leste, 15-16 Jullu 2013. Ida ne'e Konferensia dahat TLSA nian, tuir fali konferensia sira ne'ebe halao ona iha Melbourne (2005) no Dili (2009 e 2011). Timor oan sira liu 150 ho Delagado internasional sira apresenta ensaiu durante loron rua resin. Konferensia ida ne'e organiza iha dalen hat mak Tetum, Portuguese, Indonesia no Inglez. Aproximasaun ida ne'e haktuir diversidade linguistika iha Timor-Leste, no hatudu sukesu boot. Panel *homenagen* mos organiza hodi selebra servisu Helen Hill nian, hamutuk ho panel especial konaba Estadu, Povu no Hari dame husi base. Ensaiu sira ne'ebe hetan ona revisaun husi kolega sira publika iha koleksaun ida ne'e inklui apresentasaun iha dalen hat hotu no inklui mos ensaiu sira ne'ebe hatoo iha panel homenagen nian.

Editores sira hakarak hatoo obrigadu barak ba UNTL,Swinburne University of Technology, no Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa ba parseria ne'ebe halo konferensia ne'e sai posivel. Ami mos hatoo apresiasaun a'as ba Presidencia da Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste no Asia Foundation, tan sira nian apoiu ba konferensia importante ida ne'e.

Obrigadu ba Sarah Smith no Susana Barnes, ba sira nian asistensia iha produsaun ba koleksaun ida ne'e, no ba Michael Leach no Sarah Smith tan sira nian asistensia iha organizasaun konferensia nian. Ami partikularmente hato'o obrigadu ba autores sira, no dala ida tan ami hein katak volume ida ne'e sei asiste estudante no akademiku sira iha Timor-Leste, no mos ba sira ne'ebe iha estranjerru ne'ebe hakarak komprende desafiu no oportunidade barak ne'ebe nasaun jovem ne'e hasoru hafoin tinan 12 restaurasaun independensia.

<p align="center">*</p>

As comunicações incluídas neste volume foram apresentadas na conferência *Compreender Timor-Leste 2013*, organizada pela Timor-Leste Studies Association (TLSA), a qual decorreu na Universidade Nacional de Timor-Leste (UNTL), no Campus do Liceu, Avenida Cidade de Lisboa, Díli, Timor-Leste, nos dias 15 e 16 de Julho de 2013. Esta foi a 4.ª conferência da TLSA, na sequência das de Melbourne (2005) e das de Díli (2009 e 2011). Mais de 150 conferencistas timorenses e internacionais apresentaram as suas comunicações durante dois dias. A conferência decorreu em quatro línguas, com painéis em Tétum, Português, Bahasa Indonésia e Inglês. Esta escolha reflecte a diversidade linguística de Timor-Leste e tem tido grande êxito. Foi organizada uma sessão de homenagem a Helen Hill pelo seu trabalho com um painel especial sobre 'State, People and Peace-Building'. As comunicações, sujeitas a arbitragem científica, foram seleccionadas de todos os painéis e da sessão de homenagem.

Os editores gostariam de agradecer à UNTL, à Swinburne Technology University e à Universidade de Lisboa pelos apoios que tornaram esta conferência possível. Gostariam ainda de agradecer à Presidência da República de Timor-Leste e à Asia Foundation (TAF) pelos respectivos contributos e agradecer igualmente à Sarah Smith e à Susan Barnes pela colaboração na organização deste volume. Um agradecimento especial aos autores das comunicações e votos de que este volume possa ser útil aos estudantes e académicos de Timor-Leste e aqueles que fora do país queiram compreender melhor os muitos desafios e oportunidades que esta nação enfrenta após 12 anos de independência.

<p align="center">*</p>

The papers included in this volume were first presented at the Timor-Leste Studies Association (TLSA)'s *Understanding Timor-Leste 2013* conference, held at the National University of Timor-Lorosa'e (UNTL), Liceu Campus, Avenida Cidade de Lisboa, Dili, Timor-Leste, 15-16 July 2013. This was the 4th TLSA conference, following our conferences in Melbourne (2005) and Dili (2009 and 2011). More than 150 East Timorese and international delegates presented papers over two days. The conference was organised into

four language streams, with papers presented in Tetum, Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia and English. This approach reflects the linguistic diversity of Timor-Leste, and proved a great success. A festschrift panel was also organised to celebrate the work of Helen Hill, along with a special panel on State, People and Peace-Building from Below. The peer-reviewed papers published in this collection contain works from all four language streams and the papers of the festschrift panel.

The editors would like to thank UNTL, Swinburne University of Technology, and the Technical University of Lisbon for the partnerships that made this conference possible. We also wish to thank the Presidency of the Republic of Timor-Leste and The Asia Foundation (TAF) for their support of the conference. Thanks also to Sarah Smith and Susana Barnes for their assistance in the production of this collection, and to Michael Leach and Sarah Smith for their assistance in conference organisation. We particularly thank the authors of these papers, and once again hope that this volume will assist students and academics in Timor-Leste, and also those outside the country who wish to better understand the many challenges and opportunities facing this young nation after twelve years of independence.

<div align="center">*</div>

Naskah-naskah yang dimuat dalam volume pertama ini adalah dipresentasikan oleh Timor-Leste Studies Association (TLSA) pada konferensi Mengerti Timor-Leste 2013, diselenggarakan di Universitas Nacional Timor Lorosa`e (UNTL),Kampus Liceu,Jln.Cidade de Lisboa,Dili,Timor-Leste,15–16 Juli 2013. Ini adalah konferensia TLSA yang ke-4, setelah konferensi kami di Melbourne (2005) dan Dili (2009 dan 2011). Lebih dari 150 orang Timor-Leste dan delegasi Internasional menyajikan makalah selama dua hari. Konferensi diorganisir kedalam empat bahasa, makalah disampaikan dalam Tetum, Portugis, bahasa Indonesia dan Inggris. Pendekatan ini merefleksikan keanekaragaman lingustik di Timor-Leste, dan terbukti sukses besar. Panel kumpulan artikel juga diorganisir untuk merayakan karya Helen Hill, bersama dengan panel khusus mengenai negara, "Masyarakat dan pembangunan perdamaian dari bawah". Revisi dari karya makalah dan panel kumpulan artikel yang diterbitkan dalam koleksi ini memuat empat bahasa

Para editor ingin mengucapkan terima kepada Universitas Nasional Timor Lorosa`e, Universitas Swinburne Teknologi, Universitas Lisbon, untuk kemitraan yang membuat konferensi ini mungkin.Kami juga ingin berterima kasih kepada Presiden Republik Timor-Leste dan The Asia Foundation (TAF) atas dukungan mereka terhadap konferensi. Terima kasih juga diucapkan kepada Sarah Smith dan Susana Barner atas bantuan mereka dalam produksi koleksi ini dan kepada Michael Leach dan Sarah Smith atas bantuan mereka mengorganisir konferensi. Kami lebih khusus berterima kasih kepada para penulis makalah, dan sekali lagi berharap bahwa buku ini akan membantu mahasisiwa dan akademisi di Timor-Leste, dan juga mereka yang di luar negeri yang ingin lebih mengerti berbagai tantangan dan peluang yang dihadapi bangsa muda ini setelah 12 tahun merdeka.

Hannah Loney, Antero B. da Silva, Nuno Canas Mendes, Alarico da Costa Ximenes and Clinton Fernandes

Understanding Timor-Leste 2013

Edited by
Hannah Loney

Two journeys in Indonesian-occupied Timor-Leste, 1991 and 1997

Steven Farram

Following the 1975 Indonesian invasion and occupation of Timor-Leste, foreign travellers were barred entry. Little news was then heard from Timor-Leste until the beginning of 1989, when Indonesia re-opened Timor-Leste to foreign visitors, hoping to show the world that there was no local opposition to their rule. What non-Timorese knew of conditions in Timor-Leste during the remainder of the Indonesian occupation came mainly from the observations of political activists and journalists, who had usually travelled to the country specifically for that purpose. Examples include Robert Domm (1990), Max Stahl (1992) and John Pilger (1994); other stories only came out much later, such as Kirsty Sword Gusmão (2003; concerning journeys made from 1990), David Scott (2005, 312-328; concerning a journey made in 1994) and Jill Jolliffe (2010; also concerning a journey made in 1994). A number of accounts also emerged from the last days of the Indonesian occupation, many related to the referendum that led to independence, such as Jane Nicholls (1999), Tim Fischer (2000) and Irena Cristalis (2002).

Andrew McMillan (1992, 3), in the meantime, claimed to have visited Timor 'on a whim', when in Dili in January 1990, he witnessed a pro-independence demonstration that was ruthlessly suppressed by the Indonesian military. That event led him to write the book *Death in Dili*. This account is somewhat different to those outlined above and seems to have few counterparts in the published record (exceptions are some examples of a similar nature that appear in Sword and Walsh 1991). My first visit to Timor-Leste in 1991 was made with no intention of documenting the Indonesian occupation, nor was my second visit in 1997. I witnessed no demonstrations or ruthless military activity. Nor did I interview any key figures of the resistance, but I did meet and talk with many East Timorese and Indonesians. This paper is an account of my experiences and impressions from those two visits.

In September 1991, when I first visited Timor-Leste, the Indonesian occupation had received minimal mainstream reporting in my home country, Australia. I was travelling through Eastern Indonesia with a young Irishman I had met, Conor McManus, when we arrived at the West Timor port of Atapupu with the intention of travelling to Dili. Several buses met our boat and were soon full and headed off. We got onto the very last one, which took us to Maliana, just inside the Timor-Leste border. There we discovered that the last bus going to Dili had already left and there would be no more until the following day. We then decided to hitchhike.

We were in luck and were picked up by a truck going straight to Dili. The truck left the main road and we appeared to be travelling directly through the bush on a rough track; there was no other traffic. We returned to the main road before entering Dili and the driver took us directly to the Hotel Turismo, where he indicated we should get out. I handed the driver two packets of clove cigarettes in appreciation for the lift, which appeared to please him, as he shook our hands heartily and waved as he drove off.

The people at the Turismo were not very friendly and it was too expensive for our budgets, so we went looking for something cheaper. We found a hotel near the university, where I was surprised to see the manager openly drinking Portuguese wine directly from the bottle; it was only early afternoon. It might have been a sign of stress, but I cannot recall that he said very much. We stayed only a short time in Dili before heading to Baucau. Wanting to hitchhike again, we positioned ourselves outside of town to find a lift. Finally, a large truck stopped for us, but it was a bit disconcerting, as the truck belonged to the Indonesian army.

I felt like some sort of traitor to the Timorese people travelling in the back of the army truck, but our fellow travellers were all Timorese, who told me it was normal to be picked up by the army. The truck stopped for us in Baucau at a large hotel and we went to investigate the cost of lodgings. The door was locked and we had to knock to get attention. A man answered, told us they had no rooms and started to close the door again. I protested, saying that usually when a hotel had no vacancies, travellers were advised

of other places they could try. The man then told us of a small hotel nearby and shut the door. The place we had been denied lodgings was the Hotel Flamboyan, now known as the Pousada de Baucau. The Indonesians used the former Portuguese hotel as a torture and detention centre. According to the 1992 *Indonesia Handbook* (Dalton 1992, 727), the hotel was by then a 'former' detention centre and I hope that was true when I stood outside its doors in 1991.

The hotel we went to was run by a friendly older man. We were surprised to see photographs on the lobby walls of his sons wearing uniforms of the armed resistance, FALINTIL (*Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste*; Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste). The owner told us that his sons were still in the bush, fighting the Indonesian military. We entered into a deep discussion, which was frequently changed to other matters when people, whom we were later told were *mata-mata*, or spies, entered the hotel or lingered near its entrance, where we were sitting. The owner offered his opinion that the Indonesian state philosophy of *Pancasila*, with its principles of belief in God, national unity, social justice, just and civilised humanity, and government by deliberation and consent (Kingsbury 1998, 42), was a wonderful thing; it was just a pity, he said, that the Indonesians did not practice what they preached.

Conor wanted to meet some members of the resistance and through one of the hotel workers we were introduced to a young man said to be a leader of the local clandestine movement. We met at night on a dark section of road and listened to tales of FALINTIL's activities in the bush and the growing involvement of youth in the resistance movement, including a recent incident where young school students had verbally abused their Indonesian teachers. The man had purchased us some cans of ABC stout, presumably to provide us with a reason for sitting and talking. Conor was keen to help in some way and offered to carry any news or other items out of the country, but was told that there was nothing of that nature required at the moment.

We then considered travelling to Viqueque, but were told there were no hotels, although we could probably stay with the local priest. Instead, we decided to head for Kupang, and then on to Darwin. We tried to hitchhike again and thought we were very clever when a truck stopped for us after only a short wait. There were already a number of people in the back of the truck and we soon learnt that the driver would expect us to pay for our transportation. I later found that this was a common arrangement in parts of Timor where bus services were limited.

We travelled by truck all the way to SoE in West Timor, but before we reached the border, the truck was pulled over by police who asked to see our passports. They were friendly, said it was routine and nothing to worry about, but they checked our passports closely and recorded all our details. In Kupang, the relatively large number of foreign tourists made me realise that I could not recall seeing, and certainly had not spoken to, a single European for the whole time I was in Timor-Leste. I had really seen little of the country during the trip, but it was clear that it was not a happy place. When the shocking images from the Santa Cruz massacre of 12 November 1991 (Stahl 1992; Pinto and Jardine 1997, 188-200) were broadcast around the world, I realised how tragic the situation really was. By then I was back in Darwin, but I had been in Dili less than two months before.

It was several years before I returned to Timor-Leste, but in 1994 I travelled from Kupang to Ambon and back again on the ship *Dobonsolo*, which also stopped at Dili. While we were at that port, I was approached by some young Timorese, whom I greeted in Indonesian. They asked me to speak English, so that curious Indonesians standing nearby could not understand. They talked very briefly, saying that they wished me to tell people back in my own country that the Timorese were suffering under Indonesian rule, but that they were resisting and would never give up. They then left.

Later at Kupang airport, waiting to return to Darwin, I noticed a familiar figure, but could not remember who he was. He also looked at me with a puzzled expression. It was only once we were on the aeroplane that realisation came to us both. He was Andrew McNaughton, who I had known years before from a house he had shared with friends of mine in Sydney. Andrew was not then the famous activist he was to become, which was just as well, because he had just come from Dili and was carrying secretly filmed footage of demonstrations that had occurred there only days before. Andrew had also recorded interviews with massacre survivors and key figures, such as Bishop Carlos Belo (Fernandes 2011, 100;

Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo was named bishop in 1988. Belo's forceful denunciation of human rights abuses in Timor-Leste attracted international attention. Together with resistance spokesman José Ramos-Horta, Belo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996; for more, see Kohen 1999). In later years it must have been very difficult to smuggle out such material because it became the practice for officials at Kupang airport to go through every item in your luggage before boarding, as I experienced many times.

In 1997, I was in West Timor doing preliminary research for my doctoral thesis when I made my second visit to Timor-Leste, arriving in Pante Macassar, Oecusse on 15 November. The bus dropped me off at the hotel Losmen Aneka Jaya, and I later discovered a new hotel right on the beach, but those two places seemed to be the only lodgings available for travellers. Pante Macassar seemed to be a sleepy place with few vehicles on its streets. Many of the houses appeared to be of traditional design and looked comfortable and well maintained. The beach was very clean and a complete contrast to the rubbish-strewn beachfront area of Kupang. There were many big trees and a number of Portuguese-era colonial buildings; I was surprised that some of them retained their original Portuguese signage.

I had been told at my hotel that there was a restaurant nearby, but many restaurants and shops in Pante Macassar did not advertise their presence with signs and I walked right past it. As I wandered around, I surmised that there were few foreign visitors to Pante Macassar, as many people looked at me with surprise; in fact, I did not see another foreigner throughout my short stay. Most people, however, returned my greetings with a friendly smile, and some older men even bowed. I eventually discovered the restaurant and while I was there another diner arrived who told me that he spoke a little English. His name was Leo and he came from Solo in Java, although he grew up in Lampung in Sumatra, and he had been in Pante Macassar for only one week. He then told me that he was a policeman. I wondered then if his arrival in the restaurant while I was there had really been a coincidence.

Leo increased my suspicions by asking me if I was a journalist and had I come to Pante Macassar to meet Bishop Belo, who was by then world-famous. 'How could I come to Oecusse to meet Bishop Belo', I asked, 'isn't he in Dili?' I told Leo I was a tourist and that I planned to visit Lifao, the place where the Portuguese had first landed in Timor. Leo replied that it was very far, and pointing to a motorcycle outside the restaurant, said that it would be easy to get there though using that. Would I like, he asked, to go to Lifao with him? Leo seemed quite friendly and I thought it would be silly to refuse the offer, so I agreed. Then we both stood by the motorcycle and invited each other to get on first. He thought the motorcycle was mine and I thought it was his! After we realised what had happened, Leo said not to worry, as he could borrow another motorcycle.

We then went together to the police station, where I spoke briefly to another policeman, I Dewa Gede from Bali, and then got on the back of the motorcycle that Leo had borrowed. Along the way to Lifao, Leo pointed out to me the *Proyek Rumah Sangat Sederhana* (Very Simple House Project). Those buildings certainly lived up to their name; they were very small, all in a row and very shoddily built. I could not imagine why anyone would want to live there, but the proposed occupants might not have been going there by choice, as resettlement in order to remove people from areas controlled by the resistance or to compel them to undertake certain agricultural activities was a consistent policy throughout the Indonesian occupation (for one study, see Thu 2008).

Many Catholic pilgrims visited Lifao, as it was the place where the Timorese first learnt about the 'true religion'. At the site there was a small monument and I was again surprised to see that the legend on it was written in Portuguese, even though it appeared to be relatively new. I was also surprised to see a sign written in Indonesian stating *Dilarang dansa di atas tugu* (It is forbidden to dance on the monument). I asked the guard at the site about the sign and he explained that previously the local youth used to gather and dance on the monument. When I was there I witnessed no dancing, but I did see local fishermen bring some of their recent catch and hang it on the monument. Perhaps later visitors were greeted with the sign 'It is forbidden to hang fish on the monument'.

The following day, 16 November 1997, I heard that Bishop Belo really was coming to Pante Macassar. Police were all over the town and it was a total contrast to the day before. I was assured that having so many police in town was very unusual. Bishop Belo was coming for a pastoral visit, travelling in an army helicopter, which I saw flying over the town. I decided that it was probably wise to stay away from

the bishop and not attract the attention of the police, so instead I went to visit Fatusuba, an old garrison and prison built on top of a hill behind the town. I was surprised when I reached the top of the hill to find the Balinese policeman I had met the day before and his Rotenese senior, although it made perfect sense for police to be stationed at such a vantage point during the bishop's visit. After a quick look around and a short chat with the policemen, I made my way back down.

Later that day, when I was sitting in a restaurant, a woman arrived who handed another diner a weaving (called *tais* in Tetun) containing the legend *Kenang-Kenangan Timor Timur* (Souvenir of East Timor), for which he gave her a sum of money. Such weavings, I was told, were commonly purchased by Indonesian officials from elsewhere in the archipelago when they had completed their time in the territory.

On my last day in Pante Macassar, I met a local schoolteacher, Karolus Taut, who told me some history of the traditional kingdoms in the region. He also told me that during the Second World War, five Australian paratroopers landed near Maquelab, about twenty kilometres west of Pante Macassar, and were said to have killed over forty Japanese before they were caught. Further to the west again were the remains of an Australian warplane that had been shot down.

The next day I visited the Tono market, held each Tuesday on the banks of the vast River Tono. I had gone past the site when travelling to Pante Macassar from West Timor. A large bridge had been built over the river about two years before allowing for a connection all year round, but when the river was dry, as it was when I visited, most vehicles drove straight across the dry river bed. When I arrived at the market I found that many people had set up camp in the riverbed and it was being used as a general parking lot. The market itself was set up under some huge and obviously ancient trees.

The market was large and busy and people had come from far and wide to be there, some arriving on horseback. I found that many people at the market had no Indonesian, but there was usually somebody nearby willing to interpret if necessary. Locally distilled spirits, known as *sopi* or *tua sabu*, was abundant and openly on sale, with many men taking advantage of this to sit and drink with their friends. This was vastly different to West Timor or anywhere else I had been to in Indonesia, where locally distilled spirits were sold clandestinely, if at all. I was told that it was government policy to not disturb what was considered a local custom. People I later told this to in West Timor were amazed, as the police there regularly arrested people for making or selling alcohol.

One stall was unique, selling photocopied patterns used for making *tais*. I decided to purchase one as a souvenir, but when the seller told me the price, he was immediately challenged by one of his neighbours, who insisted that I be charged the right price. I was then told a new price; half of the original request. That pattern spent several years pinned to the wall of my office. One day, one of the cleaners at my university told me that she was from Timor-Leste and that she wished for one of her relatives to weave a *tais* including that pattern, so I made her a copy. It was pleasing that the souvenir I had bought all those years before was finally put to the use for which it had been made. Unfortunately, the cleaner left our university not long afterwards and I never saw the finished *tais*.

I left Tono market on the afternoon of 18 November, heading for West Timor. I did not visit Timor-Leste again until November 2003, went I travelled with my partner to Dili. By then the country was free, and although it was obvious that much work still needed to be done, there was a far more positive atmosphere than in 1991. Since then, many stories from Indonesian-occupied Timor-Leste have been revealed, including those from specifically Timorese sources, such as Irena Cristalis and Catherine Scott (2005), Jude Conway (2010) and the Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR 2005). The accounts recorded in those collections add to earlier ones, such as Michelle Turner (1992) and Rebecca Winters (1999). Such stories have been of growing interest to researchers trying to untangle the complex inter-relations of the past, present and the future in post-conflict societies. How do conditions of the present shape representations of the past? When is the past 'over' and what influence does it have on the prospects for a peaceful future? Many more questions could be asked about the role of memory and narratives, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this paper (for more on those investigating the subject see, for example, University of Brighton 2013 and Kingston University 2013). In the meantime, it can be said of the present paper that it reveals that I witnessed nothing

momentous during my two visits, but hopefully some of what I have described here can still be of use to those researching the history of those times.

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SESIM: Linking science and mathematics education to students' reality[1]

Curt Gabrielson[2] and Jacinta Barreto[3]

Introduction

Current levels of achievement in science and mathematics in Timor-Leste are extremely low due to various challenges. For four years the Center for the Study of Science and Mathematics, SESIM, has been developing practical teaching activities for science and mathematics at all levels. These activities are created with the goal of supplementing and enriching existing curriculum, and require very few specialty materials beyond what is available in homes and nature. The activities are linked tightly to both the official curriculum and the experience of students and their communities, and whenever possible make use of elements of local culture. By making these links, many educational advantages may be gained, including higher levels of interest, higher levels of achievement, better understanding of the uses of science and mathematics, and increased respect by students for their culture. Currently SESIM is carrying out widespread trainings and gathering data on the effectiveness of this pedagogy.

Today in Timor-Leste many under-qualified teachers continue to teach. Teachers and most current education leaders possess limited experience in education leadership, professional development, and administration (Timor-Leste Ministry of Education 2010). Timor-Leste's population is rising quickly, which puts additional pressure on its education system (Saikia et al 2011).

Despite the lack of sufficient preparation by most science and mathematics teachers, nearly all of them will report the absolute necessity of teaching with "pratika," that is, hands-on methods allowing personal exploration, observation and discovery. In the same breath, they'll confess their inability to carry out this sort of instruction due to a long list of challenges: lack of laboratory or materials, lack of training, lack of time in the curriculum, and lack of support from administrators, among others. The author has encountered few science and mathematics teachers who do any sort of "pratika" on a regular basis.

In addition, often after teachers have been presented with training and teaching materials to facilitate teaching with "pratika," they'll return and carry out a related teaching activity, but fall back on familiar lecture-and-listen techniques and fail to offer the key elements of the instructional experience to their students, for example, waving a single demonstration in front of the class instead of setting up each group to be personally involved. This lack of understanding or ownership of a new pedagogy, even when "mandated" by the Ministry, and carrying forth the symbols of the technique without the substance, is a broader problem seen in various areas of education in Timor-Leste (Shah 2011; Quinn & Shah 2013).

How does a country create a strong, coherent national science and mathematics curriculum and teacher development program and continue to grow its educational capacity in this area, given limited resources, expertise, and infrastructure? It is in this broader political, cultural, geographic context that the first set of learning prototypes, science teaching resources, and instructional design principles were developed.

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[1] Sections of this paper appeared as 'Design principles for creating locally-rooted national science and mathematics curricula in Timor-Leste' in *Science Education International,* Vol.23, No.3, September 2012, pp. 205-220.
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Framework and design principles for educational development

In 2009, around sixty local students from the national university, eight teachers and the author, an international consultant and science educator, created a multimedia Encyclopaedia of 83 science and mathematics topics from the daily life and experience of the Timorese. This multimedia Encyclopaedia included reference information (e.g., activity instructions, background science, explanations) and short videos of simple hands-on activities that teachers could carry out in schools using locally found materials to illuminate these topics. For example, marbles are an ever-present artefact used to play different games among children in Timor. One teaching video shows two teachers carrying out a simple energy and momentum experiment by dropping various marbles and measuring the rebound height with a meter stick placed against the classroom wall. This simple quantitative physics experiment helped to make visible the physics behind the game.

Taken as a whole, the Encyclopaedia was designed to provide a starting point for the development of new curricula as well as serve as a teacher's reference resource. The Encyclopaedia served also as a tool for teacher development through a process of participatory design (Schuler & Namioka, 1993). Different stakeholders create together to ensure the work results in a usable end product that is responsive to cultural, emotional, and practical needs. Viewed from a learning and development perspective, the multimedia Encyclopaedia provided a shared focal point and a jointly created artefact to support collaborative knowledge building among members to build a learning community[4]. Knowledge building draws on the collective intelligence of a group engaged in investigating, theorizing, critiquing, making, reflecting, and revising in order to progressively advance a community's shared theories, knowledge, and practices (Scardalalia & Bereiter 1994). Using this design partnership approach to curriculum development, the teachers were more likely to both give recognition and take ownership (and pride) in the lessons developed in the resulting knowledge resource.

As the lead science educator, the author took the role of a facilitator to model the process of inventing activities and bring focus to local topics with high potential for the Encyclopaedia. While he did most of the writing for the Encyclopaedia, the students themselves conceived, developed and tested the activities. The Timorese teachers edited both the content and presentation of materials. The result has been quite popular, with a vast majority of positive evaluations for all trainings carried out using the Encyclopaedia as a resource.

A common tendency when creating national educational resources is to assume a deficit model and consequently impose fully published science and math curricula from another nation that has been found to promote achievement. Here, intellectual resources viewed as "funds of knowledge" (Moll & González, 2004) from the Timorese were used to promote learning and engagement. The collective Timorese experience served as the context for generating the activities in the Encyclopaedia. The Timorese brought knowledge from their craft skills, common observation of earth and life systems, and every-day practices centred on work and the improvement of life through greater understanding of the world around themselves.

Common questions were often related to engineering a design that required learning and applying knowledge of mathematics and science to solve community-oriented and culturally relevant problems. The driving questions were timeless ones from real life, such as, "How can we farm more productively?", "How can I make a traditional gun to shoot birds more effectively?", "How might we weave a beautiful new rice dumpling katupa for the feast?", and "How can my family make a house using the materials that we already have here?" The contents of the Encyclopaedia are based on these kinds of questions as well as the philosophy that people from any locale learn and do, and have done science and mathematics naturally through their own experiences since time immemorial (George and Lubben 2002).

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[4] While not a curriculum per se, the Encyclopaedia was distributed to Timor's teachers, and in the following year, SESIM provided training for a group of pre-secondary and secondary teachers on how to use the Encyclopaedia to teach experiential, locally based lessons.

Scientific inquiry skills may serve as a useful instructional tool for formal science education to pose investigable questions, propose multiple alternative explanations, and collect data to verify and support one's conclusions (NSF 1999). In contrast to using magic or religion, science and mathematical reasoning through a process of guided inquiry often leads Timorese to useful effective, repeatable results. This kind of reasoning can be readily found in the development of traditional agriculture techniques, architecture, hunting and fishing methods, and the making of many indigenous health remedies. Thus, when students can be led down the same paths their ancestors trod to discover for themselves how their world works, the result is a powerfully motivating and engaging set of activities that can be included in a national curriculum. This stance on science learning is consistent with learning and development viewed as cultural processes that embrace and use community-derived knowledge as an asset to learning academic science content (Bang & Medin 2010; Nasir et al. 2006; Rogoff 2003).

During the process of creating this Encyclopaedia, the teachers formalized their meetings to form a group called SESIM, an acronym from Tetum, Timor's lingua franca, for "Centre for the Study of Science and Mathematics." SESIM's mission is to promote and improve science and mathematics education in Timor. Since the launch of the Encyclopaedia in late 2009, SESIM has continued to develop and write new topics for a second volume, while carrying out periodic trainings of teachers and students, and attempting to find an institutional home for itself within Timor's educational establishment. Trainings have received overwhelmingly positive feedback from teacher participants; a common response is that never have they participated in such relevant and useful training, and that they want it continued (SESIM 2010 – 2013).

Example activities

In the table below, three activities from the Encyclopaedia are details, showing how the core principles are articulated within each topic and how they were derived from the key design principles: locally rooted, experiential, and locally sustainable. These three principles illustrate how a community-designed curriculum approach can produce both robust curricula and culturally relevant learning environments for both learners and teachers.

Activity Name	Description	Materials Used	Disciplines + Topics, Big Ideas	Principle #1 Locally Rooted	Principle #2 Experiential	Principle #3 Locally Sustainable
Chicken foot and **Arm model**	A chicken's foot is dissected; muscles, bones, ligaments and tendons are identified and explored. An anatomically correct model of the human arm is built.	Chicken feet, razor blades, kabob sticks, rubber bands, string and tape	**Biology**: anatomy, kinesiology, structure and function of muscles, bones, joints **Physics**: force and motion, simple machines, levers	Most Timorese own chickens, familiar with body structure. Feet are easily accessible, as are materials for constructing model.	Each small group will touch the chicken foot, pull on the tendon, witness the resulting movement. Each will construct a model that behaves like their own arm, then examine their arm.	Activity is easily possible for every student in Timor. Extremely low cost.
Basketry with rhombus weave	Various types of baskets that employ the 60°/30° rhombus weave are analyzed. Simple	Common baskets from students' homes, pencils, palm leaves	**Mathematics**: geometry, angles, shapes, patterns, transformations, area and volume, factors and	All families in Timor have and use these baskets on a daily basis. Most families have members that can weave	Baskets are in hands being scrutinized for mathematics. Each student personally uncovers submerged	Basket materials are available for free from the jungle; students can each bring baskets to

	versions are weaved.		factorization, size and scale	them, most often women elders, usually without formal education.	mathematical concepts with guidance by teacher. Many major concepts from canon are discovered, observed.	school for analysis. Ongoing investigation is easily facilitated.
Leaf tensile testing	Four types of palm leaves are tested for tensile strength using simple gravitational arrangement.	Palm leaves, cargo basket from students' homes, water bottles, rocks,	**Engineering and Physics**: data taking, data analysis force, gravity, tension, density, weight and mass, **Biology**: structure of plants and plant tissue, cells, moisture content,	Name of one of these palms is synonymous with "string;" its leaves are routinely used for tying things such as animals and roofing. The strength of this palm leaf is well-known, so to make a methodical test to compare the strength of the others is illuminating.	"Common knowledge" (hypothesis) is put to the test with the scientific method in front of all to witness. Hard data is taken in the course of a legitimate, student-conducted experiment.	Lab activity is completely cost free. No special, foreign materials are necessary. Even weight can be calculated by measuring volume of water if a scale is not available.

Pedagogical design principles

The three example activities presented here from the Encyclopaedia embody key design principles that the SESIM partnership used to teach science and mathematics concepts grounded in local traditions, familiar objects, and everyday inquiry practices resulting in the development of rich science and mathematics curricular materials especially rooted in non-Western traditions. These principles also inform SESIM's other activities, such as teacher development and teacher mentoring. Here they are explained in detail:

Design Principle #1: Content, examples and activities must be locally rooted

In a community that continues to strive to feed and rebuild itself, students and their families can be understood to have little patience for learning abstractions, theories, and "inert knowledge" (Whitehead 1929). The concepts focused upon in instruction needed to be both pertinent and relevant to life in Timor, socially, culturally and economically. The concepts we chose for elaboration are based on Timorese experiences, daily, common practices and objects such as those found in cooking or toys or special noteworthy events (e.g., lightning, drought, and earthquakes). All scientific phenomena that can actually be observed at school or in the immediate surroundings of the school are given priority since teachers can accompany students in the process of inquiry. Scientific inquiry is offered as an addition to a repertoire of approaches to understand and explain one's surroundings with care not to discredit existing tools or ways of knowing. In this way, students can then begin to find value in scientific inquiry, which is important for longer-term engagement in science and mathematics.

The design principle of being locally rooted also refers to collective knowledge held by the elders in the community who possess culturally relevant knowledge and practices from their ancestors. Concepts of science and mathematics found within traditional activities or artefacts are given great value at the same time respect and recognition is given to elders and ancestors. Unlike Western science teaching standards in industrialized nations that are more top-down, requiring instruction to cover topics and standards

established by states, these curriculum elements are being derived from the ground up, using local examples, materials, and practices to teach key scientific concepts and ideas found in the disciplines. In this approach, similar to the practices followed in the African Primary School Program, teachers learn by doing while taking ownership and pride over the activities and curricula. Individual teachers direct the design, fitting, and adaptation of activities for local circumstances (Carlisle 1973; Duckworth 1978).

Design Principle #2: Content must be presented in an experiential and observable manner

Learning from direct experiences is important to allow students to witness, observe and describe concepts based on their own interactions and firsthand knowledge of a shared experience with others in the community. This is especially important when designing activities for groups that possess inaccurate conceptions of science including ancestral or indigenous beliefs such as explanations for what causes illnesses, rainbows and changes in weather. Thus, teaching, discussion and concepts to be learned are grounded and based on observable phenomena or linked to real examples common to students. This will help bridge the worldview of students to that of Western science (see Bang & Medin, 2010), and allow access to the knowledge and techniques of science by constructivist means. Students' questions, sometimes around existing beliefs, are given recognition in discussion, recorded and addressed to the extent possible, even if no satisfying answer can be achieved. The teacher conveys no information verbally if students can make the discovery personally. Complete honesty is the rule in discussing what can and can't be observed or proved, and what information needs to be taken on faith from the textbook. Students use authentic scientific methods in investigating phenomena whenever possible.

Design Principle #3: Curricula, teaching techniques, training plans, and teaching materials must all be made locally accessible and sustainable for the long-term future

To avoid the waste of developing a curriculum that is out of reach, inappropriate, or irrelevant to the local community, the third design principle espouses the idea that all instructional frameworks and materials are created and authored in partnership with teachers using firmly achievable strategies and locally accessible materials if at all possible. This allows the curriculum to be more sustainable economically and less reliant on external sources for specialty equipment, tools, and materials. If necessary, imported materials are to be strictly supplemental. If local teachers create and adapt their own lessons, there is a stronger likelihood that they will be valued, used, and adopted by other local teachers. A goal is to have locally created texts, guides and references, while still addressing key concepts and topics that form a recognized coherence in engineering and science curricula internationally. Sustainability as a design principle addresses concurrently the environmental sustainability of the materials used, as well as the economic sustainability of materials acquisition, available non-monetary resources, and the willingness of the community to contribute resources to education.

Teaching strategies and professional development of teachers

Most teachers in Timor today limit their practice to one-way lecturing, and demonstration of learning is shown on written tests of memorization and recall, which stand as the gatekeepers to pursuing higher education. As Quinn notes in her 2009 work, "Evident in all settings observed was the high proportion of teacher talk in contrast to student talk… it was rare to observe students using more than one word/one noun answers" (Quinn 2009). The opportunities within schools for group discussions and practicum experiences based on real, inquiry-based knowledge construction are few and far between.

To affect change in this challenging area, during trainings SESIM utilizes participatory, active-learning, student-centred pedagogic principles. For example, students (and teachers in teacher trainings) work together in groups, share common tools, discuss findings and communicate with their teacher, instead

of receiving a lecture. In line with the approach taken by the Exploratorium's Teacher Institute[5], each teacher is given many opportunities to learn using the methods described here so as to have personal experience in addition to the theoretical knowledge (Bezin & Tamez 2002). Teachers get considerable support in understanding the basics of these principles with many examples to reflect upon. Such methods are more common in Western schooling, but often brand new in Timor. This is a significant challenge for trainer and teacher alike, and a risk exists of teachers taking away only superficial understanding of the deeper pedagogy (Quinn & Shah 2013). Though there is yet no empirical data available on the effectiveness of these initial efforts, all indications are positive: teachers are excited about using these methods, and they are popular among students. SESIM and the authors welcome further research and foresee favourable data in the future.

Discussion, conclusions and implications for science education

From the three examples and design principles, we have provided an introduction to a participatory, experiential approach to developing science and mathematics curriculum elements and carrying out teacher training emerging from a group of dedicated teachers in Timor-Leste. Local teachers with the help of a Western-trained science teacher developed and instructed with activities that made use of local expertise, folk knowledge, and readily accessible local resources.

This work relied heavily on an inquiry-based, learning-by-doing-together approach to develop curricula elements as well as teach students and train teachers. This pedagogical approach is also consistent with collaborative knowledge building, and is necessarily grounded in everyday practices, truth-seeking, and forming systems of rationality, giving students the basic tools to conduct their own investigations and pose investigable questions in experimentation and dialogue with others. All students regardless of prior formal schooling possess knowledge of the natural world as well as a set of guiding beliefs (diSessa 1988; Hammer 1996). The students and teachers in Timor-Leste are no different.

SESIM's approach to creating more contextualized education and the idea that science learning should be more closely tied to students' existing knowledge and experiences is not a new concept, but is often forgotten in modern science education, especially in the remote, resource-limited communities that could make the best use of it. Our design principles offer some starting points and guidelines for supporting the design of culturally relevant curricula and inquiry-based instructional practices.

Culturally relevant curriculum is just one aspect of providing a contextually relevant education, which is much needed in a rapidly evolving nation. Organizing and establishing professional development to ensure teacher quality is also a necessary part of this evolving education system to establish an important foundation through means of an accepted certification process (Earnest, 2003). From our experiences, the design-based approach we have been using with great success addresses concurrently the development of teachers and the development of a meaningful curriculum that can they can implement. Future studies that make use of design-based research approaches as well as examine issues related to local context and practices can be helpful to refine locally valuable innovations while also developing more globally usable knowledge for the field (DBRC, 2003; Sandoval & Bell, 2004).

In summary, Timor-Leste offers a unique contextually rich environment to conduct cross-cultural studies to further explore the localized context for science and mathematics curricula, teacher development, contrasting and converging views of Western science and worldview of students. Our work so far has simply generated working design principles for education development at the local and regional levels. We are optimistic that this approach and these design principles can have a national impact when a participatory development approach is taken as a first step to engaging all stakeholders.

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[5] Exploratorium Teacher Institute - the professional development home for middle-and high-school science teachers since 1984, where the first author apprenticed and has taught others since 1992.
http://www.exploratorium.edu/teacher_institute/

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Timor-Leste: The political economy of a Rentier State

Guteriano Nicolau Soares Neves[1]

Introduction

Since 2005, Timor-Leste's state has received multi-billion dollars from Petroleum Revenues. These revenues, on one side, enable the state to expand its programs by financing million-dollar infrastructure projects, social services, subsidizing veterans and elderly, and have expanded the state's bureaucracy over the last five years. On the other side, it turns Timor-Leste into a Rentier State, confirmed by various quantitative data and qualitative analyses. The argument that Timor-Leste is a Rentier State is based on various characteristics, namely the independence of the state *vis-a-vis* the domestic economy, the composition of GDP, the proportion of public expenditure as domestic economy, the employment structure, and Dutch Disease. Due to this, it shapes the economic structure in its own unique way, and the characteristics in which the state and society interact. This paper discusses some of the current economic policies and some of its impacts.

Conceptual framework

The concept of a Rentier State is frequently used to explain various issues in countries where rent plays dominant roles in their domestic economy. Hossein Mahdavy (1970, 428) is considered the pioneer of this theory when he used it to explain the socio-political and socio-economic development in many Middle Eastern countries that received a high amount of money from exploring oil and gas (Mahdavy 1970, 428). He defined a Rentier State as a country that receives a substantial amount of external rents from foreign individuals or foreign government to a given country. Some scholars measure a Rentier State based on the proportion of natural resources rents against the total government revenue (Karl 2004, 661). This term primarily applies to oil. However later on, it has also been applied to externally generated revenues such as remittance, or renting assets to foreign entities. For the last thirty years, many academics have used the Rentier State concept to explain the socio-political and socio-economic dynamic in many developing countries; in Iran (Mahdavy 1970), in Arab Saudi (Hertog 2012), in Gulf States (Gray 2011), in Central Asia (Gawrich, et al 2010), and in Africa (Gray 2010).

As a political and economic concept, the most important feature of a Rentier State is that it explicates the relationship between state and the society. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (1987) wrote that:

> A rentier or exoteric state will inevitably end up performing the role of allocating the income that it receives from the rest of the world. It is free to do so in variety of ways.... As long as the domestic economy is not tapped to raise further income through domestic taxation, strengthening of the domestic economy is not reflected in the income of the state, and is therefore not a precondition for the existence and expansion of the state...

Historically, looking at the economy of Middle Eastern countries, the period of 1951-1956 is seen as the landmark since a massive amount of foreign currency and credit generated from petroleum revenues came into the state's coffers, thus, turning some oil-producing countries into Rentier States (Yates 1996 12). This revenue then enabled the Middle Eastern states to expand their state services rapidly (Mahdavy 1970, 432).

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As it expands, it turned states into 'estatism.' By this, the state assumes power to direct the economy and to manage the overall economy, and control means of production. Politically and historically, 'Estatism' facilitates newly independent states at that time to foster their legitimacy, and the state's presence in the society through various means (Kemrava 2005, 258).

Although the manifestation of Rentier States different from one country to another there are some common phenomena, which are important in the context of Timor-Leste. Economically, the revenue that the state receives from the oil sector is independent from the domestic economy (Mahdavy 1970, 429). Based on the data that Mahdavy derived on the economy of the Middle Eastern countries during the 1950s, he noted that the inputs from the local economy to the oil industry was very small, therefore the oil revenues was the same as a free gift (Mahdavy 1970, 429). Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon from the University of Washington put it nicely: 'Rents are typically generated from the exploitation of natural resources, not from production (labor), investment (interest), or management of risk (profit).' In this context, the relationship between the local economy and the state is rather than interdependent, it is the domestic economy that depends on the public expenditure.

The second impact is Dutch Disease. Dutch Disease originates from a booming resource sector, which leads to a contraction of the manufacturing sector via loss of competitiveness, due to currency appreciation (Butler, et all 1980). The way that Dutch Disease manifests in developing countries is different. The revenues from oil push inflation make it harder for the country to develop a non-oil economy. As such, Import-Substitution Industry is difficult and imported goods and services become more attractive. Despite manufacturing losing its competitiveness, the agriculture sector is also underfinanced; this drives people to move to urban areas. Nigeria is one of many examples. The massive revenues from exporting oil drove the country's currency to appreciate. Such appreciation caused imports to become cheaper. Later on, it disincentives investment in productive sectors, such as agriculture and non-oil industries (Lewis 1994).

The third factor is the characteristics of the state. According to many researchers, the government in Rentier States tends to spend only, since they generate their revenues from external sources (Bosch 2012, 4). Mathew Gray (2011, 8) observed that the government in a Rentier State has limited interest to support, to sustain, and to diversify the non-rent domestic economy when the rents grow. Hence, Beblawi and Luciani noted that the state becomes the main intermediary between the oil sector and the rest of economy, by channelling it through public expenditure (Bosch 2012, 5). In a way, the state's role is to allocate the rents to the domestic economy (Brocard & Vallet ny; Basedau ad Lay, 5,).

Fourthly, since state's revenue is high, it enables the government to embark upon large public expenditure, without any balance of payment deficit or the government has to tax its citizens. This is done through expanding the state bureaucracy, state-run social services, the expansion of public sector employment, and state-funded infrastructure programs. As the public sector expands rapidly, the public sector becomes very dominant and other sectors are dependent on the expenditure from the public sector. In addition, in terms of the public employment structure, the public sector tends to employ more people and becomes more attractive. In Arab Saudi, when the second oil peaked arrived by the late 1970s, the oil and the public sector accounted for 65% of Saudi's economic activity and the government drove 63% of total investment in physical assets (Hertog 2012). At the same time, the state expenditure increased consistently and public services, such as electricity, generation, water and sanitation, and roads, expanded rapidly (Hertog 2012). This strategy also has some political motivations, which are to buy off opposition groups, to keep everyone happy with the regime, and finally, to stay in the power.

Finally, it is argued that in a state where the government generates most of its revenues from external sources, it disincentives the state to extract tax from the domestic economy. However, from political, sociological, and economic points of view, taxes have an important role to play in nation-state building, state-capacity, society-state relations, and the quality of the institutions. One clear argument is that the ability to tax citizens indicates the state capacity. This argument is suggested by Christopher Hood (2003, 213), the "ability to tax is central to state capacity as ordinarily conceived, since state that cannot levy effective taxes will have only limited capacity to do anything else." The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) in its Policy Brief (2008) underlines the correlation between tax, state building, and the capacity of the government. In its Policy Brief, it argued that taxation helps state building, since

state building involves: the government's capacity to interact with the society, obtain support and resources from those interests, and pursuing public goals. It identified three ways in which taxation promotes state-building: providing revenues which key state functions cannot be carried out; encouraging constructive state-society relations around taxes; and creating more effective tax administration.

Timor's context of Rentier State

Various statistics prove that Timor-Leste is a "Rentier State." In term of the total GDP, according to the National Account (2000-2011), since 2005, the Petroleum Sector has taken over non-oil in terms of proportion to Timor's GDP. In 2011 alone, 76.9% of the GDP came from the Petroleum Sector. In term of the state's revenues, in 2012 96% of the state's revenues was from Petroleum, and in 2013 94% of the state's revenues was from Petroleum (MoF 2013). In term of Public expenditure, in 2010, 2011, and 2013, domestic revenues contributed 12.7%, 10.18% and 11.5% respectively, which means that the rest was from the Petroleum Fund Account (MoF 2013). While more than 95% of the state's revenues are from oil, the oil industry is independent from the domestic economy. Another way of looking Timor as a Rentier State is to compare the percentage of the state's annual expenditure as the non-oil GDP. In 2011, 2012, and 2013, public expenditure was 97.2%, 88.72 and 107.3% respectively of non-oil GDP in every given year.

As far as linkage between the oil industry and the rest of economy, the oil industry is independent from the rest of the economy. Oil processing takes place in the Northern Territory of Darwin, and Timor-Leste's government only receives profit and tax revenues, which is transferred to the Petroleum Fund Account. The proportion of public expenditure compared to the domestic economy provides a strong foundation for this. In this circumstance, it is valid to argue that by looking from a fiscal point of view, the state in Timor-Leste is independent from the domestic economy. Although every year, the state suffers non-oil fiscal deficit more than one billion dollars during the last three years, the state still functions due to rents from petroleum revenues. During the last three years, Timor-Leste experienced more than one billion dollars in non-oil fiscal deficit. However, this has been closed by the transfers from Petroleum Fund. For the next five years, based on the current projection, there will not be any structural changes.

This situation shapes the role of the state in a society in a certain ways, by which it allocates the rent resources from petroleum to the rest of the economy. This is reflected in the government's economy policy to inject capital into the market. While the economic rationale behind this policy is to create demand, on the other hand, the state becomes allocative. There are many measures in which the state allocates its resources. One important measure is the establishment of several autonomous agencies and public-owned enterprises, such as EDTL, SAMES, IGE, Centru Bamboo, RTTL, and Timor Gap. Although in theory these institutions are autonomous, they are heavily subsidized by the state. In this context, these institutions serve to allocate resources to the domestic economy.

Another measure is through public transfers expenditure. This item consists of various subsidies, such as elderly subsidy, veterans' subsidy, subsidy to civil society, subsidy to the village, subsidy to local business, etc. This item increases every year, and is projected to continue increase in the future. In 2011, 2012, and 2013, the government spent $142.6 million, $233.7 million, and $239 million respectively. In term of proportionality, this accounts for 12.6%, 17.3% and 15.5% respectively. Compare to the other countries in the region, or other fragile states, this is considerably high (World Bank 2013, 41).

Another characteristic of the Rentier State in Timor-Leste is inflation, which is a manifestation of Dutch Disease. Since Timor-Leste does not have an independent monetary policy, the manifestation of Dutch Disease in evident in the fiscal policy. Since 2008, the government embarked a large public expenditure to finance an infrastructure program's recurrent expenditure. Expansionary fiscal policy contributes to inflation in Timor-Leste that has been higher than 10% on an annual basis for the last three four years (IMF 2012). The Ministry of Finance also acknowledges the impact of the government's policy as well, in its analysis on inflation in Timor. This inflation, in turn, hinders incentives for the domestic market to produce. Subsidy in itself is a form of social welfare, which is important in a country like Timor-Leste. However, if it is not strategically designed, it will stimulate consumption and disincentive people to produce.

Rentierism and the State's expansion

Timor-Leste's government's macroeconomic policy has been to inject capital into the domestic market. The main assumption is that by injecting capital into the domestic economy, it will stimulate the demand for goods and services, and the supply side will respond to domestic market's demand (Book 1 of State Budget 2012, 23). Capital is injected into the market through wage and salary, personal benefit to the elders and veterans, small-scale projects such as PDD and PDL, as well as certain amount of goods and services. This has contributed to the current GDP growth rate. In doing so, the government has increased its annual budget significantly from 2008 to 2012. By 2013, the state proposed budget has already reached $1.8 billion, compared to $200 million in 2007. Such an increase makes Timor-Leste one of world leaders in terms of budget increase.

One area of the state's expansion is the bureaucracy. Beside various ministries and secretary of state, various commissions including the Anti Corruption Commission, the Public Service Commission, the National Election Commission, the National Development Agency, the National Ombudsman, and others were established. Some of these institutions were created as part of "Administrative Reform" that fell under the Gusmao-led government. There are also various autonomous agencies and public enterprises namely: Electrisidade de Timor-Leste, Institute Gestaun Ekipametu, Portu, Sames, and Aviasaun. State owned enterprises or Emprezariu Públiku include Timor Gap, and Radio Televizaun Timor-Leste. Theoretically these institutions are self-funded and enjoy autonomy from the government; however, they are still heavily subsidized by the state.

Another sector is the infrastructure sector. This is one of key issues in Timor-Leste because poor quality of infrastructure is seen as the main constraint for the private investment and overall economic development in Timor-Leste (IMF 2012, 4). During the last five years under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao, physical infrastructure, including roads, public buildings, and electricity became the core program for the government. In 2008, the government's direct spending on infrastructure, as indicated by the Capital Development items, was still $86.5 million or 17% of the total annual budget at that year (RDTL State Budget 2012, 17). By 2012, it reached $915.3 million, or without inflation, it increased 775% (RDTL State Budget 2012, 17). The government is more likely to maintain this level of expenditure on infrastructure, as it is one of the government's top priorities as lay down by the Strategic Development Plan.

Social Services are another critical sector for Timor-Leste, mainly education and health. The expansion of these sectors is critical, given that in the rural areas, these sectors make state's presence visible to the people. Between 2009 and 2013, the government's recurrent expenditure on education increased from 53% from 2009 level (RDTL; State Budget 2013). The government's expenditure on health during the same period increased 115% from the 2009 level (RDTL; State Budget 2013). In addition to health and education, the government has various forms of subsidies: the elders' subsidy and the veterans' subsidy are the most famous ones. In 2009, the annual budget allocation to this sector was $31 million. However by 2012, the government's allocation to the personal benefit payment reached $109 million, or increased more than 240% in four years. In term of its contribution to the GDP, according to the National Account report, in 2011 government expenditure on public administration, which covers education, health, and defence, increased by 25% compared to the previous year. Outside of Dili, these services are critical to make the state's presence visible to the population.

The increase of public expenditure and the expansion of the public bureaucracy also have implications for the employment structure in Timor-Leste. The current employment structure bears similarities with other Rentier States, where the formal employment structure directly or indirectly relates to the oil sector. In term of its growth, according to data derived from National Statistics, between 2004 to 2010 people who are engaged in the Public Administration, Administrative Support, Professional and Scientific, Education, Health and Social work increased by 155%. According to data from the government, by the end of 2012 public sector employed around 39,226 people, including PNTL, F-FDTL, Teachers and Nurses and not including advisors and consultants employed in every public institution. As public servants increase, the government's allocation for wage and salary also increases. By 2008, the government's

allocation on wage and salary was $50.3 million and it reached $140 million or increased by 270% by 2012 (RDTL 2012, 17). In 2013, Government expenditure on salary and wages was more than 10% of the projected non-oil GDP. According to the World Bank Report (2011, ii), as the percentage of GDP, Timor-Leste's wage and salary is about 25% to 50% higher than countries such as Fiji, Tonga, and Vanuatu. The expansion of the bureaucracy also has implications for Household Income in Timor-Leste. According to the recent Survey on Household Income, at the national level, 54.4% of household wage income per month comes from the government, or public sector, compared to the private sector, which is 45.6%. Employment in the private sector also directly relates to the public expenditure. According to the Survey on Business Activities, in 2011, 30% out of 58,200 employments in the private sector were under construction, and 80% of them were centralized in Dili. This directly relates to public sector spending as most of the petro dollars are recycled in Dili, and infrastructure has been one of the governments' priorities during the last five years.

The impact of the political economy of Rentier States

It is common in the history of the developing world, especially after colonization, that although the state as an institution is new, it is very powerful and determinant in the transformation of society. In such a situation, the state expands rapidly through various sectors, in which the state intends to make itself visible to the society. In Timor-Leste's case, this is to a certain degree unavoidable because the capacity of the private sector was very weak. What is unique for Timor-Leste as a petroleum-dependent country is that only petroleum revenues enabled this expansion. Therefore, the central argument of this paper is that the state's expansion takes place independent from the domestic economy. Therefore, relations between the state and the domestic economy are not mutually dependent, but it is the domestic economy that depends on the recycling of petro dollars.

It is widely agreed that economic development in Timor-Leste takes place because of public expenditure, which is the recycling of petro dollars. It is arguable to state that the public sector in Timor-Leste functions as the intermediary between petroleum revenues with the domestic economy. It facilitates the distribution of the petro dollars through public expenditure. This shapes the politicians and bureaucrats in the public sector to neglect developing the domestic economy and other productive sectors, as it does not take part in the state's revenues. It shapes the way that policymakers think, which is how to spend money easily, without thinking creatively. In the end, public investment is mainly to spend petro dollars and less investment is given to generate income domestically, and less investment is directed toward long-term return.

The public sector, which is the main driver of economic growth, employs around 3.5% of the population. The agriculture sector, which is still considered to be the main source of livelihood for the people in the rural areas, declined in terms of its contribution to the GDP. Heavily emphasized by infrastructure, aside from the quality of the spending, this also means that the current political economy only satisfies small groups of people in Dili, especially the contractors, whereas the population outside of Dili are not equally benefited. This is confirmed by various reports from the Department of Statistics, where infrastructure grew by 19%. At the same time, in term of employment distribution, 80% of employment in the private sectors is in Dili, whereas twelve districts only share 20%. In this context, it is simple to think that only a small proportion of the population contributed to this growth; therefore, the growth is also not equally distributed.

This economic structure leads to a third implication, which is the relationship between the state and society. A modern state, as defined by Western philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Lock, Jean Jacqueas Rosseau, is a result of the social contract. In a modern world, this contract also implies that the mutual dependence between the state and the domestic economy, and fiscal dependence from the state toward the citizens should exist. In other words, people need to contribute to the state's operations. This mutual dependence does not exist in Timor. The fact is that tax is merely seen as the source of income, tax is the state's instrument to intervene in the market, to distribute resources, to shape the society character's are not reflected in the political economy. Finally as tax is played down, it also implies that the fiscal contract between the state and its citizens are not strong, which later on undermines state-society relations.

The fourth implication of the state's expenditure is inflation in Timor-Leste. Many observers have pointed out that while external factors contribute, current inflation to greater extent is due to massive public expenditure. During the last three years, the increase of the price of basic needs has become one of the main concerns in Timor-Leste. In the last two years, 2011 and 2012, while Timor-Leste experienced "double-digit" economic growth, the inflation rate was even higher. For example, based on a report from the National Directorate of Statistics (2012), in 2012, the rolling year rate of CPI range from 11% up to 17% during the whole year. According to a study conducted by the Asian Development Bank, a 10% rise in food price in Timor-Leste could increase poverty incidence by 2.25% points (cited by the IMF 2012, 9). As such, the IMF (2012; 7) has warned that, "high inflation could push back progress on poverty reduction and lead to real currency appreciation that would hurt private-sector-led growth". In the long run, if the inflation rate continues, this will make it hard for domestically produced goods and services to grow, import substitution will continue to be hard, and there will be an increase in dependency on imported goods and services.

Finally, the question of sustainability of Timor-Leste is an important one. The concept of a Rentier State is used to explain the situation in Middle Eastern countries, where oil dominates the national economy. In the context of Timor-Leste, statistics speak for themselves. However, Middle Eastern countries are rich in natural resources, such as oil and gas. On the other hand Timor-Leste, by any account, does not resemble Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, the question is for how long will petroleum revenues sustain Timor-Leste's economy? A recent article by Charlie Scheiner (2013) gives us some alarming commentary about the risk of Timor's political economy of a Rentier State. Recent revision of the Petroleum Wealth by the Ministry of Finance also confirms what many already stated, where the current oil field that is in production is expected to be depleted four years faster than last year projection.

Conclusion

This article intends to provoke critical and deeper analysis into the impact of the petroleum revenues toward the state-society relations. This article argues that offshore petroleum revenues enable the state to expand through public administration, infrastructure, and social services. This expansion takes place independently from the domestic economy, as the domestic economy contributes less than 10% to the total state's revenues. As such, it shapes the economic structure, and the way in which interactions between society and the state takes place.

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Dengue vectors in a rural area of Timor-Leste: Can small-scale mosquito control have a place in an integrated dengue control program?

Esther Anderson[1]

Introduction

Dengue virus infection is a major health problem in many countries in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific region, including Timor-Leste (WHO 2009; Shepard et al 2013). Dengue is endemic in over 100 countries worldwide, with an estimated 390 million cases/year; of these, an estimated 96 million are moderate to severe (Bhatt et al 2013). Dengue incidence is generally underestimated, as dengue fever may be misdiagnosed if the diagnosis is made on clinical grounds only (Capeding et al 2013) and mild cases may be unreported. Serological tests for dengue are expensive, and, in rural areas of Timor-Leste where resources are limited, diagnosis is likely to be made on the basis of symptoms only. In addition, a proportion of the population may not seek medical advice for a variety of reasons, including travel distance to a health facility, absence of a health practitioner and use of traditional medicines (Deen et al 2013) and in these circumstances, cases of dengue would not be reported. Undurraga et al (2013) devised a model to estimate the burden of dengue in 12 countries in Southeast Asia, including Timor-Leste, based on existing health data but using an expansion factor that took into account under-reporting and misdiagnosis of dengue, and estimated that during the period 2001 to 2010, the average number of people infected with dengue virus was over 6,000 per year.

Dengue is transmitted primarily by *Aedes aegypti*, with *Ae albopictus* considered to be a less important vector (Lambrechts et al 2010). *Ae polynesiensis*, *Ae scutellaris* and *Ae hensilli* are also minor vectors of dengue in the Pacific region (Lambdin et al 2009; Moore et al 2007; Ashford et al 2003). *Ae albopictus* was first recorded in Timor-Leste (then Portuguese Timor) in 1974 (Pinhao 1974), although the exact location was not stated, and *Ae aegypti* was first recorded in Timor-Leste in Dili in 1991, together with *Ae albopictus* (Whelan 1999).

Dengue prevention programs focus on controlling *Aedes* mosquito populations, as at present there is no vaccine for this disease (Chang et al 2011; Lambrechts and Failloux 2012). There are several large-scale population control methods in development, for example, laboratory breeding of adult mosquitoes that carry a dominant lethal gene, then release of these *en masse* to compete with non-modified adults. Specific lethal genes include those resulting in flightless female offspring, sterility in males and failure to develop (Lacroix et al 2012). Another method is mass release of male mosquitoes that have been sterilized by radiation (Wise de Valdez et al 2011) or mosquitoes infected with a strain of the bacteria *Wolbachia* that suppresses transmission of dengue virus (Hoffmann et al 2011). However, it is not known when these large-scale methods may be widely applied in Timor-Leste, there are some disadvantages in their use, and efficacy is not guaranteed. For example, experimental releases of sterilised males of the malaria vector *Anopheles albimanus* in a small breeding population in El Salvador successfully eliminated *An albimanus,* but releases of sterilised males in larger scale experiments in the USA failed to control either *Ae aegypti* or *An quadrimaculatus*. Factors that affected efficacy included the low ability of laboratory-bred mosquitoes to compete with wild mosquitoes and the movement of fertilized females into the release zones (Dame et al 2009; Fanchinelli et al 2003).

Spraying adulticide or larvicide over large areas as fog/aerosol mist by plane, helicopter or land vehicle is commonly used to control *Aedes* mosquitoes (WHO 2009). Chemicals used are mainly pyrethroids or organophosphates. *Bacillus thuringiensis israelensis (Bti)* a bacterium that kills mosquito

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larvae may also be sprayed or misted onto larval habitats (Tan et al 2012; Jacups et al 2013). These large-scale methods may not be applicable or cost effective in some rural areas of Timor-Leste because of lack of vehicle access and difficulty of covering all larval habitats. Resistance to pesticides is also a problem (Tan et al 1999), as is harm to non-target organisms.

Larval control methods that can be implemented at the village level in rural areas include reducing available larval habitats by emptying, screening or covering water-containers (source reduction), adding natural predators or parasites of mosquito larvae to breeding sites (Nam et al 2005; Regis et al 2013; Paily et al 2013), adding larvicides (conventional insecticides, insect growth regulators or chitin synthesis inhibitors or *Bti*) to water containers and placing ovitraps (artificial egg traps) that incorporate a kill mechanism in and adjacent to houses. Each of these methods has disadvantages; for example, it is not usually possible to eliminate all possible breeding sites, the use of predators such as fish or copepods is restricted to relatively large containers that do not dry out, resistance has arisen to commonly-used organophosphate larvicides (e.g. temephos) (Lima et al 2011) and pyrethroids (Marcombe et al 2011a), and insect growth regulators (e.g. pyriproxyfen) and chitin synthesis inhibitors (e.g. novaluron) that kill larvae by interfering with their growth are expensive. The biological larvicide *Bti,* is useful in mosquito control because it kills rapidly and there is no cross-resistance with conventional pesticides. However *Bti* must be frequently replaced in natural breeding sites, especially in polluted habitats (Marcombe et al 2011b) or if there is exposure to direct sunlight (Mahilum et al 2005). The biolarvicide spinosad, may have a greater residual activity (Marcombe et al 2011b). Lethal ovitraps using chemical or biological larvicides as the kill mechanism have the disadvantages mentioned above, and ovitraps that have a mechanical kill mechanism, e.g. a wire mesh screen that stops the emergence of adults, or glue that traps ovipositing females), may become breeding sites for mosquitoes if the kill mechanism fails, and if the ovitraps are not monitored.

Lethal ovitraps have been used in *Aedes* control programs in, for example, Australia, Brazil and Thailand using pyrethroid-impregnated oviposition strips (Rapley et al 2009; Ritchie et al 2010b; Perich et al 2003; Sithiprasasna et al 2003), in Pakistan using *Bti* and insect growth regulators (Jahan et al 2011), in the Philippines using a pepper-based larvicide (Philippine information agency 2012), in Australia using sticky oviposition strips that trap adult females (Rapley et al 2009) and in Singapore, Thailand and the United States using a mesh barrier to trap emerging adults (Chan, 1972; Chan et al 1977; Peace Corps 2012; Lok, 1977; Cheng et al 1982). Attractants, usually plant infusions, may be added to lethal ovitraps (lure and kill strategy) (Reiter et al 1991; Mackay et al 2013). Ovitraps are also widely used in surveillance of Aedes mosquitoes, and the addition of a kill mechanism reduces the risk of surveillance ovitraps becoming breeding sites (Regis et al 2013). Female mosquitoes acquire dengue either by biting an infected person, or by infection at the egg stage (as infected females can transmit the virus to their eggs), so the number of mosquitoes capable of transmitting dengue can be reduced by ovitraps, as they remove the eggs of infected females who choose ovitraps as oviposition sites, i.e. the ovitraps act as 'egg sinks'.

Although there have been some published surveys of the mosquitoes of various areas of Timor-Leste (Pinhao 1974; Whelan, 1999; Whelan and Petitt 2005; Cooper 2010) to date there has been little, if any, published data from Manufahi. In this study, larval surveys were conducted in a small rural community in Same sub-district, Manufahi District over 3 years with the aim of detecting the presence of the dengue vectors *Ae albopictus* and/or *Ae aegypti.* In an area where a dengue vector was detected, two methods of small-scale control were investigated, firstly, the use of copepods native to the area that are natural predators of mosquito larvae, and secondly the use of lethal ovitraps with wire screens to trap emerging adults.

Material and methods

Larval surveys were conducted in a rural area on the outskirts of the town of Same, in the district of Manufahi. The survey area bordered the Welala River, with an elevation ranging from approximately 460m to 600 m, and included forest, land that had been cleared for grazing and agricultural planting, and houses. The surveys were carried out in September 2010, January, July and November 2011, January and July 2012 and January 2013. Larval surveys were also carried out in Maliana in 2010 and 2011.

Natural habitats for container-breeding mosquitoes included tree-holes, rock holes, puddles, tree and bamboo stumps, and broken or gnawed coconut shells. Artificial habitats included containers for washing (mandis), smaller plastic containers for carrying and storing water, splits in bamboo fences, animal drinking troughs, potplant holders, and discarded metal drums, cans, bottles and tyres. Sampling these natural and artificial habitats for container-breeding larval Culicidae was conducted using a mosquito dipper for large containers, and by emptying small portable containers such as coconut shells into a large white plastic dish and removing larvae with a transfer pipette. Small tree holes and rock holes were sampled directly using a transfer pipette to empty the hole. Stage 4 larvae and pupae were killed in 70% ethanol, examined under a digital microscope and identified using the keys of Mattingly (1971) Huang (1979) and Steffan (1968). Some larvae and pupae were retained and raised to adults in breeding vials or large mosquito breeders for identification. Representative larvae, killed and preserved in 70% ethanol were taken to the Medical Entomology Unit, Darwin, Australia for confirmation of identification. Pools and large water containers were sampled for copepods using a plankton net. Copepods, killed and preserved in 70% ethanol, were sent to Dr. Maria Hołyńska, Museum and Institute of Zoology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, for identification.

Ovitraps were constructed by cutting the sloping top section off discarded plastic water bottles to make straight-sided containers. For some trials the top was completely removed, for others, only half of the top part of the bottle was cut away, leaving the cap and a sloping portion, that would partially protect the contents from rain and falling debris. The reason for recycling these discarded bottles rather than buying the standard black plastic cups or buckets that are traditionally used as ovitraps was one of cost and availability, as, at present, discarded plastic water bottles are very common in Timor-Leste. The containers were darkened by wrapping them in black plastic (recycled shopping bags obtained locally), as studies have shown that *Ae albopictus* and *Ae aegypti* prefer to oviposit in dark containers (Hoel et al 2011). A 1 cm diameter drainage hole was cut approximately 2 cm from the top of the container. Mosquito screen was cut into circles (diameter about 2mm less than the diameter of the bottles) and a smaller ring shape was cut from black polystyrene 'foam' food trays. As *Aedes* mosquitoes oviposit predominantly on the sides of containers on moist rough surfaces, a 2.5cm wide strip of either red velour paper or white cotton cloth was clipped to the inside of the container with a paperclip, which was also used to secure the black plastic wrapping. Spring water, or solutions containing various attractants were placed in the containers, and the polystyrene ring and mosquito wire were floated on the surface of the liquids. These ovitraps were placed in various locations, both inside and outside houses, with the permission of the landowners/householders. The purpose and mechanism of action of the ovitraps were explained, and householders were asked to choose a place inside their houses where the ovitraps would not inconvenience them and where they would not be easily accessible to young children. The ovitraps were checked daily for mosquito eggs using a hand lens. Constraints on ovitrap placement outdoors included the requirement to protect them from wandering livestock (pigs, poultry, goats, dogs, and cattle), heavy rain, and also from young children. Stones and pebbles were placed against the sides of the outside ovitraps for added stability.

Results

Ae albopictus was the only potential dengue vector found during the larval surveys in a rural area in Same sub-district. Opportunistic human landing catches also confirmed the presence of *Ae albopictus* as a highly prevalent day-biting mosquito. Larval identification was confirmed by Dr Huy Nguyen, Medical Entomology Unit, CDC, Royal Darwin Hospital. *Ae aegypti* was not found in this area, although a larval survey in Maliana in September 2010 found both *Ae albopictus* and *Ae aegypti*. Predatory copepods, identified as *Mesocyclops aspericornis* were found in a blocked drain in Same, Manufahi (the first confirmed record of this species from Timor-Leste). This identification was confirmed by Dr. Maria Hołyńska, Museum and Institute of Zoology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw. *M aspericornis* has been effectively used elsewhere in Asia to control *Aedes sp*. However, it became apparent that *M aspericornis* would have limited use as a control agent in this area, as the main natural breeding sites of *Ae albopictus* in this particular rural community were too small and transient to be suitable long-term habitats

for *M aspericornis*. Except for mandis, the community did not in general use the large water storage containers that were common in communities where *M aspericornis* has been successfully used for mosquito control, instead people generally collected water daily from springs and streams, and used communal springs, and also the riverside, as laundry and washing places. In addition, a study published during 2011 raised concerns about *M aspericornis* as a potential agent of transmission of *Gnathostoma spinigerum*, the cause of gnathostomias (Janwan et al 2011) which suggests that adding cyclopoid copepods to water containers that could be used for drinking or washing now may be contraindicated because of public health concerns.

Overall the ovitraps functioned effectively in that they were attractive oviposition sites for *Ae albopictus*, suggesting they could be used in both screening/monitoring and control programs. Trials in which larvae were allowed to develop to pupae showed that the mesh screen was effective in preventing the emergence of adults. In some cases, the mesh screen became dislodged from the supporting ring, by e.g. in several instances small toads jumping into the ovitraps or large chunks of debris falling in, indicating that regular monitoring would always be necessary to prevent the ovitraps becoming breeding sites. Ovitraps in houses functioned well in preventing emergence except in houses where they were placed in reach of young children. After the purpose and mode of action of the ovitraps was explained, people were encouraging about their use, however in general, their preference for long-term use was for ovitraps to be placed outside, not inside their houses.

Discussion

The presence of *Ae albopictus* in this rural area, and the absence to date of *Ae aegypti* has implications for control options. *Ae albopictus* is considered to be a less effective vector of dengue than *Ae aegypti,* (possibly due to its wider host range, and also because *Ae albopictus* is naturally infected with a strain of *Wolbachia* that reduces viral infection of the mosquito's salivary glands (Mousson et al 2012; Lambrechts et al 2010). However *Ae albopictus* has caused dengue epidemics in areas where *Ae aegypti* is absent, although these are generally less severe than those caused by *Ae aegypti* (Peng et al 2012; Xu et al 2007; Effler et al 2005).

The incidence of dengue in Same sub-district is reported to be low (Same hospital administration and Manufahi Department of Health personal communication). However, as in many other countries where dengue is endemic, it seems likely that mild cases of dengue are not reported. Although a survey of health service usage was not a component of this study it was impossible to avoid noticing a strong reliance on traditional medicine among the householders in the sample area. The two traditional medicine clinics supplied locally grown herbal products to treat fever, some local people regularly harvested plants for medicinal purposes, and people with mild fever tended initially not to seek advice from doctors, and therefore mild fever due to dengue would not be recorded in these cases. *Ae albopictus* is thought to act as a maintenance vector of dengue in rural areas (Gratz et al 2004) and control measures that decreased the population of this mosquito would reduce the risk of a major dengue outbreak in the future.

Ae albopictus is also a competent vector of at least 22 other arboviruses including chikungunya, (Vazeille et al 2010, Gratz 2004, Samuel et al 2009) *Ae albopictus* is of veterinary importance too, as it is a vector of dog heartworm, *Dirofilaria immitis (*Cancrini et al 2003) and a nuisance day-time biter. For these reasons control of *Ae albopictus* in this rural area is desirable.

The WHO recommends a dengue vector management plan incorporating several methods of mosquito control including include source reduction, biological control if applicable and environmental management through community participation (Chang et al 2011). Current WHO research strategies for dengue control includes the use of lethal ovitraps (WHO 2013). Efficacy of ovitraps depends on the attractiveness as oviposition sites compared with other available oviposition sites, placement and density of traps, efficacy of the kill mechanism long-term, and acceptance of ovitraps by the local community. Norzahira et al (2011) and Lim et al (2010) in ovitrap surveys in a suburban area in Malaysia found significantly more *Ae albopictus* larvae in outdoor ovitraps than in indoor ovitraps. This was not the case for *Ae aegypti*. However in a study in Taiwan, significantly more *Ae aegypti* females were collected indoors

than outdoors, but more *Ae aegypti* eggs were collected from ovitraps placed outside houses (Wu et al 2013). In the present study, because house windows and doors were unscreened, house doors were frequently left open all day, and traditional house construction left many gaps where mosquitoes could enter, it was hypothesized initially that ovitraps inside would collect as many eggs as ovitraps outside, but this was not so. Placement of ovitraps inside houses had the advantage of protecting the ovitraps from rain, debris and disturbance by animals, but the disadvantages of a lower egg count, and householders' general preference for outside placement of traps.

Conclusion

The dengue vector, *Ae albopictus* is present in the sub-district of Same, Manufahi District. Lethal ovitraps made from recycled plastic bottles with a mesh screen as a kill mechanism are a low-cost, environmentally friendly method of potentially reducing *Ae albopictus* populations in this rural area, if combined with source reduction and other control methods, and if ovitraps are monitored at approximately weekly intervals. Biological control using the copepod *M aspericornis* may have a very limited application.

Ethics statement

Approval from the Timor-Leste Ministry of Health Research Committee, the District Administrator of Manufahi and the Manufahi District Minister of Health was obtained to conduct a field study in Timor-Leste. Verbal permission from the landowners was obtained before placing any ovitraps, or sampling any natural or artificial habitats for larval Culicidae. After explanation of study objectives and procedures, verbal consent was obtained from the adults living in each household for placement of ovitraps in and adjacent to houses.

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Pragmatism or preference? Examining Timorese responses to decentralization

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This paper considers the decentralisation of powers to 'liberal-local hybrid' institutions at the village (that is, *suco*) and hamlet (that is, *aldeia*) level in Timor-Leste. It begins with a general introduction to the literature on decentralisation and liberal-local hybridity. It then outlines the process of decentralisation in Timor-Leste and considers the opportunities and challenges it has generated. It concludes that the Timor-Leste case suggests that decentralisation guided by liberal-local hybridity can play a role in building and embedding Timor-Leste and other new and post-conflict states.[2]

Introduction to the literature

In most states which are considered to be consolidated liberal democracies state institutions generated gradually. In many new and post-conflict states, centralised state institutions are often 'delivered' (Boege, et al. 2009b, 601) via state-building operations before a transition to 'state organisation of political life' has occurred (Warren 2006, 383). As a result, their capacity can be poor and they can have difficulty projecting their power across their territories. Instead, local socio-political practices and institutions often fill the gap at the local level, particularly in rural areas, which means that state institutions are not necessarily 'embedded in the local environment' (Dinnen 2007). This can challenge the legitimacy of centralised state institutions, as they are only one of many 'alternative' sites of legitimate power (Nelson 2006).

There is an emerging academic and practical literature, which argues that state-builders should recognise local political agency and engage with embedded local socio-political practices and institutions when building new and post-conflict states. The literature posits that engagement with local socio-political practices and institutions will result in a 'liberal-local hybrid' peace project, which recognises the hybridity of liberal and local socio-political practices and institutions (Richmond 2009a, 2009b, 2011). That is, it recognises that liberal and local socio-political practices and institutions 'co-exist, overlap, interact, and intertwine' (Boege et al. 2009a, 17). Rather than viewing local practices and institutions as spoilers or hurdles to building a liberal state, this literature focuses on their 'strength and resilience' (Ibid., 13-14). From this perspective it is possible to construct alternative methods of liberal state-building that recognise local political agency and work with embedded local practices and institutions. The decentralisation of powers and functions to the *sucos* and *aldeias* in Timor-Leste may provide ways to operationalise liberal-local hybridity to assist state-building, as it may allow the state to be built upon already-functioning local socio-political practices and institutions.

Decentralisation refers to 'the assignment of powers to governing bodies located at different jurisdictional tiers in governmental systems' (Breton, Cassone and Fraschini 1998, 23). Decentralisation holds that central governments should limit their intervention in the activities of lower tier governments to situations when they are ineffective or need assistance (Barber 2005). This formulation has parallels with the literature on liberal-local hybridity, as it implies that the role of already-functioning, locally-legitimate socio-political practices and institutions should be recognised via decentralisation. However, neither strand of literature calls for blanket decentralisation, which would effectively lead to the collapse of the state. Central governments can also perform an important role in the equitable redistribution of resources, and in inducing cooperative behaviour by citizens in response to challenges and for the provision of public goods.

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[2] This paper draws on a comparative study of decentralisation in Timor-Leste and Bougainville: Wallis, Joanne 2013, 'What role can decentralisation play in state-building? Lessons from Timor-Leste and Bougainville', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 51(4): 424-446. This paper has been supplemented by additional field and desk research.

Some public goods provision requires a level of technical input, such as medical or engineering expertise, that is unlikely to be generally available at the local level. Consequently, the decentralisation literature argues for a balance in power and functions between tiers of government (DFID 2002). The literature on hybridity similarly recognises that often no clear delineation exists between the central government and local institutions.

Decentralisation in Timor-Leste

The Timor-Leste Constitution requires the central government to engage in decentralisation (*Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste*, sections 5(1) and 71(1)), although this requirement is forward-looking and envisages that decentralisation would not occur immediately at independence. While this might have partly been due to concerns about a lack of resources and capacity, it was contrary to the views expressed by Timorese people during consultations on their future Constitution (UNTAET Constitutional Affairs Branch 2001).

At independence Timor-Leste inherited the decentralised administrative system that had been utilised by Portugal, and later Indonesia, and then by the United Nations transitional administration. Each of its 13 districts and 65 sub-districts is headed by a centrally-appointed administrator. Below the sub-districts are 442 *sucos*, below which are 2,225 *aldeias*. At independence *suco* and *aldeia* heads were largely selected according to local practices, with *sucos* and *aldeias* recognised merely as administrative divisions, rather than as formal institutions. For the first few years after Timor-Leste's independence state power and functions were highly centralized. This meant that the Timor-Leste state was largely absent from the lives of the almost 80% of the population residing in rural areas. Consequently, many Timorese people continued to live according to local socio-political institutions centred on their *suco* and *aldeia*, with a 2002 survey finding that *suco* chiefs were the most respected mediators for personal or property disputes, and the preferred personal source for political information (Asia Foundation, 2002).

In 2004 the government introduced a program of limited decentralization which built on existing local socio-political institutions in the *sucos* and *aldeias* (*Decree Law on Community Authorities* No. 5/2004). *Suco* leaders and *aldeia* leaders were given certain powers and functions over governance, justice and development, and *suco* councils (comprising the *suco* leader, *aldeia* leaders, two women, two young people (one male, one female) and one elder) were created. However, these powers and functions were ill-defined and local leaders were given little funding or support, which undermined the quality of local decision-making and development. This process of decentralisation involved liberal-local hybridity, as the government sought to 'legitimise' local institutions according to liberal principles, by introducing democratic elections for *aldeia* leaders, *suco* leaders and *suco* councils (Wallis 2012). In 2009 decentralisation was enhanced, with *sucos* given increased power over social infrastructure and development projects (*Law on Community Leaderships and Their Election* No. 3/2009).

In 2009 the government adopted a law which provides that the 13 districts and 65 sub-districts will be merged into 13 municipalities (*Law on Administrative and Territorial Division* No. 11/2009). This law built on the Local Development Programme that ran from 2004 until 2006 and the Local Governance Support Programme, which began in 2007 and designed the policy guidelines for the municipalities (MSATM 2008). While elections for the new municipalities were supposed to take place in 2010, they have been deferred until at least 2015, primarily due to a lack of political consensus holding up the passage of the relevant legislation and concern about the progress of local capacity-building. Instead, the government is currently engaged in a program of 'pre-decentralisation', described as 'deconcentration', whereby power and resources are to be decentralized to the district level in preparation for the formation and election of the municipalities.

As the Timor-Leste government began to receive comparatively large oil and gas revenues from 2005 onwards, in 2009 it decentralised more resources to the *suco* and *aldeia* levels. The government also began to decentralise more development projects by introducing the *Pakote Referendum* (Referendum Package) of infrastructure projects in 2009, many of which were in rural areas. In 2010 it then introduced the *Pakote Dezenvolvimentu Desentralizasaun* (Decentralised Development Package), which decentralised

infrastructure projects to the district level. In 2011 the government enhanced the decentralisation of infrastructure projects by introducing the *Programa Dezenvolvimentu Dezentralizadu* (Decentralised Development Programmes), which decentralised development projects to the district and sub-district levels. These decentralised development projects have seen significant resources distributed to rural areas, which has prompted a flurry of new companies to be created throughout Timor-Leste, which has in turn created jobs at the local level. However, the quality of these development projects has differed, primarily due to poor planning and project choice, variable levels of local capacity, at times limited opportunities for local input, and the minimal oversight provided by the central government.

In recognition of the importance of continuing to decentralise resources and to improve opportunities for local planning and oversight, in 2012 the government announced a new *Programa Nasional Dezenvolvimentu Suco* (National Program for Village Development). This program is to be implemented over eight years from 2014 and will see *suco* and *aldeia* leaders directly involved in the planning, construction and management of small infrastructure development projects. This program implicitly involves liberal-local hybridity, as it is expected that *suco* and *aldeia* leaders will utilize local socio-political practices of consultation and consensus in order to garner their communities' perspectives of the development projects they require.

Opportunities and challenges generated by decentralization

As Timor-Leste has implemented a process of decentralisation which utilises liberal-local hybridity at the *suco* and *aldeia* levels, this may generate a number of opportunities for Timor-Leste and lessons for similar new and post-conflict states. Most significantly, decentralisation guided by a model of liberal-local hybridity seems to have helped to bridge the gap between the central government and the local level in Timor-Leste, as it has allowed the central government to 'buil[d] on existing social entities rather than supplanting them' (Meitzner Yoder 2007, 52). Decentralisation to liberal-local hybrid institutions also appears to have played a role in extending democracy to the local level, via the *suco* and *aldeia* elections. It has also provided mechanisms through which representatives of the frequently neglected rural population can exert influence on the central government and access greater resources, as *suco* and *aldeia* leaders report to, and make requests from, sub-district and district administrators, who in turn interact with the central government. Decentralisation also appears to have improved opportunities for women's political participation. Seats are reserved in *suco* councils for women and other disadvantaged social groups, and Timor-Leste has changed its local government law to refer to the gender-neutral *suco* 'leaders', instead of *suco* 'chiefs'.

As decentralisation to hybrid institutions has encouraged local political participation, this has allowed local governments to draw on local knowledge and preferences in order to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of government. For example, *sucos* and *aldeias* have used customary *tarabandu* agreements to manage 'aspects of behaviour and relationships among people, between people and natural resources, and economic life' (Brown and Gusmao 2009, 67), and with the central government (Meitzner Yoder 2007). From 2014, the government will be implementing the *Programa Nasional Dezenvolvimentu Suco*, which will involve local communities more comprehensively in planning, implementing and monitoring development projects. There is evidence from studies of other cases that involving local communities in their development may contribute to improvements in the delivery of development projects (World Bank 2004; Work undated).

If decentralisation facilitates local political participation in Timor-Leste it may improve the accountability and responsiveness of the central government, by providing routes for people to engage in 'monitoring, evaluation and planning from below' (Manor 1999, 38; Burki, Perry and Dillinger 1999). This benefit may be enhanced in Timor-Leste because decentralisation to the *suco* and *aldeia* levels involves liberal-local hybridity and utilises local methods of oversight and accountability. If enhanced local political participation leads to the distribution of information and improved transparency it may also make the Timorese people more aware and understanding of the central government's policies and more realistic in their expectations of the government. Studies of other cases have found that this can improve satisfaction

with government performance, which can help to establish the legitimacy of state institutions (Crook and Manor 1995, 1998; World Bank 1995).

However, decentralisation can also raise challenges. Most importantly, central governments can undertake decentralisation for disingenuous reasons, as it can act as a substitute for enhanced transparency and democratisation at the central level, and can distract attention from the central government's corruption, patronage and ineffectiveness (Manor 1999). To date it is not apparent that this is the central government's intention in Timor-Leste, although there are growing rumours of corruption and patronage, particularly at the central level. Beyond the decentralised development infrastructure projects the government has implemented since 2009, the government has been relatively ineffective at delivering substantive public services, such as education and healthcare, in rural areas. As is frequently acknowledged by members of Timorese civil society, the central government is able to build schools, but not necessarily to provide the resources for education to be delivered within their walls.

Decentralisation to local-liberal hybrid institutions can also have destabilising consequences. In Timor-Leste many local leaders hold political party affiliations, which add another layer of obligation to their calculations. In some instances this has affected their perceived legitimacy, which has had disruptive consequences, particularly when it has undermined local socio-political practices. For example, the first round of *suco* elections in 2005 and 2006 were highly politicised, which was perceived as 'divisive, with the polarisation of politics at the national level now penetrating to the local level' (Brown 2009, 151). As a result, political parties were prevented from running in the 2009 *suco* elections (although anecdotal evidence suggests that they were still active).

There is concern that decentralisation to liberal-local hybrid institutions might echo the colonial practice of indirect rule, whereby the central government is perceived to be using local socio-political institutions instrumentally in order to extend its dominance over society. However, the increasing assertiveness of local leader towards the central government in Timor-Leste illustrates that local actors are not just passive subjects, and can instrumentalise custom to take back control from the central government. For example, *suco* leaders regularly meet with sub-district and district administrators, as well as members of the central government, to advocate on behalf of their communities. *Tarabandu* agreements have also managed the relationship between the central government and local communities in relation to natural resources and societal behaviour. At the same time, while there are opportunities for consultation, it is often very difficult for *suco* leaders to exert significant influence on central government decision-making, particularly in relation to access to resources or development projects.

In addition, some local socio-political practices can be discriminatory, which can challenge the perceived legitimacy of liberal-local hybrid institutions (Jackson 2006). In Timor-Leste local practices can discriminate against women and young people, since it is generally elder males who have authority in local contexts. While, local practices can also be 'participatory and consultative', as local leaders rely on the support of their community for power (Boege, et al. 2009a, 18), it often remains difficult for women and young people to influence decision-making. For example, many representatives of women and young people on *suco* councils can find it difficult to make themselves heard.

The perceived legitimacy of liberal-local hybrid institutions in Timor-Leste has also been challenged by their performance, as the capacity of *suco* leaders to plan and implement projects has varied. The initial inability of the central government to decentralise significant resources has also affected their capacity. Although the situation has improved since 2009 as more resources have been decentralised, there has been a corresponding increase in instances of alleged corruption at the local level. This suggests that decentralisation should be governed by an unambiguous legal framework that specifies the distribution of power and resources, and provides mechanisms for accountability and oversight (Burki, Perry and Dillinger 1999; Litvack, Ahmad and Bird 1998; Manor 1999), including elections for local leaders and institutions such as the nascent Timor-Leste Anti-Corruption Commission.

Looking forward: Is decentralisation based on pragmatism or preference?

Based on the case of Timor-Leste, it appears that decentralisation guided by liberal-local hybridity can play a role in building and embedding new and post-conflict states. Although O'Dwyer and Ziblatt (2006) find that 'in economically underdeveloped countries… decentralisation actually is associated with poorer quality of governance', the Timor-Leste case suggests that, while local institutions can have their faults, they are often the 'only mechanisms available to dispense any kind of justice or administration' (Nixon 2006, 91). Consequently, it appears that in other new and post-conflict states the recognition of local socio-political institutions, and a form of power-sharing which mediates the central government through liberal-local hybrid institutions, can assist state-building.

Much of the literature on liberal-local hybridity has assumed that the populations of new and post-conflict states such as Timor-Leste have a preference for the recognition of their local socio-political practices and the decentralisation of powers and functions to liberal-local hybrid institutions (Boege et al. 2009a, 2009b; Richmond 2009a, 2009b, 2011). My ongoing research problematises this assumption by examining the rationale for, and responses to, decentralisation to *sucos* and *aldeias* in Timor-Leste. I consider the extent to which decentralisation to *sucos* and *aldeias* is motivated by the genuine preference of the local population, as compared to a pragmatic decision by the central government (and its international advisers) to utilise often already-functioning and locally-legitimate local socio-political practices in the absence of legitimate or effective central government institutions.

My initial research suggests that, if decentralisation guided by a liberal-local hybrid approach is primarily based on the preference of the Timorese people, this is likely to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of dencentralised governance in the long-term, as people are more likely to respect the decisions of their *suco* and *aldeia* leaders and to support their governance, justice and development initiatives. However, if decentralisation guided by liberal-local hybridity is utilised primarily for pragmatic reasons it may have long-term implications for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the *suco* and *aldeia*, and the central government which they feed in to. It may see local socio-political practices used instrumentally to enhance the power of the state. Local practices may be co-opted or corrupted in the process, which may undermine their legitimacy. It might also entrench potentially discriminatory local practices, which may prevent them from evolving to reflect changes in Timorese society. This research is ongoing and will be reported at a future Timor-Leste Studies Association conference.

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Timor Leste Unions and the right to strike?

<div align="right">Chris White[1]</div>

Introduction

I demonstrate by describing four industrial relations disputes that the right to strike for Timor Leste unions has been undermined by the police. Such unwarranted police intervention against workers' rights makes the successful bargaining by Timor Leste unions more difficult.

I do not here give the history of the struggle for independence, nor the history of unions since 2000 or the context of Timor Leste capitalist development and the formation of the working class, nor workers' lives on a minimum wage $85 US per month in 2012 lifted to $150 per month.

Zito Jose da Conceicao da Costa, Zito, President of the KSTL, Konfederasaun Sindikato Timor Leste demonstrates my argument about one aspect of the new Timor Leste repressive state apparatus on developing employment relations. Zito's reaction to the police intervention against the SJT-TL union, Sindikato Jeral Trabalhadores Timor Leste, in the Mandiri Bank strike - that I deal with below – was:

> The police stopped our legal strike. This prohibits workers to organise a strike and is against our right to strike. The Government and the police have become accomplices and protectors for employers, especially foreign companies such as Mandiri Bank. This is far from the only case in which the government and the police have acted to protect employers. Police action against legal industrial action has occurred five times in 2004-2009, and twice in 2011. The government has neither addressed the issue of police violence nor taken action against exploitative employers. Without the government to protect workers' rights, workers are increasingly subject to unfair and arbitrary treatment by their employers.[2]

The right to strike

The Portuguese and Indonesian governments banned unions. Workers had no employment rights.

The KSTL was formed and held its first Congress in 2001, assisted by APHEDA (Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad) the ACTU's overseas aid agency and Australian

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[2] There is not any academic literature on this topic, but I have in the references articles on the right to strike. I adopt an active research position as a supporter of Timor Leste unions, the KSTL and SJT-TL. The KSTL (like the Australian Council of Trade Unions ACTU) is the peak union body in Timor-Leste. The SJT-TL is the General Workers Union. This presentation is based on interviews with Zito KSTL and Almerio Vila-Nova, Secretary, SJT-TL. The SJT-TL and the right to strike - parts one, two, and three. In part one is an introduction to the KSTL http://chriswhiteonline.org/2012/11/sjt-tl-and-the-right-to-strike-part-one/ My SJT-TL 2nd National Congress Report Dili October 17th 18th 2012 recounts the SJT-TL history from 2008, the union coverage and challenges and my speech. http://chriswhiteonline.org/2012/10/sindikatu-jeral-trabalhadores-timor-leste-2nd-congress/ My report of KSTL union challenges at their 2013 Congress is in http://chriswhiteonline.org/2013/03/kstl-kongresu-most-democratic/

unionists. Importantly, in the Timor Leste Constitution, all parties agreed to section 51 for the right to strike:

> 1. Every worker has the right to resort to strike, the exercise of which shall be regulated by law.
> 2. The law shall determine the conditions under which services are provided, during a strike, that are necessary for the safety and maintenance of equipment and facilities, as well as minimum services that are necessary to meet essential social needs.
> 3. Lock-out is prohibited.

In 2001, the first Timor Leste Government with PM Alkatiri and the KSTL and employer representatives worked together with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to apply ILO principles and agreed on the first ever Labour Code. The Transitional Administrator in the UNTAET Regulation No 2002/5 on the Establishment of a Labour Code of East Timor enacted this on 1 May 2002. The Labour Code was updated in 2012 by Parliament.

Lawful rights for workers in unions with the right to strike in collective bargaining for agreements were agreed. It is important to record these lawful collective bargaining rights and the right to strike in the Labour Code in order to demonstrate my argument.

> 24.1 A Registered Trade Union shall have the right to represent its members in a particular workplace for purposes of collective bargaining or for dealing with an employer including on matters concerning terms and conditions of employment. …
> 24.3 A Registered Trade Union may request the employer concerned to enter into negotiations concerning the terms and conditions of employment. The employer shall provide a reply within reasonable time, which shall not be later than 30 (thirty) days after receiving the request for negotiations. …
> 24.5 The parties to collective bargaining shall bargain in good faith and shall make every reasonable effort to conclude an agreement.
> 24.6 In order to facilitate collective bargaining, the parties shall disclose, share and exchange all information relevant to the negotiations with each other…
> 24.7 Employers shall allow reasonable time off during working hours, without loss of pay, for the Workers' Representatives to enable them to participate in collective bargaining negotiations and to hold discussions with Registered Trade Union members.
> 24.8 Where an employer…in replying, has refused the request, and where after the commencement of negotiations the parties fail to reach agreement, either party may seek the assistance of the Conciliation and Mediation Service. If no agreement is reached …any of the parties may file the necessary application to the Board for binding arbitration.
> 24.9 If a dispute has remained unresolved after recourse to collective bargaining procedures, either party may take action by exercising the right to strike or to lockout after observing the prescribed cooling-off period. A party to a dispute who is intending to exercise the right to strike or to lockout shall give a written notice to the other party and to the Conciliation and Mediation Service, at least 10 (ten) days before taking such action.
> 24.10 The Transitional Administrator may proscribe or otherwise restrict the right to strike…in cases involving Essential Services. …
> 24.11 An employer shall not employ a person to perform the work of an employee participating in a strike or who is locked out, unless such work is necessary to maintain minimum maintenance service or services the interruption of which would result in material damage to the working area or machinery.[3]

Workers and their unions do, when necessary as a last resort, use strike action to collectively bargain. Since 2000, the KSTL and unions have been developing as unions,[4] but it has been "like pushing molasses up a mountain" admitted Peter Jennings, continuing:

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[3] Timor Leste Labour Code 2002: from the ILO translated from Portuguese; my copy from Peter Jennings, Executive Officer of APHEDA.
[4] The unions are: The Teachers Union with Secretary Francisco da Costa Fernandes; the Maritime Transport Energy Union with Secretary Paulino da Costa; the Construction Union with Secretary Tito Geronimo; the Nurses Union with

When you look back and reflect, Timor Leste unions have done well comparatively in the short 13 years after sitting around with APHEDA people to discuss forming unions in 2001. The real problem is that this good legislation has not yet effective institutions, such as a strong arbitration system, or proper enforcement or education by the government on workers' rights; e.g. to be in a union, to bargain and with the right to strike without the police intervening.[5]

I now deal with key lawful strikes and peaceful worker assemblies that were broken up by police repression.

The Mandiri Bank dispute

The SJT-TL with KSTL support, in December 2011, organised workers at the Indonesian Mandiri bank to strike over the unfair and unlawful dismissal of three staff who were union delegates and involved in union activities. After a number of unsuccessful meetings with the Indonesian Mandiri Bank for reinstatement, Almerio Vila-Nova explains:[6]

> The union then gives consideration for a strike. But first we seek a mediation conference, but there is no response. As required, we gave 10 days' notice of the strike. The three sacked union officials, myself and Zito had two meetings with the Mandiri Bank but there was no change saying the dismissal was because the three union officials were not doing their jobs properly.

Almerio disputed this as an unjustified reason. He illustrated that the staff were dismissed because they were acting as unionists. Such dismissals are against Article 50 'no dismissal without just cause', and Article 52 'trade union freedom' in the Labour Code. He complained to the National Labour Department to assist reinstatement, but to no avail.

The SJT-TL's press statement on the 14th December 2011 was on the front page of the paper.[7] The SJT-TL held a meeting of the 47 bank workers who were upset over the dismissals. They voted to have the strike:

Secretary Bernardo Amaral do Rosario; the Public Service Union with Secretary Ramalho da Costa; SJT-TL General Workers Union with Secretary Almerio Vila-Nova; the Agricultural Union with Secretary Joa Cabral.

[5] Peter Jennings, in an interview by Chris White, Monday April 8th 2013 at the APHEDA office Sydney. APHEDA was created in 1984 as the ACTU overseas aid agency. APHEDA first assisted the formation of the KSTL in 2000-2 (the history not related here) and continues to support and fund Timor Leste unions. APHEDA http://www.apheda.org.au/cgi-bin/search/search.pl?ss=Timor+leste&x=25&y=11

The International Trade Union Confederation ITUC confirms my argument. In their 2011 East Timor report on Union violations, they report: "Although fundamental trade union rights are guaranteed, areas of concern exist in the labour law. Freedom of association is secured in the Constitution and the Labour Code, and in 2009 Timor Leste ratified the two ILO core conventions on trade union rights. While termination of employment for union activity is explicitly prohibited in law, the protection is partly undermined by another provision, which allows for financial compensation in lieu of reinstatement if the employer refuses to reinstate the worker. Furthermore, trade union activities are hampered by provisions in the Freedom, Assembly and Demonstration Act. Protests are not allowed within 100 meters of certain buildings, including government offices and diplomatic missions, as well as of infrastructure such as ports and key parts of transportation. The Minister has an absolute right to prohibit or restrict a strike in "essential services". The unstructured economy is a barrier to organizing. More than 80% of the active population of East Timor work in the informal economy. Given the difficulties that workers face to find paid employment, few dare to speak out against employers. The problem is compounded by their limited knowledge of trade union rights." ITUC http://survey.ituc-csi.org/Timor-Leste-East-Timor.html?lang=en#tabs-3

[6] My interviews are with Almerio Vila Nova SJT-TL Secretary, in three parts, covering these disputes http://chriswhiteonline.org/2012/11/sjt-tl-and-the-right-to-strike-part-one/ and parts, 2,3,4. Almerio here relates the explanation of the dismissals and the union steps taken.

[7] http://chriswhiteonline.org/2012/01/union-arrests-in-timor-leste/

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Zito notifies all unions for solidarity.[8] The strike started on Dec 19th. On the second day workers on strike assembled on the premises. Then the police came. That was a surprise because before we had notified the police on the details of the strike and we thought the police respected the strike process. The police said they came for security. We said we did not want them as third parties. The police interrogated us to get more information. The police want us to stop the strike action saying that we did not get permission for the demonstration that had to be within 50 metres away from the bank. But we replied that this was not a demonstration and we think the police do not understand the legal strike. This police intervention occurred after a two-hour meeting between Police Commander Longuinhos Monteiro and the General Manager of Mandiri Bank, Mohamad Yani, at the Mandiri Bank offices. The Police commander did not say any word to the workers. He sent in the Special Forces, who said you have to stand outside the Bank. But no, we stayed inside and then the many police took all the banners and forced us out from the premises.

The KSTL and SJT-TL promptly contacted the Secretary of State for Vocational Training and Employment. It became clear that the government sided with Mandiri Bank management and no settlement was reached during the mediation.

I asked Zito his reaction: "The police did it as a strategy to stop the strike action. This prohibits workers to organise a strike and is against our right to strike."

The Kmanek Supermarket strike

Almerio Vila-Nova relates**,** the SJT-TL first strike.[9] Here is first the context:

After the SJT-TL was established in October 2008, we have …the education campaign explaining the union, our objectives, our values and our rules and we find so many problems, so many violations to workers' rights.

Workers from the Kmanek Supermarket were one group…they had many complaints. During 8 years workers had no contracts at all, just what the boss said to do their job and no papers to regulate the conditions…all joined the union and agreed to negotiate for the collective agreement for pay and conditions. We met with the management and told them that the workers had to have their conditions improved and in a collective agreement. At that time, we had good communication with the management and they agreed to discuss the union recommendations. …But they did not like the collective agreement saying our draft it is too much. They said some points are OK but they insisted only individual contracts. We refused, saying no, we have the right to make this collective agreement... We discussed this with them three more times.

This is our first campaign for a collective agreement. We do not want to lose. We said we will have a strike. But management was very tough and not afraid of our ultimatum. We had on 3rd October 2008 long discussions with members and they agreed on the strike.

We gave 10 days notice to the company, to the government and to the police. I was worried, as I have no experience working with the union and my first SJT-TL strike. Then on the 15 November the strike commenced. About 90 workers were on strike and on the picket…After 3 days Clarence Lee the Supermarket owner contacted us and we met. He still did not want a collective agreement but would put terms into each individual contract. On the last day, Clarence said I have some information to discuss with you, so I agreed. At the meeting he said he would dismiss three of his staff, the union delegates, because they do not respect me, they used bad language against me during the strike. I said no, I never heard this, I said no I am controlling the situation and I never heard someone use such language. But he dismisses our 3 delegates because they are very vocal on the union. We objected…after that we again continue with our working strike. On 18th November the strike happened again and continued because of the injustice to our 3 members.

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[8] APHEDA press release http://apheda.labor.net.au/news/1326070405_23333.html
[9] http://chriswhiteonline.org/2012/11/sjt-tl-and-the-right-to-strike-part-three/

Almerio then describes the police intervention:

> The police came to destroy our strike. Ten came first in three cars, then 20. We said the police knew of the details of the strike but unfortunately they got their request from the company. The police took down and out all our union banners. The police made threats that if we have no agreement to move then the special police will come to destroy you. They are supposed to be for the criminal, for breaking the law. These BOP special police are like a military with guns and they used them as a threat. They said they could not control the picket even though it is peaceful. They said this demonstration this protest is too many and too hard to control. I was distressed with the police.

Almerio showed me a photo of a policeman formally a commander of the Liquique District police. "He had a gun at the supermarket. He threatened me and I was scared in the stomach, this was no good." Almerio showed me photos of workers holding the banners.[10] "We are on the picket line" "Clarence we need our jobs back", "Clarence please respect our law.":

> The police became violent…with Zito's arm being pulled up… Then another delegate and worker were arrested. I protested and was arrested. We were all in the police car and taken to the police station where they treated us like criminals, ordering us to sit on the floor, to take off our shoes, to empty out our pockets, everything was taken out. So we are in the corner and had to put our hands and turn to the wall.

> We explained to the police our rights based on …the Labour Code and our right to strike in the Constitution. After a while they said they understand but they received their orders from their Commander. We explained again the violation of workers' rights, the violation of our human rights. We were able to put out a call for union solidarity not only in Dili but also throughout solidarity union networks around the world. We were in the police station about 3 hours, and we were not put in the gaol but in the room. The police dispersed the workers.[11]

> We were let out because the Prosecutor General said our actions were legal and we followed the law.

Almerio concludes on the outcome of the dispute:

> Finally after further discussions, we reached a settlement with the company. Our Collective Agreement was not successful as a Collective Agreement, but I think it was successful because our terms were put inside all the individual contracts, so we may call them a collective agreement. Their salaries were adjusted eventually based on the minimum. Before the workers had no annual leave, had too long working hours, had no over-time, no public holidays. The workers are now with permanent contracts; 44 hours a week, over 6 days, 5 days at 8 hours per day, they now have days off, some sat/sun over 7 days a week the supermarket is open. All the conditions now comply with the Labour Code.

> Unfortunately for the three dismissed, the company only offered compensation. We discussed this and as it is in the Labour Code and we did not want to prolong the case, we had to accept this.

I agree with Zito's assessment. He said: "This police action is to intimidate workers. Workers are scared that we cannot strike as we will be arrested and we will lose not only our wages during the strike but we can be put in the police cell. The police prohibit workers to organise a strike."

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[10] http://chriswhiteonline.org/2012/11/sjt-tl-photos-part-4/

[11] The KSTL press release:

"Union Leaders Arrested in Timor Leste to intimidate strikers. On Tuesday 18 November, the President of the KSTL and the Secretary of the General Workers' Union, were arrested by police while taking part in a peaceful protest…Timor-Leste's union believe that the motivation for the arrest was to intimidate both union officials and the striking workers…The constitution and Labour law of Timor-Leste clearly state that a company cannot dismiss any workers without reason, and also clearly state that workers have the right to form and join a union, and have the right to strike."

The Ministry of Justice dispute[12]

The strike against the Government Minister of Justice and police intervention is another illustration of the denial of workers' rights. This is summarised in the press release by Almerio Vila-Nova:

> On Tuesday 11 October, the General Secretary and the National Organizer of General Workers' Union including 17 workers were arrested by police while preparing for a peaceful protest at the office of Ministry of Justice.
>
> The protest was being staged in support of the demand of 19 workers that been dismissed unfairly by the Justice Ministry. These two union officials, the Secretary General Mr. Almério Vila Nova and the National Organizer Mrs. Henita Casimira of the SJT-TL and the 17 workers are now still in the cell of Police in Caicoli-Dili. The workers were engaged in the preparation of protest were dismissed from the Turismo Hotel because of the unfair decision of the Justice Ministry towards their management in closing the business.
>
> Timor-Leste's union believes that the motivation of the arrest is to protect the government member - Justice Minister Mrs. Lucia Lobato and to intimidate workers to not speak up their right and to not protest the government members. Formal protests are being lodged by the union with the Government of Timor-Leste and the parliament over the intervention of the police and the attitude of the Minister in causing dismissal of the workers, and urge the National Police to immediately release the union officials and the workers. The KSTL and the SJT-TL criticises the intervention of the police with arrests. The police should not be involved.

The California Hotel dispute

Here I show my argument by citing first the APHEDA headlines 4 February 2011:

> Hotel workers in Timor denied contracts. There is growing alarm that management of a leading hotel in Dili have chosen to dismiss trained and long serving staff instead of following local law and providing written contracts for their workers.

Now Almerio continues to describe what happened:

> On 2nd January 2011, seven female workers took Xmas Day and New Year Day to be with their families. The boss then said 'you are not coming in, no need' and he locked them out.
>
> The employer of the California Hotel, Dili, dismissed them in a dispute when they had requested written contracts of employment. Their union, the General Workers' Union are standing up for these workers' rights and asking the hotel to follow the law. The Labour Code of Timor-Leste states that: "Both workers and employers have the right to a written Contract of Employment.

The SJT-TL notified a strike on 17 January 2011 and gave the California Hotel 10 days' notice to reconsider their position. But the Hotel management still refused to meet and discuss the issue. Workers went on strike on 27 January 2011 to protest against these dismissals, to seek reinstatement and to demand that the hotel follow the Labour Code of Timor-Leste. Almerio Vila- Nova, General Secretary said:

> Our members are only asking for a written contract. We are alarmed that management have chosen to dismiss trained and long serving staff instead of following the law. We will fight to ensure that the hotel

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[12] http://chriswhiteonline.org/2012/11/sjt-tl-and-the-right-to-strike-part-three/

reinstates our members who were unfairly dismissed. The police unnecessarily came and intimidated us, but here there were no arrests.[13]

Conclusion

I was able to make my arguments at the SJT-TL Conference in 2012 and the KSTL Congress 2013, as an invited guest, to applause:

> Workers have a right to join a union, to organise, rights to collective bargaining and to use the strike for your interests. I am a strong supporter of the right to strike for workers.
>
> I am very concerned about your police when they illegally try to bust up your lawful strikes.
>
> Your police are not allowed to be on the side of the employers. Your police are not allowed to intimidate the workers. Your police are not allowed to arrest workers on a lawful strike.
>
> We ask the Xanana Gusmao government to ensure the police do not intervene in your strikes and threaten the workers.

The Labour Code is accepted by all political parties and employers and is positive for employment relations. However, that depends on the police not intervening to deny the effectiveness of the right to strike. This may be resolved after a recent 2013 "training session" for the police with the KSTL and SJT-TL on union rights including the right to strike. This Timor Leste 'right to strike' question is only an illustration of one of the many employment relations challenges.

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[13] http://chriswhiteonline.org/2012/11/sjt-tl-and-the-right-to-strike-part-three/ . In 2004, in the East Timor Plumbing and Gas dispute, the police disrupted the strike by construction workers with just Zito, the KSTL involved. This was before the Construction Union formed. I do not relate other strikes e.g. by the Teachers' Union in Bacau or Maritime Union that the police did not disrupt.

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As well many more articles on the right to strike on my blog: http://chriswhiteonline.org

History and future of tourism development in Timor-Leste

Denis Tolkach[1]

Introduction

Timor-Leste is one of South-East Asia's least developed Small Island Developing States (SIDS), located on the eastern half of Timor Island, 640 km North of Darwin, Australia, and is a part of the Lesser Sunda Archipelago (CIA 2012). Timor-Leste had been under Portuguese rule for four hundred fifty years until 1975. Consequently, it was illegally occupied by Indonesia from 1975 to 1999. Since Timor-Leste has become independent from Indonesia, successive governments and international agencies have viewed tourism as a sector that can boost development and alleviate poverty. This paper reviews the history of tourism in Timor-Leste, and consequently discusses themes arising from the review. Statistical information and up-to-date analyses of tourism in Timor-Leste have been lacking. Taking these factors into consideration, the present paper draws upon statistical information, government documents and non-academic publications (e.g. newspapers and magazines). The findings are presented in a narrative and chronological form historical and recent developments in tourism. The latter section of the paper reflects on the themes arising from the past and present challenges for tourism development as identified in the literature.

Tourism-related history of Timor-Leste

Before 1999

One of the first acknowledgements of Timor-Leste's potential for being a holiday destination appears to be during the World War I, when according to Fernandes (2010, 215) the Australian government was discussing a proposal of taking possession over Timor as a holiday destination. The idea was, however, soon rejected on the grounds of Timor being an unlikely place for Northern Territory residents to spend holidays. There were also rumours that other powers might purchase Timor-Leste from Portugal (Fernandes 2010, 215). The Japanese forces occupied Timor-Leste during the World War II. Consequently, Portugal continued its administration of Timor-Leste. Some infrastructural developments that stimulated tourism were constructed at the time, for example Baucau airport. Currently, Baucau Airport is not being used, even though it has a runway fit for international flights, and was used by Trans Australia Airline prior to the Indonesian invasion (Wheeler 2004, 17). The government of Timor-Leste is planning to rehabilitate it in the future (Timor-Leste Government 2011, 98). For the first time the Portuguese government made explicit funding allocations for the development of tourism and tourism infrastructure in the Third Development Plan (1968-1973) (CAVR 2005, 11; Gunn 1999). During the last years of Portuguese rule tourism started appearing in Timor-Leste, with around 5,000 international visitors in 1972 (Cabasset-Semedo 2009, 214).

During the last years of Portuguese rule, Timor became part of the "hippy trail": overland routes taken by backpackers from Europe to Asia and Australia. It features in the second guide book of the founders of Lonely Planet, Maureen and Tony Wheeler, called *South-East Asia on the Shoestring* (1975). They had arrived to Baucau airport and were travelling to the capital of Dili by motorcycle, then to Maubisse, located in the mountains of Timor, and continuing to Indonesian West Timor. The description of that travel by Wheeler (2004) emphasises how little infrastructure was in Portuguese Timor. For example, there were no petrol stations outside of Dili, except for the military bases and no bridges across rivers.

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According to Wheeler (2004, 17) Timor was forgotten by the Portuguese due to the independence struggles of Angola and Mozambique.

After gaining independence for Portugal in 1975, Timor-Leste was occupied by Indonesia. During the first decade of Indonesian occupation there was little room for tourism development as protests and civil unrest continued. Jakarta opened foreign access to Timor in 1989. Between 1989 and 1991 3,000 international visitors came to Timor-Leste (CAVR 2005, 14). Many of them were NGO workers and journalists travelling on tourist visas, and these travellers exposed the situation in Timor-Leste to the world.

1999-2007

After the referendum vote in 1999, the United Nations (UN) established a temporary government and restored peace. This led to the arrival of many foreign workers from international development, non-government and humanitarian organisations, who needed a place to stay. The construction of hotels and restaurants started. Arguably, tourism in Timor-Leste started with the UN mission (Cabasset-Semedo 2009, 214), and by 2003 there were 41 hotels and 60 restaurants in Timor-Leste, mostly in Dili (Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry 2010). The UN handed over power to local government in 2002, and started to downsize its presence, which negatively affected service industries (Cabasset-Semedo 2009, 214).

One of the directions for future economic development identified after the restoration of independence was tourism development. Only other two major industries have been continuously acknowledged: oil and natural gas exploration and agriculture. Carter et al. (2001, 36) published 'Development of Tourism Policy and Strategic Planning in East Timor' and identified as *"immediate"* the following issues:

- experience in tourism,
- tourism related infrastructure,
- trained tourism workers,
- tourism training facilities,
- organised internal transport suitable for tourists.

In the paper Carter et al. (2001, 37) proposed the guidelines for future tourism policy and possible markets for Timor-Leste, among them in the chronological order of appearance: UN and international organisations staff, European backpackers, ecotourism, Australian resort and culture tourists, and Asian market.

Community-based tourism (as tourism that is owned and/or managed by local residents of the destination) and ecotourism have been promoted in Timor-Leste since restoration of independence in 1999. The then National Council President Xanana Gusmao (current prime-minister of Timor-Leste) expressed his opinion on tourism development as follows:

> A beautiful country like East Timor, with its determined and heroic history, must not be promoted through a tourist industry which creates a small modern world of luxury hotels, but rather we should accelerate the creation of conditions for ecotourism as a means to promote the unique identity, personality and character of our people, with a dimension of more humane relationships between people" (Xanana Gusmao 1999 in Carter et al. 2001, 38).

Nevertheless, there were fears of unsustainable tourism development at that time. An ecotourism/CBT initiative started on a small island of Atauro due to the plans of opening a casino on the island. That was the first ecotourism operation in the whole of Timor-Leste. The proximity of Atauro Island to Dili ensured the steady visitation of the international staff (Pedi 2007, 51). The ecotourism initiative at Atauro was not the first tourism development there. Shortly prior to independence, Indonesian government built a hotel on Atauro. However, it never functioned and was destroyed upon restoration of independence. After the first ecotourism initiative had been established on Atauro, it was planned to organise a local ecotourism association to ensure that tourism development on the island occured in accordance with wishes of communities. After consultations with representatives of communities of Atauro, Roman Luan, the NGO

managing ecotourism lodge, wrote to Atauro Island Tourism Regulations, however the association has not yet been formed (Pedi 2007, 57). The tourism sector in general has continuously attempted to organise itself in Timor-Leste by creating an association. However, until 2012 these attempts have been unsuccessful.

With the departure of the large number of foreign workers, occupancy of hotels and restaurants decreased drastically (Cabasset-Semedo 2009, 224), from 41 hotels and 60 restaurants in 2003 to only 4 hotels and 5 restaurants in 2006, according to the government's official statistics (Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry 2010). Timor-Leste experienced a political crisis in 2006-2007 that started from allegations of discrimination by the military in the west of the country and spread to the rest of society. Due to the violence, there was no tourism in Timor-Leste during the crisis. It also negatively affected tourism initiatives that were in their start-up, such as the Atauro Ecotourism Association (Pedi 2007, 57). Momentum was lost with the crisis and the initiative did not attracted the attention of the island residents for the next four years. Stabilisation of the situation required a new UN peacekeeping mission: the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (United Nations 2006).

After 2007

Since the 2006-2007 crisis resolution, the Timor-Leste tourism sector started developing again. Tourism and many other service industries have been again boosted by the UN and international development organisations staff repeating the scenario of 1999-2005. However, due to media and travel advisories of many developed countries, the perception of Timor-Leste as a dangerous place has not faded away (Carlos and Carlos 2011). This has resulted in a lower number of visitors and foreign investment.

The national economy has started to experience both benefits and downsides from its natural resources, namely exploration of oil in the Timor Sea. Some commentators have suggested that the economic and public policy situation in Timor-Leste resembles a 'resource curse' in that the oil money seems to feed inequality and the rise of an elite class. At the same time, little attention is being paid towards developing other sectors of the economy, for example agriculture or tourism. This is evident in that Timor-Leste still has no tourism policy, despite the fact that tourism has been a topic of considerable debate since 1999 (Dunn 2011; La'o Hamutuk 2012b; Neves 2011; Thaler 2011).

In 2009 at the First International Tourism Conference in Timor-Leste both Prime-Minister Xanana Gusmao and Minister of Tourism, Trade and Industry Gil Alves again acknowledged community-based and eco-tourism as types of tourism that should be developed in order to bring maximum benefits to the community and mitigate the negative impacts of tourism on culture, local people and the environment. Gil Alves has encouraged visitors to explore the nature of Timor-Leste, visit rural communities and learn about the culture (Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry 2009).

At this stage other community tourism initiatives started to appear in Timor. One example is Valu-Sere Cooperative in Tutuala at the eastern tip of Timor-Leste. It was set up with assistance of an NGO Haburas Foundation. It is also located within the Nino Konis Santana National Park. The cooperative provides accommodation, organises tour guides and spends revenue on infrastructure (Haburas Foundation 2011; Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry 2009). Government has run a Community Tourism initiative to support family and community group owned hospitality and tourism enterprises including financial assistance, in areas where such enterprises have appeared. These are namely Liquiça (West of Dili), Com (North-East coast) and Maubisse (in the central mountain region) (Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry 2010). Loi'hunu (sub-district Ossu) in centre-east of the country has become another tourism destination upon opening of the Village Hotel there (Timor Village Hotels 2010).

According to statistics provided by the Timorese government, Timor-Leste received 26,714 tourist arrivals in 2009 and arrivals have grown by 41.3% per cent since 2008 (Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry 2010). No later statistics on tourist arrivals have been found. However, the National Directorate of statistics provides the total number of arrival of foreign citizens to Dili Airport (includes all arrivals, not only those who have tourism as primary purpose of visit), which was a total of 39,825 in 2010, 50,590 in 2011 and 57,517 in 2012. Tourism receipts in recent years have been fluctuating between $US 16,000,000

in 2009, $US 26,000,000 in 2010 and $US 21,000,000 in 2011 (The World Bank 2013). These figures suggest that each tourist generates on average $US 477. The pricing and types of accommodation are diverse and range from backpacker hostels charging $US10 to luxury resorts charging $US145 (Tourism Timor-Leste 2012).

In July 2011 the government of Timor-Leste adopted Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030 (Timor-Leste Government 2011) as the guiding document for future development of the country. The Strategic Development Plan suggests that tourism is one of the important economic sector for the future of Timor-Leste, the other two being petroleum and agriculture.

One of the proposed initiatives is the development of a polytechnic institution in Lospalos in the east of the island. In order to assist the development of tourism, the government plans to develop new public policies on land, environmental protection and tax incentives (Office of the Prime Minister 2010). The experience of other countries in the Pacific suggests that the land and tax reforms should be carefully designed (Anderson 2006; La'o Hamutuk 2012a; Scheyvens 2011).

The government also plans to create a National Tourism Centre with delegations in the districts of Timor-Leste to ensure regional development (Presidency of the Ministers' Office 2007). Large investments have been made recently to develop infrastructure including the road network and electricity (Ministerio das Finanças 2011). However, there is no mention of organising internal transport suitable for tourists in the Strategic Development Plan.

Timor-Leste's presidential and parliamentary elections took place in 2012. Following the generally peaceful and democratic conduct of the elections, the United Nations peacekeeping mission has withdrawn in the end of that year (UN News Centre 2012). The Australian-led International Stabilisation Force has also withdrawn from Timor-Leste in December 2012 (BBC 2012). 2013 may be a difficult year for Timor-Leste's economy, since there is a necessity for service industries, whose main clientele was UN to adapt to withdrawal of the UN staff.

Haburas Foundation by now has helped three communities to set up tourism cooperatives, and is developing a network to unite them. They also have finished a study mapping potential places for community-based tourism development identifying more than seventy sites in five districts of Timor-Leste: Dili, Liquiça, Baucau, Lautem and Ainaro (Haburas Foundation 2012). Tourism Centre Timor-Leste has been registered in May 2012 as an association of tourism operators in Timor-Leste, however it has not been operating yet in the beginning of 2013. Tourism Centre Timor-Leste may represent a good initiative on the part of private sector. However, higher level of co-operation may be required between different sectors, including NGOs, government, and rural communities, since such networks and associations have been proven efficient in other destinations (Dredge 2006; Kimbu and Ngoasong 2013; Kokkranikal and Morrison 2011).

Statistics on tourism remain largely unavailable. While several centres attracting tourism emerged in Timor, namely Atauro, Tutuala, Com, Loi'hunu, Maubisse, Liquiça, Balibo, the majority of accommodation and tourism companies operate in Dili, therefore reducing the positive economic impact of tourism activities on regional Timor-Leste. The slow progress of tourism development to date may be explained as a result of lack of human resources and general lack of knowledge about tourism in Timor-Leste, since the Timorese never experienced it. Therefore, customised training programs suitable for the needs of local communities are required (Moscardo 2008, 8; Stronza 2008, 109).

Possible future tourism development

Timor-Leste can be divided into two: Dili and *foho* or rural areas (Silva 2011). Dili has developed as a place for foreign international organisations workers. As a capital of the country it is likely to require large accommodation units suited for business travellers. As an arrival point for almost all foreign leisure tourists (possibly land crossing from West Timor will become more popular in the future) Dili will require also higher room capacity than the rest of the country. The rest of the country so far has been providing small-scale community-based tourism experience, with lack of facilities and services, as evident from the official Tourism Timor-Leste website (Tourism Timor-Leste 2012). The benefit of the niche community-based tourism is that it usually attracts responsible travellers. Nevertheless, basic clean amenities and safe

environment have to be provided. It is possible to develop a high standard ecotourism resorts around the country in a long-term perspective, if human resources are developed and standards of facilities, infrastructure and services are significantly improved. This may divide the tourism market into two groups and differentiate tourism products: products for high yield small group travellers and budget adventure products. A careful communication strategy should be developed directed at relevant market segments, since the current state of tourism development may not match visitor expectations.

Conclusion

The paper has reconstructed the history of tourism development in Timor-Leste by using academic and non-academic literature and official documents. A prolonged period of Portuguese colonisation and consequent violent Indonesian occupation delayed tourism development in the country, despite the high number of natural and cultural attractions that Timor-Leste possesses. Geography and historical legacies are likely to play an important role in future tourism development. Among the characteristics that separate the case of Timor-Leste from many other states are the dependency of service industries on UN and international development organisations staff and the existence of oil resource. Both characteristics have positive and negative sides. UN and international organisations staff provided a demand for services that otherwise may not have existed, considering poor international perception of security situation in Timor-Leste post-independence. However, high salaries of foreign workers have pushed prices up, while being less demanding in terms of the service standards. Revenues from oil export have on the one hand created opportunity for government to have large budget spending on necessary infrastructure, but on the other hand have created a 'resource curse' situation, which fuels inequality and neglects other non-oil industries.

Government is yet to fulfil the existing expectation of leadership in economic development through implementation of policies and development of education and infrastructure. Besides the tourism policy, a sound policy regulating land tenure is required to resolve land disputes. Networks and associations that provide opportunities for collaborations between different stakeholder groups are also necessary to develop tourism. Tourism sector in Timor-Leste has split between Dili, where most of the foreign workers and diplomatic missions push for larger and more expensive facilities, and the rest of the country, which is dominated by small-scale community-based tourism. Nature and culture driven tourism appears to be suitable for Timor-Leste. Development of human resources and improvement of standards are required to ensure successful future tourism development.

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Matak-malirin, Tempu Rai-diak and Halerik: Expressions of what Timorese longed for in life

Josh Trindade

In this article, I will talk about three simple Timorese expressions, namely *matak-malirin* (the green and the cool), *tempu rai-diak* (the tranquil time) and *halerik* (the chanting of suffering). I am interested in exploring these expressions because Timorese use them to express what they are looking for in life. This article will discuss the meaning and the use of *matak-mailirin* in life by the Timorese and its distribution among them. The article will then explore the idea of *tempu rai-diak* (the tranquil time), a time in the past where people lived in peace and tranquillity with no shortage of food. The article will further discuss about *halerik*, the singing or chanting of suffering.

Matak-malirin

Matak-malirin is derived from *Tetun Terik* language, *matak* = the green and *malirin* = cool. The term itself can be found in all language groups in Timor-Leste. Generally, people refer to it as *bua-malus* (betel leaves and areca nuts or betel nut). In Naueti language for example, people refer to *matak-malirin* as *wai-malu* (*wai*= water, the cool one, *malu* = betel leaves, the green one). In *Idate* language it is called *mama*.

     Matak-malirin in this article refers to 'the green and the cool', which metaphorically represent the idea of peace, prosperity, good health and protection from bad luck and other misfortune or misery in life. In this case, the green (*matak*) represents the idea of good harvest where food isplentiful. Meanwhile 'cool' (*malirin*) represents the idea of peace in the society. In this context *malirin* (cool) has connection to the calmness or coolness of water in a pond. When there is *malirin*, this means that there is no *manas* (hot) or violence. Timorese used the term *malirin* to refer to a calm or peaceful situation while they use *manas* (hot) to refer to a violent situation.

     According to Vroklage (1953) *matak-malirin* (*matak*= newly green or sprouting,*malirin*= cool), refers to good health and productive life energy or the life force of human beings, plants and animals. Water is the *matak inan malirin inan* (the mother of the greenness, the mother of coolness), that is, the mother of good health and productive life force or life energy (cited in Kehi and Palmer 2012, 447)

     The ultimate goal of Timorese rituals is to receive *matak-malirin* which distributed at the end of the event in the forms of betel-nut (*bua-malus*), corn, rice and meat. For example, at the end of corn harvest ritual, each family who participated in the ceremony will receive betel-nut, corn and meat.

The above picture was taken during an *Uma Lulik* (sacred house) inauguration from *Naueti* language group in Uatolari, Viqueque district. There is rice, meat, betel nut and water. This is *matak-malirin* in its real form. The meat (beef and pork), rice, green betel leaves represent the idea of prosperity, while the water in the pot symbolizes peace and tranquillity in society. It is the values of peace and prosperity that *matak-malirin* emphasizes.

When people receive *matak-malirin*, they believe that they will have a better harvest in the coming season, better health, and that they will be protected from bad luck in their life. The distribution of *matak-malirin* follows the rules set by the *lulik*, where it is given out by a ritual power holder to a political power holder and it flows from the insider to the outsider.

The receiver of *matak-malirin* is ritually in an inferior position to the giver, but is politically superior to them (see Trindade 2012). For example, *matak-malirin* is always distributed by the wife-giver (*umane*) to the wife-taker (*fetosan*), not the other way around. It is because the woman who is married out from the wife-giver house represents the continuation of life to the receiving house. The wife-giver, therefore, is the source of life. This is the reason why they are ritually superior to the wife-taker and have the right to distribute *matak-malirin.*

Matak-malirin can only be distributed when the giver and the receiver are in a harmonious relationship. This can be seen as a conflict resolution mechanism, because the distribution of *matak-malirin* requires a peaceful relationship; therefore, any existing conflict must be resolved.

During the war against the Indonesians, Timorese resistance fighters kept *matak-malirin* in the form of betel nut and used them as ritual protection. Today, there remains a veteran organization called *Bua-malus* or betel nut.

Those who live a modern life in Dili have different expectations to those who live in rural areas when they receive *matak-malirin* during a ritual. They no longer hope to get a better harvest in their farm, but they are hoping to have nice job in an air-conditioned office, or a nice car to drive, a nice house, etc.

For the State of Timor-Leste, the example of the idea of *matak-malirin* for the nation and its people, is described in the 'Program for the fifth Constitutional Government 2012 – 2017 Legislature' as follows:

If and when each Timorese family is sheltered
                    in a decent home,
                        where water runs
                        and electricity powers,
            in an urbanised rural community,
                with kindergartens,
                with schools and clinics,
                surrounded by green and leisure spaces,
                as well as the activities of commerce,
                        small industries
                        and workshops,
    the people of the community will have
                        a deep sense of belonging
                        and responsibility
    and men, women, elderly and children
    guided by the noble values of solidarity,
                will be able to live in an atmosphere of social harmony
                    that will consolidate for all time,
                        national identity
                        and unity.
    And each child of this land
    will be proud to be TIMORESE!

Tempu Rai-Diak (The Tranquil Time)

When people are blessed *matak-malirin*, they believe that they are living in *tempu rai-diak*. *Tempu rai-diak* refers to a time in the past when people lived in peace, agriculture was good and there was no shortage of food. It generally refers to the time of the ancestors prior to the European arrival.

Tempu rai-diak is also used to differentiate between the two colonial periods in Timor-Leste by the elderly. During the Indonesian occupation, people referred to the Portuguese colonial period as *tempu rai-diak* as opposed to the period of Indonesian occupation. This is because during the Portuguese colonial period, the Portuguese were ruling the country indirectly through local *Liurais*. Compare to Portuguese times, the Indonesia time was more catastrophic, where an estimated 200,000 people died during the short period of 24 years of occupation. Furthermore, during the Indonesian occupation, freedom of movement was limited compared to Portuguese times. When the Portuguese ruled Timor-Leste, people had greater freedom of movement and there were no check points as in Indonesian times.

One can imagine that those who lived during the Portuguese colonial period used *tempu rai-diak* to refer to the pre-European arrival times. The tranquil time was when there was peace, no shortage of food, war or violence. The elderly described that during the tranquil time, people were free to go to their farms without fear.

Tempu rai-diak is also known as *tempu beiala* (the time of the ancestors), Babo Soares (2003, 89) described that:

> […] life in the beiala period is portrayed as peaceful, calm and governed by the rules of ukun (lit., rule, regulate) and bandu (lit., forbidden) or customary law. Emphasis is placed on the point that in the time of the ancestors' life was peaceful, calm and bountiful. There was no shortage of food and the people lived a good life. This is the kind of life later interrupted by the invasion of outsiders. In public conversations, people refer back to the period of beiala as the time of **rai diak** (lit., earth/soil good) or peaceful times without making a reference to the opposite period, *raia at* (lit., earth/soil bad) or bad times. The colonial period is generally referred to as the time of war, famine and so on.

It makes sense why *beiala* period is referred to as *tempu rai-diak*. Back in *Beiala* time, the population of Timor was a lot less than what it is today. That means that competition for food, land and other natural resources was not as intense. Peace and tranquillity can be easily created and maintained when natural resources are abundant.

Tempu rai-diak does not mean there is 'zero violence' in the society, nor does it refer to a society where violence does not exist. Rather, it emphasises the certainty in a society in which a stable social order existed. As an example, during the Indonesian occupation, they referred to the Portuguese time as *tempu rai-diak*. The Portuguese times were not a time of zero violence- there were wars among language groups within Timor-Leste. People were traded as slaves in exchange for gun powder (ammunition) during this time. But why is it that Portuguese times are referred to as the time of tranquillity? The difference lies within the consequence of the war itself, where during the Indonesian occupation the catastrophe of the regime was more severe in comparison to during the Portuguese times.

According to the elderly, the *tempu rai-diak* was disrupted by the presence of the colonialists. Babo Soares (2003, 86) described that:

> the past, *uluk*, or *beiala nia tempo* (lit., time of the ancestors) is distinguished from the time of struggle. For a much older generation, *beiala nia tempo* refers to the period before the arrival of the Europeans. Interpretation of the European period varies from one place to another in East Timor since the occupation and settlement began gradually through different periods in different places. The assumption among old generation Timorese is pointed at the 'presence' and influence of Europeans in the period where their forbears had lived. It was a time when the traditional social and political structure was intact and untouched by outside influences.

Tempu rai-diak is an imagination of a time that existed in the past. Recalling the past can also serve as a tool to revive memories and to remind people, not only of the life of the ancestors but also of the facts of social life in the past. Undeniably, perceptions reconstruct society's consciousness of the past and help to understand the past's relevance to the present (Fox 1979 cited in Babos Soares 2004, 87).

Perceptions of the past are used to reconstruct societies' histories, their social structures, and their relations with the past. While perceptions are the result of thought and reflection, they are also the result of an interpretation of both oral and written history. Both historiography and oral history present a moral validation to contemporary institutions or political interests and can serve as a basis for the creation of new values (Marr and Reid 1979 cited in Babo Sores 2003, 108).

One interesting thing I found is that the generation of today, especially those who born and grew up during 70s, cannot make reference to *tempu rai-diak* because they were born and raised during the conflict. For them, the tranquil time exists at present in the *tempu ukun-an* (Independence time).

Halerik

When the Timorese sense that they are not blessed with *matak-malirin* or are not living in *tempu rai-diak* they will do *halerik*. *Halerik* is the singing or the chanting of the suffering. It is used to seek external assistance and it represents the voice of the powerless (*ema kbi'it laek*) to the powerful (*ema bo'ot*). Normally, *halerik* is voiced out by women, children or elderly when they face difficulties in their life. *Halerik* speaks out the truth and describes the social, economic and political problems. If we watch local television news, it is common in Timor-Leste to hear people say "*rona netik ami nia halerik*" (please listen to our *halerik*).

This chanting of the suffering or *halerik* can be expressed as a song, poetry, crying (during a funeral), or *dahur*. It also sung in the church during mass. In song, for example, we can see the famous Timorese *halerik* in the "E *Foho Ramelau*" (E mount Ramelau) song where it said: '*tansa Timoroan atan ba bebeik, tansa Timoroan terus ba bebeik*' (why are Timorese still enslaved, why do Timorese still suffer). When people sing the song and repeat this expression over and over, it gives them strengths to fight for better future.

There are differences between *halerik* during Indonesian times and after independence. During the Indonesian occupation, *halerik* focused on the fight for freedom or self-determination (*ukun rasik an*), the end of violence (*terus*) caused by the Indonesians, and the economic burden (*susar*) caused by war and displacements.

After independence, the tone of halerik has changed. Today's halerik revolved around basic needs of the *ema kbi'it laek sira* (the powerless). Example of today's *halerik can be found* in newspaper headlines as follows:

- *Kondotor Sira Halerik Kona Ba Kondisaun Liuron Ba Parte Leste* (The drivers lament about the road condition to the eastern part of the country), (Tempo Semanal 06 May 2013)
- *Komunidade Manufahi Halerik Estrada Aitutu-Same* (Community in Manufahi lament about road conditions between Aitutu-Same), (Suara Timor Lorosae 05 February 2008)·
- *Komunidade Palaban halerik ba bee moos* (Community in Palaban lament for drinkable water), (Dili Weekly 01 June 2012)

Conclusion

Matak-malirin represents the idea of peace and prosperity that Timorese looking for in their lives. When Timorese face difficulties in their lives, they are looking to achieve *matak-malirin* and to live in *tempu rai-diak*. *Matak-malirin* and *tempu rai-diak* are the utopian vision of the Timorese. When people feel that they are not blessed with *matak-malirin* and live in *tempu rai-diak*, they express their difficulties through *halerik*.

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Practical innovations introduced by the Youth and Employment Promotion Project-GIZ to increase vegetable production in Timor – Leste

Adelino Pimentel do Rego[1]

Introduction

This paper describes a project on improving vegetable production for Youth-Producers' Groups (YPGs) in Timor-Leste from 2009 to 2012. The Youth and Employment Promotion Project (YEPP) was implemented by the Germany Agency for International Cooperation (or Deutsche Geselischaft for Internasionale Zusammenarbait - GIZ). In particular, technical innovations introduced are discussed, and recommendations are made from the lessons learned.

By 2012, the project supported and formed 121 YPGs with 1,195 members. These members comprised of 367 (32%) women and 828 (68%) men and among the members, 269 (23%) had graduated from the Agriculture School. The average group size ranged from 4 to 15 members. In each group, at least 2 members had graduated from Agriculture School.

By June 2013, only 80 groups (66%) were considered successful and viable groups. The high rate of inactive YPGs was due to lack of supervision (a limited number of supervisors?) in 121 YPGs, which scattered across 12 districts in Timor-Leste. Limited supervision was a consequence of recruiting problems and retaining sufficient field staffs.

Two cooperatives were established, based in Suai and Viqueque, with 17 and 43 members respectively. The main farming activities of the groups were producing vegetables, other food crops (such as corn, rice, cassava and sweet potato), poultry, tree crops (such as coconut and cashew nuts), fish culture, and food processing.

The paper begins with a justification of vegetable production in Timor-Leste to increase employment, followed by a description of the formation of YPGs including the practical innovations introduced. The methods and justification for the use of organic fertiliser and pesticides are described.

Justification of creation employment through increasing vegetable production

Vegetable farming was the dominant activity of the YPGs during the project operation. Seventy-five percent of groups grew vegetables as a main crop, or intercropped with other crops. The purpose of growing vegetables was either for sale or for their own consumption. Growing vegetables is popular because there is a market demand for vegetables. It is recognized that vegetables offer an important source of nutrition. Fresh vegetable sales, and their origin, across Dili markets are shown in Table 1 and 2.

Table 1 – Estimate of annual sales of fresh vegetable in Dili markets (quantity and value) in 2013

Market	Kg	($)
Becora	258,153	244,493
Comoro	1,055,432	1,443,392
Hali-laran	3,586,990	4,280,086
Taibessi	517,655	504,121
Tasi-ibun (Lecidere)	715,796	1,353,790
Total:	6,134,018	7,825,884

Source: DAI-USAID 2013

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Total estimated vegetables sold in Dili markets were 6,134 tons, valued at US $7.8 million in 2013 (Table 1). Market Hali-laran sold the highest quantity of vegetables to consumers in Dili, which accounted for 55 % of the total by value. On the other hand, the lowest quantity of sales was Becora market, which accounted for 3 % by value. Comoro market ranked in second position (18%), followed by Tasi-ibun (17%) and Taibesi (6%) markets. Vegetables sold at these markets were from various districts in Timor-Leste (Table 2).

Table 2 – District of origin of fresh vegetables in Dili markets

District	Percentage (%)
Ainaro	17
Baucau	15
Dili	14
Aileu	12
Bobonaro	8
Liquica	6
Lautem	4
Ermera	4
Other	2
Sub-Total:	**82**
Imports	18
Total:	**100**

In 2013, districts that supplied significant vegetables to Dili markets were Ainaro, Baucau, Dili and Aileu. The rest of districts supplied less than 8 %. Eighteen percent of fresh vegetables sold at local markets were imported vegetables.

The main reasons for increasing vegetable production are:

1. There is a high demand for fresh vegetable at local markets, which is estimated at 6,000 – 9,000 tons per year
2. Farming vegetable offers job opportunities for youth growers after finishing their schooling
3. Compared to other crops, growing vegetable can generate good income in a relatively short period of time
4. Vegetables are nutritious and can significantly improve people's food nutrition in rural areas
5. Locally supplied fresh vegetable are estimated only about 48% of the market and the rest (52 %) imported (including vegetables not sold through the local fresh vegetable markets, but imported directly by supermarkets, catering companies or hotels) (Gusmao & Johnston 2013, p 2-5).

Process in the formation of YPGs

A plan was created with young farmers to encourage them to fully participate in farm activities. For the first six months, YPGs were provided with food subsidies (until crops came on stream), as well as technical and management training, start-up investment funds, and ongoing advice and supervision through a team of seven districts coordinators, GFA p. 12-13. The process of the activities was as follows:

1. One day Orientation Seminar for graduated Agriculture Technical Schools
2. Received of the requests and on-site assessment
3. Two-day project concept and organization development workshops
4. Revised proposal from youth groups and contracts were prepared
5. Six-day workshops on starting agribusiness projects
6. Contracts were signed and funds were released
7. Youth groups were monitored and training needs were assessed
8. Managerial and technical training were provided, based on requests
9. Need-based technical and management trainings was conducted
10. Youth groups were provided with additional logistical assistance, based on requests
11. Activities of youth groups were continuously monitored and they were provided with business counseling
12. Formation of the cooperatives for youth groups' project was facilitated.

Innovations in froduction

Technology development in the agriculture sector in Timor-Leste has contributed directly to a significant shift in supply of various food crops, including vegetable production. Practical technological adoption in vegetable farming systems has encouraged more young people to increase the domestic production of vegetables.

Between 2010-13 GIZ partnerships with MAP (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) has introduced affordable micro-irrigation and others practical innovations to increase vegetable production by youth growers. Detail innovations outlined in the paper include:

1. High value seed
2. Use of potting trays
3. Drip irrigation
4. Mulching
5. Composting
6. Organic pesticides

High value seed

Good seed is a key determinant to produce high quality and quantity vegetables and this is important to fulfill market demand. Good seeds have better germination, growth and development as well as better resistance to drought and diseases that can lead to a better yield and thus higher economic returns to the growers. There was no guarantee that local seeds can fulfill market demand.

Open-pollinated seeds are preferable to hybrid seeds. Both open-pollinated and hybrid seeds were used by vegetable growers during the project life. Although hybrid seeds produced better yield than local open-pollinated seeds, they create growers' dependence on seed producers/suppliers. The use of good open-pollinated seeds was strongly recommended to growers as this type of seed can be saved by growers and/or widely available for growers to plant.

The benefits of good quality seeds are:

- They are genetically pure (true to type)
- Offer high return per unit area
- Less infection with weed seed/other crop seeds
- They are vigorous, free from pests, diseases and insect problems
- Respond well to applied fertilizers and nutrients
- Uniformity in plant population and maturity
- Easy to handle post-harvest operation
- Produce high value and marketability products

For example, field experience by youth-producer groups demonstrated that tomato seed imported from Australia *(Levante-variety)* grew more vigorously, produced higher quality of tomatoes, and yielded 5 kg/plant/season of fresh tomatoes compared to seed from Indonesia (Ratna-variety and Karina-variety). Irrespective of differences, tomato varieties from both Australian and Indonesian grew well, and produce good tomatoes during the rainy season, because they have resistance to wet climatic conditions.

Potting tray

Potting tray is a new method for producing good seedling. This method was introduced to replace the traditionally method of leaf-made container or seedbed method. A tray contains a number of pots for seeding. Normally, a single seed is sown in each pot after the tray has been filled out with the right potting mix which creates an optimum condition for seeds to germinate and thus produce healthy seedlings.

Germination rates of up to 95% are achievable, making the use of high quality, expensive seeds feasible. Seedlings in pots grow and hold soil well and the soil with root is easily removed for transplanting, thus preventing damage to seedling roots. This helps seedlings reduce stress after being transplanted into an open field.

Other advantage of using potting tray is that it is convenient to transport as well as to handle seedlings grown in a potting tray; 128 seedlings can be grown in a tray. This new method is more effective and efficient in that it encourages youth groups to engage more in farming activities compared to other seeding methods.

Drip irrigation

For an effective irrigation system, GIZ field staff introduced a new system of drip irrigation to youth producer groups to irrigate their vegetables.

The new drip irrigation system was introduced in a year at a Professional Agriculture Course at Natabora Agriculture School, and in the YPGs training centers. This system was introduced to replace the old system, which was ditch irrigation system that was considered not effective due to washing top soils and fertilizers away from the growing sites.

The new technique is attractive because it saves water and fertilizer more than 50 % compared to old system. The system also protects topsoil from erosion. The system produces large size of vegetables which are highly demanded by restaurants and markets.

Growers found that new practices provide more labour efficiency. The new techniques are not only attractive and motivated to growers but also benefit environment, given growers a greater chance of success.

The cost of setting up a drip irrigation system is around US$ 265 per 1,000 square meters. This does not include the cost of water tank of 1000 litre which is about US$ 130/tank. [2]

Straw mulching

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[2] Those interested in establishing a small scale drip irrigation for vegetable production in Timor-Lese should contact Mr Peter Dougan at +670, 77609013.

Plastic and straw mulches were used by the groups for growing vegetables. Plastic mulch is expensive and difficult to obtain in Timor-Leste. Straw mulch (rice, corn and bean straws) was preferred by the groups as it is widely available in rural areas. Straw mulch can protect soil from rain, reduce soil evaporation, increase water use efficiency and improve soil fertility after decomposition.

The benefits of mulching include:

- **Reduced evaporation:** Soil water does not escape from under straw/plastic mulch.
- **Reduced soil compaction:** Soil under mulch remains loose, friable and well-aerated. Roots have access to adequate oxygen and microbial activity is excellent.
- **Reduced weed problems:** Black plastic mulch provides good weed control in the row.
- **Reduced fertilizer leaching:** Water runs off the impervious mulch resulting in maximum utilization of the fertilizer.
- **Cleaner product:** A mulched crop is cleaner due to elimination of soil splashing on the plants or fruits.
- **Created a home for beneficial predator:** mulched soil as a home for beneficial beetles and spiders that could reduce the need for pesticides to prevent onion thrips (a pest) in onion field (Herring 2013, p15)

Compost

Composting is a technique used to accelerate the natural decay process and converts organic wastes to a mulch, which is used to fertilize soil. Composting time varies from 14 days to one year, depending on labour and type of microorganism used.

In vegetable farming, compost is well-known as organic fertilizer and importantly this can be produced locally and therefore it can be used to replace a more expensive chemical fertilizer which may have a negative impact on environment and health.

Advantages of using compost are:

- Improving soil fertility
- Increasing vegetable production
- Easy to make from local materials
- Cheaper than chemical fertilizers.

Although there is no chemical analysis showing the nutritional benefits of the compost, field observations show that compost improves soil fertility and soil structure.

The project used a standard composting technique with the use of a microbial activator to enhance the composting process. The microbial activator was a solution of EM4 (Effective Micro-organisms 4) or Micro Organisms Local (MOL); EM4 can be purchased from agriculture shops, while MOL con be made from coconut water, gin, pineapple, and papaya. Five liters of EM4 or MOL were mixed with 10 liters of water and sprayed onto the composting material twice a week. Within 2-3 weeks the compost was ready to use and had no smell, good micro-organism activity, and was black in colour and soft with all the materials biodegraded; signs of good compost GIZ p15-19.

Organic pesticides

Organic pesticides have no negative impact on the environment and are safe to existing predators. Reasons for introducing organic pesticides are: (i) Chemical pesticides can harm the environment and kill beneficial predators; (ii) Farmers in Timor-Leste do not often have money to purchase chemical pesticides; and (iii) the ingredients are cheap and locally available to make organic pesticides.

Using organic pesticide allows vegetable growers to reduce the use of synthetic pesticides by more than two-thirds and at the same time, produce top-quality of fresh vegetables. Locations where GTZ - RDP

facilitated farmers to use organic pesticides were in the villages of Liaro, Betecania, Caitarahu, Henihuta, Cailetiana, Fatosa, Loho, Uhacai, Halderai, Canlor, Uaisimo, Loiboroua, Soba , Afaloicai Baugia, Venilale, Quelicai.

The project used *Vitex negundo* (commonly known as the five-leaved chaste tree) to make organic pesticide. A 10 kg of the plant material was crushed to make a powder and 1 kg of this powder was added to 10 liters of water and 5 cc of detergent. The moisture was stirred in a bucket, closed with a cloth, to avoid direct sunlight, and stored in shady place for 24 hours before being used,[3] GIZ p15-19.

This solution was only effective to prevent crops from insects and microbes but not effective to kill/ eradicate insects and microbes, and for this reasons chemical pesticides were used.

Conclusions and recommendations

Market demand for fresh vegetables in Timor-Leste increases from time to time. Whilst domestic production has increased, it is still not sufficient enough to meet market demand and, therefore, imported vegetables are needed to fulfill the demand. However, this provides an opportunity to increase more vegetable production in Timor-Leste.

Vegetable farming creates jobs and incomes for young farmers. Use of new technologies (improved seeds, potting trays, mulching, organic fertilizer and drip irrigation) enhance vegetables production and labor efficiency making vegetable production more attractive to young farmers and increasing the economic benefits. This in turn would reduce importing of vegetables into Timor-Leste.

A study is justified to better describe and quantify those vegetable which can be produced locally and which are now imported. Also important is the seasonal fluctuation of such imports so that shortfalls in domestic supply can be matched against the seasonality of local production opportunities.

Young and educated farmers are more able to recognize the benefits of commercial contract-farming arrangements. Contract farming will be an important mechanism to ensure production for the market at the right time, in the right quantity, and of the right quality. The link between farmers, traders and the wholesale and retail markets are made explicit by such contracts.

There is very little economic data for vegetable production in Timor-Leste, particularly costs and returns, or gross margin data for individual crops. It is important to collect this information so that the returns to land, labour and capital investment can be quantified and compared to other opportunities.

The YEP project has now finished. Groups can gain access of support from the Directorate of Cooperatives if they establish cooperative structures, and the Ministry of agriculture (MAP) can support these groups with technical expertise, and non-technical support such as providing vegetable seeds. It is important for the Directorate of Cooperatives to support the formative capacity and institutional strengthening of these groups to become cooperatives, and to coordinate well with MAP.

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[3] Those interested in making compost and pesticides organic for vegetable crops in Timor-Lese should contact Mr Abilio da Costa at +670, 77283674.

Forest reliance as a livelihood strategy in Timor-Leste

Merve Hosgelen[1] and Dr Udoy Saikia

Introduction

Timor-Leste's environment has been under fundamental stress since the colonial period, particularly during the Indonesian occupation when much of the country's primary forests was logged or burned (The World Bank 2009). Today, the sustainability of forests in Timor-Leste continues to be threatened by increasing population pressures and poor environmental governance. The country's deforestation rate remains one of the highest in the world at 1.3 percent (The World Bank 2008). Population growth rate on the other hand is very high at 2.41 percent due to unprecedented high fertility rate of 5.7 children per women (The Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2010). While forests are disappearing at a rapid rate, the impact of the same on people's livelihoods is unknown. This paper aims to highlight the role of forests in supporting people's livelihoods in Timor-Leste. The conceptual framework in this paper applies a sustainable livelihoods approach for its analysis and identifies forest reliance as a household's livelihood strategy. Within this framework livelihood strategy is considered as the range and combination of activities and choices that people make and undertake in order to achieve their livelihood goal (DFID 1999). Adopted from DFID's conceptual framework this paper explores six distinct uses of forest resources under the context of a household's forest reliance (see Fig 1). Forest reliance in this paper is considered as a livelihood strategy adopted by households in order to achieve livelihood goals expressed in terms of improved wellbeing, increased income, improved food security and reduced vulnerability.

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Figure 1- Conceptual Framework adopted from DFID

Sustainable livelihoods framework

Key
H = Human Capital   S = Social Capital
N = Natural Capital   P = Physical Capital
F = Financial Capital

Method of analysis

The findings of this research are based on primary data consisting of 170 household level interviews and four focus group discussions, which were collected in five districts of Timor-Leste during field work undertaken between 2011 and 2012. The households and focus group participants were randomly selected from a total of eight villages located in the districts of Ainaro, Manufahi, Liquica, Lautem and Dili. A stratified sampling method was employed in the selection of these regions on the basis of their forest cover, poverty and fertility rates. For data analysis, statistical software SPSS version 21 is used.

Findings

The fieldwork data collected for this research shows that 60 percent of the households live very close to the forests, the distance being on average within 1.5 kilometres. Sixteen percent of the households had ownership of natural (primary) forest with an average size of 4.1 hectares. The findings also reveal a strikingly high percentage of forest product collection with 93 percent of the households collecting forest products for food, construction, selling, medicine or firewood in the past year. The key findings of each individual component of forest reliance are presented below.

Forest product reliance for housing

Forest resources make up a large component of the materials used in the construction of a local house, making them a major source of shelter for the Timorese people. Results from the 2001 World Bank housing strategy survey indicated that of the estimated 170,000 housing units in Timor-Leste approximately 88 percent were owner occupied and self-built (Bugalski 2010). This indicates that the majority of local houses in Timor-Leste are handled and built by the local community. According to the analysis of this research, 77 percent of households live in a house that consists of forest products. Of these, 23 percent live in a house where the entire roof and walls are constructed with forest products. The most commonly collected forest resources for housing include straw, grass, leaves, bamboo and wooden boards. Bundles named as *Bebak* in the local language, a slatted panel made from the base of palm frond and *Piku,* another prefabricated panel made by palm leaf are also collected.

The community discussions revealed that the ideal house size in rural areas as advised by the village chief is 30 square metres (6 metres by 5 metres) and the households are allowed to extract 3 cubic metres of wood from the forest to build their houses. Although the Timorese government, with the intention of reducing the burden on forest resources, has lowered this amount from 5 cubic metres (which was allowed during the Indonesian period), it was argued that there is no assurance or monitoring scheme for this rule. With increasing population pressure the demand on forest products for shelter is indeed going to be prominent.

Forest reliance for construction

This research finds that 53 percent of the households have in the past year collected forest product for the construction, maintenance of a house, making furniture or construction of a sacred house. The most collected construction materials are bamboo and teak, followed by mangroves, gum, sauce tree (Albizia tree), coconut leaves, palm stems and rattan. The construction of a sacred house among communities with ancestral ties is particularly unique in the context of Timor-Leste as it is closely linked to people's well-being. While the intangible and spiritual side of a sacred house includes ceremonies and rituals as well as people's beliefs symbolising the building as a protective house where people from the same decent can worship and communicate with their ancestors (Carvalho 2011), the material aspect is related to its construction. Being built entirely by forest products such as timber, bamboo, wooden planks, twine and fibre ropes, the construction of a sacred house establishes a positive link between people and forests beyond productive means. However with increasing population pressures, the need for building new houses (be it for sacred or as a dwelling) will continue to impose an increased demand on forest resources for construction purposes.

Forest reliance for firewood

FAO (2010) estimates that 93 per cent of the energy consumed by households in Timor-Leste comes from wood. According to the analysis of this research each one of the households covered in the fieldwork used firewood for their energy needs in the past year. Seventy percent of the households obtained firewood only

by collection while 23 percent relied on purchasing from the market. The remaining seven percent both collected and purchased firewood. The types of wood used as energy sources are presented in table below.

Table 1 Common Types of Wood used for Energy in Timor-Leste

Tree Names Known in English	Scientific Name	Name known in Local Language	Districts in which they are widely used
Casuarina or Coffee Shade Tree	Paraserianthes falcataria	Ai Kakeu/ Ai Osoho	Ainaro, Manufahi, Lautem, Liquica (not common in Dili)
White Gum	Eucalyptus alba	Ai Bubur	Ainaro, Manufahi Dili (widely sold at the streets)
Albizia tree or white lead tree or sauce tree	Leucaena leucocephala	Ai Samtuku	Ainaro
Accacia	Leucaena	Ai Kafe/ Ai Lomtoro	Ainaro, Manufahi
Not Known		Ai Denuk	Ainaro
Teak	Tectona grandis	Ai Teka	Manufahi
Ceylon oak	Sheleichera oleasa	Ai Kaidawa/ Ai dak	Lautem, Liquica
A type of tree which turns into red colour when it matures	Not known	Ai Laran Katimu (in Bahasa)	Lautem, Liquica
Mangrove	Rhizophora mangle	Ai Parapa	Liquica
Not Known		Ai Lok	Liquica
Not Known		Ai Ru	Dili
Not Known		Ai Dadak	Dili (This type is found to be a good type as it produces little smoke however the problem is identified as the bundles sold at the market are usually a mixture of many.

Firewood collection is generally a demanding task, requiring the time and labour of members of the household. In the group of families who collect firewood 54 percent of the households stated that everyone in the family is involved in the firewood collection activity. Twenty three percent mentioned that only adults collect firewood while 15 percent indicated that the job is handled by women and children. In terms of time, the analysis showed that an average size family (5-6 people) spends around 4 to 8 hours per week. For the group of households that purchase firewood from the market, this research found that the households each spend about $5 per week. Generally a 4-5 piece bundle of fire wood is sold at 10 cents. Considering almost half of the population lives on less than $1 a day, the cost of firewood as well as time and labour spent in its collection put a great burden on people's livelihoods.

The heavy reliance on firewood for energy needs also exerts great pressure on forest resources and its sustainability. The analysis of this research indicates that the majority of people are well aware of the deterioration of their local environment. Forty seven percent of the households perceive that there is less firewood available compared to 5 years ago. Eighty seven percent of the households indicate that they have to walk further away to collect firewood while 50 percent argue that they spend more time in firewood collection (see Table 2). With increasing population pressures the demand for firewood for energy purposes will no doubt increase unless alternatives are provided for those who lack other livelihood choices.

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Table 2 Perceptions of the firewood availability and access

Percentage of people that think		
	there is less firewood available compared to 5 years ago	47
	the availability of firewood is the same compared to 5 years ago	47
	there is more firewood available compared to 5 years ago	6
	they walk further away to collect firewood compared to 5 years ago	87
	more time is required for firewood collection compared to 5 years ago	47
	same time is required for firewood collection compared to 5 years ago	25
	less time is required for firewood collection compared to 5 years ago	28

Forest reliance for food

The analysis of this research shows that 39 percent of the households collected forest products for food purposes in the past year. The most commonly collected forest products include jackfruit, coffee, taro, two types of root crops locally named as kontas and tali, betel nut, candle nut and also palm for wine production in the given order. When it comes to bush meat the focus group discussions revealed that hunting of deer, monkey, boar, squirrel, frog, possum, wild bird, wild cat, mouse and snake is very common.

In the focus group discussions growing population pressures and excessive hunting were raised as emerging problems. The following quote from a participant indicates the increasing human threat on forest animals which are closely linked with food security in the country.

> We used to find monkeys everywhere. It was easy to hunt them but now there are so many people in the village... They caught a lot of monkeys. First only for their families but then they started to sell them. Now it is very hard to find them. We need to walk much longer into the forest to find monkeys snakes, and deer these days (A participant, fieldwork survey 2011-12).

This research has found that 14 percent of the households did not have enough food to survive in the past year and 79 percent had somewhat enough. In such circumstances further loss of forest food species can worsen the situation of food security in the country.

Forest reliance for medicine

In Timor-Leste the local knowledge of producing medicine from plants is held by a few people considered by the community to be wise with special talents named as 'matan-do'ok' (Carvalho 2011). The focus group discussions revealed that this knowledge is usually kept secret to ensure the sustainability of the medicinal products (plants or animals) as well as the tradition itself.

Research findings show that only 4 percent of the households, that is 7 households in total (6 male headed and 1 female headed with household heads aged 40 and above) collected forest products for medicinal purposes in the past year. This small percentage may reflect a few things. Firstly as discussed previously it may be due to the fact that the knowledge of making medicine is strictly kept among a limited number of people with special talents. Secondly the numbers of traditional healers may remain very low because of the cultural disruptions that took place during the occupation preventing the culture to be passed on. It may also be due to the fact that the sources for medicine are heavily exploited by many, making it hard to find. Finally increased health services at the community level may have caused a decline in the use of forest products for medicinal purposes.

According to the community discussions, the medicinal forest products are used to cure diseases such as cold, flu, malaria, to heal scars, cuts and to ease child labour. For example in the district of Ainaro,

the forest product `Ai kulit-manas` is used to cure sneezing, fever and malaria whereas `Ai bou` is used to ease child birth. In the district of Liquisa, the participants indicated that they use forest products to make medicine to treat headaches and coughing amongst others. Table 3 presents the local and scientific names of the forest products and includes a brief example from literature of their medicinal use.

Table 3 - Forest Products Used for Medicinal Purposes in Timor-Leste

Local Name	English or Scientific Name	Medicinal Use and Some Literature
Malu-Maluhu	Wild betel/ Wild pepper/ Wild chilly	In Timor-Leste the leaves of this medicine is used to treat headache.
Rounu	Lantana Camara	These scrubs are told to be very common between Dili and Liquica districts in Timor-Leste. It is majorly used to cure small cuts. Some literature suggests that the plant is traditionally used in Brazil and the leaves can be used as an antipyretic, carminative and in the treatment of respiratory system infections as well as healing gastric ulcers.
Due-due or Ai Badu	Jatropha (common name is physic nut and it is similar to candle nut)	The exact purpose of use is not identified in Timor-Leste however they are told to be found between Dili and Liquica districts. Literature suggests that the plant is generally used to produce light along with its medicinal benefits. The oil extracted from its leaves are used to treat babies with swollen throat or white tongue. In 2007, Goldman Sachs cited Jatropha curcas as one of the best candidates for future biodiesel production. The plant is resistant to drought and pests, and produces seeds containing 34 percent oil on average. Besides its medicinal benefits, jatropha seeds are therefore a source of biodisel production and after oil extraction they can be burnt for energy production.
Suaha or Fukira (Tetum) **Or Kadamba**	**Anthocephalus indicus**	In Timor-Leste the green part of the bark is usually crushed into pieces and dried to cure cuts. Literature suggests that the leaves are good for pain, swelling and better healing of wounds. The bark is also argued to be a remedy for diarrhea, dysentery and colitis.
Vehu or Ai Hanek or Ai Doti	Apocynaceae, commonly called Blackboard tree, Indian devil tree, Ditabark, Milkwood pine, White cheesewood	It is known to be a big tree of which leaves and bark are used for Malaria. This type is not used for firewood as when it is burnt it causes itchiness. Literature suggests that in India the bark of Alstonia scholaris is used solely for medicinal purposes, ranging from malaria and epilepsy to skin conditions and asthma. Other purposes include treating diarrhea, skin disorders, malarial fever, chronic dysentery, snake bite, ulcer.
Aikulit manas or Konela or Kayu Moui	Cinnamon Bark	The use of cinnamon for medicinal purpose in Timor-Leste context is not clear however other studies argue that the essential oil from the leaves of cinnamon tree has antiviral properties specifically against oral and genital herpes. It is also suggested that cinnamon improves glucose and lipids of with type 2 diabetes.
Ninu or Mankudu or Nenuk	Not Known	In Timor-Leste this plant is used for so many purposes including treatment of high blood pressure, fever, TB, cancer.
Pailalaha or Gaharu	Not Known	This small shrub type plant is told to be boiled to treat diarrhea among children in timor-Leste
Ai Dik	Flame Tree or	Literature suggests that the flowers of this plant are

	Golden Rain Tree *or Koelreuteria*	ophthalmic and can be used to treat complications related to anatomy, physiology or eyes.
Mauimi watu	Not Known	Putu is known to be the local name of the medicine produced.
Ipu-dudu	Not Known	N/A
Ai-bokur	Gum Tree	N/A
Memaja	Not Known	N/A

Forest reliance for income generation

This research finds that 42 percent of the households collected and sold forest products during the past year. The most commonly sold forest products included jackfruit, wild coffee, candle nut, palm stems and leaves, coconut leaves, teak, bamboo, palm wine, betel nut, coconut, taro, vanilla, and mahogany in the given order. The majority of forest products are sold to locals and visitors. Coffee, palm leaves and stems, teak and vanilla are generally sold to different parties such as cooperatives, non-government organisations, the government or private entities. Table 4 provides information on the unit prices of the forest products that were collected and sold in the past year.

Table 4 Forest Products Collected and Sold

Name	Unit	Market Price in US$
Bamboo	1 piece	$2.5-3 (depending on length)
Coconut leaves	1 bundle	$2.5
Palm stems	1 bundle	$2.5
Palm leaves	1 bundle	$2.5
Teak	m^3	More than $500 (About $10 per tree 10-15 diameters)
Firewood	1 bundle	10 cents
Candle nut	1 kilo	80 cents if separated from the shell 40 cents if not separated from the shell
Betel nut	Stick or Leaves	A stick is 5 cents, leaves are 25 cents. (1 stick is enough for 2-3 days and people on average spend 1$ spent per week on all parts)
Palm Wine	1.5 Litre Bottle	$4 if processed 1.5$ if not processed (Generally 5 litres is $10)
Jackfruit	1 Piece	$2.5 depending on size. There is a type only used for vegetables and that is 25 cents per piece.
Coffee	1 kilogram	50 cents (beans) $2 (powder)
Taro	2-3 pieces a bundle	50 cent to $1 depending on the size
Mahagoni	m3	More than $300
Vanilla	Not known	Not known
Rattan	Not known	Not known

Conclusion

This paper provides important information related to forest reliance in Timor-Leste at the household level. It highlights the traditional use of forest products for agricultural, construction, cultural and medicinal purposes. It finds considerably heavy reliance on forest products with 77 percent of the households collecting forest products for energy, 53 percent for construction, 42 percent for income generation and 39 percent for food in the past year. Having identified the nature of forest reliance and types of commonly collected forest resources for local livelihoods, this paper suggests that the sustainability of forests in Timor-Leste can't be ensured unless conservation targeted policies address people's diverse dependence on forest resources for their well-being. Hence it is vital that the knowledge of the traditional use of forest products is not undermined by policy makers and not lost to future generations in an ever increasingly globalised environment. The burden of losing the forest resource base and the knowledge of its traditional use would not only fall on the communities themselves but also on the government. Therefore this paper argues that for the well-being of local communities the wealth of forest resources needs to be protected and its traditional use needs to be encouraged within sustainable limits. This paper also encourages improved market opportunities and pricing for forest products and technological and human resource advancement for their production, harvesting and processing. Finally this paper recommends further analysis of the factors that influence a household's reliance on forest resources (such as demographic and socio-economic factors, household poverty and household's livelihood assets) for better targeting of conservation and development policies.

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Water deficit during the reproductive period reduced yields of tomato varieties

Marcal Gusmao and Sabino Henrique[1]

Introduction

In Timor-Leste, demand for tomato (*Lycopersicon esculentum* L.) product increases and is consistent with the improvement of country's economy and family income since the country decided to separate from Indonesia in 1999 and gained independence in 2002. Tomato production in Timor-Leste varies according to data sources. Total tomato production, according to the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), increased consistently from 241 tons in 2001 to 600 tons in 2011 (http://faostat.fao.org). Although the production for 2012 has not been recorded yet, based on the available data in previous years, one can expect that the production will be more than 600 tons. On the other hand, a much less tomato production of approximately 2 tons was observed in a recent survey in 2012 conducted by USAID, Timor-Leste (USAID 2013, 7). Further, this study showed production distributions across the country. Five major tomato production districts were Baucau (approx. 1 tons), Maliana (approx. 0.4 tons), Dili (approx. 0.3 tons), Aileu (approx. 0.2 tons) and Liquica (approx. 0.1 tons). Irrespective of the differences in the production of tomato in Timor-Leste between sources, it is clear that the production is not sufficient for consumption and hence its importing requirement is needed to fulfill the consumers' demand. Available data indicated that tomato product imported to Timor-Leste was 24 tons in 2010 (RDTL 2011, 126). High imported tomato product in Timor-Leste is related to its low production which is associated with climate constraints and limited irrigation.

Farmers usually grow tomato towards the end of the rain season. They recognize that by growing tomato early in the rainy season, for example in November or December, production is likely to fail due to disease and pests attack on plants and fruits during heavy raining in February and March. To avoid this, farmers traditionally recognize that a better quality of tomato fruits can be obtained when they grow late in the rain season and/or during dry season. Despite this, irrigation support is lacking and hence production is limited. Water deficit herewith refers as drought increases when plant enters to their reproduction e.g. in May in the northern and central parts of the country when the drought season begins. As tomato plants are semi or indeterminate plants, drought would reduce growth and production of flower and fruit and consequently reduce fruit yield. The extent of tomato yield reduction under drought and whether there was a better adapted variety among varieties tested were not well-understood. This study aimed to quantify and compare yield reduction between tomato varieties under drought and to identify a drought resistant variety.

Methods and materials

Study location and experimental details

This study was conducted in a Field Trial of the Faculty of Agriculture, National University of East Timor (or Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e – UNTL), in Hera from May to September 2012. Three tomato varieties of Apple (VA), Potato (VP) and Local (VL) were used in this study. The VA and VP were considered as improved varieties from Indonesia and seeds were obtained from a local agricultural market in Dili, Timor-Leste. The VL used in this study was the variety that has had been grown locally for years. Seeds of VL were obtained from a local market in Dili, Timor-Leste.

A pre-germinated plant of each variety was grown in a pot containing 7 kg of a 6 : 1 mixture of a sieved air-dried and sand collected from experimental site and nearby river, respectively. Plants in pots

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were arranged in a completely randomized design with 5 replications in a temporary established greenhouse and were well-watered at 70% of field capacity (FC) from sowing until 50% of flowering when drought treatments initiated. The drought treatment was applied by reducing pot water content from 70% FC to 55% FC (for moderate drought) and 40% FC (for severe drought) and these levels of water content were maintained until harvest. The control plants were watered and maintained at 70% FC until harvest. The amount of water used in each watering was calculated by weighing pots in every 2 – 3 days interval.

Plant water use

The amount of water applied in each watering from sowing to harvest was recorded and was summing up for the cumulative plant water use. Total plant water use was used to determine plant water use efficiency (see section plant water use efficiency below for details).

Growth and development

Numbers of plant leaves, branches and plant height were determined at harvest. Plant leaves were determined by counting all plant leaves. The number of branches was determined by counting the number of branches developed. Plant height was determined by measuring its height from the soil surface to the top of highest stem e.g. main stem. Plant materials (except fruits) were oven dried at 70°C for 48 hours and reweighed for dry matter determination.

Flower and fruit production and their abortions

The number of flowers developed including those successfully formed fruits and aborted flowers were counted. In addition, the numbers of fruits as well as aborted fruits were also recorded.

Plant water use efficiency

Water use efficiency for dry matter and fresh fruits were determined by dividing the weight of plant dry matter and fresh fruit to the total plant water use.

Statistical analysis

The package GenStat Discovery Edition 4 (Oxford UK) was used for statistical analysis of the data. The data was analysed using a two-way analysis of variance.

Results and discussion

Plant water use

Figure 1 - Cumulative water use for VA (a), VP (b) and VL (c) with control plants (70% FC), moderate drought (55% FC) and severe drought (40%). Data are means ± SE (n = 5).

Plant water use from sowing to 50% flowering at the time when water treatment initiated was approximately 8 L per plant in all three tomato varieties. Drought reduced plant water use by 19% for plants received a moderate drought (55 % FC) and by 38 % for plants received a severe drought (40% FC) in all varieties, compared with their control plants (70% FC). Overall, the reduction of plants' water use affected their physiological activities and thus led to reduce growth, development and yield of tomato varieties.

Growth and development

Drought significantly reduced number of plant leaves (P<0.001), branches (P<0.001) and plant height (P<0.01), despite there was no significant difference between tomato varieties (P>0.05) leading to no interaction between treatments and varieties. Under the moderate drought, number of plant leaves was reduced by 19, 17 and 12 leaves in VA, VP and VL, respectively, compared with their controls (Table 1). In a severe drought, plant leaves number were decreased further by 33, 30 and 28 in VA, VP and VL, respectively, compared with their controls. Reduction in plant leaves was due to the reduction in number of branches and nodes. Severe drought reduced plant branch number by 21, 38, and 25% for VA, VP, and VL, respectively and plant height by 17, 12 and 10% for VA, VP and VL, respectively, compared with their controls. These results consistent with studies on an indeterminate growth habit grass pea (*Lathyrus sativus* cv. Ceora) that growth and development were reduced when plants imposed to either moderate or severe drought (Gusmao 2010, 41, 65; Gusmao et al. 2012, 5). Reduction of plant leaves led to reduce green leaf area and thus photosynthesis which led to reduce plant dry matter production as well as flower and fruit production (Table 2).

Table 1. Number of plant leaves, branches and plant height (cm) of the tomato varieties. Data are means $\pm$ SE (n = 5).

Water treatment	Tomato variety		
	VA	VP	VL
Number of plant leaves			
70 % FC	16.0 ± 0.3	15.4 ± 0.7	14.8 ± 0.4
55 % FC	13.0 ± 0.8	$12.8 + 0.6$	13.0 ± 0.3
40 % FC	10.8 ± 0.8	10.8 ± 0.7	10.6 ± 0.5
Number of plant branches			
70 % FC	2.8 ± 0.2	2.6 ± 0.2	2.4 ± 0.2
55 % FC	2.4 ± 0.2	2.2 ± 0.2	2.0 ± 0.3
40 % FC	2.2 ± 0.2	1.6 ± 0.2	1.8 ± 0.2
Plant height			
70 % FC	78.2 ± 2.7	73.0 ± 2.0	71.2 ± 5.5
55 % FC	68.0 ± 7.5	67.8 ± 1.2	67.6 ± 0.9
40 % FC	64.8 ± 5.9	64.2 ± 2.0	64.0 ± 0.8

Dry matter production, fruit number, fresh fruit weight, aborted flower and fruit

There were interaction between treatment and variety in dry matter production (P<0.001) (Table 2). The highest dry matter production was VA in control plants, while dry matter production was comparable in all varieties when plants imposed to moderate and severe droughts. Under moderate drought, dry matter production of VA was reduced by almost half (46%) compared with control. A slight further reduction occurred when water application reduced further to a severe drought. Potato variety, however, did not differ between treatments on dry matter production. On the other hand, VL showed a steady reduction of 19 and 34% in moderate and severe droughts, respectively, compared with control. A field study observed that a 75-day irrigation cutoff reduced plant dry matter by 26% compared with control (Mitchell and Shennan 1991, 4) which was in between moderate and severe drought of the VL variety. Reduction of plant dry matter is a consequence of the reduction of photosynthesis when water supplement decreases (Morison et al. 2008, 642) that it reduces plant water status (Gusmao et al. 2012, 5).

Table 2 - Dry matter production, fruit number, fresh fruit weight, aborted flower and fruit per plant. Data are means $\pm$ SE (n = 5) at LSD, P<0.05.

Water treatment	Tomato variety														
	VA	VP	VL	VA	VP	VL	VA	VP	VL	VA	VP	VL	VA	VP	VL
	Dry matter production (g/plant)			Fruit number per plant			Weight of fresh fruit (g/plant)			Aborted flower per plant			Aborted fruit per plant		
70% FC	46.7±3.4	28.1±2.3	29.6±2.3	15.4±1.3	11.0±0.7	10.6±0.8	80.2±7.7	44.3±4.9	32.7±2.8	1.4±0.4	1.0±0.5	1.8±0.5	1.2±0.4	2.0±0.6	2.0±0.3
55% FC	25.2±1.5	24.6±1.7	24.0±1.3	11.2±1.2	10.6±0.5	10.2±0.6	43.6±4.2	32.4±2.0	30.9±3.4	5.0±0.5	6.0±0.5	6.8±0.8	1.8±0.2	2.4±0.7	3.0±0.6
40% FC	22.4±1.3	21.4±3.0	19.5±0.7	8.8±0.5	7.8±0.4	8.2±0.4	30.4±1.7	23.9±2.1	21.1±2.2	7.0±0.3	7.8±0.4	12.2±0.6	4.2±0.5	3.4±0.5	4.8±0.4
LSD-Treatment	3.49***			1.27***			2.26***			na			na		
LSD-Variety	3.49***			1.27**			2.26***			na			na		
LSD-Interaction	6.04***			2.20*			3.91***			na			na		

***significant at P≤0.001, **significant at P≤0.01, *significant at P≤0.05, na not aplicable

Table 3 - Water use efficiency for dry mass (WUE$_{dm}$) and for fresh fruit (WUE$_{ff}$) of the tomato varieties. Data are means $\pm$ SE (n = 5).

Water treatment	Tomato varieties		
	VA	VP	VL
WUE$_{dm}$			
70 % FC	2.9	1.8	1.9
55 % FC	1.9	1.9	1.8
40 % FC	2.2	2.1	1.9
WUE$_{ff}$			
70 % FC	5.0	2.8	2.0
55 % FC	3.4	2.5	2.4
40 % FC	3.0	2.4	2.1

Fruit production per plant was significantly interacted between water treatments and tomato varieties (P<0.001) (Table 2). Under well-watered conditions, the highest fruit production per plant was VA which was 15.4 fruits and this was consistent with the highest dry matter production compared with other varieties (described in the previous paragraph). Fruit productions were similar in VP and VL which were 11 and 10.6 fruits, respectively. Moderate drought did not reduce fruits number in VP and VL compared with their controls, but there was a dramatic reduction in fruit number in VA variety which was 27% less than its control. Severe drought significantly reduced fruit number in all varieties which were 43, 29 and 23% for VA, VP and VL, respectively, compared with their controls. Number of fruits produced was similar in all varieties under severe drought.

The weight of fruits per plant reflected well the fruit number produced described above, except VP and VL where different trends were observed (Table 2). Moderate drought significantly reduced fruits weight by 46 and 27% in VA and VP, respectively, but it did not reduce weight of fruits in VL (6%) compared with their controls. Severe drought significantly reduced fruit weight per plant by 62, 46 and 36% in VA, VP and VL, respectively, compared with their controls. In a field study, it was observed that a 75-day irrigation cutoff reduced tomato fruit yield by 29% compared with control (Mitchell and Shennan 1991, 5). This result can be comparable with the moderate drought in current study as in the field condition, there may be more soil moisture available deeper in the soil profile that support growth and fruit yield of tomato. In the current study, results suggest that VA and VP were more sensitive in response to drought compared with the VL. The reduction of fruit number and weight were due to the increase in flower and fruit abortions (Table 2).

Moderate drought increased flower abortions by triple (compared with controls) in all varieties. When plants imposed to severe drought, there was a moderate increase in flower abortion in VA and VP, but it was almost double in VL, compare with their moderate drought. Fruit abortion under moderate drought did not differ to control plants and they were comparable, except VL where it was higher than the VA (Table 2). However, under severe drought, the highest aborted fruit was VL and this was comparable with VA. High flower and fruit abortion in VL was probably an adaptive strategy of the plant to maintain size of the remaining fruits and this is consistent with other study on indeterminate growth habit grass pea (Gusmao et al. 2012, 5).

Water use efficiency for dry matter mass and fresh fruit

In VA, drought reduced water use efficiency for dry matter production (WUE_{dm}) by 34 and 23% for moderate and severe drought, respectively, compared with control (Table 3). In VL, moderate drought slightly reduced WUE_{dm} (by 0.4%) compared with control, but this was increased again and reached to control value in a severe drought. In VP, drought improved WUE_{dm} by 8 and 22% in moderate and severe drought, respectively, compared with control. Despite this, in VP, drought reduced water use efficiency for fresh fruit (WUE_{ff}) by 10 and 14% in moderate and severe drought, respectively, compared with control. Similarly, in VA, drought reduced WUE_{ff} by 33 and 39% in moderate and severe drought, respectively, compared with control. On the other hand, in VL, drought improved WUE_{ff} by 16 and 3% in moderate and severe drought, respectively, compared with control.

Conclusion

Drought reduced growth and development, but increased flower and fruit abortion of all tomato varieties which led to reduced dry matter production and fruit yields. Within the varieties, the VA was the most sensitive to drought compare to the other two varieties. Variety Local was less affected and showed an improvement in water use efficiency for fresh fruit under drought compared to the other two improved varieties.

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Identities, territories and agricultural practices: Some landmarks for the preservation of local communities' Heritage in East Timor

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East Timor lies at the threshold between insular Southeast Asia and Oceania. At the easternmost tip of the Sunda chain of islands, West of Papua and off Australia's North coast, it presents an original combination between Austronesian and Non-Austronesian (or Papuan) worlds, and both linguistic groups coexist within the country.

The antiquity of the settlement and the diversity of cultural interactions offered in Timor presents an interesting ground to address and discuss the models of cultural evolutions or cultural transformations through time and, in particular, to evaluate the chronology and impact of the Austronesian contact in the island.

This paper introduces the research we are just beginning in Timor-Leste. It combines the approaches of Archaeology, Anthropology, Geography, Ethnoecology in order to study the evolution of society, of environment and of subsistence systems through time, and to record knowledge on places or "geosymbols" invested with history, myth, magic or power.

Such an approach aims at understanding the long-term dynamics sustaining today's cultures. With this research we hope to get an environmentally sound vision of the expending repertoire of plant exploitation through time and its associated agricultural practices, in order to characterise, at a local or regional level, the dynamics of cultural changes and to highlight major natural or external cultural events in the process.

By focusing on plant exploitation and agricultural practices, land use and cultural landscape, in addition to the more classical approach of archaeology (chronologies and typologies), we hope to raise new issues regarding the so-called « Neolithic revolution » and in particular highlight, as in PNG (Denham et al. 2004, 2009; Denham 2011), the complexity of cultural interactions before Austronesian contact some 3500 years ago. Finally we wish also to address the relevance of linguistic as a marker of specific cultural practices. Plan exploitation and ancient agricultural practices have already been well studied in some area of Timor-Leste and the present research will build upon them (see for instance, for the latest publications Oliveira 2008, 2010, 2012).

To achieve these goals, we have selected an area west of the country, along the road from Maubara to Suai, with several linguistic groups: the Austronesian-speaking Kemak and Tetun and Bekais groups, and the Non-Austronesian-speaking Bunak. The results from this area will be in a second stage compared with similar research in different environments: the South-East coast and the Atauro Island.

In 2012, a large survey has allowed us to select the region of Balibó as a suitable area to begin this research. Balibó, located at the central western end of the country, displays a karstic environment of plateaus and hills dissected by small valley systems, which offer an ideal environment for cultivation and living. Rock-shelters and caves, with evidence on the surface of a lithic industry and of stone features, suggested a rich and long history of the place. Furthermore, Balibó lies at a medium altitude (around 500 meters) not very far from, and connected to the sea by several large river systems.

This region of Timor-Leste is poorly documented by archaeology and our research will also add up to the archaeological knowledge already gathered in the East (Lospalos) and Centre-East (Baucau) of the country (0'Connor 2007; 0'Connor et al. 2007, 2010).

A 3 weeks field trip in June and July 2013 allowed us to:

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- Identify suitable archaeological sites to document a long term history of the area and to test the potential of some of these places.
- Map the most prominent features of the cultural landscape and collect information on its use.
- Record the local usages of wild and cultivated plants and crops.

Preliminary archaeological survey achievements

The immediate surroundings of the village of Balibó are set in a landscape of narrow and fertile valleys, bordered by low calcareous cliffs which display many rock shelters and dissolution caves (Figure). Many offer good shelter and a few of them seemed to have had enough sedimentation for the preservation of ancient traces of occupation. Two one-meter test excavations in suitable rock shelters and a deep test-pit in the gardens below have been made. They will be described now.

Figure 1. The Balibo karst complex with indication of archaeological sites visited or excavated (triangles)

Kerahu Luhan (Duan Nele)

This is a large and mostly vertical calcareous cliff around 18 meters high with several small shelters at the end of a narrow valley occupied by local fields.

      The place occupies a strategic position, overlooking a vast area of gardens and its orientation to the North-East make it a shaded area during most of the day. A small open cave at one end offers a dry shelter for the night. Cassava gardens extending almost inside the sheltered area have disturbed the soil and lithic flakes are now abundant on the surface.

      Our first excavation was set outside one of the shelters, in a gently sloping area where flakes were abundant.

      The stratigraphy revealed a homogenous deposition of clayish soil associated with calcareous stones and a large amount of flakes. Only one stone tool was excavated here. The calcareous floor of the shelter was hit at about 50cm under the surface of the soil.

Kerahu Luhan, with its large amount of flakes and raw material, might have been a working place for stone tools, rather than an occasional or permanent living place. The range of flakes sizes, the presence of used raw material (nucleus) as well as small flakes and chips indicate that the flaking occurred on the spot. Most of the flakes were made in locally available red or yellow jasper of medium to poor quality. One retouched tool only, a point, was found in the excavated testpit (Figure 1). This point, known from elsewhere in Timor, always found in small quantity, is a rare example of the knowledge and technology at this time. Other artefacts include mainly flakes in large quantity. Faunal and flora remains, mainly bones and charcoal were only met in small quantity.

At this stage, it proves difficult to evaluate the antiquity of the use of this place. Pottery is very rare and only found on the surface. This could indicate that the place was used more than 2000 years ago. Further research in the near future will be organised in a more protected small area of the same complex.

A test excavation was set in the gardens below the shelter, halfway between two lines of calcareous stones set there to prevent erosion. It was hoped that this test pit could reveal further ancient deposits, as in the Kerahu Luhan shelter which is only 40 meters away.

The stratigraphy revealed a deep natural deposition of clay and silt without any trace of human activity. Soil samples will help determine the nature and length of cultivation in these gardens as well, we hope, as its vegetational history through pollen and phytoliths determination.

Maulamun Tama

This is a rock shelter of around 9 meters high and 25 meters in its widest part, whose outermost part is occupied by a large banyan tree.

The shelter is located at the exit of a valley, 50 m from a semi-permanent, 300 meters long pond, and overlooks the valleys nearby. It is a well-oriented (NE) and large shelter. The excavated area (1x1m) revealed 60 cm of largely silty brown sediment and ashes with again large calcareous stones which have fallen from the walls before reaching what seems to be a natural cave floor.

Remains of human activity were found up to the bottom in limited quantity. The preservation is much better here than in the previous test-pit of Kerahu Luhan, and many bones, some burnt, as well as flakes were excavated. Marine shells and even a shell bead and large rat bones from an unknown, now extinct, giant rat genus suggest here that the human occupation of the shelter also predates 2000 BP.

Conclusions which can be drawn from this initial research in Balibó are obviously limited as the fieldwork has just ended and analysis and dating results are not yet available. A very preliminary understanding of the chronology and landscape use emerges from this survey and in the light of previous research in other area of Timor-Leste (O'Connor et al. 2002, 2007, 2012; O'Connor 2006; Lape 2006; Lape et al. 2008; Veith et al. 2004; Spriggs et al. 2003) . Human presence in the area is ancient. The excavated shelters indicate a certain antiquity of their use. It is difficult at this stage to give an accurate date but the scarcity of pottery and the importance of lithic industry, especially in Kerahu Luhan, suggest an age older than 1500 years. Remains of large rats found at the base of the excavation in the shelter of Maulamun Tama further indicate an occupation prior to 2000 BP (Aplin 2010 and Aplin pers. com.), some direct dating of these bones will be performed.

The lithic industry in both excavated areas is quite similar to the one described further East and in the wider region of insular Southeast Asia at the same time. A large part of the assemblage is made of simple flakes of various shapes and poor quality which could belong to the "strike-a-light" type of artefacts. Among the numerous single flakes emerge a few retouched artefacts which again elsewhere in Timor point to a late neolithic occupation (Glover 1986). Most of the raw material is available locally but the diversity of the stones used for flaking could imply some import.

Figure 2. Balibo, tanged point (a) and scraper (b)
Figure 2 (a) Balibo. Kerahu Luhan.Tanged point (scale is 1cm)

Figure 2 (b) Balibo, Dua Nelle surface find. Scraper (scale is 1 cm)

Local information indicates that traditional villages were on the karst hilltops before the arrival of Europeans and the resettlement along the road. Several fortified sites have been located (but not surveyed due to time constraint and the necessity to obtain customary authorization), above the actual village of Balibó and in the nearby areas. In Balibó, most hilltop sites are still used for sacred ceremonies linked with the re-enactment of social ties. The knowledge of their previous occupation is still strong and oral traditions suggest that most fortified sites were abandoned "when muskets replaced bows and arrows". Similar fortified sites are well described in the East of Timore-Leste where their use has been dated back to between 1100 and around 1700 AD (Lape 2006; Lape et al. 2008; O'Connor et al. 2012). Fortified sites appear at similar times from Eastern Indonesia to Eastern Polynesia, and from Okinawa to New Zealand (Field et al. 2010).

Karst landscapes offer fertile soils, water, shelter and vegetation and also material for large buildings or retaining walls, all of which concur to make these environments particularly suitable for human occupation. Our preliminary observations indicate that the Balibó area has a broadly similar history to the one highlighted by the research of our colleagues further East in similar environments. This history is based on the specific resources of the karsts but is not disconnected from other environments. In the Maulamun Tama shelter, fishbone and shellfish indicate the past use of marine resources, another ecological zone complementary to the karst.

There is no doubt that these landscapes were appreciated during most of the history of human presence in Timor-Leste and that these environments favoured the development or the persistence of a specific identity linked with place, in other words a specific territoriality, and highlighted by the re-use of older culturally important places such as fortified sites, rock shelters or remarkable natural places. A tendency probably amplified in Balibó by the limited size of the karst area. Other similar limited karst landscapes, in Ilimanu, Baucau, Atauro Island or elsewhere might offer good comparisons in the future.

While there is obvious evidence of a long use of the karst area, there is no evident continuity of occupation, especially in recent times with evidences of conflicts and migrations, as described in oral traditions and as visible in the remains of fortified villages. Obviously, the language change within a group is also something that can occur quite rapidly, as informants confirmed. This first field experience in Balibó leads us to consider that languages are probably not a efficient criteria to differentiate cultural areas.

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The continuum of women's activism in Timor-Leste in the context of UN peacebuilding

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This paper looks at the continuum of women's activism from the end of Indonesian occupation through to the period of independence in Timor-Leste and focuses on some discursive tensions between international norms of gender equality and domestic women's activism in Timor-Leste. The paper is based on the authors PhD research which assesses UN Security Council mandated missions in Timor-Leste and their approach to gender mainstreaming – the process by which the UN must allow for the equitable participation of men and women in the whole of peace support operations.[2] The paper draws on interviews conducted as part of this research in Timor-Leste in 2012 and 2013. Interviews are referred to by number, rather than name, and all interviews were conducted with the author of this article. The analysis here will highlight the continuum of women's activism in Timor-Leste and their role in translating international conventions on gender equality into benefits on the ground. This account can provide an impetus for improved policy and engagement on gender inclusive post-conflict reconstruction. This discussion brings to the fore concerns with ownership and empowerment in international gender equality projects. Improved understanding will further buttress empowerment of women in host countries, a central theme of gender mainstreaming rhetoric.

Over time, the UN system has increasingly incorporated insights from feminist movements and gender equality advocates into the weave of peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations. This has been done through a process of Security Council resolutions that mandate action on, variously, preventing sexual violence in conflict, improving women's representation in decision-making – in both peace processes and UN structures – and ensuring that the human rights of women in post-conflict situations are not overlooked. The watershed moment for this was the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security which established the foundations for gender mainstreaming and argued for women's increased representation in the UN system and in decision-making. Resolution 1325 acknowledged women's experiences of war and laid foundations for incorporating gender perspectives into state-building processes – such as electoral, peace and judiciary systems. Most notably it was 'the first time the Security Council [had] devoted an entire session to debating women's experiences in conflict and post-conflict zones' (Cohn, Kinsella and Gibbings 2004, 10). Subsequent resolutions on women, peace and security have continued to support women's role in these processes and have attempted to address some of the gender based impacts of conflict (see Security Council Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960 and 2122).[3] Together these mandates centre on two central themes of gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, which can be broadly defined as protection and empowerment of women in conflict and post-conflict zones.

The process which led to Resolution 1325 built on collaborations between feminists that had been emerging across borders for some years, including the *Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW 1979) and the *Beijing Platform for Action* (1995) which itself was borne out of the momentum of the Nairobi Conference in 1985 which closed the 'UN Decade for Women'. These movements highlight the intertwining agendas of equality, development and peace. The Nairobi Conference

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[2] Established as a 'global strategy' in the *Beijing Platform for Action* in 1995, and as a strategy fundamental for peace and security operations in Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (S/RES/1325, 2000). However a commonly used definition and principles of gender mainstreaming can be found in the ECOSOC 'Agreed Conclusions' (1997/2).

[3] For literature that more closely analyses UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions on women, peace and security see *inter alia* Barrow (2010), Cohn (2004), Gizelis and Pierre (2013), Puechguirbal (2010), Shepherd (2011), St-Pierre (2011).

saw nearly 14,000 women from around the globe come together, a majority of who were from the developing world (Çağatay, Grown and Santiago 1986, 402). East Timorese women were also present at both the Nairobi NGO Forum held prior to the official UN conference and the UNs Fourth World Conference in Beijing 1995 (Hill 2012, 218). The culmination of these movements is, in essence, about recognising women's unequal share of decision making power and simultaneously rectifying the historical silence in the international realm on both this exclusion, the subordination of women it perpetuates, and the differential experiences of women during times of conflict. Notably, the movements were driven by diverse groups of women from around the globe that represented various intersections of race, class, ethnicity and sexuality.

As laudable as these developments and their stated ideals are, implementing these principles in a positive, effective and meaningful way has not always occurred. Resolution 1325 has spawned large amounts of literature questioning its effectiveness, both real and potential, and analysing the impacts it has had since its introduction.[4] A less insignificant part of this literature points to the ad hoc and often lackadaisical approach of the UN and the inherent problems of enforcing such a broad mandate (Binder, Lukas and Schweiger 2008; Westendorf 2013, 4-5). These represent internal limitations – institutional limitations in ability or will to implement such a framework. External obstacles are also part of this discussion and are frequently connected to a national culture, a tension between local and international norms of gender equality (Hall 2009), 'deep-seated gendered hierarchies' in the country in question (Hall and True 2009, 159) or 'discriminatory social norms' (UN General Assembly 2010, 7). At its most basic level, this iteration of the tensions between international and national sees them as mutually exclusive and the local can be brushed aside as incompatible with peacebuilding whereas international norms are equitable.

Both internal and external factors are present in Timor-Leste. Successful implementation of gender mainstreaming principles has meant contending with both patriarchal norms in Timor-Leste and the attendant challenges of having a large UN bureaucracy in country. In Timor-Leste, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 2000-2002) was obliged to incorporate a gender perspective into its operations even though it predated Resolution 1325, due to the precedent set by the international conferences on women. Due to lobbying from both East Timorese women and activists within the UN, UNTAET was the first UN peacekeeping mission to have a Gender Affairs Unit (GAU). Therefore, in regards to gender mainstreaming, Timor-Leste represents an important milestone for UN peacebuilding missions. The GAU of UNTAET became the predecessor for the Office for the Promotion of Equality (OPE) and subsequently the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality (SEPI). The following mission, UNMISET,[5] gave less importance to gender and failed to support ongoing consolidation of some of the gains made during UNTAET (Olsson 2009, 82). With the establishment of UNMIT,[6] gender advisors were placed in most units and as well as these positions UNMIT had its own GAU. UNMITs focus fell towards physical security, with the Security Council encouraging security sector responsiveness to the needs of women in Timor-Leste, in line with the security sector focus of UNMIT.

The women's movement in Timor-Leste has been active and visible prior to the establishment of UNTAET. The development of this movement is inextricably linked to the fight for independence and self-determination from 1974 onwards. In 1975, Rosa Bonaparte, the founding secretary of the women's wing of Fretilin, *Organização Popular da Mulher Timorense* (OPMT), famously stated their aim as 'firstly, to participate directly in the struggle against colonialism and second, to fight in every way the violent discrimination that Timorese women have suffered in colonial society' (Bonaparte 1976, 7). OPMT was the first indigenous women's organisation in Timor-Leste and women participated actively in every arm of the resistance movement, including in armed combat, attending training on how to assemble and disassemble a

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[4] See for example Black (2009), Rehn (2001), Willett (2010).
[5] United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, 2002-2005.
[6] United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, 2006-2012.

rifle (Sequeira and Abrantes 2012, 49).[7] Women's activities in resistance against occupation were many and varied and reflect the organisational and logistical stages of the resistance movement. OPMT was organised consistent with the administrative sectors of Fretilin and provided support networks of women and spaces for them to work together, with the opportunity to engage in active combat and clandestine activities (Alves, Abrantes and Reis 2005; da Silva 2010, 152-159; Cristalis and Scott 2005). OPMT also engaged in Fretilin's education programs, which included learning of women's emancipation, as well as political and literacy education (CAVR 2005, section 5.2, para 38-44). *Organização da Mulher Timorense* (OMT) was established in 1998 and welcomed women from all political parties and none, to reflect the united front of the newly created CNRT.[8] The OMTs aims and objectives were not much different from OPMT and would continue to support the cause for independence and organise at the grassroots level (Cristalis and Scott 2005, 47). Also established during the occupation period, FOKUPERS,[9] a grass roots women's advocacy organisation, was 'one of only a handful of pre-referendum non-church NGOs trying to operate in a hostile environment' (Conway 2010, xviii).

In 1975 Rosa Bonaparte produced OPMTs manifesto, providing insight into the theoretical basis of the women's movement at that time, and which highlighted the causes of women's oppression as 'both cultural and structural' (da Silva 2010, 149). Speaking out against polygamy and *barlake* – commonly translated as dowry or bride price[10] – the capacity of this movement was clearly demonstrated as members critically engaged with internal issues of women's equality. This was not simply a women's 'auxiliary' role to the independence movement, but also a movement that demanded changes within the structure of East Timorese society and saw their participation in resistance as integral. East Timorese women have spoken of learning about emancipation whilst fighting for independence, and many gained knowledge in these areas from those who had studied abroad and returned to Timor-Leste. Therefore, prior to the arrival of the UN missions, the East Timorese women's movement was not isolated from the globalised movements discussed above and indeed East Timorese women brought the violence they and others suffered under Indonesian occupation to international attention well before 1999 (Hill 2012, 218).

In the post-1999 period, given the lifting of a hostile and oppressive environment and the influx of international funds, a number of local and national NGOs have been established supporting the rights, needs and interests of East Timorese women.[11] In 2000, the First National Women's Congress was organised and an umbrella women's secretariat, Rede Feto, was established which brought together 16 women's organisations. Rede Feto was instrumental in campaigning around women's political representation in independent Timor-Leste (Wigglesworth 2010, 245). Resistance era organisations such as OPMT, its sister organisation GFFTL,[12] OMT and FOKUPERS continue their work in issue areas such as women's parliamentary representation, women's literacy and domestic violence.

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[7] See Sequeira and Abrantes (2012) and Conway (2010) for the testimonies of women and the many roles they undertook as part of the resistance against Indonesian occupation and also their day-to-day lives during occupation.

[8] *Conselho Nacional da Reconstrucão Timoresnse* – National Congress of Timorese Reconstruction – united front of the resistance, established 1998, which incorporated political parties outside of Fretilin.

[9] *Forum Komunikasi Untuk Perempuan Lorosa'e* – East Timorese Women's Communications Forum.

[10] Although *barlake* is commonly translated to mean dowry or bride price, Sara Niner (2012, 141) has pointed out that this is a mistaken translation, stating: 'The term "dowry" refers to an endowment by the bride's family, transferred with her in marriage, representing her natal inheritance in patriarchal societies which have no tradition of independent inheritance for women…Bride-price…is a gift of payment from the groom's family to the bride's family, understood as compensation for the loss to the bride's kin group of her labour and fertility…'. *Barlake* on the other hand represents reciprocal exchange (Niner 2012). One interview participant elaborated on this: 'You give a present, you receive a present more or less the same value…But your presents are of a different kind then the present you receive, for example, I give you live things, you give me dead things. If you give me *tais,* gold, money, I give you pigs, cows, this is life' (Interview no. 24, 22 August 2013).

[11] For a more detailed account of NGOs, national and international, operating in Timor-Leste with a gender framework, see Trembath and Grenfell (2007).

[12] *Grupo Feto Foinsa'e Timor Lorosa'e* – East Timor Young Women's Group, was established in 1998 as part of student organising against occupation, working in rural areas.

Despite various challenges, not least of which was an extremely challenging political and social environment, East Timorese women have continued, in many respects successfully, their advocacy for equality and empowerment in the presence of successive UN peacebuilding missions. In the case of Timor-Leste, a simple dichotomy of international norms taking hold and dislodging restrictive cultural norms inherently opposed to gender equality does not fully capture the complexity of this relationship, as the international presence itself can reinforce a patriarchal hierarchy through the exclusion of women. Despite precedent for women's inclusion in peacebuilding processes, there were concerns that East Timorese women were excluded from transitional administration:

> Today we have entered a new stage, the final stage until full independence for East Timor under [UN] Administration. However, it has become apparent that even with the UNs presence in East Timor, the women of East Timor still have a double battle to fight. We must combat our own society's views of the role of women, the traditional ties that bind while at the same time continuously advocating to the UNTAET and the East Timor Transitional Administration for policies and hiring practices that include women (Rede Feto 2000).

The above sentiment bears similarity to the dual purposes of OPMT outlined in 1975, to fight both patriarchal structures within Timor-Leste and those within Portuguese colonialism. This has also occurred in the context of a 'post-conflict backlash', in which women in post-conflict areas may find their needs marginalised and their behaviours and rights restricted as part of romanticised notions to return to a more traditional era (Pankhurst 2008). This process has been evident in post-occupation Timor-Leste (Charlesworth and Wood 2002, 334-339; Hall 2009, 317-320; Niner 2011). Yet it is also true that the international community can be complicit in this process by excluding women from peace-making and peacebuilding. In Timor-Leste, women have felt excluded from peace-making processes;[13] at a Security Council session in 2000, a Rede Feto representative stated:

> Although we also participated and suffered in the struggle our participation in peace making has been limited. But we have embraced and welcomed the small opportunities given and have [made] every effort not to be forgotten or overlooked (Rede Feto 2000).

This exclusion has been noted again following 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste as women were excluded from high-level dialogue to end outbreaks of violence in 2006 (Haq 2011). Certainly issues of ownership are intertwined with this discussion. Viewing women's role in peacebuilding in Timor-Leste solely through the lens of international conventions can ignore women's sense of ownership over the gains made in this period. This was neatly captured by one participant (Interview no. 3, 27 July 2012) who stated:

> For me, international treaties or the adoption of the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals] or adoption of 1325 is just to strengthen what is supposed to be there. It is not because of CEDAW we want to reduce discrimination [against women]. It is not because of the MDGs that we want to improve our living standard or poverty or nutrition and gender equality.

Whilst patriarchy does present challenges to women's and men's attempts to improve gender equality in Timor-Leste, to view challenges to patriarchal norms solely as a function of international mechanisms is to ignore the full continuum of women's activism in Timor-Leste. By acknowledging work already underway on the ground, we see that women in Timor-Leste had already been challenging barriers to the full enjoyment of their rights; however, the language of gender mainstreaming did not comfortably reflect this work (Interview no. 16, 7 September 2012; Interview no. 19, 29 July 2013). Participants often stated that

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[13] Such as at the 5 May Agreements which were the final agreements between the governments of Portugal and Indonesia under UN Secretary General auspices made on 5 May 1999 regarding Timor-Leste, which outlined the process for the popular consultation to take place to decide on autonomy and makes necessary security arrangements. See S/RES/1236 (1999) which was adopted by the Security Council on 7 May 1999.

the discourse and practice of 'gender' within the UN mission 'looked different' to the rhetoric of women's emancipation which already existed (Interview no. 19, 29 July 2013). This was explained in particular relation to context; the context in which women advocated for their needs and interests changed dramatically in the post-1999 era:

> Before 1999, there have been cases…Some women, those who are affected by the violence, they cannot go and report to the police or to the military or to people they can trust…We cannot talk about human rights, we cannot talk about women's rights. We made an effort to promote women's rights but because we were under Indonesian occupation we couldn't do anything, so the military [could] do whatever they want to do with women…After 1999, we can see there is no more Indonesian occupation but women still experience sexual violence…Now we cannot let this happen. But this was not because of *malaes* [foreigners] but before *malaes* were here we already knew that sexual violence wasn't good, but we couldn't do anything because we were under occupation. So we still work the same but in a different situation (Interview no. 20, 31 July 2013).

The idea that the language and theory used by the international community was different to that in practice in Timor-Leste is an important characterisation and brings to the fore the importance of ownership and context. Through this lens we can also challenge the assumption that knowledge of and activity around women's rights was simply absent; an assumption that has been more readily the response of some institutional accounts that reflect upon the work of the UN missions. For example:

> The gender unit of UNTAET was established in December 2000…It was instrumental in mainstreaming gender in all functional areas of the mission's work and in supporting the creation of a national women's movement (UN DPKO 2005, 35).

This disregards the role of East Timorese women in maintaining UNTAETs commitment to gender mainstreaming and credits the GAU with the creation of the women's movement in Timor-Leste which is demonstrably untrue.

When we focus on international norms, we start to focus on adherence or non-adherence to these norms, rather than on whether women and men benefit, and benefit equally. The gaze of these norms usually sits squarely on the presumed inadequacy of third world, developing, underdeveloped or fragile states. Yet transnational partnerships have developed across these lines, as can be seen at the Nairobi Conference and other movements that have led to documents such as Resolution 1325 as a mechanism for women's empowerment.[14] This is also true in Timor-Leste as a key arm of the resistance front was to garner international attention and create solidarity across borders, essentially a form of transnational partnering. We can also see this in the combined lobbying efforts to maintain UNTAETs focus on its gender mainstreaming commitments and partnerships around particular issues, such as work on the *Law Against Domestic Violence* (Hall 2009).

East Timorese women were integral to placing gender principles on the initial agenda of UN peacebuilding in Timor-Leste, challenging the notion of a dichotomous relationship between the international and the national. Part of the problem of a static and homogenous understanding of 'tradition' or domestic norms is that tradition in Timor-Leste is contested, porous and intractably linked to histories of colonialism, occupation *and* international intervention post-1999. This is not to suggest that we should overly romanticise the local. Rather, I would suggest that we are de-romanticising the international, challenging its rigidity whilst simultaneously seeing the role it can and does play in supporting a range of actions of an indigenous women's movement. This can reshape our perspective to one in which the post-1999 UN missions are another political backdrop against which East Timorese women fought for their rights. I would argue that this better supports the empowerment mandate of international resolutions

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[14] As Carol Cohn (2004, 8) has noted, what makes Resolution 1325 particularly important is that 'it is both the product and armature for a massive mobilization of women's political energies.'

regarding women, peace and security and casts a more critical eye to the way gender mainstreaming processes are judged and evaluated.

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The case for developing a destination brand for Timor-Leste

Sara Currie

The idea that tourism will play a role in the future development of Timor-Leste is not new (Cabasset-Semedo 2009, 216). Since Timor-Leste's formal independence in 2002, tourism has been promoted as a means to create jobs, build businesses, create income for national and local economies and improve regional economic imbalances (Timor-Leste Government 2011).

Timor-Leste's economy is heavily reliant upon offshore resources, specifically oil and natural gas, as well as agriculture, predominantly coffee and rice. The population is very young as a result of a 24-year occupation, with 41.4% aged 14 years and younger (National Statistics Directorate & United Nations Population Fund 2011). A flourishing tourism industry could create jobs for the growing population while at the same time, diversify the nation's oil-dependent economy.

The country is also blessed with natural and cultural resources, making it an ideal candidate for tourism. As the country's Strategic Plan 2011-2030, the most recent tourism planning document to date, proclaims: 'With Timor-Leste's natural beauty, rich history and cultural heritage there is great potential to develop tourism as a major industry to underpin our economic development' (Timor-Leste-Government 2011).

However in the decade since independence, progress has been slow. Data for tourism arrivals is scarce and in many cases contradictory, with the Timorese government producing vastly different statistics to the World Bank (The World Bank 2012). The country still works without an official 'Tourism Development Plan' and poor infrastructure, inflated prices, and limited choice of accommodation and restaurants further impede growth.

Due to its tumultuous history, Timor-Leste also suffers from a negative international perception. Despite a decade of relative peace and safety, the perception persists that Timor-Leste is dangerous and unstable (Carlos and Carlos 2011). The country lacks a strong, defined and *positive* image that can be communicated to prospective international visitors.

It is argued that in today's competitive marketplace, effective positioning and differentiation are critical to destination success (Morgan et al. 2003, 286; Anholt 2006, 1; Baker and Cameron 2008, 81; Vitic and Ringer 2008, 128; Pike 2009, 857). A uniquely identifiable 'brand' is seen by many as a crucial tool in achieving a competitive advantage (Balakrishnan et al. 2011, 5; Garcia et al. 2012, 646), particularly in the early stages of market recovery, where it can help resurrect international image and perception (Vitic and Ringer 2008, 129).

Branding is hailed by some as a key national asset (Kotler and Gertner 2002, 250; Baker and Cameron, 2008, 85) and the basis for survival within a globally competitive marketplace (Morgan et al. 2003, 286).

Further to this, brands are more than a logo and slogan, for which they are often mistaken. Modern definitions of brands claim they present a narrative to potential consumers, who then feel a connection (Morgan et al. 2003, 286; Konecnik Ruzzier 2012, 127).

While it would be unfair to say that branding Timor-Leste has not been attempted, one could argue that developing a powerful and lasting 'brand identity' for Timor-Leste is yet to be realised by successive Ministers and governments. A number of slogans were used during the early years of independence, a 'turismo Timor-Leste' logo was developed by an international consultancy agency and successive Ministries have each built new websites and produced new brochures. However, as Morgan et al. (2003) argue, destination brand building can be undermined by the 'short-termism' of chief political stakeholders, given that a destination brand's lifespan is a longer-term proposition than most politicians' careers (Morgan et al. 2003, 288). In the case of Timor-Leste, the marketing strategy has changed with successive Ministries, making it disjointed and often inconsistent.

Indeed, merely disseminating information about the country does not equate to managing and building the country's *image*. Nor do a slogan and a logo necessarily enable the destination to deliver a powerful,

targeted and unique destination *brand*, particularly if they are not widely and consistently used.

This paper will argue the case for developing a sustainable and strategic destination brand for Timor-Leste and contend that it could effectively stimulate tourism growth. The paper will then elucidate some useful principles relevant to the case of Timor-Leste that could aid the brand development process.

Nations and destinations as brands

According to Anholt (2002) much of the wealth of the developed world has been generated through the effective positioning of individual nations and utilising sophisticated marketing techniques (Akotia et al. 2011, 123). While at the beginning of the new millennium some researchers still strongly objected to transferring the brand concept to the level of country or destination (Konecnik Ruzzier 2012, 127), the number of advocates of the country brand concept has grown dramatically over the last few years. The literature now concurs that to generate an effective position and positive image in the marketplace, countries, like products and services, can, and should be branded (Baker and Cameron 2008, 86; Osei and Gbadamosi 2011, 286).

Many authors argue that regardless of whether a country consciously brands itself, it will be already perceived in a certain way by people within and outside the country (Osei and Gbadamosi 2011, 286). According to Fan (2006) a nation has a brand with or without nation branding. For example, in the case of France, Olins' argues the nation has been, in effect, 're-branded' by various historical leaders for centuries, experiencing five republics, two empires and at least four kingdoms (Olins 2002, 242).

So in a sense, place or destination branding is often re-branding, due to the fact that all places have an intrinsic image (Hankinson 2007, 250). And in the case of Timor this is true – the country already has a 'brand', because it is perceived in a certain way, but because this brand is not being actively managed, it is not always positive and rarely equates Timor with tourism.

A major objective of any destination branding strategy is to reinforce a positive image already held by a target market, correct a negative image, or create a new image, (Gudlaugsson and Magnússon 2012, 115). Thus in the case of Timor-Leste, its negative image needs to be replaced by (or developed into) a new and positive one.

Brands have a functional dimension, consisting of practical attributes such as price, quality and amenity, as well as a symbolic dimension, which attempts to evoke a deeper emotion (Balakrishnan et al. 2011, 9). This is true of many tourism brands – for example 'Brand Australia', which promotes wild adventure, rugged outback and endless summer or 'Incredible India', which rests on being a spiritual, intriguing and mystical destination. In both cases, the brand takes on an emotional value above and beyond its functional dimensions, and promises a unique experience.

One could argue, however, that the perceived 'brand' of Timor-Leste will rarely incite positive tourism images. While quantitative data is unavailable, anecdotal evidence indicates that potential visitors equate the country to recent civil war, poverty and a bloody occupation.

So it becomes clear that providing snippets of information about the country's functional attributes has proved unsuccessful in overcoming the nation's negative image and providing visitors with targeted information on why they should visit. Hence we see the benefit of providing more than just information, but a clearly articulated brand.

Not only will a destination brand help replace Timor-Leste's negative image with positive tourism attributes, it will also help overcome visitors' concerns about negative attributes such as price, accessibility and infrastructure. Even if Timor lacks impressive hospitality, first-class hotels or well-made roads, if it can appeal to visitors on an emotional level they will often choose to visit regardless.

Indeed as Wager and Peters (2009) explain, while a competitor can copy a product, a brand is unique; and whilst a product can be easily outdated, a successful brand is timeless (Wagner and Peters 2009, 53).

Branding Timor-Leste

Place branding expert, Simon Anholt (2004), describes the real world of international branding as a 'bloody business' in comparison to the academic perspective, indicating a disconnect between theory, research and practice (Anholt 2004, 10). Akotia et al (2011) further contend there has been very little research on the branding of developing economies (Akotia et al., 2011). Thus, while there is a case for developing a destination brand for Timor-Leste, the 'how to' may prove somewhat more difficult. As there has to date been no research into the application of destination branding to Timor-Leste, it is important to begin by looking at the branding particularities as they relate to this specific case.

In the following sections, three aspects of branding that are particularly relevant to Timor-Leste will be discussed: branding a Small Island Developing State, branding a post-conflict nation, and branding a 'brand new' nation.

Branding a Small Island Developing State

Timor-Leste is classified by the United Nations as a Small Island Developing State (SIDS): a category of nations with shared socio-economic and political characteristics and a very low position in the international political economy (SIDSNET 2013; Yasarata et al. 2010, 345). Many SIDS are also heavily dependent upon tourism, given that they possess a rich cultural and natural heritage and oftentimes pristine coral reefs, rivers, sea and landscape (SIDNET 2013).

There is at present limited literature specific to the branding and marketing of SIDS. In *Marketing Island Destinations* (2010), one of few the publications to give considerable attention to this area, editors Lewis-Cameron and Roberts contend that in today's highly competitive marketplace, SIDS must diverge from the traditional sun, sea and sand (3S) approach to branding (Lewis-Cameron and Roberts 2010, 13).

Indeed, 'substitutability' has become a major problem in the 3S markets (Pike 2004, 81; Baker and Cameron 2008, 85). While many island tourism campaigns make generic claims of sandy beaches, sunny climate and a laidback lifestyle (Dinnie 2008, 52) these claims are not unique to a particular nation (Harrison-Walker 2011, 137) and according to Morgan et al (2003, 286), such 'wallpaper' advertising renders all island destinations indistinguishable from one another. Campaigns for white sand beaches and clear blue waters are frequently of this type, for example rendering Samoa as indistinguishable from the Seychelles or the Society Islands.

At the same time, some commentators argue that tourists themselves now often seek more than the 3S's. Modern tourists, who are often more experienced and discerning than the traditional 'mass tourist', see travel as not just about being at the destination but experiencing personal fulfillment and identity (Roberts and Lewis-Cameron 2010, 28). It's less about lying around on a deck chair with a cocktail and more about experiencing the culture and, in some cases, even wanting to give something back. In this instance, destinations should not be branded by their purely functional attributes, but by adding texture and meaning to their identity (Daye 2010, 12). The challenge for marketers is to make the destination brand 'live' and allow visitors to feel the authenticity and uniqueness of place (Morgan et al. 2003, 287).

So there is a clear opportunity for Timor-Leste to promote itself to this modern tourist. Not only to stand out in the marketplace, but also because the nation has so much more to offer – for example cultural and historical richness – as opposed to just sun, sea and sand.

Branding a post-conflict nation

Brand management seems to be even more challenging for emerging and post-conflict nations (Vitic and Ringer 2008, 128), and while a few nations have overcome their image problems and enhanced their brand, many still struggle (Gertner 2007, 4; Vitic and Ringer 2008, 128).

Negative stereotypes and prejudices affect destination image (Amujo and Otubanjo 2012, 89) and many tourists are reluctant to visit countries they believe to be prone to political strife and perceived internal problems (Ryan and Silvanto 2010, 536). However, in some cases, these images are based on inaccurate information or widespread stereotypes reinforced by the media, while in others these images are

founded on past political unrest, clouding the destination image much longer than it takes to overcome the actual problems (Vitic and Ringer 2008, 128).

This is true of Timor-Leste. People abroad, particularly those in Australia, have for decades read and seen news reports of civil war, occupation and violence. According to Tapsell and Eldenfalk (2013, 589), constant media attention in 1999, graphically describing the horror in Timor-Leste, was influential in finally instigating an international response. However, while this reporting was pivotal during the occupation in bringing about change, over a decade later the nation is no longer dangerous or war-torn, but its image has yet to be repaired.

But the first point of note is that a post-conflict nation is not necessarily a negative for tourism – it is just the image and perception of safety that must be managed, not the history itself. In fact the post-conflict nature of the nation can provide a tourism attraction in itself - nations such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Montenegro, Bosnia and the newly emerging Myanmar, have, and continue to manage this very well. In Timor-Leste, it is also very easy to see how this may be possible.

Significantly, the development of tourism in a post- conflict nation can have benefits well beyond the obvious economic ones. Research suggests that tourism marketing and nation branding can also play an important role in the process of social renewal and the transformation of sorrow (Causevic and Lynch 2011, 795). Similarly Pezzullo (2009) suggests that tourism marketing can offer the opportunity for nation rebuilding and enhance sustainable memories following a disaster or internal unrest (Amujo and Otubanjo 2012, 92).

Ultimately, branding is about communicating a sense of community, uniqueness and place distinctiveness (Gotham 2007, 839). On top of this, branding can unite disparate groups of residents and galvanise support for tourism as well as reconnect the locale with a sense of socio-cultural 'belonging' (Gotham 2007, 839). Therefore, if a tourism brand seeks to identify the positive symbolic and historical elements of the tragedy and develop empathetic messages for tourists (Amujo and Otubanjo 2012, 95), this in turn can actually help the country's internal stakeholders, its people, 'make sense' of the past and begin a process of social renewal. Seen in this way, post-conflict branding is important not only to grow tourism but also to help unite a fragmented nation in the aftermath of internal unrest (Amujo and Otubanjo 2012, 96). This is one aspect of brand development that has clear relevance for Timor-Leste.

Branding a 'brand new' nation

It is safe to say Timor-Leste has not been actively branded by either the government or tourism authorities across its eleven years as an independent nation. However, many authors purport that there is no such thing as branding an entirely new nation, as all nations already have an intrinsic image. Place 'branding' is in effect just place 're-branding' (Hankinson 2007, 250) and regardless of whether a country consciously brands itself, it will be already perceived in a certain way by people within and outside the country (Osei and Gbadamosi 2011, 285).

So while Timor-Leste has not been 'actively' branded to date, one could argue it already has an intrinsic brand image. And given the nation's status as a poor, developing state, recently emerged from conflict and civil war, one could further argue this brand would not be a positive one. However, as Mihailovich (2006) argues, 'effective branding not only serves to reinforce positive images but also helps fight negative ones by shaping new images and associations' (cited in Harish 2010, 154). Hence the need for actively branding and rebranding Timor-Leste is crucial.

In beginning to 'rebrand' a nation or destination, Anholt (2006) argues that '... people only change their minds about places if the people and organizations in those places start to change the things they make and do, or the way they behave. And that is the only sense in which a nation can start to exercise some degree of control over its image...' (Anholt 2006, 1). In other words, support from key internal stakeholders is critical to creating and managing a new brand.

Indeed, many authors claim that satisfaction of the various destination stakeholders is one of the fundamental requirements of successful destination branding (Baker and Cameron 2008, 88; Wagner and Peters 2009, 56; Ryan and Silvanto 2010, 536; Akotia et al. 2011, 124; Garcia et al. 2012, 648). Brickell

(2012) contends that many brands struggle to succeed when they overlook the perspectives of the host population, in favour of 'expert' assessments of tourism development (Brickell 2012, 98).

This notion of 'internal branding' sees internal stakeholders as the 'first customers' of a brand and stresses the importance of encouraging them to internalise and deliver the corporate brand values (Sartori et al. 2012, 331). As internal stakeholders define the brand and provide the actualisation of the experience, it is important a new brand emerges from what the nation is about (Vasudevan 2008, 335). As Kapferer claims: "before knowing how we are perceived, we must know who we are" (Kapferer 1999, 71; Konecnik and Go 2008, 179; Wagner and Peters 2009, 55).

Further research

In summary, this paper has argued that there is a strong case for developing a destination brand for Timor-Leste. More specifically, it contends that the following will be important in the final brand development process. Firstly, identifying the unique and authentic attributes of a destination is crucial for any branding strategy, but particularly in the case of Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste cannot compete with other destinations on the basis of price, amenity, quality accommodation, customer service and so forth, so it is crucial that a brand communicates something that is authentic and unique to the nation; something that is worthwhile visiting no matter what and that will help tourists overlook potential barriers to their travel.

Secondly, stakeholder involvement and community congruence will be crucial. They are to any brand, but in the case of Timor-Leste, a country with a difficult and a painful past, it is essential that stakeholders are consulted and feel comfortable with their nation's 'image'. Ultimately, it is the internal stakeholders who 'live' the brand and if they feel it does not fairly represent their nation, it is unlikely to be successful.

Third, prospective tourists need a consistent message to believe in a brand and if the government re-brands the nation, it must ensure consistency across all marketing channels and long-term consistency in strategy and message in order to see positive impact. At the same time, it must be supported by the nation's people and government.

And finally, there is no point branding the destination on something it cannot deliver. Any brand, and particularly for Timor-Leste, must be true of the actual experience or it will struggle to survive.

Further research is needed to identify the country's strengths and weaknesses as a tourist destination, including the unique attributes that set it apart from its neighbours. Based on these attributes potential target markets can be identified and destination brand concepts developed.

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The impact of the El Niño Southern Oscillation on rainfall variability in Timor-Leste

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The El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is an established climate phenomenon occurring across the Pacific Ocean. This well-documented climate phenomenon is known to have an impact on climate variability in Timor-Leste. Historical rainfall data from the Portuguese period of Timor-Leste was analysed together with historical data on the Southern Oscillation Index. Averages for each month when these events occurred were collated and compared with the overall average rainfall pattern. This analysis was done for the thirteen district centres to assess the historical impact of ENSO on the annual rainfall patterns across Timor-Leste. For the 13 district centres, the annual total rainfall for Timor-Leste is 1583mm on average. During a La Niña event this rises to 1885mm (19.1% increase). During an El Niño event, rainfall fell to 1313mm (17.0% decrease). ENSO had a greater impact on rainfall during the transition periods between the wet season and dry season. Finally the Southern Oscillation Index was compared to maize and rice production.

Introduction

The El Niño Southern Oscillation affects many regions around the world, including Timor-Leste. (Ropelewski & Halpert, 1987). The El Niño Southern Oscillation refers to the oscillation in air pressure across the Pacific Ocean resulting in two weather phases called El Niño and La Niña. In the Pacific Ocean, strong easterly trade winds lead to the development of ocean currents flowing east to west across the tropical Pacific. The easterly trade winds are part of a circulation of air currents known as the Walker Circulation (BOM 2005) (see Figure 1). During El Niño, the easterly trade winds weaken and there is a warming of the central and eastern regions of the tropical Pacific Ocean leading to a shift in the low pressure area of the Walker Circulation towards the east. This leads to lower rainfall throughout the western Pacific including Timor-Leste. During La Niña, the Walker Circulation shifts to the west leading to higher rainfalls in the western Pacific (BOM 2013).

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
[1] Seeds of Life, Division of Research and Special Services, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries

Figure 1 - The relationship between the Walker Circulation and ENSO as sea temperatures change (BOM 2013)

The Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) is a standard indicator used to identify phases of the ENSO cycle. SOI compares the difference in air pressure measured in Tahiti in the central South Pacific Ocean and Darwin in northern Australia. The SOI is defined as ten times the standardised value of the mean sea level pressure in Tahiti minus the mean sea level pressure in Darwin (Troup, 1965). Sustained positive values of the SOI above +8 may indicate a La Niña event, while sustained negative values below −8 may indicate an El Niño event. Studies have been conducted on the impact of rainfall during El Niño for Dili indicating that, when the SOI is negative, dry season rainfall is below normal and the wet season onset is later than normal (CAWCR 2004). Timor-Leste's rugged landscape results in very different climates from north to south and from low altitudes to high altitudes. The main ridgeline of mountains running east-west along the length of the country results in drier conditions on the northern side and wetter conditions on the southern side which also has a bi-modal wet season. Inter-annual variation in rainfall due to ENSO can have a significant impact on livelihoods. ENSO is also known to affect other aspects such as health especially with increased rains during La Niña (Kovats, et al., 1999). This paper explores the impact of ENSO across the nation to understand how it affects different regions of different climatic conditions.

Method

We used historical monthly rainfall data for Timor-Leste collated by the Australian National University (Santika, 2004). This data ranges from 1914 through until 1998. There are 64 sites with historical rainfall data which have on average 22 years of data. Homogeneity testing was not applied as previous studies note that possible break points around ENSO events displayed by homogeneity testing may in fact be a genuine climatic process being identified as an inhomogeneity (Caesar, et al., 2011). It should be noted that the Inter-decadal Pacific Oscillation (IPO) phase was negative during the period of 1954-1974 which have the most complete sets of data. The ENSO-hydroclimate relationship is a lot stronger when the IPO phase is negative compared to when it is positive. (Chiew & Leahy, 2004) For the district of Emera, a combination of data from Gleno and Emera town was used.

ENSO events were classified according to the Australian Queensland Government's *Long Paddock* documentation which states that El Niño years were determined when the average SOI from June to November was less than or equal to -5.5, and La Niña years were determined when the average SOI was greater than or equal to +5.5 (QG 2011).

Location	Period	Mthly Data	Latitude	Longitude	Alt. (m)
Manatuto	1917-1974	415	-8.30	126.08	4
Dili	1914-1998	787	-8.60	125.60	5
Oecussi	1916-1998	480	-9.12	124.22	10
Liquica	1916-1974	359	-8.38	125.20	25
Maliana	1953-1974	262	-8.59	125.14	278
Baucau	1917-1998	546	-8.28	126.20	350
Gleno	1914-1919*	72	-8.43	125.27	770
	1968-1974	84			
Aileu	1916-1974	243	-8.45	125.35	930
Ainaro	1928-1974	412	-9.01	125.30	809
Same	1916-1974	373	-9.05	125.47	544
Los Palos	1953-1974	264	-8.32	127.01	394
Suai	1916-1974	192	-9.21	125.18	71
Viqueque	1916-1974	440	-8.50	126.28	46

Table 1 - Monthly rainfall data for the 13 district centres of Timor-Leste. *adjusted data based on the nearby town of Emera.

A typical ENSO phase begins around April and lasts for approximately 14 months but the beginning, duration and ending of an ENSO phase can vary widely. For this study, where an El Niño year has been classified, the El Niño event is taken to start at the beginning of a consistent set of negative SOI values for that period and end at the last consistent negative SOI value for that period. The same method was applied for the calculation of La Niña rainfall during years classified as La Niña years based on positive SOI values. SOI data was sourced from the Australian Bureau of Meteorology. (BOM 2013)

The Southern Oscillation Index was compared with maize and rice production. For maize, this used the average of the SOI for November to January. For rice, the comparison was made using the SOI average for December to February. This was correlated with production, yield and area harvested. Crop data was sourced from statistics from the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). (FAO, 2013)

Wet season onset is defined as occurring when rainfall exceeds 50mm in two successive 10-day periods where each month is be divided into three periods of 10 days each. (CAWCR 2004) For this data set, the wet season onset was defined as that date at which 100mm of rainfall was accumulated in the first month after August using a simple linear analysis of the monthly rainfall data.

Results

The average of the total annual rainfall, as measured in 13 district centres, is 1583mm. During an El Niño event the annual rainfall falls by 17.0% to 1313mm on average. During a La Niña event the annual rainfall rises by 19.1% to 1885mm on average. This change in rainfall is not consistent over all months (Figure 2). There is a significant change in rainfall during the months of April and May.

Figure 2 - El Niño and La Niña in Timor-Leste based on monthly averages of 13 district centres.

Figure 3 - Map of Timor- Leste showing rainfall distribution with the total annual rainfall received during La Niña, Neutral and El Niño ENSO phases

During La Niña, the wet season extends into June. During El Niño, the wet season ends earlier in the month of April. In the month of May La Niña results in 195mm on average whereas El Niño results in 110mm on average. Similarly, large differences in rainfall are experienced in November when La Niña results in 223mm compared with El Niño rainfall of 56mm. It is at these two periods, the change between wet season and dry season that ENSO has the greatest impact. During El Niño there is less rainfall annually and it is concentrated heavily into the wet season months of December to February. During La Niña there is more rainfall annually but it is distributed more broadly from the months of November through to June the following year.

An ENSO event has a comparatively greater impact on rainfall during the late wet and dry season months with less impact during the wet season. (Table 2) Rainfall in November has high variation from -56% (El Niño) to 77% (La Niña) combined with substantial monthly rainfall averaging 126mm. The impact is particularly large in April, June and November when some regions are still experiencing significant amounts of rainfall

Month	Rainfall (mm)	El Niño (%)	La Niña (%)
January	248	-7%	1%
February	230	-2%	-6%
March	204	-7%	6%
April	151	-18%	26%
May	150	-27%	30%
June	98	-33%	28%
July	56	-29%	32%
August	21	-65%	113%
September	19	-65%	121%
October	43	-71%	94%
November	126	-56%	77%
December	235	4%	-5%

Table 2 - Monthly rainfall anomaly during ENSO showing change in rainfall from the average due to El Niño and La Niña. (negative values indicate below average rainfall, positive values indicate above average rainfall)

Figure 4 - Graph of ENSO anomaly with monthly rainfall indicating that the greatest digression from normal rainfall occurs during the dry season.

Location results

The monthly rainfall results for La Niña, El Niño and the average for each of the 13 district centres are shown in Figure 5. These have been categorised into northern and southern regions to reflect the different climatic conditions on either side of the main ridgeline. Total annual rainfall in the northern region is 1281mm and increases by 10.7% during La Niña and decreases by 19.4% during El Niño. From this we can see that El Niño has the greatest impact on rainfall for the north. The main impact on the northern region is during the late dry when there is an early start to the wet season during La Niña and a delayed start to the wet season during El Niño. During the late wet season period of March through to May, El Niño influences rainfall more than La Niña. Wet season rainfall from December through to January is below average for both El Niño and La Niña.

Total annual rainfall in the southern region is 2065mm and increases by 27.4% during La Niña and decreases by 14.6% during El Niño. In contrast to the northern region, it is La Niña that has the greatest impact on rainfall for the south. La Niña delivers above average rainfall for all months except December. The greatest increases are during the late wet season months of April to June as well as the late dry/early wet season months of October and November.

Figure 5 - Change in average monthly rainfall during La Niña and El Niño for two broad regions: Northern (AEZ 1-3) and Southern (AEZ 4-6)

Graphs of rainfall for individual district locations are shown in Figure 6 (Northern Region) and Figure 7 (Southern Region). The results of this analysis demonstrate that the impact of ENSO is different in different locations.

Figure 6 - Change in average monthly rainfall during La Niña and El Niño for district centres in northern agro-ecological zones.

Figure 7 - Change in average monthly rainfall during La Niña and El Niño for district centres in southern agro-ecological zones.

High rainfall locations such as Same, Ainaro and Los Palos received proportionally even more rainfall during La Niña than low rainfall locations. (R = 0.53*, Figure 8).

Figure 8 - Increase in rainfall due to La Niña correlated with the average of the total annual rainfall for that location.

Wet Season Onset Anomaly

One of the important aspects of the impact of ENSO on Timor-Leste farming is the onset of the wet season. (Table 3) During La Niña, the wet season starts 22 days earlier on average. During El Niño, the wet season starts 15 days later on average. In locations at higher altitudes, the wet season begins earlier than those locations at lower altitudes (Figure 9).

Location	La Niña	Average	El Niño
Manatuto	34 days early	23rd January	Not achieved
Dili	23 days early	16th December	5 days late
Oecussi	24 days early	11th December	20 days late
Liquica	16 days early	8th December	7 days late
Maliana	7 days early	7th November	29 days late
Baucau	20 days early	7th December	13 days late
Gleno	13 days early	10th November	22 days late
Aileu	16 days early	1st November	11 days late
Ainaro	24 days early	2nd November	18 days late

Same	51 days early	8th November	24 days late
Los Palos	19 days early	2nd December	8 days late
Suai	19 days early	27th November	17 days late
Viqueque	22 days early	8th December	6 days late

Table 3 - Average date to accumulate 100mm of rainfall at the onset of the wet season and changes in the wet season onset during La Niña and El Niño.

Alt. (m)	AEZ	Location	Change in Onset of Wet Season

Northern
4	1	Manatuto
5	1	Dili
10	1	Oecussi
25	1	Liquica
278	2	Maliana
350	2	Baucau
770	3	Gleno
930	3	Aileu

Southern
809	4	Ainaro
544	4	Same
394	5	Los Palos
71	6	Suai
46	6	Viqueque

Month | Sept. | October | November | December | January

Legend:
Onset of: La Niña   Average   El Niño

Figure 9 - A comparison of the change in the onset of the wet season for the 13 district centres arranged according to agro-ecological zones.

SOI and food production

Annual maize production reported by FAO from 1990 to the present was compared with SOI values from November to January when maize is being planted. Figure 10 indicates that when the SOI is either strongly positive (La Niña) or strongly negative (El Niño) around the time of planting and early crop growth then total maize production is reduced. (R = 0.55* for P<0.01) There is a drop in production of 11.5% during El Niño (if the 2010 production of 149000 t is considered an outlier (Young, 2013)). During La Niña, the production falls by 17.2%. This drop in production was found to be associated with less area being harvested rather than a drop in yield (Figure 11, 12). (SOI correlated with area harvested, R=0.61* for P<0.01). Rice production, including area harvested and yield was not found to be correlated with SOI.

Figure 10 - Annual maize production versus average SOI Nov-Jan from 1990-2012.

Figure 11 - Average maize yield versus average SOI Nov-Jan from 1990-2012

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
Figure 12 - Average maize area harvested versus average SOI Nov-Jan from 1990-2012

Discussion

The analysis of the data shows that an El Niño event results in less rainfall overall for Timor-Leste. El Niño means a late start to the wet season and an early finish with a contraction of the total rainfall into a shorter period over the wet season often leading to higher rainfall in January during El Niño. Planting too early may lead to crop failure with plants dying due to a false start in the wet season. Caution should be taken when considering planting a second crop in those areas with a bimodal rainfall pattern.

A La Niña event results in more rainfall overall for Timor-Leste. The impact on rainfall is greatest in the transition between the wet season and dry season. La Niña tends to mean an extended wet season and higher rainfall throughout the dry season. This can create problems during harvest and drying of crops with the risk of storing the grain with moisture levels that are too high. It can also allow planting of a second crop in areas where only a single crop is planted.

Region specific impact of ENSO

The ENSO cycle affects the rainfall of different regions across Timor-Leste in different amounts and at different periods during the year. In the region of the southern and eastern slopes, Timor-Leste experiences a bimodal wet season allowing two crops to be grown. The main wet season is affected by the movement of the monsoonal trough south of the equator. The second peak in rainfall around March to June is due to the development of south-east trade winds delivering rain to Timor-Leste from the Timor Sea. In these areas, La Niña has an impact on the second peak in rainfall.

Wet season onset

La Niña consistently leads to an early onset of the wet season while El Niño leads to a delay in the onset of the wet season. It can also be seen from the results that this change in the wet season onset is not the same in each location. In Same, it could be difficult to identify the start to the wet season as relatively high rainfall can be experienced throughout the year. Most locations experience a 4-6 week variation in the wet season onset from La Niña to El Niño. Locations at higher altitudes tend to have an earlier start to the wet season than locations at lower altitudes.

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SOI and food production

The Southern Oscillation Index is correlated with annual maize production. The greatest impact on maize production occurs during La Niña. This is related to the reported figures of the amount of area harvested rather than yield which may mean farmers plant fewer crops during La Niña or there is a greater incidence of crop failure. Further complications can also be experienced with increased disease lowering yield in the moist, wet conditions and damaging stored food.

There also appears to be an association with low SOI values (such as during El Niño) and food production. This may be due to germination failure and early crop failure. Areas that usually produce a second crop may not be successful in establishing the second crop during periods of negative SOI.

The drop in maize production correlated with ENSO (El Niño, 11%; La Niña, 17%) is greater than the predicted drop in maize production due to climate change. A 1.5^{o}C rise in temperature may result in a drop in maize production of 6% by 2050. (Molyneux N, 2012) However, if these two factors are compounded Timor-Leste may experience falls in production of up to 23% in the future.

Conclusion

The El Niño Southern Oscillation cycle has a significant impact on the rainfall patterns of Timor-Leste. El Niño results in less rainfall for Timor-Leste with the greatest impact on the contraction of the wet season. La Niña leads to more rainfall with the greatest impact on the late wet season especially in locations with a bimodal rainfall pattern. It is important that agricultural workers and farmers have an understanding of how this cycle can affect crops and food production in their specific location of Timor-Leste.

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Perceptions of development in Timorese communities

Sophia Close[1]

This paper is a summary of my PhD field research, and is in two parts: first, I will explain my research problem; then, outline the emerging themes of my fieldwork in Timor-Leste.

Development-related conflict

Timorese people experience conflict in multiple ways; at national and community levels and among (or between) individuals and in complex institutional, gendered and structural ways. These conflicts are triggered by a broad range of factors, but they can also be related to conflict that is exacerbated or triggered by poor development taking place where Timorese people live, or to land or resources which they own and are responsible for.

Key research problem

My research specifically examines post-1999 experiences of development and development-related conflict in Timor-Leste. I argue that the modern international aid and development system may create further conflict in communities because it often overlooks or does not appropriately value or empower Timorese perspectives of development.[2] I argue that Timorese perspectives often encompass local Indigenous knowledge.

> IK [Indigenous Knowledge] is stored in peoples' memories and activities and is expressed in stories, songs, folklore, proverbs, dances, myths, cultural values, beliefs, rituals, community laws, local language and taxonomy, agricultural practice, equipment, materials, plant species and animal breeds. IK is shared and communicated orally, by specific example, and through culture (Grenier 1998, 6).

The modern development system positions Western knowledge as primary. This hierarchy leads to the disempowerment and de-legitimisation of non-Western knowledge, resulting in Indigenous knowledge being defined as inferior and unscientific (Shiva 2000, vii). However, Western knowledge is facing difficulties in effectively resolving or managing the complex and dynamic development challenges of these communities (UNPFII 2010). In comparison, Table 1 indicates that Indigenous knowledge systems can be helpful in dealing with these complex systems. It is important that the current hierarchy of knowledge within the development system is debunked, in order to better understand each community's local-level decision-making processes, which are key to achieving peace and development in communities.

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[2] I use the term 'modern development system' to describe the complex set of elements (i.e. institutions, actors, and rules) and relationships that governs structures and behaviors within the current dominant international aid and development system.

Table 1 - Differences between Indigenous and Western Knowledge (Mazzocchi 2006, 464).

Indigenous Knowledge	Western Knowledge
Intuitive	Analytical
Holistic	Reductionist
Spiritual	Positivist
No distinction between empirical and sacred	Materialistic
Subjective	Objective
Qualitative	Quantitative
Passed on orally between generations	Academic and literate transmission
Depends on local context and conditions	Separates subject from object

My research includes a broad analysis of the modern development system, as currently practiced by governments, donors, multilaterals, faith-based and non-government organisations in Timor-Leste since 1999. Early findings from my field research indicate that using the modern development system as a tool to achieve change and to transform conflict in Timorese communities is risky.

Indigenous perspectives

Indigenous peoples are the most diverse and complex grouping of humanity. Worldwide, at least 370 million people are considered to be Indigenous (IWGIA 2013). Represented across approximately 5,000 different nation groups, speaking at least 4-5000 of the approximately 6000 languages existing today, they are geographically located across all States and territories (Martinez Cobo 1987; Ibid). Worldwide, Indigenous peoples are seeking to transform their community challenges through self-determined development. They are engaging with the modern development system to assist them to attain their goals.

Due to the complexity and potential for exclusion when defining Indigenous peoples, the United Nations (UN) and other international bodies have not adopted a formal definition of Indigenity. Instead, the UN looks to identify Indigenous peoples according to the following criteria, not all of which must be fulfilled (UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues 2013):

- Self- identification as Indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by their community as their member.
- Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies.
- Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources.
- Distinct social, economic or political systems.
- Distinct language, culture and beliefs.
- Form non-dominant groups of society.
- Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities.

Timorese people rarely identify themselves as Indigenous, however, their distinct cultural knowledge and social, economic and political systems, and their historical continuity with their pre-colonial society, and strong link to land and natural resources indicate that there are many similarities of experience and history that connect Timorese people with the distinct characteristics of Indigenous peoples as identified by the United Nations (Trindade 2011; Hohe 2002).

It is therefore relevant to explore how Timorese (Indigenous) knowledge, governance, and cultural practices affect development practice in Timor-Leste. The use of an Indigenous critical theory lens enables a new analysis of the modern development system and provides a greater understanding of how development affects relationships, power and culture in Timor-Leste.

Field research in Timor-Leste

I selected post-1999 Timor-Leste as my case study field site as it has a long history of colonialism, conflict, and development. It is difficult to obtain data, but La'o Hamutuk reports that between 1999-2009 approximately $5.2 billion US dollars were directed to development programming in Timor-Leste, and that only 1/10 or $550 million of these funds entered the Timorese economy (La'o Hamutuk 2009, 1). To date I have completed approximately 90 field interviews with Timorese community members, Government and NGO representatives; and with Indigenous peoples and international peacebuilding and development practitioners.

Initial results of field research

During my field interviews, I asked participants about their experiences of development interventions in Timor-Leste post-1999, in order to understand how the development system is playing out in the Timor-Leste context. A range of flaws in this development system were identified by interviewees. There were also many practical reflections on the changes needed to transform the development system in Timor-Leste. In this paper I highlight – relationships, power and culture – as the three most important themes that emerged from these discussions. These three themes form the basis for the Indigenous critical theory framework I propose, where I advocate that development practitioners should increase their understanding of each context through these lens' that prioritise Indigenous knowledge.

Relationships

Almost every person I spoke to referenced relationships as central to building sustainable and peaceful development outcomes. An International NGO worker who manages peacebuilding programs in Timor-Leste said: "We believe that conflict can be transformed; it is not about necessarily resolving the particular issue but about transforming the relationships. Peace is a process, it is not an event" (Field Interview 22/09/2009, Washington D.C. USA).

Timing is absolutely critical. Whose timeframe are development actors working to? Is it that of communities, or is the short time frame from a demanding government minister, or the idiosyncrasies of a senior foreign bureaucrat, or is it pushed by an arbitrary funding schedule based on a financial year? Rarely do communities determine when and at what pace development occurs which results in misaligned programming that can trigger conflict in communities. A Timorese Development Consultant noted: "Development partners are not that flexible. In order to get more participation, you actually need more time and proper relationships with the people that you actually have to work with. Few agencies do that" (Field Interview 13/09/10 Dili, Timor-Leste).

The pace of development affects all the relationship building, ownership, sustainability, and the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation processes within the modern development cycle. An International Development worker said: "Agencies need to be here for the long haul. Almost everything requires long-term relationships. But the constant churn over of staff makes it very hard. [People] need to be here for 5 – 10 years. It takes that long before people will speak the truth" (Field Interview: 09/2010; Dili, Timor-Leste).

Many people also identified divisions within the Timorese community, and between Timorese and outsiders. A Timorese NGO worker said: "International solidarity helped us gain independence but these people came in with perceptions that helped undermine our local capacities, our local knowledge, our local experience. In many cases, people undermined this potential" (Field Interview 17/09/2010, Dili, Timor-Leste). Many participants described conflicted relationships between Timorese and non-Timorese, resulting in insider-outsider bias. Timorese participants discussed a range of cultural processes to build relationships with outsiders including inter-marriage, and ceremonies and rituals involving *lulik* and *liurai* (Field Interview 14/09/2010, Dili, Timor-Leste).

The participants had a range of solutions to build and sustain better relationships – including trust, respect, and flexibility and learning Tetum or local languages. Participants also highlighted the need to undertake culturally-appropriate processes, be that the na-ha-biti-bot, the Timorese 'rolling out the mat' ceremony, or having coffee every Tuesday morning to build relationships that will endure the challenges of change. They emphasised that it is also possible to transform the current development systems tools and processes in order to better share cultural understandings and then putting in place checks and balances, incentives, and processes that explicitly act to value culture in decision-making.

Power

An international development specialist said:

> The relationship is paramount. Until you have a reasonable relationship, then whatever agreement you get, will not be worth the paper it is printed on. The main point of the relationship is to recalibrate this huge asymmetry of power, which is absolutely inevitable (Field Interview 22/09/2009, Washington D.C. USA).

Interviewees highlighted that having the power to choose what kind of development they want is critical. They asserted that choice – or free prior and informed consent - is fundamental to Indigenous development and self-determination. Free prior and informed consent is a decision-making process that does not involve coercion, is made before interventions begin and includes understanding the full range of potential impacts. Communities are empowered to say 'Yes' or 'No' to a relationship, program or policy (Desert Knowledge Cooperative Research Centre 2010; United Nations 2007). Free prior and informed consent is a deeply contentious issue for States, private companies and development agencies. Participants suggested the need for greater understanding of traditional decision-making processes, in line with engagement with culturally appropriate leaders, as an important step toward community management of land and resources.

Corruption within development programs was highlighted as pervasive, with possible links to future conflict between elites and ordinary Timorese. An International development worker noted, "Single source tenders, corruption is getting out of control. And of course that is not getting to the people in the countryside. It isn't even going to all the people in Dili, it is going to small elites" (Field Interview 29/09/10, Dili, Timor-Leste).

For many communities relationship-building and mutual accountability that occurs during the process of reaching an agreement is more important than the outcome. This is challenging, as even with good intentions and evolving policies, much of the current development system is focused on the outcome, not on the process. A Timorese NGO worker said: "For example, a donor has already been given money, which they have to spend. They go out to a community to do an activity, but it has already been done (by another organisation), so they go ahead and duplicate" (Field Interview 09/2010, Dili, Timor-Leste). The absence of power to consent can lead to lack of community involvement in decision-making, which can contribute to development-related conflict.

Culture

Overall, there was limited incorporation of Timorese culture, language and identity into development interventions. People particularly commented on the challenges of multiple official languages and the lack of Tetum language use by both international development workers and Timorese elites. One Timorese observer noted: [The elite group] manipulates this idea of national identity, the idea of Portuguese language as Timorese identity in order to gain access to power, and by claiming this they discriminate against the Timorese who do not speak Portuguese. It is because they do not value Timorese ideas that much. Because they think it is backward" (Field Interview 19/09/13, Dili, Timor-Leste). Language policy and use was seen as both symbolic of creating a bridge between cultures, a valuing of something that was uniquely Timorese and a sign that those non-Timorese who spoke Tetum were committed to supporting the long-term future of Timor. Some participants saw a lack of shared language as a conflict trigger in communities. A Timorese

NGO worker noted: "They [rural communities] do not have access to anything and they cannot understand. Nobody tells them. This is why I say it is a time bomb, if the elite continue with this, it will create problems" (Field Interview 6/10/10, Dili, Timor-Leste).

Gender remained a key issue in inclusive decision-making and participative governance. A senior female Timorese Development worker said: "There is a cultural bias against participation of women, most power and decision making goes to men. We are a young country, with an old cultural system. You have to try to get [women's] ideas about what they want, and you have to dig down" (Field Interview 09/09/2010, Dili, Timor-Leste).

Tensions and the power dynamics between traditional and modern knowledge systems were highlighted. A Timorese academic stated: "Development agencies are within the western cultures and they misunderstand [our] cultures and that leads to conflict. There is an assumption that somehow indigenous peoples are inferior, less advanced, less knowledgeable, and less capable, less worthy" (Field Interview 09/2010, Dili, Timor-Leste).

Misunderstanding of Timorese culture leads to a misunderstanding of the problems and triggers for conflict, and a system-wide undervaluing of these cultures. Existing conflict in communities was not seen to be understood well. A Timorese development specialist said: "We have already had conflict resolution methods here for 1000s of years but then people come here to teach conflict resolution. These outside processes are not working because people don't believe in it" (Field Interview 09/2010, Dili, Timor-Leste).

The capacity of Indigenous communities is critical to achieving and sustaining change (Hunt 2005). The majority of development actors said the capacity, or power of the Timorese communities to enact change was limited. This response contradicted the strengths and resilience that Timorese people proudly referred to. A Timorese NGO worker said: "We are driven by models which do not apply here. When people do it themselves they do it better" (Field Interview 09/2010, Dili, Timor-Leste). To complement this insight, an International NGO worker said: "Partner agencies need to realise by pushing they create more harm than good. They need Timorese to drive the process of change. Otherwise they destroy the social network and it is just another form of colonialism" (Field Interview 09/2010, Dili, Timor-Leste).

Many participants made suggestions to better understand the contexts they worked in to bring about more effective development. An International development worker said: "We need independent analyses and the freedom to say it like it is. Aid workers need to have humility in order to not make it worse. We should be brave and radical in order to create the shifts that are necessary" (Field Interview 23/09/2010, Dili, Timor-Leste).

Comment

In line with these initial findings of my fieldwork, I argue, that the current development practice in Timor-Leste has significant flaws resulting in a range of challenges concerning relationships, power and culture. Therefore, it is risky to anticipate that development in its current form will transform conflict in Timorese communities. Indeed, the current development system may create further conflict in these communities because it often overlooks or does not appropriately value or empower Timorese worldviews, culture or governance processes.

While development practitioners understand that they should be taking a particular context into 'account' we do not have an effective framework or tools to do this. By using an Indigenous critical theory framework that analyses relationships, power and culture, my research can provide a more specific analysis for development practitioners to understand and work within the 'context' of any given development challenge. Using this framework, development practitioners could more effectively understand how community's local knowledge should be driving decision-making and resource allocation resulting in more effective conflict transformation and development outcomes.

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Gender and state-building: The case for Timor-Leste

Terese Geraghty

Introduction

Scholarship on state failure and (re)construction focuses on explaining *why* states may or may not function in a manner that promotes development, but seldom addresses the differing experiences of men and women within these 'fragile' countries. As the remedy to state failure, state-building is commonly considered a crucial process towards improving a nation's ability to have a positive economic, environmental and socio-cultural future. Similarly, gains in gender equality are frequently deemed to increase the effectiveness of state capacity and national development.

The following paper provides a case for including gender in the analysis of state-building efforts in Timor-Leste. There is currently little academic literature on fragile states that focuses on gender concerns in such countries. By creating a case for this inclusion, this paper seeks to broaden state-building literature to provide alternative frameworks with which to analyse these issues, while also providing the case for the continued inclusion of gendered concerns in the development efforts of Timor-Leste.

The paper will firstly provide an overview of why gender is important for state-building and more specifically why it is important for Timor-Leste. Secondly, it will discuss the emphasis placed on state-building activities by the international aid and development architecture. It will call attention to where Timor-Leste has taken steps to increase gender equality and where improvements may be made.
Finally, using a small theoretical case study on domestic violence, the paper will show how a lack of gender equality can be framed as state-failure, and show how the goal has not made the leaps and bounds it should have if the interventions from the international community coupled with the constitutionalisation of these rights had been sufficient. This paper seeks to encourage a change in policies and behaviours towards gender issues, rather than the business-as-usual or default measures deemed sufficient to encourage gender equality.

Gender and state-building

When scholars write about gender, it is often discussed in relation to gender equality. The term 'gender equality' implies that the needs and interests of both men and women are being met in equal and comparable ways. That is, in a gender equal society men and women would have equal opportunities in accessing financial resources, employment opportunities, decision making forums and other mechanisms in both the public and private spheres.

It has been widely recognised that there is compelling evidence demonstrating the link between economic growth, increased social well-being and the mobilisation of the poor out of poverty when men and women hold relatively equal positions in a society (Coleman 2004, 80-81; OECD 2010, 6; UNDP 2012, 7). Also, the inclusion of gender equality and women's empowerment into the Millennium Development Goals highlighted the global push toward the recognition of the need for a change in attitude toward the status of women worldwide as an end in itself as well as a beneficial contribution to the processes designed to develop nations. state-building is one such process.

Here, states seek to strengthen their capacity (DFID 2008, 4) in a way that is never finished, as it is constantly on-going as states change and adapt over time (DFID 2008, 4). The degree to which states include gender equality in their state-building efforts varies greatly as the goal of state-building is to deliver the objectives of the government which 'may or may not emphasise areas orientated to the public good' (DFID 2008, 4). That is, state-building is a fundamentally political process which is just as likely to be oriented toward appeasing donors as it is to be perpetuating security or securing state loans.

Scholarly literature on state-building traditionally focuses on the capacity of formal state institutions, but this focus has resulted in there being very little said about gender and state-building together (Jennings 2010, 1-3). This has caused a deficiency of critical analysis being available on gender and state-building, despite the general acceptance of the importance of gender in all aspects of development.

The concept and role of the 'State'

It has been argued that state-building is vital to the evolution of a viable Timorese nation-state (Borgerhoff 2006, 101). Max Weber most famously defines the state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (1946, 78). That is, a state is legitimate once an armed force is able to control a citizenry into peace under the threat of state led discipline. Fukuyama suggests that by using this definition, a country like the U.S would be considered to have a strong state as he interprets this definition as meaning 'the ability, ultimately, to send someone with a uniform and a gun to force people to comply with the state's laws' even where the welfare state remains extremely limited compared to those offered by other developed democracies (2004, 21).

Building on Weber's theory of state, Milliken and Krause (2002, 756) argue that there are three fundamental functions of statehood. These are security, representation and welfare. If we understand that these functions are to act as a blue print to inform the rights and freedoms of citizens, the obligation of the state is to provide them not only as duty to the state's society, but also to legitimise the state itself. Any definition of state that focuses solely on security tells only part of the story of what a state can (and possibly should) be. If the state is unable to operate in a way that promotes security, representation and welfare, both its strength and legitimacy will and should be questioned. By expanding on Weber's observations and definition, the scope of a state's responsibilities has increased enabling a wider range of issues to be considered obligations, such as those stemming from poverty and disparity issues. Therefore, a state's strength will be determined by a diverse range of factors including gender equality. In a post-conflict setting, once the state is legitimised through the establishment and maintenance of peace it will be in a position to further reinforce this independence both domestically and internationally, and further engage in the promotion of a gender equal society when representation and welfare sit alongside security in the functions of statehood.

State-building, the international community and Timor-Leste

Although state-building in its essence is a local or domestic undertaking, there is much emphasis placed on this process by the international community. The influence of international human rights norms on the state-building practices of singular states is widespread through the introduction or reinforcement of these norms by state champions and international development actors (Lotz 2010, 233). These norms are 'not the exclusive property of international agencies or a group of developed countries that can control their application' but rather are commonly known and desired by people living in fragile conditions all over the world (Lotz 2010, 233). Timor-Leste provides a clear example of a country that has adopted the discourse of international norms as central to its own state-building and development process.

For instance, the Constitution of Timor-Leste is ripe with gender equality rhetoric. In section 17 of the Constitution it is written that 'women and men shall have the same rights and duties in all areas of family, political, economic, social and cultural life' (2002, Section 17). Explicit mention of gender equality is also highlighted as it is written that 'all citizens are equal before the law' and that 'no-one shall be discriminated against on grounds of...gender' (2002: Section 16). This definitive stance suggests that there is a push for real increases in gender equality in the country. In fact, many influential documents designed to influence state-building processes and the development of Timor-Leste has the common thread of a gender equality discourse.

A gender equality sensibility is also reflected in the Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030 (SDP), which outlines the direction that the Government of Timor-Leste sees as being vital to the development of the country. Here, the ambition to be progressive agents in achieving gender equality is

undeniable. The SDP addresses gender inequalities and reiterates the constitutions rationale, again echoing the guarantee of the 'protection against discrimination based on sex' and the promotion of an equality of rights in 'familial, political, economic, social and cultural life' (2010, 49). Earlier in the document it is stated that 'our vision is that in 2030 Timor-Leste will be a gender-fair society where human dignity and women's rights are valued, protected and promoted by our laws and culture' (2010, 50). The strategies designed to achieve this vision cover a wide range of areas including education, employment and political representation among others. These are hoped to be realised through the provision of rights enshrined within the constitution as well as through the ratification of international treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), of which Timor-Leste became a signatory in 2003.

As we have seen, the push for the application of gender equality can be traced throughout the development of Timor-Leste's state-building plans and the documents designed to influence the development process within the country. This positioning has enabled Timor-Leste to participate with the international community in gender and state-building dialogues, both issues which have had great importance placed upon them by the international community through the establishment of international norms.

Through provisions afforded in international conventions and treaties and conditions placed on foreign aid provisions by donors, the international community has placed great emphasis upon gender equality. How this community of actors has gone about increasing the likelihood of fostering a state that has gender equality has particular relevance for Timor-Leste.

It has been written that 'failed states' have provided 'the opportunity to the international community with 'green field sites' in which to test development theories' (Julien 2008, 308). A clear example of how this can be applied to Timor-Leste can be seen in a claim made by the United Nations. Here it was hoped that the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) could 'serve as a model for future (UN peace keeping) missions' (Whittington 2003, 1288). Inspired by the addition of the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1325 in 2000, it was hoped that the Timor-Leste peacekeeping mission would be successful as the first operation that would implement the new commitment. This resolution affirms 'the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building' as well as 'recognising the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective' (UNSC 2000). UNSC's call in Resolution 1325 was to 'all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt...measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary' (UNSC 2000) all of which are state mechanisms subject to state-building practice.

As a country under UN administration at the time of the formulation of this resolution, Timor-Leste served to be somewhat of a testing ground for the policies outlined in Resolution 1325. However, current indicators suggest that gender based violence is extremely high in Timor-Leste and has not shown great improvement since the UNTAET period. Gender equality indicators should be showing greater increases than are currently being seen if this resolution and its impact promoted adequate policy change to improve gender equality.

Theoretical implications of gender blind state-building: The issue of domestic violence

As has been shown, there is a strong case for the inclusion of gender considerations into state-building efforts. Furthermore, we can understand that the relevance for the push for this in Timor-Leste has come about due to both domestic policy, as well as policy from international actors. We have seen how theories of statehood have evolved from being primarily concerned with security and control to the diversification of a state's duty to include representation and welfare. Now the task at hand is to understand the theoretical implications of a state that does not adequately take the task of gender equality seriously. To do this, I will be using the well-known issue of domestic violence to give an example of how, despite the promotion of gender equality, a lack of strong state intervention could result in the state to be considered 'failed'.

It is a distressing fact that currently in Timor-Leste 38% of women aged 15-49 have experience domestic violence in their lifetime and 36% of women experience sexual, physical and emotional abuse from their husband or partner (IRIN 2012). Recently, the Government of Timor-Leste passed a law making domestic violence a public crime in a bid to curb the issue. This law change means that now the reporting of the crime can be done by people privy to the violence, not just those involved. As an improvement to the previous process, this achievement should not go unnoticed as any measure taken by the state to improve to the current situation is to be commended. However, since the implementation of this law the JSMP have consistently reported that once cases of domestic violence are taken to the courts the perpetrators are not being adequately disciplined. In Baucau for instance, a recent case of domestic violence was put to the courts where the defendant was charged by the public prosecutor with an offence against physical integrity. On this particular case, the Executive Director of JSMP, Luis de Oliveira Sampaio stated that:

> JSMP is very disappointed because the public prosecutor failed to apply the appropriate article in this case of domestic violence where by the defendant should have been charged with the crime of serious maltreatment of a spouse, not a simple offence against physical integrity (IRIN 2013).

Of all the cases monitored by the JSMP in 2012, 37% of these were cases of domestic violence with a further 10% being cases of sexual violence. In the 2012 Institutional report produced by the JSMP, it is stated that there is a 'worrying prevalence of violence against women and girls in Timor-Leste' (JSMP, 2012: 6). That is, current trends of violence in the country are not isolated cases but rather represent a consistent failing of the current system to afford women and children the equality provided to them by the Constitution. This means that despite the policy work that has been developed, the implementation has not happened in a manner conducive to the actualisation of positive outcomes.

I argue that the presence of widespread domestic violence without strong institutional intervention or justice for victims indicates state failure in the broadest sense of the term. As defined by Weber it is the *monopoly* on the use of violence that legitimises the state. The two key institutions designed to control violence in a society are the military and the police. Thirdly, the court system needs to be included due to its ability to deter perpetrators of committing violent crimes and to provide justice where violence has occurred. If there are no mechanisms in these state institutions pushing to cease domestic violence or at least provide the disciplinary action necessary to deter future offences, then it is a matter of, at least, '*de-facto* state failure'. That is, despite the policies of state institutions to control the presence of violence within its territory, there remains little follow through in cases of domestic violence thus rendering the state ineffective in its duties. The presence of laws and policies consistent with the attitude that domestic violence is unacceptable is not sufficient. Domestic violence needs to be viewed as a challenge to the monopoly on violence.

In Timor-Leste, other incidents of violence seem to be prioritised for heavier interventions from the state despite domestic violence being one of the most destructive forms of crime. For example, in Dili there has been a recent push to curb gang violence that has surfaced on the streets of Colmera. As a reaction the authorities have placed members of the police force to patrol the streets at night and intervene in any such activity swiftly and with serious consequences. Therefore, I wish to pose the question of why street violence is treated in this way. What justifies these measures when the more common form of violence, that which takes place in the home, is still taken to be less consequential?

As suggested by Peterson and Runyan, 'states and international organisations reduce issues like reproductive rights, rape, and wife battering to domestic or even personal problems, which then appear irrelevant to the so-called real politics of war and economic competition' (1993: 80). Could this opinion be reflected in the case for Timor-Leste and the differing measures taken to curb domestic violence and street violence? This question is not posed to suggest that street violence should not be of concern to state actors but more to suggest that there are other forms of violence that require the attention and action of the state. Therefore, there needs to be an intrinsic imperative that both global and local development actors implement strong gender equality sensitivity in state-building efforts *if* the aim of development is to foster secure and stable nation states.

Conclusion

As has been shown, the case for analysing state-building from a gender perspective in Timor-Leste is two-fold. Firstly, the emphasis on state-building activities from the international aid and development architecture highlights the need of partner countries such as Timor-Leste to continue to define state-building to maintain ownership over its own development. The political will to do this has been highlighted by the Government of Timor-Leste's ratification of major international human rights instruments such as CEDAW and through the gender-forward nature of the country's constitution and recent changes to the domestic violence laws. Secondly, there are serious theoretical implications when a State does not act in a manner that takes its commitment to gender issues seriously.

Great gains have been made in Timor-Leste as it has transitioned to independence, particularly in relation to the passing of laws on domestic violence. It will be the great success of Timor-Leste if it is able to develop into the country its constitution and strategic development plan seeks to become. This provides a prime opportunity for Timor-Leste to become a leading player in a subject that so many countries struggle with.

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The heterozygosity of corn variety of NAI following half-sib selection compared to one of its parents

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Introduction

Corn is widely grown and is considered to be the major staple food crop in Timor-Leste, with cultivation on 80,000 ha followed by rice (35,000 ha) (Nabais et al., 2008). Annual production is about 120 tons, which means only 1.5 t ha^{-1}. Biotic and abiotic stresses, such as disease, drought and flood are the major constraints causing yield reduction in the country that affect the food shortage annually.

To fulfill the domestic demand particularly for food, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) with the International Corn Foundation (ICF)/International Agricultural Research Institute (IARI) of Kyungpook National University, South Korea, started a corn breeding program in February 2004. In collaboration with the national program staffers and Australian Seed of Life Program, four maize populations, Arjuna, Kalinga, Suwan 1, and Suwan 5, were selected for downy mildew (DM) resistance (R). The first two cultivars were bred in Indonesia, while other two cultivars were bred in Thailand.

From the random crosses, the joint team led by Prof. Kim Soon-Kwon (ICF/IARI) then developed successfully a new open-pollinated variety (OPV) named NAI and released it in March, 2007. NAI was generated from the population of Suwan 5 and Arjuna. Suwan 5 was an improved line from Suwan 1 (1982) at Kasetsart University (KU) Farm in Suwan and released in 1993 (Jampatong et al., 2000). Meanwhile, Arjuna was generated from TC1 (Thai Composite 1) Early DMR (S) C2 (Cycle 2) from Thailand, released in 1980 and recorded as highly tolerant to DM (*Peronosclerospora maydis*) (Subandi, 1984) and (Sutoro et al., 2007).

NAI was developed for both resistant to downy mildew (DM) and drought (Kim, 2007). This first OPV developed in East Timor also adapted well to DM, Southern corn leaf blight caused by *Helminthosporium maydis* Nisik (Syn *Bipolaris maydis* Nisik) and Southern rust (*Puccinia polysora*) with high yield in Aceh, Indonesia. It was named as Jagung Aceh for new improved variety (Hendri, et al., 2010).

Materials and methods

Half-sib selection with testcross

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We selected 400 ears of NAI population based on desired feature to develop a new cycle by using half-sib selection with testcross. Ears were obtained from previous rainy season crop in 2008. Half seeds of each selected ears were planted in ETR in an isolated field. The half remnant seeds were bulked and planted as pollen sources. The materials were then planted at Loes Research Station on December 27th, 2008. Field was designed in 2 m length with 75 cm wide row. Seeds of pollen sources and female (ETR) lines were planted in 2 and 5 rows, respectively. Two to three seeds per hill were sown with 30 cm between hills. Weeding was done by hand. We did not apply any fertilizer or pesticide. We kept only one plant per hill for each line. Female tassels were emasculated before the pollen shed. Important agronomic characteristics, such as DM, drought and lodging tolerance, vigorous and uniformity, were rated. Ten of 400 lines were selected. Five to ten superior progenies per row were selected. The population was reconstituted by compositing equal quantities of seeds from selected plants and superior testcross progenies.

Fig A. Seeds selection of the first cycle of NAI by Prof. Kim Soon-Kwon in Lospalos (October, 2009). Fig. B. On-farm demonstration of the first cycle of NAI in Lospalos (February, 2010). Fig. C. Recommended cultivation practice with one seed one hill at on-farm demonstration in Viqueuqe (February, 2010). Fig. D. Farmers' field day (FFD) of on-farm demonstration of NAI in Viqueque (February, 2010)

On-farm trials implementation

The composite seed was multiplied in an isolated area during the second crop season in Lospalos, under the cooperation of MAF, ICF and KOICA in May 2009. The desired features of each plant were evaluated and separated for on-farm trial. Thirty on-farm trials were conducted in four districts: Dili, Ermera, Viqueque and Lospalos, in December 2009. Arjuna and local cultivars were also included in the on-farm trials. Seeds were planted in plots with the dimensions of 10 m x 10 m wide with 25 cm x 75 cm for plant distance and one plant per hill. Demonstrators followed local cultivation practices, weeding with hand, without using fertilizer or any chemical. Six sets of on-farm trials in Lospalos and Viqueque were intensively observed. We conducted farmers' field day (FFD) to know their preferences toward the yield performance of the first cycle of variety NAI.

Investigation

Data was collected on important agronomic characters, such as plant height (PH), ear height (EH), tassel length (TL), commercial value (Co.V.) and dry mater (Dr.Mt.). DM infection was observed in two weeks and four weeks after planting. DM was rated from 1 to 9 (1= a few infection, highly tolerant and 9 = 91 - 100% infection, plant die). Co.V. was rated from 1 to 9 (1= excellent and 9= poor) during mature stage to determine the mean of the important agronomic traits such as yield, vigorous, tolerant to biotic and abiotic stresses and also lodging. Commercial value (Co.V.) is usually used by breeders to save time during their observation. PH, EH and TL were measured 2 weeks before harvested. Dry matter was measured with analytic balance. Data was analyzed by using the SAS 9.1 GLM program.

Result and discussion

To evaluate the population performance across the 30 diverse on-farm demonstrations during the first crop, the mean of important agronomic traits at each site were compared to Arjuna and local cultivars. However, an intensive observation was concentrated on 6 demonstrations in Lospalos and Viqueque. The first cycle of NAI revealed outstanding performance with tolerance to DM and lodging with good yield. Plants at two sites of on-farm demonstrations in Muapitine and Fuiloro demonstrated purple color on leaves, symptoms of lack of phosphorous (P).

Among five on-farm trials in Lospalos and one trial in Viqueque, we found symptoms of DM infection only in Mr. Domingos' field in Lospalos. However, infected plants showed segregation traits of off type of NAI. DM infection at on-farm trials and farmers' field in both, Lospalos and Viqueque was not serious. It is probably due to the resistance cultivars have been spread throughout the country such as NAI, Suwan 5 and Sele. Later, two cultivars were released in March, 2007 by the MAF of East Timor and Australian aid cooperation (ACIAR) program with CYMMIT involvement (Seeds of Life, 2007).

Fig. B The agronomic traits data of on-farm demonstration of the first cycle on NAI in Lospalos (Lps) and Viqueque (Vqq), harvested in April 2010.

Demonstrators	DM (T/ha)		PH (cm)		EH (cm)		Co.V. (1-9)	
	NAI	Arjuna	NAI	Arjuna	NAI	Arjuna	NAI	Arjuna
Almeida (Lps)	16.6	14.7	240	221.7	88.8	81.7	2.3	3.0
Lucia (Lps)	12.2	12.0	159.2	119.2	68.3	63.3	3.8	4.0
Domingos (Lps)	14.5	13.2	221.7	205	80	75	3	3.3
Hipolito (Lps)	21.3	14.7	207.5	171.7	90	90	2.2	3.3
Luis (Lps)	19.6	11.3	248.3	217	101.7	81.7	2.3	3.2
Lucio (Vqq)	17.1	15.4	202.5	187.5	100	92.5	2.5	3.5
Mean	*16.9*	*13.6*	*213.2*	*187.0*	*88.1*	*80.7*	*2.7*	*3.4*

Dry matter (Dr.Mt.) measurement

The result of on-farm trials for stoves dry matter showed highly significant different (*P= 0.001*) among the genotypes and environments (*P= 0.001*) with CV 16.5 %. NAI at Hipolito and Luis' on-farm trials showed highly significant different with 21.3t and 19.6t ha[-1], respectively from the mean value 16.9. Genotypes versus environment and locations did not show significant different. The distances from one site to another

were about 5 to 10 km. However, the yield of dry matter was highly affected by environment. It was probably due the differences of cultivation practices and soil fertility in each site.

The lowest stoves dry matter was Arjuna at Luis, Lucia and Domingos with 11.3, 12.0 and 1 ha^1, respectively from the mean value of Arjuna (16.9 t ha^{-1}). Hipolito's trial, plants exhibited outstanding with high yield. Among the replications and varieties versus environments there was significant difference shown. This indicates that reducing plant density per ha will not affect the dry matter weight with the normal spacing.

Plant height (PH) measurement

The result of on-farm trials at 6 locations showed highly significant difference (*P=0.001*) in PH among genotypes with CV= 6.2%, environment and genotypes versus environment. The highest PH was NAI at Luis, Almeida and Domingos' on-farm trials with 248.3 cm, 240 cm and 221.7 cm, respectively from the mean value (213.2 cm). The lowest PH was Arjuna at Lucia and Hipolito's on-farm trials with 119.2 cm and 171.7 cm from the mean value (187.0 cm). All replications showed no significant different.

The highest PH of Arjuna was at Mr. Almeida's on-farm demonstration with 221.7 cm. The lowest PH of Arjuna was at Lucia's farm demonstration with 119.2 cm. Agronomic traits which controlled by polygenic genes are easily affected by environment.

Ear height (EH) measurement

Among the genotypes that showed significant difference was (*P= 0.014*) with CV= 14.7%. Genotypes versus environment and locations did not show a significant difference. The highest EH was NAI at Luis and Lucio on-farm trials with 101.7 cm and 100 cm respectively from the mean value (88.1 cm). The lowest EH was Arjuna at Lucia and Domingos' on-farm trials with 63.3 cm and 75.0 cm from the mean value (80.7 cm).

The result of the on-farm trials showed significant and highly significant differences among genotypes and environment, but no significant difference among replications and varieties versus environment, respectively with *Mean: 276.5 cm* and *CV: 9.4%*. The highest EH of NAI was at Mr. Luis' on-farm trial with 101.7 cm. The lowest EH was Arjuna at Ms. Lucia's site trial with 63.3 cm. The highest EH of Arjuna was at Mr. Lucio's on-farm demonstration with 92.5 cm.

Commercial value (Co.V.) rating

The result of on-farm trials at 6 on-farm trials showed highly significant differences (*P= 0.001*) in Co.V. for genotypes and environments effects. Among the genotypes that showed significant difference was (*P= 0.001*) with 20.8%. Genotypes versus environment and locations did not show significant differences at *P= 0.36* and *0.24*, respectively. The highest Co.V. was at Hipolito, Luis, Almeida and Lucio's on-farm trials with 2.2, 2.3, 2.3 and 2.5, respectively from the mean value (2.7). The lowest Co.V. was Arjuna at Lucia and Lucio's on-farm trials with 4.0 and 3.5, respectively from the mean value. Meanwhile, the lowest rate was at Lucia's on-farm trial.

Summary

The result of the first cycle of NAI showed outstanding performance with high Co.V., and Dr.Mt. In Lospalos, the first cycle of NAI yielding 2.2 for Co.V. and 21.3 t/ha^{-1} at Hipolito's on-farm. This evidence indicated that some dominance genes may effect the Dr.Mt. Expression of additive gene action in this breeding was determined by the heterosis effect of genotypes at each demonstration field. Ear to row (ETR) procedure selection was an effective in changing gene frequency for highly heritable characters. Hallauer (1986) stated that the proportion of the additive genetic variance expressed among testcross families or

involved in covariances of testcross means is independent of the choice of tester, but is dependent on the inbreeding level in the population prior to crossing to the tester.

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From activists to managers: Learnings about growth, change and challenge in civil society organisations in Timor-Leste

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Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have had to constantly redevelop their governance strategies throughout their existence in Timor-Leste. This paper looks at some of the challenges that organisations are currently facing and suggests potential ways forward to guide strong governance through internal capacity development now that the CSO environment is again changing. The myriad of challenges CSOs face can be hard to navigate at times. As Basáñez (2010) states, a deeper understanding of history, institutions and conditions unique to Timor-Leste can provide a more in-depth perspective linking research and theory to more viable, sustainable governance solutions. The purpose of this paper is to help provoke discussion around how to best support sustainable development through CSOs in Timor-Leste. Drawing upon research, projects, and most strongly 'on the ground' experience, this paper is derived from our work together with CSOs within Timor-Leste and reflects our personal assessments of what is most useful to CSOs in strengthening governance. Note that we use the term CSO rather than Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) as in Timor-Leste some organisations are community-based but not registered as NGOs.

CSOs fulfil a number of roles in Timor-Leste, such as service provision, advocacy, public education, network building, and monitoring of State programmes. In recent years, a number of CSOs have experienced challenges as they have tried to balance these various roles, as well as sustaining their organisation. Challenges include how CSOs are adapting to a shifting donor environment; how to enable different roles to ensure both strong governance and accountability; and how visions for accountability and justice can be realised. For the purpose of this paper, governance by definition 'focuses on issues of policy and identity, rather than the issues of day-to-day implementation of programmes… governance requires the creation of structures and processes which enable the CSO to monitor performance and remain accountable to its stakeholders' (Tandon 1995, 2).

In 2013 a number of the donors who have been committed to long-term core support to CSOs, including strengthening of organisations and advocacy work, are withdrawing from, or distancing support for Timor-Leste. Many of these donor organisations started their support to Timor-Leste during the Indonesian Occupation, as a gesture of solidarity. Now, in a development climate that increasingly demands results, it has become difficult for these donors to defend work where results are more difficult to identify. Yet donors with a long-term view on sustainable development, commitment to a strong civil society, and attention to institutional strengthening are exactly the kind of donor partners that should be actively involved in Timor-Leste. Less flexible donors, those driven by strong policy at home will not have the same impact as flexible donors. As de Tray states:

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The fact that donor agencies are in service to poor countries but accountable to, and financed by rich countries creates a weird set of conflicting incentives that often produce programs that satisfy neither paymasters nor poor countries (de Tray 2011, 7).

This juxtaposition presents some key questions for consideration. For CSOs in Timor-Leste – should they be doing more to demonstrate the importance of their work and the changes that are created as a result of their work? All too often monitoring and evaluation is used as an exercise to report to donors, rather than to reflect on the difference/change the CSO is making in its context. Unfortunately, this orientation to change is not as strong as it should be in some CSOs. The sense of activism has been lost with many CSOs becoming focused on service provision. Monitoring the changes created and explaining these to interested parties (not just donors but also government, other stakeholders, and most importantly individuals) should be a key aspect of the work of any justice-oriented organisation. This is an aspect of advocacy – something that should be important to activists.

Who governs organisations?

Governance of CSOs has not been given sufficient attention in Timor-Leste. By governance, we mean high-level oversight of an organisation and its staff through a structure like a Board of Directors. Governance of CSOs usually is not considered until there is an organisational issue that requires a high-level decision like financial misconduct, senior recruitment, or holding Annual General Meetings. Many CSOs in Timor-Leste have a Board that hardly functions leading to donors playing some sort of governance role in their partner CSO. For example, donors may interact with CSOs regarding planning with funds over the year, human resource policies, hiring processes, and execution of resources. These are areas that elsewhere are considered by Boards. But donors may step into this role either because there is no Board, or because the donor must be involved in these processes due to its own internal requirements. If CSOs feel that donors intervene too much in their internal affairs, then CSOs need to determine what they can do to strengthen their processes and structures to demonstrate this to donors. There is a need to look more creatively at governance structures and oversight in the Timor-Leste context. If we look at CSO Boards at the national level, many of the same people are on many Boards, which is unsustainable but it also brings into question individual's suitability to provide effective governance to such a vast number of CSOs. There is also a tendency to have people from other CSOs on Boards, but not to bring in people from other sectors. Involving different sectors could be useful in terms of increasing competency levels, the pool of people, bringing in new ideas, and perhaps finding new funding streams. CSOs may not need Boards if they are getting good governance from other sources, or there could be a way to create some kind of unified structure to provide oversight to a number of CSOs. Strong governance ensures the sustainability of CSOs and can determine whether their organisations principally provide service provision or a critical voice of civil society.

As a member-based networkm, FONGTIL has a multi-level governance system and its structure and experience raises a number of questions about CSOs and how they manage themselves and change. FONGTIL has faced challenges meeting the wide array of needs from members whilst also responding to requirements and perspectives of donors. To what extent is it appropriate for donors to influence the programming and direction of an umbrella organisation, which is supposed to get its mandate from members? While this is a question of governance, it is also a question of economics – to be more member-focussed and more independent; the organisation would also have to adjust to a much smaller budget (as donor funds make up a large part of the budget). FONGTIL has also struggled with tensions around how much it should programme through the Secretariat and how much should be undertaken by members. In recent years, the FONGTIL Secretariat has become more engaged in programming, partly because international donors find FONGTIL a useful mechanism through which to programme and achieve some level of connection to district-based work. In this way FONGTIL helps donors to manage the burden and complications of working with civil society, but this shift of focus to programming reduces the resources to fulfil the core mandate – Advocacy, Facilitation, Communication and Capacity Building. It also indicates a

weakness in the relationships and responses of some donors with CSOs. FONGTIL has a relationship with donors who at various times have pushed and pulled the organisation in different directions impacting on strategic planning, contractual obligations, capacity, and ultimately on both management and governance. Donor accountability and contractual targets deflect the organisation's focus and accountability upwards, away from its membership base, to which it is meant to be accountable. As donors step in there is short-term adoption of systems and direction, but once the donor is no longer providing funds or staff change, systems and direction shift. As the umbrella organisation FONGTIL should be exemplary and provide support for its member CSOs on good governance practices but FONGTIL has maintained a focus on programming due to a high dependency on donor funding to cover operating costs which have lead to short term funding opportunities leaving the organisation highly vulnerable to donor demands.

Visions for justice and accountability

Donors need to consider how they look at change and results, timelines for measuring change, and how they resource their work if they want to contribute to strong, sustainable CSOs. In Timor-Leste, so much information is exchanged in ways that do not easily translate to the written word and even less to log frames. Staff in CSOs struggle to communicate their work in ways that are immediately useful to audiences outside of Timor-Leste. Donors often do not sufficiently resource their own work to allow for the time and accompaniment needed to produce information related to results, which can be compelling and useful to actors outside of Timor-Leste. There is increasing thinking that development actors must be much more open to looking at the complexity of development and the non-linear path which development often follows. This means looking both at planned and unplanned changes, which have resulted from their work. As donors become increasingly focussed on effectiveness and value for money, there are more demands on CSOs in terms of being able to manage and report on their work, particularly in terms of finances and monitoring and evaluation. In 2013 the 'flexible' donors are withdrawing and the remaining larger donors require more rigour that will in turn require a higher level of management skills from staff and more fixed processes within CSOs. As CSOs in Timor-Leste are heavily dependent on donor contributions to function, a major influence on CSO governance and management comes from western donors. If donors are not using the right models and incentives then their increasingly rigid requirements will have a negative impact on CSO governance and processes leading to a decline in organisational capacity which is the opposite effect of what donors are trying to achieve. De Tray (2011) argues that capacity stripping is the biggest challenge for CSOs in Timor-Leste as donors are using the wrong incentives, wrong models, wrong timeframes, and working on the wrong capacity problems.

Related to the issue of demonstrating change/results, while some of this comes from how people understand change and present information, some of the challenge is linked to a lack of belief in accountability. There may be an attitude of not needing to account for what a person or an organisation does. Some of this may be due to a sense of strength and victory – now that Timor-Leste is independent, CSOs and individuals do not need to answer to outside actors. Some of this may be related to historical and cultural issues, such as the strong links between civil society and clandestine networks and ways of working during the Indonesian Occupation. Some of this is related to power and privilege, with information being a way to protect this. As Sommers highlights, the way political leaders manage and share information needs to be improved. In a society where sharing information is highly valued, leaders appear to have placed a high priority on controlling information flow. At its worst, lack of accountability can lead to corruption and abuse, and is corrosive to organisations and individuals. In Trocaire's experience, organisational secrecy is one of the biggest challenges facing Timor-Leste CSOs. CSOs need to recognise that they have a responsibility to be accountable to beneficiaries. Funds are raised on behalf of particular groups, but to what extent do CSOs report back to these groups on the progress being made, get feedback or receive criticism and requests for change? CSOs will demand that government is more transparent, but we also need to consider how transparency could strengthen civil society, take for example the Istanbul Principles

on Development Effectiveness[2] which offer some ways forward on this. Trocaire's partners, who have strengthened their processes to consult with communities, have reported that they feel that their work is stronger, and this comes through in their ability to demonstrate the changes being created through their work.

Through our experience some interesting points about leadership and capacity can be further drawn out. Different models of leadership to ensure good governance and accountability of CSOs may need to be considered. Decades of resistance have influenced how the Timorese lead and understand leadership. The environment in Timor-Leste has changed over the past 10 years with different social norms being influenced by external actors. Western concepts of good leadership (frequently advocated by donors), include negotiation, open communication, compromise, etc. while concepts of good leadership within the Timorese context may include being strong willed. Some of these tensions regarding leadership styles can both strengthen and undermine best practice development methodologies, for example those outlined in the Istanbul Principles. As a 2010 USAID funded Values Study on Timor-Leste highlights, 'although Timorese believe debate to be good, they are not fully ready to accept the costs it may bring or, likewise, they believe that agreement cannot exist where there is debate' (Basáñez 2010, 22). This is just one example of some of the underlying culturally specific beliefs that impacts on the governance and accountability of CSOs. Donors need to take these cultural beliefs and Timor-Leste's history into account when working with CSOs to ensure meaningful sustainable development can be achieved.

It is also worthwhile to consider whether individuals and CSOs want to change their governance strategies in the way that Western donors are demanding – strengthening leadership and accountability. It may be the case that in some ways they indicate that they want to change, as they seek donor support but at a more fundamental level they do not want to. This will then result in ongoing difficulties between donors and the CSO, which will then struggle to meet financial management and reporting requirements of donors. This may come to be seen as a lack of capacity of the CSO, but maybe it is a reflection of different priorities. CSOs need time to develop capacity, to improve the quality of work, to rethink purpose and to organise how to do their work - growing horizontally, continuously improving and evaluating. If CSOs do have different priorities, they should make different choices about the resources they need to do their work, and where they seek these resources. In some cases, donor funded projects may be seen more as a way of seeking livelihoods for staff than as an opportunity to bring about change, increased justice, reduced poverty, etc. If a CSO decides that it wants to improve it needs to put people with the right skills in the right positions. Programme management and finance are particularly key. Unfortunately, CSOs do not always match skills to positions. In some cases, this is about identity of the CSO – we want people who are like us/from the same background/are activists (not managers). In some cases, this is because people are put into positions due to connections or because of a perceived need that the person has for a job (livelihood) or for an opportunity for learning. In some cases, this is because the CSO cannot find the time or the process to conceive of new roles and put people into these new roles. Trocaire has seen a number of partners struggle with time, energy, and knowledge management as skilled field workers are filling management positions stuck close to their computer rather than being out doing what they do best or even if there are resources available to hire a Programme Manager CSOs may not do this. This is the result of other more complex issues of organisational culture and understanding about how individuals want to do their work.

Conclusion

Organisational change is a constant challenge in any sector, in any nation. CSOs are no different in that they face a continuously changing environment and their success depends on whether or not they have the ability to reassess and change together with their environment. CSOs in Timor-Leste are becoming service providers for both the government and/or donors because these CSOs lack the ability to reassess their

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[2] Istanbul Principles (International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness) 2010, Open Forum's Global Assembly in Istanbul, Turkey, September 28-30, 2010, , http://cso-effectiveness.org/istanbul-principles,067, viewed June 2013.

objectives and change. Government and donors need to understand that CSOs have to change to remain true to their values and stay relevant to their stakeholders, and this may mean that CSOs do not use the same governance structures and strategies that donors have and expect. In the past ten years in Timor-Leste, according to Hunt (2008) CSOs had to constantly reassess their roles in the rapidly changing context, and adjust their activities and relationships requiring them to make frequent changes in their organisational structures in response. As in the past, Timor-Leste's activist CSOs need to reassess their strategies in order to define the path that's best for them in the current context in Timor-Leste or risk becoming service providers. There may be ways that donor support can continue to build capacity rather than strip capacities and distract organisations from their own strategic focus, but this requires donors to define capacity as more than a human resource or technical skill and to look at more than just value for money and short-term results.

Potential ways to strengthen CSO capacity

Based on our experience, consultations and learning exercises (such as evaluations), and discussion during presentation at the TLSA conference, some potential ways forward can be identified including:

- CSOs that self-assess their development needs are able to provide and seek capacity development inputs that best suit their organisational needs. They are also better able to assess what they are already doing well and what needs to change. They can then use this information in negation with donors, and donors should request and fund these types activities.
- CSOs function better when they share information internally. For example, program staff need to understand how their work is financed and obligations related to grants so that they can plan and implement their activities within budget.
- It is useful to develop Strategic Plans that include organisational development and meaningful benchmarks to track this development and Donors need to prioritise funding for the internal organisational development of CSOs.
- Donors and CSOs need to ensure that projects are set up to enable sustainability – for example by including costs for severance pay and employee benefits.
- CSOs must consider the Istanbul Principles for effective CSOs and consider how these can be implemented in practice.
- Donors and CSOs should try to use more creative approaches to M&E and especially indicators which could better capture the characteristics of their work, rather than only measuring the work from externally driven indicators, often created to meet donor requirements.
- Donors and CSOs need to discuss and understand organisational capacities (of both the Donor and CSO) and these should be communicated and monitored regularly.

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Adult literacy education in Timor-Leste in recent years: from research to practice

Danielle Boon[1]

Introduction

This article presents findings of a study on adult literacy education in Timor-Leste, for which data were collected in 2009-2011. The study is part of a larger research project on contemporary and historical dimensions of adult literacy in Timor-Leste that runs from 2009-2014[2] (see De Araújo e Corte-Real & Kroon 2012; Cabral & Martin-Jones 2012; Da Conceição Savio et al. 2012). The study presented here consists of two parts: a broad study in eight districts, investigating teacher and learner backgrounds and learners' emergent literacy ability; and a case study in seven districts, investigating teaching and learning processes in literacy classes and ideas of learners, teachers and coordinators about literacy education and use. The broad study was already reported on in the TLSA 2011 conference proceedings (Boon & Kurvers 2012a). Therefore, after a summary of the broad study, here I will mainly focus on the case study. For a more detailed account of my research, in the following I will refer to a number of already available publications and to Boon 2014a and b (both forthcoming).

Broad study: Participants and reading and writing ability

In the broad study, data were collected in 73 adult literacy groups in three programmes aiming at literacy in Tetun: *Los Hau Bele* (Yes I Can), the three-month audio-visual literacy programme of Cuban origin[3], adapted to Timor-Leste's reality, that was part of Timor-Leste's national literacy campaign in 2007-2012; *Alfanamor*, Timor-Leste's national literacy programme, since 2007-2008 consisting of the two six-month programmes *Hakat ba Oin* (Step Forward) for beginners and *Iha Dalan* (On the Way) for advanced learners[4]; the *YEP Literacy & Numeracy* courses in 2009-2011, that were part of the *Youth Employment Promotion* (YEP) programme and used summarized versions of the *Hakat ba Oin* and *Iha Dalan* manuals[5]. For a detailed description of all programmes see Boon (2011a).

100 teachers and 789 learners[6] participated in the study. The teachers filled out a questionnaire. Their ages varied from 19 to 66 years; their number of years of education varied from four to 13 years; 75% had one year or less experience in teaching adult literacy; 80% had a regional language (e.g. Mambae, Baikenu) as their mother tongue; 54% was female. Many teachers worked in rather poor circumstances: outside at a veranda (61%), without electricity (66%), without chairs (40%) and without tables for the participants (82%). The 789 learners were interviewed briefly and were asked to participate in two reading and two writing tasks in Tetun. They considerably varied in age, from young teenagers to people in their mid-seventies. 68% were women. 88% had a regional language as their mother tongue and 82% reported

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[1] Tilburg University, the Netherlands

[2] "*Becoming a nation of readers in Timor-Leste: Language policy and adult literacy development in a multilingual context*", supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research NWO/WOTRO Science for Global Development, file number W 01.65.315.00.

[3] *Los Hau Bele* is based on the Cuban adult literacy programme *Yo, Sí Puedo* (Yes I can), orginally conceived in the late nineties (Boughton 2010: 62), and implemented in 28 countries (http://www.iplac.rimed.cu/, 17-1-2014).

[4] In 2004-2008, the author of this article was involved in the joint development of the *Hakat ba Oin* and *Iha Dalan* curriculum and manuals, as adult literacy adviser at Timor-Leste's Ministry of Education, paid by UNDP.

[5] These versions, *YEP Livru 1* and *2*, were developed with involvement of the author of this article.

[6] Informed consent was acquired in advance at all levels (including ministerial, directorate and coordination level), and during each class visit it was secured at an individual level in face to face interaction with the adult learners, with translations in their regional language.

they could speak Tetun. 31% had attended formal education in the past and 15% had participated in another literacy course before this one.

Each learner was given a grapheme recognition task, a word reading task, a form filling task and a word writing task. First we looked at the reading and writing ability of all participants who had had three to four months of literacy education[7] (n=369). This group consisted of learners with and without prior education. For all tasks, the participants who never went to school before (n=229) had significantly lower scores than the ones with school experience. We then focussed on those participants without any school experience, the main target group of adult literacy education. They could recognize on average 15 out of 30 graphemes, read on average 14 out of 80 words in three minutes, could fill out on average four items out of ten in the basic form and could write on average four out of ten words on dictation. Their scores on all four tasks showed huge variation, as shown in table 1:

Table 1: Proportion of participants who scored between 0 and 100% correct on each of the tasks

Score	Grapheme recognition 30 graphemes (%, n=237)	Word reading 80 words (%, n=229)	Form filling 10 items (%, n=239)	Word writing 10 words (%, n=239)
0% correct	9	52	11	30
1-20% correct	16	23	35	17
21-80% correct	52	16	44	36
81-100% correct	23	9	10	17

Table 1 shows that many learners scored 0 or very low (1-20% correct) while others scored very high (80-100% correct). In this large individual variety in task scores, some patterns could be distinguished. For all four tasks, the younger participants on average had significantly higher scores than the older ones. Tetun proficiency seemed less crucial: only in the grapheme recognition task Tetun speakers did significantly better than non-Tetun speakers.

Three to four months of literacy education had not been enough for most participants to build initial reading ability. Letter knowledge and particularly being able to apply grapheme-phoneme correspondence are crucial but not sufficient for learning to read an alphabetic script (Adams 1990; Byrne 1998). Many learners had acquired the graphemes, but they had trouble blending them to words. Of those who could read words, many lacked the speed or fluency required for comprehension. And although many learners could write their name and signature, they had not learned to write (new) words independently. For a more detailed account of this part of the study, see Boon & Kurvers (2012a) and Boon (2011b; 2014b, forthcoming).

Case study: The teaching and learning of literacy

In 2010-2011, I observed and audio-recorded 20 adult literacy classes in twelve groups in seven districts: Viqueque, Aileu, Covalima, Dili, Ermera, Manufahi and Manatuto. Districts and locations were selected in coordination with national and district coordinators. Of the 20 classes, eight were *Los Hau Bele*, four *Hakat ba Oin* and eight *Iha Dalan* classes. During the observations, I used a checklist, took field notes and used still photography to capture texts on the blackboard and class layouts. After the classes, I interviewed nine groups of learners, ten teachers and six district/subdistrict coordinators of literacy education. During the

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[7] In three to four months of literacy education, mostly six to nine hours per week, one could finish the *Los Hau Bele* programme (+/- 3 months), or most of the *YEP* literacy programme (+/- 4 months), or half to two thirds of the *Hakat ba Oin* programme (+/- 6 months).

interviews, I used interview guidelines related to specific activities and roles of coordinators, teachers and learners.

I will focus here on two topics from the case study that contribute to a deeper understanding of the above findings: language use in the literacy classrooms and the teaching of reading and writing.

Multilingual classroom talk

In the adult literacy classes in the case study, I observed the use of four different languages: Tetun, the regional language, Portuguese and Indonesian (Boon & Kurvers 2012a). Drawing on observations of two classes in Viqueque and Covalima, Boon (2013) gives a detailed account on what languages were used when and by whom. Tetun, the target language for literacy, turned out to be the main language of classroom interaction. The regional languages, Makasae in Viqueque and Bunak in Covalima, were used for extra explanations, repetitions of lesson content, translations and 'small talk' not directly related to the lesson content. Tetun and loanwords from Portuguese, and occasionally from Indonesian, were used by the teachers for 'meta-talk', i.e., the talking about literacy and numeracy. In the Viqueque class, reference to numbers was made mostly in Indonesian, but also in Tetun and Portuguese, and, occasionally in Makasae; in the Covalima class this mainly happened in Portuguese, occasionally in Indonesian and not in Tetun (although Tetun was the main language of instruction).

The multilingual interactional practices observed in these two classes resonated with the practices I observed in other adult literacy classes in other districts. On some occasions, the contrast between different languages was clearly used as a meaning-making resource. Some switches distinguished different kinds of talk: from small talk in the regional language to lesson content in Tetun; from explanation in Tetun to extra explanation in the regional language. But there were also occasions when people simply drew on the totality of multilingual communicative resources available to them.

The use of regional languages alongside other languages in adult literacy education is not surprising, given that regional languages are widely used in local communication outside the classroom (Hajek 2000; Taylor-Leech 2009). Following Arthur (2001), Tetun could be described as the 'on-stage' language in literacy classes, and the regional languages as 'backstage' languages, since the latter were accepted for small talk and extra explanations/repetitions, but not as languages to be used in 'staged' question-and-answer performances.

The audio recordings of classroom talk revealed the multiple ways in which teachers and learners drew on the linguistic resources available to them to get new lesson content across and make meaning of reading and writing tasks. They found 'local pragmatic solutions' (Lin 2001) to the challenges involved in taking on a new language of teaching.

Teaching adult literacy

My class observations revealed that all twelve groups were very heterogeneous, with young and older learners with and without prior education. The (mostly whole-class) teaching generally followed the specific literacy programme in use. A significant part of all lessons was spent on writing exercises on the blackboard. In all classes, there was a strong focus on the letter-syllable-word level, and on technical literacy (spelling and decoding skills). To refer to letters, letter names (not their sounds) were used, often Portuguese-Tetun letter names like /ʒi'gɛ/ for 'g', /'ʒɔtɐ / for 'j' and /ɛmi/ for 'm'. Observations revealed a stronger focus on writing (often: copying from the blackboard) than on decoding, reading and understanding written text. Few reading exercises were done, mostly at the syllable-word level, only occasionally regarding short phrases. Not much attention was paid to developing speed and fluency in reading, to achieve comprehension of longer phrases or short texts.

Eight lessons were partly dedicated to numeracy, practicing calculations. Eight other lessons included basic functional literacy, mainly writing names, signatures and other personal data. Often this regarded strings of letters that could be learned by heart, without an understanding of grapheme-phoneme

correspondence; not every learner could mention each letter and read the syllables in words he/she produced.

Apart from these general findings in all programmes, there were findings specifically related to certain programme features. Specific for all eight *Los Hau Bele* classes, for instance, was that a significant part of lesson time was spent on connections (and rote association) of numbers and letters. The idea behind this method of connecting a number to each new letter to be learnt, is that numbers are already familiar to many adult literacy learners (Boughton 2010:64), and that combining something familiar (a number) to something new (a letter) makes learning the letters easier. In the classes observed, however, connecting numbers to letters did not seem to help people acquiring the alphabetic principle (see also Boon & Kurvers 2012b[8]), but to put them to an extra task, of which the usefulness in authentic reading and writing was not clear. This might have to do with, for reading, the arbitrary relationship between the chosen numbers and letters, while the alphabetic principle applies for reading systematic relationship between letters and sounds. I observed that for new writers the writing of letters with a line below and the (according to *Los Hau Bele*) corresponding number underneath seemed too difficult; it resulted in drawings in which they somehow copied what was on the blackboard without understanding what or why, which led the attention away from practicing the letter-sound correspondence that is crucial in the emergent reading process.

A specific element in four *Iha Dalan* classes and one *Hakat ba Oin* class was the establishing of links between lesson content and the outside world by writing long lists of words and sometimes phrases related to participants' daily work: names of agricultural products and natural resources, tools they used in the field. On the one hand, this activity clearly made sense to the participants, since they were obviously "reading and writing their own world", hence their active, enthusiastic participation. On the other hand, also here the focus often did not go beyond word level, and it seemed that learners often repeated words they already could read and write. When the words were not used as stepping stones to improve decoding skills, this activity did not seem to contribute much to the better applying of the alphabetic principle, nor to moving up to fluent reading and writing of longer phrases and text comprehension.

The interviews with learners, teachers and coordinators provided information about their ideas on literacy education, literacy use in daily life and further learning needs after basic literacy (see also Boon, 2014a, forthcoming). Learners explained that in the past they missed out on school because of poverty and conflict, and that now they welcomed any opportunity to acquire literacy. In most places visited, learners said there were not many occasions in which they could practice their newly built reading and writing skills in daily life. Some mentioned occasions like sms-texting, reading letters and voting during elections. One occasion frequently mentioned, was elderly people having to write their name and signature to receive their monthly retirement pay. For many elderly people, to learn this was the ultimate goal of participating in a literacy class. But many other learners, young and older, were eager to learn more in all literacy, post-literacy and continued education options available. Most interviewees (learners, teachers and coordinators) saw the three-month *Los Hau Bele* programme as a first step on a longer road of becoming literate, that might take one or a couple of years and included more literacy and post-literacy education, like the *Hakat ba Oin* and *Iha Dalan* programmes, followed by programmes equivalent to basic education. Despite the fact that districts had been declared "free from illiteracy" after closure of the *Los Hau Bele* programme, learners, teachers and coordinators were well aware that more literacy and post-literacy education was needed for learners to become skilled readers and writers. They shared a great concern that by lack or delay of more education options, participants quickly might, in their words, "fall back into illiteracy".

Conclusions, recommendations and implementation

The above findings of the broad and the case study (see also Boon 2014b, forthcoming), illustrated the heterogeneity of literacy groups in recent adult literacy education in Timor-Leste, and the large individual variety in literacy ability developed. Contrary to what is often heard, not all adult learners enter literacy

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[8] This article describes four teachers teaching different *Los Hau Bele* lessons, resp. lesson 17, 34, 42 and 48 according to the programme's teacher manual.

programmes as "illiterates", and the majority does not "become literate" in a few months in a single programme. The broad study revealed a huge individual variety in reading and writing scores after three to four months of literacy education. Although some participants had high scores, many others had not yet learned to apply the alphabetic principle and could not read and write words independently. Three to four months of literacy education clearly was not enough for the majority to acquire basic literacy skills. These findings are in line with findings from international studies on adult literacy (Kurvers et al. 2010; Condelli et al. 2003).

Looking at what happens in adult literacy classes can help to better understand the above findings. The broad study showed that participants' proficiency in Tetun played a less crucial role than expected. This might have to do with the use of multiple languages in literacy classes, as revealed by class observations in the case study. Classroom communication generally turned out to be multilingual, with teachers and learners using their full repertoire of linguistic resources to explain and understand new lesson content. Learners in that way could probably compensate for not being able to understand Tetun. Teachers and learners clearly had found pragmatic solutions to deal with the challenges of the highly multilingual setting they daily operate in.

The teaching in most classes observed in the case study showed a dominant focus on the letter-syllable-word level and on technical literacy skills. The broadly used letter names seemed to complicate synthesis: using the letter names /ɛfi/, /ɛli/ and /ɛni/ to form or decode the word *fulan* (moon/month) is more difficult than using the sounds of those letters. In most lessons more attention was paid to writing syllables and words than to reading or reading comprehension of larger units. And some activities did not seem to contribute to acquiring the alphabetic principle.

Most education observed did not take into account the diverse literacy levels in the highly heterogeneous groups, nor did some of the materials used. The rather programme-centred education seemed to result in a one-size-fits-all approach in which lessons were probably too easy for some learners, too difficult for others, and just right for only a few. This might lead to motivation loss and drop out of learners whose learning needs are not met.

Class observations also revealed that not many links were made between classroom literacy and literacy practices in daily life (although some lessons spent time on basic functional literacy).

In interviews in the case study, participants in low-literate environments said they did not have many opportunities to practice reading and writing out of class. Learners, teachers and coordinators also signalled a lack of, or delay in, provision of further literacy, post-literacy and other education options after the first few months (often due to financial constraints), which caused broadly shared worries about low retention and people "falling back to illiteracy".

The study's findings lead to a number of recommendations. Firstly, teacher trainings could stress crucial aspects of literacy teaching, so that teachers become better equipped to guide learners from emergent literacy skills to fluent reading and writing. Teachers need to be provided with more knowledge and practice on teaching activities at the letter-syllable-word level that contribute to the acquisition of the alphabetic principle, to increasing speed and reaching automatic application of grapheme-phoneme correspondence. They need training on providing their learners with extensive practice beyond the word level to expand initial literacy ability, and on focusing not only on technical reading and writing but also on meaning and comprehension.

Secondly, if literacy groups in the future will be as heterogeneous as in recent years, which is highly likely, then there might be a need to adapt the education to that heterogeneity. Teachers should be provided training on how to better meet the large diversity of literacy levels within the groups they teach. Programmes and materials should provide more possibilities to establish differentiation. Heterogeneous groups need teachers who have developed capacity in multi-level group teaching, and programmes and materials that take into account diverse learning needs.

Thirdly, more relevant lesson content might be realized by focusing less on "classroom literacy" and more on daily life literacy practices, e.g. by using more authentic materials, practicing daily literacy tasks and making links to numeracy and financial literacy used in daily transactions.

Fourthly, provision of a variety of well-connected literacy, post-literacy and continued education options is crucial to avoid rapid loss of newly built basic literacy ability.

Our study already saw a small, practical follow-up in 2012-2014, related to the first three recommendations. Some suggestions were put into practice on request by and in collaboration with Timor-Leste's Ministry of Education, NGO's and international organisations involved in adult literacy in Timor-Leste. Tetun language support was provided by the National Institute of Linguistics. New additional materials in Tetun for adult literacy and post-literacy education have been developed, piloted and in some cases implemented. Two new teacher manuals[9] contain guidelines on steps to take when teaching a multilevel adult literacy group: assessment of the various starting levels and learning needs with easy-to-use entrance tests, making lesson plans based on that variety of levels and needs, carrying out lesson plans in a more learner-centred way and, finally, assessment of achieved literacy and numeracy ability. These guidelines can be, and in some cases already have been, used as a basis for teacher training. For adult learners, seven new literacy and post-literacy manuals have been developed[10], with which they can first repeat previously acquired basic literacy and numeracy, and then expand and strengthen their reading, writing and numeracy ability with manuals with relevant content in larger units. The manuals are based on authentic materials, like posters and signs in the streets throughout Timor-Leste, and authentic settings, like the buying and selling at local markets and shops where the reading, writing and calculations involve a large variety of products and prices. These materials provide teachers and learners with some examples on how to expand learners' emergent literacy and numeracy ability, how to meet diverse learning needs, and how to establish more links between classroom and daily life literacy. In that way they form a small contribution to the -hopefully- more relevant, more learner-centred and tailor-made teaching of literacy to adults in Timor-Leste's future.

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[9] "From basic literacy to the entrance level of Equivalence 1" and "From basic literacy to the entrance level of the Foundation Course" (titles translated from Tetun).

[10] "Repetition manual: basic literacy & numeracy"; "Reading on the street: posters and signs" - level 1 and 2; "Reading, writing and calculating at the market"; "Reading, writing and calculating in the shop"; "Percentages"; "Options after literacy" (titles translated from Tetun).

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State building and nation building: Exploring a complex relationship through the construction of urban citizenship in Dili, Timor Leste

Alix Valenti

Introduction

A survey of the literature on international interventions in post-conflict countries reveals that the terms 'state building' and 'nation building' are often used interchangeably, when they are in fact two quite distinct processes, and their use as interchangeable notions in the literature and international interventions can have significantly negative consequences on the sustainability of the reconstruction efforts for countries recovering from conflicts or having recently gained their independence.

Based on the initial findings of nine months' fieldwork carried out in Dili, Timor Leste, this paper explores this relationships by highlighting some of the impacts that state building policies have on the challenging process of nation building in a newly independent country. In a brief theoretical review of the research's key concepts, the first part of this paper sets out to present a framework which articulates the interaction of the processes of state building and nation building within the context of urban spaces, arguing that to be effective and sustainable a state needs to win the hearts and minds of its population by ensuring not only contractual state-citizen relations – defining rights and duties to build its legitimacy – but also facilitating peaceful and cooperative relations amongst its citizens – fostering a basis for its sovereignty. Analysing these dynamics within urban spaces, this paper explains, is particularly interesting as their different history, position and migration flows create unique spaces where the encounter of diversity, politics and economic activity – shaped by state policies – produce specific opportunities and challenges for the negotiation of different identities into that of a nation. The second, empirical, part of this paper uses the research carried out in Dili to analyse how people's perceptions of the state building process, influenced by different narratives of history, migration and development, produce fragmented forms of citizenship that 'constitute themselves differently from the dominant images given to them' (Isin 2002 in Secor 2004, 353), thus potentially undermining the construction of a national identity.

State building and nation building

In order to understand the relationship between state building and nation building, it is useful to take one step back to look at the relationship between states and nations through the lens of social contract theory. Although there are various strands of social contract theory[1] arguing, simply put, for either a general common will guided by morals or a more individualistic approach to society guided by protection of private property, what these theories have in common is their conceptualisation of the existence of a state based on the consent of individuals willing to negotiate their differences in order to form one body politic to be governed by their chosen form of state. Individuals' willingness to remain within one body politic is what is commonly referred to as state sovereignty. But to maintain its sovereignty, the state needs to build its legitimacy by developing institutions and promoting policies that reflect the body politic's basic virtues and encourages social cooperation (Paz-Fuchs 2011, 3) so as to facilitate the dialogue necessary for the constant negotiation of differences[2], for if individuals perceive that they are being governed by a state that promotes only certain groups' interests, the sovereignty of said state can be severely undermined.

The key element of the relationship between the state and the nation, therefore, is citizenship: if people recognise that it is in their best interest to form a body politic under one state – i.e. relational

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[1] Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, John Ralws.
[2] Here again the aim of the state differs according the different strands, ranging from equality to protection of property and equal opportunities. It does not, however, fall within the scope of this paper to discuss these in details.

citizenship - and if the state is capable of developing the institutions that will peacefully manage the constant renegotiation of identities necessary to form a nation – i.e. juridico-legal citizenship – then the government can function effectively. Citizenship, in its relational sense, entails the construction of 'a degree of sameness within a universe of difference' (LiPuma 1995, 57) in order to transform a previously fragmented territory, characterised by different narratives of history – not only those related to the conflict, but also more traditional differences –, into a nation with a sense of national social identity. As such, it requires a careful analysis of both the perceived impact of state policies on everyday life – with its challenges and opportunities – and how these perceptions affect the relationships between the state and the individuals as well as between different groups, for citizenship is 'linked to various notions of identity, attained through action, not only vis-à-vis the state, but in other sites of politics as well, be they in the home, acts of cultural resistance or social movements' (Gaventa 2006, 24).

In the context of the relationship between state building and nation building, however, the dynamics between sovereignty, legitimacy and citizenship outlined above are now heavily influenced – and at times dictated – by international institutions, which propensity to understand the concepts of state building and nation building interchangeably often has resulted into an overemphasis on jurido-legal citizenship to the detriment of the development of relational citizenship. This has been particularly the case in the framework of state building processes focused on (neo)liberal strategies (Barbara 2008, 308) which promote a 'roll-back' of state social policies[3] and 'roll-out' of pro-market policies[4] (Peck and Tickell 2002 in Purcell 2008, 15) based on the perception of the citizen as an individual who 'is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities [especially the capacity to labour], for which he owes nothing to society' (MacPherson 1969 in Foster 1995, 19). This very juridico-legal and individualistic understanding of citizenship, however, can have a significant impact on the ability, and willingness, of citizens to perceive themselves as part of a bigger community and may, therefore, contribute to the creation of more local forms of citizenship undermining the functioning of the state.

The significance of urban spaces

In this context, urban spaces, as opposed to rural areas, provide a very good opportunity for analysing how people's perceptions of state policies impact on how 'ideas are formed, actions are produced, and relationships are created and maintained' (Marston 2005, 427) and how, in turn, these relations shape and are shaped by the everyday spaces of urban life, thus impacting on the creation of a national social identity[5]. Indeed, cities – and in particular capital cities – are particularly interesting case studies because the significant infrastructure investments they attract, the work they create – through infrastructure development and the international aid industry – and the new opportunities they offer – e.g. jobs, education, alleged better quality of life – constitute pull factors on the rest of the country's population, increasing significantly rural-urban migration patterns and resulting in fast, often uncontrolled, urbanisation. This fast urbanisation, compounded by uneven investment in infrastructure – dictated by market development policies and private investment priorities – produces an urban fabric characterised by stark social and economic differences that shape a wide variety of urban spaces where rich areas become richer whilst others stagnate or become increasingly ostracised, trapped into a vicious circle of rising unemployment, economic insecurity and inability to participate to the project of the new country. Consequently, the gap between these new spaces of difference continues to increase, significantly affecting the relationships between different groups of citizen.

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[3] Such as welfare and other variations of social security nets available to the most deprived populations

[4] Direct privatisation; Public-private partnerships; Outsourcing, i.e. tendering; Creating new markets; Making internet markets; and, Creating new conditions for competitive success (Clarke 1999 in Clarke 2004, 35)

[5] The use of the terms 'actual' and 'virtual' is borrowed from Deleuze (1994 in Marston 2005, 425); they refer respectively to 'bodies actualized in sensible composites' and the 'vast regime of differential potentialities through which those actualisations resolve themselves'. In other words here, the materialization of state practices (actual) has an impact on the different ways the state can be perceived (virtual) through citizenship, which consequently has an impact on how the state, through the nation, functions (actual again).

But capital cities are not only economic hubs; they are also the centres of decision-making – especially in countries recovering from conflict where decentralisation has either not yet been envisaged or proved unsuccessful – and as such, they have also become the centre for the contestation of power. Indeed, the type of governance resulting from the neoliberal emphasis on public/private partnerships and private investments[6] results into a type of decision-making – as regards infrastructure, labour market, etc – that is both essentially market-driven and thoroughly undemocratic: citizens have no leverage for protesting against the social and economic impacts of these decisions because they are carried out by private entities. Accordingly, as frustration mounts within some spaces of difference, met only by state repression[7], the disenfranchised citizens are left with two options: resorting to violence or creating new, more localised forms of citizenship.

The case of Dili, Timor Leste

The role of Dili in Timor Leste goes beyond that of the capital of the country. Historically, its position as an important place of residence and commerce started developing during the centuries of Portuguese colonisation, whilst it gained most of its symbolic significance as a key strategic point for decision-making and control during the Indonesian military rule. As a result of its symbolism and importance, Dili has also been 'seized by paroxysms of collective violence on several occasions over the past six decades: in 1942, 1975, 1980, 1991, 2002, 2006 and 2006' (Jütersonke et al 2010, 10). Finally, the subsequent official designation of Dili as the capital of Timor Leste after independence has played a crucial part in continuing to develop the significance of the city for the country. Indeed, the arrival of the United Nations mandated mission[8] and its establishment in the capital – from whence it organised its transitional administration – marked the beginning of a long succession of other international organisations and donors that settled in Dili, and contributed significantly – through the constant flow of international aid money and the business opportunities represented by international aid staff – to attracting a vast number of people from rural areas who sought their chance to improve their economic situation, living standards and, as such, contribute to the building of the country.

As a result, Dili's population doubled in less than ten years, going from 123,474 inhabitants in 2001 to 234,026 in 2010 (National Directorate for Statistics – NDS 2013), that is 21% of Timor Leste's population (ibid), and attracting people from all other twelve districts in the country, thus becoming the most diverse district in Timor Leste, as shown in Figure 1 below.[9]

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[6] Which often result in infrastructure and other development projects being carried out by private investors, NGOs and INGOs through complicated and often less than transparent tendering processes

[7] In neoliberal states the use of violence by the state to repress social movements is legitimised by the need to maintain security for the production of capital

[8] UNTAET and its follow-up missions

[9] The NDS has not yet published the statistics for migration flows in 2010, therefore it was only possible to use those for 2004. Nonetheless, the persistent absence of significant development all other districts suggests that these patterns are likely to have remained unchanged

Figure 1 – Population flows between districts (Source: Census Atlas 2004, 31)

The fieldwork revealed, however, that despite the increasing urban population and the concentration of infrastructure development projects, Dili remains to this day without an urban development plan to manage the fast and scattered urbanisation, resulting in the emergence of very different and contrasted urban spaces within the same urban area.

Therefore, Dili is a very interesting case study to analyse how people's perceptions of the impact of state policies on their urban environment affect their interactions within and between different urban spaces across the whole urban area and, as a result, contribute to shape their sense of social identity at different scales. To this end, the fieldwork for the research was carried out in three areas presenting different characteristics as shown in Table 1 below. Interviews[10] in the areas were conducted in a semi-structured manner, guiding participants' answers through specific topics related to their interactions with other people in their aldeia, their perceptions of the causes – or absence – of violence in their area, their movements within and outside their area and their perception of state policies since independence.

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[10] To ensure a variety of points of view, the interviewees spun across the following categories: communities leaders – *xefi suku, xefi aldeia, xefi juventude, lian nain* and de facto community leaders; employed and unemployed; male and female; youth, middle-aged and elderly; level of education – primary/secondary school, university

Table 1 – Characteristics of selected areas

Aldeia	History of violence	Development	Socio-economic	Location in Dili
Culao	Violent until 2006; calmer since IDP dialogues	Developed during Indonesian times; site of resistance	Increase in level of education and employment	By the mountain but good transport connections
Liriu	Very little violence since independence	Developed during Portuguese times; administration staff residence	Generally high level of education and employment, with pockets of lower income	Centre of Dili, good transport connections
Metin IV	Much violence since independence, still ongoing	Developed during Indonesian times; Indonesian military & Timorese	Low level of education and high unemployment	Isolated by the river, no transport connection

Main findings

Table 2 below presents an overview of the main findings gathered in the research areas on the basis of the four main topics approached with interviewees.[11]

Table 2 – Main area findings

Topic	Culao	Liriu	Metin IV
Interaction at aldeia level	Attendance but little participation in aldeia meetings; people feel they cannot make difference and do not discuss issues	High participation to aldeia meetings and initiatives; open debate between neighbours	Attendance and participation, but reliant on aldeia leaders' efforts; open debate between neighbours on areas' main issues
Mobility within Dili	Majority travel at least in neighbouring aldeias; employed travel farther	Majority travel to most aldeias around Liriu and to markets; employed travel farther	Mostly only employed travel outside aldeia; majority leaves once a week/month
Causes of violence	Decreasing unemployment and increasing education engender more peaceful relations	Little violence resulting from high levels of education and employment	High levels of violence resulting from unemployment and low level education; leaders' involvement is key
Perception of state	Little presence of government; most issues addressed locally	Little presence of government but have seen changes in urban fabric	Violence repression, no changes in urban fabric, feel forgotten

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[11] For the purpose of this paper the author has chosen to highlight only certain aspects of the findings from the field research. It is important to note, nonetheless, that the nine months fieldwork yielded more complex and intricate findings.

The most striking finding from the analysis of the information gathered through case study area interviews is that, regardless of the urban fabric in which people live, work and interact on a daily basis, the vast majority of the participants believe that the presence, or absence, of violence in their area is very often related to levels of education and unemployment in those areas. Indeed, participants from the area of Culao have generally indicated that prior to the 2006 crisis, school attendance was still quite low whilst unemployment levels, especially amongst youth, were high leading, they believe, to many of these young people joining gangs or simply 'hanging out' with their friends in the streets, drinking and causing trouble. However, government and international programmes implemented in the area in response to the significant levels of violence in the area during the crisis, appear to have inverted these tendencies, bringing with it more peaceful relationships between different groups. Conversely, participants in Metin IV stressed the feeling of being caught in a vicious circle marked, according to them, by the fact that the continuing high levels of violence in their area badly affect the quality of education offered by the local school[12], resulting in a lack of opportunity for its numerous youth and, consequently, in many of them joining gangs or getting drunk and participating in social jealousy related violence.[13]

Additionally, combining the interview findings with the characteristics of the areas previously outlined, another interesting finding emerges: long terms patterns of violence, or absence thereof, appear to be correlated with population involvement in aldeia matters. In fact, on the one hand, Liriu has a long history of connection to state and governance structures[14] and conversations with the participants revealed that there was a significant level of participation by the aldeia's population in both official meetings as well as other activities organised by leaders and non-leaders alike. Many of these activities were targeted at keeping youth engaged and occupied in order to ensure that they kept out of trouble outside school times. On the other hand, participants in Metin IV emphasised the important role played by leaders and *de facto* leaders in ensuring participation to aldeia activities as well as providing conflict resolution and mediation. Thus, although historically Metin IV is not related to the presence of strong state governance structures[15], the needs of the aldeia's population have nonetheless contributed to creating strong community ties. Finally, the violence and socio-economic changes experienced by Culao appear to have left a vacuum where strong aldeia leadership is no longer key to maintaining peace, but a new leadership maintaining strong ties amongst the population has not yet emerged, thus leading to a lack of engagement in the area.

Lastly, an analysis of people's movements within and outside their area reveals two key points. Firstly, that participants living in areas better connected with the rest of Dili's urban area are more inclined to move around, at least to neighbouring areas to go to the market and visit friends, whereas participants in Metin IV were deterred, by both the insecurity of the long walk to the main road and the taxi fares, to leave their area more than once a week or month. Secondly, employed people are more likely to travel across Dili than unemployed, since they need to travel to their workplace.

Implications for the construction of citizenship in Dili

The findings outlined above demonstrate that the urban fabric characterising people's everyday spaces of interaction has a significant impact on the way in which people interact with other areas' inhabitants and how they perceive their state institutions. Indeed, participants living in Liriu, an area with a longer history of state governance and a good urban fabric[16], said that they do feel the state could be more proactive in anticipating and solving certain problems – e.g. issues with drinking water – but they are aware that the past

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[12] Metin IV's school is located on the main street where most of the violence happens. As a result, it closes whenever there are episodes of violence, disrupting education, and many teachers refuse to work there.

[13] A number of participants have indicated that the presence of higher income houses in their area raises feelings of social jealousy, especially amongst the disenfranchised youth, and episodes of stone-throwing against those houses are not uncommon

[14] Since the area used to host Portuguese administration staff and, subsequently, Indonesian military staff

[15] The control exercised by Indonesian military in the area does not fit within the realm of governance; it is military control.

[16] i.e. good infrastructure and transport connections, generally higher socio-economic background, better security

three governments have been on a learning curve and there have been significant improvements for people in the country in the past decade. Furthermore, whilst their aldeia there appears to show a good level of leadership to solve local issues and create a community through different activities, participants' ability to move around Dili's urban space – whether employed or not – appeared to contribute to giving them more perspective on the issues in their area and the urban area as a whole. In contrast, Metin IV's participants' perception of their aldeia's urban fabric and its development in the past decade[17] reflect very poorly on their perception of the state, which they feel has abandoned them. Furthermore, many participants indicated that state's approach to security in the area, that is, repression, clearly sends them a message that the state would rather get rid of a problem rather than understanding its root causes, thus depoliticising violence (Dikeç, 2002; p.95). Finally, lack of movement across Dili's urban area appeared to affect people's perceptions of the issues at stake and their relations with other areas, limiting them mostly to focusing on Metin IV's issues rather than understanding them within Dili's wider context.

Consequently, these findings reveal that in certain areas of Dili, such as Metin IV, people's perceptions of the impact of state building on their urban fabric is seriously threatening its legitimacy, whilst state inability to create the adequate conditions for interactions between different groups across aldeias is threatening the creation of a wider social identity, thus undermining its sovereignty. These gaps, however, are being filled by local leadership and the emergence of strong, inward-looking community ties that seem to create new spaces for a more local form of citizenship; for indeed, 'who we happen to see regularly as we move through the world has an influence on who we think of as citizens and who we think to engage with as citizens' (Bickford 2000, 363). These different, more local forms of urban citizenship demonstrate that the state is currently failing to renegotiate these identities and, as such, hindering the nation building process.

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[17] Participants indicated that there have been no developments to build a new, better and better lighted road to reach the main streets; most of the running water is a result of community efforts to build wells; and much of the electricity is illegally taken from the main cables. Socio-economic conditions in the area have also remained unchanged since independence.

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Can social capital and a focus on building collection action help coffee growers overcome livelihood challenges in in Timor-Leste?

Lisa Walker

The small nation of Timor-Leste has a natural advantage in producing good quality, organic Arabica coffee owing to its climate, altitude and historically low use of inputs including fertilizer (World Bank 2011; MAF 2009). Despite these advantages and similar to other agricultural commodities in Timor-Leste, the coffee industry must also contend with poor roads, missing infrastructure and limited access to essential services. In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) estimates that over 55 per cent of the area planted with coffee trees in the country is now taken up with old and relatively unproductive trees (MAF 2009). Notwithstanding these challenges, the Government has identified the industry, which provides income to over one third of the population (NSD 2011) and accounted for 80% of the value of non-oil exports in 2010, as having a key role to play in reducing rural poverty (GOTL 2011).

In addition to productivity constraints, Timorese coffee growers must also engage with supply chains for international coffee that have marginalised and disempowered small scale coffee producers. While there are a number of well-studied initiatives, such as Fairtrade coffee, that attempt to change the damaging effects market trends are having on small-hold growers (Bacon 2005; Daviron and Ponte 2005; Ponte 2002), it is increasingly being found that price premiums have not increased in line with coffee prices1 and that where a premium does exist it is often insufficient to have an impact on overall household livelihoods (Méndez et al. 2010; Bacon 2010; Valkila 2009; Jena et al. 2012).

One aspect that is receiving more coverage in the literature is how participation in cooperatives (including Fairtrade or organic) helps improve household livelihoods. Jena et al. (2012) isolate the benefits that arise as a result of participation in cooperatives and compare these to the benefits of being part of a certification scheme. They conclude that certification does not automatically provide better outcomes for coffee growers and that it is the structure and capabilities of the cooperative itself that are most relevant to overall grower livelihoods. Viewed more broadly, cooperatives and collective action, with their focus on providing services to members, also provide a number of benefits to coffee growers including improving economies of scale (Markelova et al. 2009), increasing market coordination and facilitating access to higher value supply chains, such as Fairtrade and organic certified coffee (Poulton et al. 2010).

This research seeks to build on these findings and contribute to the small body of literature on the Timor-Leste coffee industry. It aims to understand the key factors influencing the livelihoods of coffee growers with a view to identifying how actors can best work with communities to improve overall livelihoods. The paper is separated into two sections. The first section of the paper will introduce the sustainable livelihoods approach and explore the conceptualisation of social capital within this framework. The second section will outline the research methods and explain the key findings.

Sustainable livelihoods and social capital

Given the complexity of the problem facing growers in Timor-Leste, with interlinked challenges of low productivity, poor infrastructure, persistent poverty, and overall supply chain disadvantages, there is a need to draw on a cross-disciplinary, integrated analysis that can understand how each of these factors impacts the overall wellbeing of individuals, households and broader communities. The sustainable livelihoods approach, as outlined in Scoones (1998) and DFID (1999), provides a useful set of tools with which to analyse the situation. The approach has made a significant contribution in shifting the focus of development

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[1] In 2007-08 the FLO approved a small, nominal increase in the Fair Trade minimum price, this was the first major change in the Fair Trade price since the scheme originated in 1988 (Bacon 2010)

literature and practice from macro level concerns to micro, household level factors, including the strategies available to different households and how various resources are applied to make a livelihood, see for example Barrett et al. (2001), and Ellis (2000).

Notwithstanding its widespread use, there are a number of criticisms that are often levelled at the sustainable livelihoods approach. Most relevant to this paper is the view that while the sustainable livelihoods approach makes references to social assets (henceforth referred to as social capital) and indeed recognises social capital as having a key livelihood impact, ideas of reciprocity, interdependence and cooperation are often only included at the margins (King et al. 2013; De Haan and Zoomers 2005). A scan of literature on rural sustainable livelihoods finds some merit in this critique and in particular highlights the lack of consistency in the empirical treatment of social capital (Ellis and Bahiigwa 2003; Cramb et al. 2004). This criticism holds particular relevance for the analysis of coffee growing in Timor-Leste, given that social capital has been identified as playing a key role in facilitating collective action and cooperative behaviours in communities (Krishna 2004; Ostrom et al. 1994).

The social capital variables that will be utilised in the next section have been designed giving consideration to this criticism. The first social capital variable relates to the percentage of households that participate in collective coffee production activities. These activities include both formally and informally organised activities such as harvesting, pruning, mulching, or re-planting trees. Consistent with the treatment of participation in labour sharing groups in Krishna (2004), this variable provides an indication of the established patterns of organisation and resource mobilisation in communities. It therefore provides a useful indicator of the *structural* levels of social capital in the community. The second social capital variable provides indications of borrowing that occurs between households. High levels of inter-household borrowings may suggest strong networks of trust and reciprocity amongst rural coffee growing households, effectively capturing the more intangible aspects of social capital and thus providing a good representation of its *cultural* component (Van Deth 2003).

Research findings

This paper will draw on the results of a survey and follow up semi-structured interviews of coffee growing households in Ermera district. The survey was conducted in two stages, 826 coffee farming households in Ermera were interviewed in the first stage in February 2011 and 777 of these households were available for the second interview in August 2011. Researchers randomly selected a sub-set of 4-6 sucos (villages) within each of the five sub-districts in Ermera District and sampled approximately 20 households within each suco. The survey provided household level data on a range of topics including household assets, income sources, education and coffee production. The information gathered in the survey was then used to inform semi-structured interviews with growers and other key informants from the Timor-Leste coffee industry.

Table 1 – Asset endowments by income group

Variable	statistic	Income group 1 n=250	Income Group 2 n=250	Income Group 3 n=249
Physical capital				
House with electricity	% of households with	21.2	27.2	34.9
House made from concrete or brick	% of households with	20.8	22.8	38.6
Human capital				
Household size	mean	7.2	6.9	6
Education	average years	5.8	4.6	4.8
Meals per day	mean	1.6	2	2
Financial capital				
Household per capita income	mean ($US/cap)	17.6	70.9	284.5

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Months with no income	mean	2.3	2.2	2.1
Coffee income	% of total household income	87.0	71.4	49.6
Labour income	% of total household income	4.7	10.3	32.7
Animal income	% of total household income	4.1	13.7	13.8
Crop income	% of total household income	3.8	3.3	1.9
Cattle equivalent units	mean	0.9	1.1	1.7
Natural capital				
Household coffee yield[1]	(kg parchment equivalent/hectare)	47.6	133.1	197.3
Household land (excluding coffee)	mean (acres)	2.8	3.2	3.2
Coffee land	mean (acres)	2.6	3.0	3.5
Social capital				
Borrowed money from friends/family	% of households	56.8	48.0	49.0
Participate in collective coffee activities	% of households	4.8	12.0	9.6

[1] Coffee in Timor-Leste is typically sold as either red cherry or parchment, where 5kgs of red cherry equal 1kg of parchment. To calculate the yield, the quantity of red cherry has been converted to its equivalent parchment weight and added to the total amount of parchment sold

Table 1 separates the results of the survey of coffee growing households in Ermera into the five asset categories that form the core of the sustainable livelihoods approach as detailed in Scoones (1998) and DFID (1999). Consistent with the treatment in Ellis and Bahiigwa (2003, p. 1003) the asset holdings of households are evenly distributed across three income groups. The first group represents households with per capita income of less than $38.57 per year, the second group contains households with incomes from $38.58-$118.75 per year and the third group represents households with per capita income greater than $118.75 per year. In the discussion to follow, it is important to be cognisant of the high levels of poverty in the district and as such, while households in the third income category may have relatively high average per capita income ($284.5) compared to this first group ($17.6), all of the households need to be recognised as facing significant income challenges. Furthermore, a cross-check of the reported household incomes against coffee quantities and average parchment prices indicates that households in the third income category may have over-estimated their household earnings.

The analysis shows that coffee income makes up 87 per cent of total income for households in the first group and that this decreases to less than 50 per cent of total household income for those in the third group. Large differences are evident in the importance of labour income for overall household income with labour income making up over one third of total household income in the last income group compared to less than five per cent in the first group. This is a significant difference and as will be discussed below, the reliance on coffee income has implications for overall yield levels and the ability of households to respond to stresses and shocks.

The survey data also reveals large differences in average yield levels between the three income groups. Households in the second and third income group produce 133.1kgs and 197.3kgs of coffee respectively per hectare. In comparison, those in the low income group produce 47.6kgs per hectare. While the large discrepancies in average yield between the poor and less poor households is a significant concern, the yields for all groups are also considerably low by international standards. In this regard, the World Bank (2011) estimated that Timor-Leste's total coffee yield (at 0.22Mt/ha) was approximately 20 per cent of

those achieved in comparable South-East Asian Nations.[2] The World Bank (2011), MAF (2009) and Oxfam (2004) have all highlighted low yields, resulting from old trees[3] and poor maintenance practices as placing significant constraints on household livelihoods and on the further development of the industry in Timor-Leste.

Field research undertaken for this study highlighted that in many coffee growing areas in Ermera, the only way to plant new trees coffee trees is to cut down older ones. However, with over a third of households surveyed receiving more than 80 per cent of their total household income from coffee it seems reasonable to assume that growers may be reluctant to heavily prune or replace trees because the associated reduction in income for up to three years while the trees mature would have severe short term consequences for income levels and overall livelihoods. Instead of replacing trees, growers have taken to planting new trees in vacant space amongst existing trees, potentially contributing to over-crowding problems and further impacting yields.

Recognising the challenges facing the industry, MAF and a number of the commercial coffee producers have introduced training programs to help growers improve yields and the overall quality of coffee produced. However, the reach of these programs is limited, with only 14 per cent of surveyed households receiving formal training in the previous four years. In addition, despite the significant difference in yield and the importance of coffee income to households in group one, those in the third income category are most likely to receive training.

The social capital variables provide contrasting results for the survey population. Fewer than nine per cent of households participate in labour sharing groups for coffee production. Interviews with growers did indicate that this result may fluctuate year to year depending on expected harvests, with participation in labour sharing groups more likely when higher returns are expected. As one grower remarked:

> ….in a good year, when there are plenty of cherries, we ask others to come help with harvesting our coffee trees, we also go and help others harvest their coffee (personal communication, 17 November, 2012).

Table 1 shows that households in the lowest income group are the least likely to participate in any labour sharing activities. These findings are consistent with low levels of collective action across the entire coffee industry. The market is dominated by three commercial firms, Timor Global, Timor Corp and the Cooperative Café Timor (CCT).[4] While a handful of NGOs promote cooperative based coffee production, their market share is very small. Data from the MAF indicated that in 2008, they accounted for approximately 1 per cent of total coffee exports (MAF 2009). By way of comparison, the Ethiopian coffee industry has an extensive network of primary cooperatives. These cooperatives, which operate under cooperative unions, provide access to equipment, inputs, technical support and aim to counterbalance the market strength of private organisations (Ruben and Heras 2012).

The second measure of social capital finds that approximately half the households borrowed money from family or friends in either one or more of the survey periods. In contrast, only 4 per cent of households borrowed money from formal lenders (e.g. banks) and 12.1 per cent borrowed from local money lenders. As the male head of one household explained:

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[2] The World Bank compares yields for Indonesia (0.51Mt/ha), Lao PDR (0.65Mt/ha), Cambodia (0.82Mt/ha) and Thailand (0.87Mt/ha).

[3] It is generally accepted that coffee trees are productive up to 30 years old, in contrast, it is estimated that the average age of coffee plants in Timor-Leste is between 50-80 years old (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2000; Oxfam 2004)

[4] For the purposes of this paper, CCT is viewed as a commercial coffee entity, rather than a cooperative organisation. CCT was the only certified Fairtrade coffee producer in the country until 2011 when the organisation voluntarily withdrew itself from the international Fairtrade system to focus on the high value organic market. Despite its cooperative background, research indicated that CTT regularly purchases cherry from growers that are not cooperative members. Furthermore, key industry informants also voiced concern with the level of grower representation/organisation and the organisation's overall commitment to underlying cooperative principles.

 …for many years we have been looking for other institutions to borrow money from….other income is hard to get, we borrow money when food is low, mainly from other households. Then we have to repay at harvest time" (personal communication, 16 November, 2012).

Overall, the high rates of borrowing between friends and family demonstrates that in the presence of missing credit markets and/or high barriers to entry, households are drawing on the strong relationships and cultural connections in their communities to manage income fluctuations.

Social capital in practice

When reviewing the survey results, it became clear that a number of coffee growers were participating in training and collective activities being facilitated by Alter Trade Timor (ATT) a local NGO that began operating in Ermera in 2007.[5] ATT's activities focus on a number of key areas including improving coffee production through training and access to processing equipment, and income diversification and management. Most relevant to this research project, the organisation places a strong emphasis on building social capital and facilitating collective action through suco level farmer committees. In this regard it provides a useful example of how to operationalise elements of social capital within a broader sustainable livelihoods approach to development.

 The organisation has established 23 farmer committees incorporating 430 growers in Ermera. The activities of each committee are managed by a local coffee grower that is formally employed by ATT and receives training and ongoing support. Farmer committees meet formally five times each year and local ATT staff meet with members on a weekly basis. By relying on trusted members of the local community to facilitate key project activities and ensuring these activities are undertaken in close consultation with all committee members, ATT is leveraging the strong networks of trust, highlighted in the preceding analysis, to build networks, formal processes and structural aspects of social capital.

 This is a relatively unique model in Timor-Leste where government agencies and NGOs have tended to rely on introducing external experts into rural communities to provide education and training. According to one Dili-based key industry informant, these programs often suffer from significant cultural misunderstandings. For example, superstitions are often cited as key reasons for the reluctance of growers to adopt new practices advocated by extension officers. However, no evidence was found to substantiate this suggestion in the research undertaken for this paper. Rather, it seems likely that growers may be hesitant to adopt new practices because agricultural extension workers often have few pre-established relationships to rural communities and are received with considerable caution by local communities.

 One of ATT's key goals is to improve the quality of village based wet processing of coffee cherries.[6] ATT provide equipment and training to allow growers to process red cherries to parchment and to improve the quality of this parchment. Once the cherry has been processed, ATT pays growers a price for parchment that is equal to the price for red cherry multiplied by five, plus an additional $0.15 cents to recognise the 'value-added' component involved in processing the cherries. In this way, growers that sell to ATT are better off producing parchment. By using the farmer committees to facilitate access to processing equipment, ATT is reducing the overall transaction costs associated with producing parchment, allowing small-holders access to training and equipment that they would otherwise not be able to afford and thus tapping into the structural benefits of social capital. Recognising the income challenges facing growers, ATT is also working with its farmer committees to help diversify household income and improve the

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[5] The NGO is a certified organic producer under the Japanese Agricultural Standard and is a subsidiary of Alternative Trade Japan (ATJ), an organisation launched in 1987 by a number of consumer cooperatives in Japan to promote trade in organic and ethically produced food (Japanese Consumer Cooperative, 2012).

[6] There are two main methods to process coffee cherries to parchment in Timor-Leste, wet and dry processing. Dry processing involves leaving the red cherry in the sun for approximately 10 days to remove all moisture from the bean. Wet processing involves pulping, fermenting and washing cherries. Five kilograms of cherry produce approximately one kilogram of parchment.

capacity of growers to undertake much needed maintenance and rehabilitation of their coffee plantations.[7] Increasing non-coffee income not only helps to reduce vulnerability to fluctuations in coffee prices and yields but also improves the ability of households to manage the short term decrease in income that arises as new trees mature.

Conclusions

This paper used the sustainable livelihoods framework to understand the factors that impact the livelihoods of small-scale coffee growing households in Timor-Leste. It acknowledged the small but growing literature that recognises the importance of collective action and cooperatives to the livelihoods of small scale coffee growers. In light of these findings it proposed a more consistent treatment of social capital within the sustainable livelihoods approach to improve its ability to adequately capture the multidimensional ways in which social capital influences livelihoods.

Applying this re-focused framework, the paper analysed the results of qualitative and quantitative data on coffee growing households in the Ermera district. Key issues including low yields and a high dependence on coffee income amongst the poorest members of the community, coupled with significantly low levels of coordinated collective activity, were all identified as presenting considerable challenges that impact the long term sustainability of individual and household livelihoods. While the economic manifestations of social capital were low, cultural indicators of trust and shared values were found to be central to households' livelihood strategies, with households at all income levels drawing on their relationships with family and friends to help meet their basic needs.

The paper also provided a practical example of how one organisation is leveraging the strong bonds between rural households and taking a multifaceted approach to strengthen rural livelihoods. ATT is letting local growers lead training projects while also facilitating income diversification projects that aim to both reduce household reliance on coffee income and provide households with the capacity to prune and replant trees to increase yields. By building effective, local level institutions, ATT is helping growers realise the many tangible benefits offered by collective action and thus provides a useful example for others seeking to improve the livelihoods of growers.

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[7] In one example, ATT encouraged commercial fishing in the village of Eraulo which is situated within close proximity to a large lake that provides a year round source of water.

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Promoting Timor-Leste's local and indigenous knowledge for sustainable development[1]

Lisa Hiwasaki[2]

Introduction

Local and indigenous knowledge, as defined by UNESCO's programme on Local and Indigenous Knowledge Systems (LINKS), refers to "understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with long histories of interaction with their natural surroundings" (UNESCO, undated). Local and indigenous knowledge (LINK) is synonymous with terms such as traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), indigenous knowledge (IK), local knowledge, and rural peoples' and/or farmers' knowledge. As is clear from these synonyms, LINK is not necessary restricted to knowledge owned by people officially recognized, or those who consider themselves, indigenous. Rather than associating knowledge with a group of people, it is useful to consider the characteristics of local and indigenous knowledge itself, which typically (a) originates and is maintained within a community; (b) is disseminated orally from generation to generation; (c) develops and changes over generations; and (d) is embedded in a community's way of life. Local and indigenous knowledge takes diverse forms, such as stories, songs, folklore, proverbs, cultural values, beliefs, rituals, customary laws, language, and agricultural practices (CBD, undated). For rural and indigenous peoples, this knowledge is highly relevant to their daily lives, since it allows them to make decisions about fundamental aspects of everyday life and is the basis for a broad range of problem-solving strategies. LINK is intimately linked to a wide range of issues fundamental to a people's well-being, such as livelihoods and food security, biodiversity conservation, health and medicine, observations of and adaptation to climate change, natural disaster preparedness and response, and identity and self-esteem.

Timor-Leste, an emerging post-conflict small island development state, is rich in both biological and cultural diversity. Located in an area where the Asian and Australian continents converge, Timor-Leste contains flora and fauna common to both regions. The tropical climate in a varied terrain of mountains, 700 km of coastline, dry forest, and grasslands provides habitats that sustain many different species. Similarly, the population consists of several distinct indigenous groups of Malayo-Polynesian (Austronesian) and Melanesian-Papuan descent, with over 16 ethnic languages spoken, in addition to Portuguese and Indonesian. Considering its relatively small geographical area, the cultural and biological diversity in Timor-Leste is immense. This also means that there is a wide variation in local and indigenous knowledge systems within the country.

Like many other indigenous peoples, the East Timorese are concerned about the threats to this diversity: degradation of the environment through deforestation, soil erosion, and overgrazing; loss of their cultures and languages; and disintegration of their unique ethnic identities. As indigenous people are exposed to increasing global changes, they are responding and adapting to them by accommodating new lifestyles and practices. While these changes offer new opportunities, traditional knowledge systems are increasingly at risk due to lack of opportunities for knowledge transmission, erosion of social support networks, and loss of cultural identity and heritage. In light of such challenges, it is evident that preservation, maintenance and transmission of traditional knowledge systems are vital for conservation of biological and cultural diversity.

This paper presents UNESCO's activities between 2011-2013 to promote the use of local and indigenous knowledge related to environmental conservation, hydro-meteorological hazards and climate change in Timor-Leste. The programme included organizing seminars, conducting research, and developing educational materials based on such knowledge. The paper identifies and analyzes the challenges and

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lessons learned through this process. The central theme in this paper is the need to promote international recognition of local and indigenous knowledge as an important resource in development programmes. In order to do so, it is necessary to obtain a better understanding of such knowledge, and come up with ways to use it effectively. Recommendations on how such knowledge can be harnessed to move Timor-Leste towards sustainable development are outlined in the conclusion of this paper.

UNESCO's programme on Local and Indigenous Knowledge Systems

UNESCO's LINKS programme has implemented activities worldwide since 2000. These activities fall into three main themes: (1) revitalizing knowledge and indigenous education; (2) local and indigenous conservation and management; and (3) climate change and adaptation.

The objectives of the programme are:
- to empower local and indigenous peoples in environmental management by advocating recognition and mobilization of their unique knowledge, know-how and practices; and
- to contribute to safeguarding of LINK by reinforcing their inter-generational transmission.

The UNESCO Office in Jakarta has implemented LINKS activities related to theme (1) in Timor-Leste since 2011. Two events were organized to raise awareness of the importance of LINK: a workshop co-organized by the Timor-Leste National Commission for UNESCO (TL NatCom) and Haburas Foundation held in June 2011; and a seminar hosted by the TL NatCom in May 2012. A book titled *Matenek Lokal, Timor Nian!* (*Traditional Knowledge of Timor!*),[3] edited by Demetrio do Amaral de Carvalho, was published in 2012. The publication is a compilation of papers that explore the various aspects of local and traditional knowledge and its relation to nature conservation, land management and natural resource management, as well as industry. The book also outlines recommendations for promoting LINK and how to integrate it into development policies.

Fishermen taking out traditional fish trap (*Opa sesou*) to the sea from Makili Village, Atauro.
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[3] The book is available in hard copy in Tetum only. A limited number of hard copies is still available. Please contact the author or UNESCO Antenna Office in Dili to obtain a copy. Soft copies of the Tetum and English versions of the book can be downloaded from: http://portal.unesco.org/geography/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15178&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

UNESCO has also developed educational & awareness-raising material based on local and indigenous knowledge For livelihoods in Timor-Leste. In 2011, environmental education materials for youth and adults were published in cooperation with Timor Aid Foundation.[4] These booklets and posters can be used as primary or supporting teaching materials in non-formal education. These materials were piloted in three Community Learning Centres in the country in December 2011. Two booklets and five posters on LINK related to fishing methods and coastal ecosystems were published, in cooperation with Roman Luan in 2013.[5] These materials will help transmit traditional marine ecological knowledge to youth, and increase the awareness of villagers towards the establishment of a marine protected area and customary laws (*Tara bandu*) on sustainable use of marine resources.

While the above activities have been implemented over a period of a few months, UNESO Jakarta has also been implementing a longer-term project that falls under themes (1) and (3) above. The following section describes the results of this project.

Strengthening the resilience of communities towards hydro-meteorological hazards and climate change impacts

UNESCO Jakarta has promoted the use of local and indigenous knowledge related to hydro-meteorological hazards and climate change in order to increase communities' resilience by integrating such knowledge with science since 2011, as part of a three-year project in Indonesia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste. Activities in Timor-Leste are being implemented in close cooperation with the Timorese National Disaster Management Directorate (NDMD) while the National Center of Scientific Investigation at the National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL-CNIC) conducted research during 2012-2013.

Research to identify and document LINK took place in three villages: Raimea (Covalima), a lowland coastal area that frequently experiences heavy rains and floods, droughts, and storms; Lau-Hata (Liquiça), an upland coastal area with an extended dry season, non-stop rains, floods, landslides, rise in sea-level, and strong winds; and Maluru-Beaço (Viqueque), a coastal village exposed to droughts, heavy rains, storms, rise in sea-level and sea-water temperature, erosion, and landslides. Various forms of LINK related to hydro-meteorological hazards and climate change were identified and documented through focus group discussions (FGDs) and interviews in December 2012, involving *lia-na'in*, traditional leaders, women, youth, local authority representatives, teachers and church representatives.

Traditional ceremonies and rituals based on respect for nature are practised to apologize to nature after a hazard (*Monu ain ba lulik*), to stop heavy rainfall and storms (e.g., *Lakapogoa* in Lau-Hata), and to stop rain (*Queror* in Lau-Hata and *Bare-bare* in Maluru-Beaço). Customary laws (*Tara bandu*) related to conservation of the environment play important roles in preventing and mitigating landslides and floods. Alternative food sources such as sago and tubers are eaten to ensure food security in times of disasters, drums (*Guci*) are used to preserve food and medicine during the rainy season, and local materials are used to secure roofs (*Ai Tatan*) and to act as a shield (*Lenik*) during strong winds.

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[4] Three booklets on plants in Timor-Leste used for textile production, on producing red and blue colours from native dye plants for *tais* dyeing, and on Nino Konis Santa National Park were published. Six posters to assist class activities were also produced. A limited number of hard copies of the booklets in the Tetum language are available. To obtain a copy, please contact the author or UNESCO Antenna Office in Dili. Soft copies can be downloaded from http://portal.unesco.org/geography/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15186&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.

[5] One booklet provides information on several traditional fishing methods, including ceremonies and legends associated with the use of fish traps, as documented in Makili village. The other booklet documents traditional uses of mangroves, sea grass and corals in Bikeli village. The posters are based on research conducted in Makili and Bikeli villages, and describe ways to improve traditional fishing methods and to use mangroves, sea grasses and corals sustainably. They emphasize the importance of safeguarding traditional ecological knowledge related to fishing and the coastal ecosystem for the communities' sustainable future. They are available online from: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/jakarta/about-this-office/single-view/news/launch_of_fishing_method_booklet_and_posters_on_marine_traditional_ecological_knowledge_in_timor_leste/

Observation of the sun, moon, clouds, stars, sky, sea, animals, plants, and insects allow coastal communities to predict storms, heavy rainfall, floods, droughts, and landslides. For example, when white clouds come down fast from the mountains to the sea, and form black lines of cloud (*kalohan tasi risku metan*) above the sea in Maluru-Beaço, it is predicted that there will be strong winds and/or a big storm. In Raimea, villagers predict whether summer will be prolonged, a rainy season is coming, or if there will be drought, depending on how the *manu tuturik* birds sing.

Traditional house with *Ai Tatan* and *Lenik* in Raimea, Covalima. © UNESCO/UNTL-CNIC.

Local and indigenous knowledge that helps coastal communities predict hazards enable them to develop ways to better prepare for such hazards, as well as to mitigate their impacts. Traditional beliefs, rituals, and laws help communities mitigate impacts of future hydro-meteorological hazards and climate change, because they engender and reinforce respect for the environment and strengthen social relationships. Strengthening LINK is extremely important given that technical means of preventing and mitigating natural disasters are not available in many parts of Timor-Leste, which are isolated and lack basic infrastructure such as reliable roads. Considering also the cultural and linguistic diversity of Timor-Leste, reinforcing social relationships and promoting beliefs and practices that lead to environmental conservation will also decrease coastal communities' vulnerability to hazards.

Local knowledge and practices were presented to groups of villagers during FGDs as part of a community validation process held in January and April 2013. The villagers then responded with their assessments, and most observations of the sun, clouds, sea, animals, and insects were considered as a valid means to predict hazards, while measures to ensure food security and local materials used to secure roofs were considered valid response mechanisms.

In the next phase of the project, LINK will be validated by scientists, which would then enable LINK to scientific knowledge and technology. After this, locally driven and context-specific educational and awareness-raising materials, action and adaptation plans will be developed. These steps are vital in the process of enabling the formation of local strategies to help communities develop their own means of predicting and dealing with hazards, disasters, and climate change impacts, and will be taken in close partnership with NDMD from September 2013 until June 2014.

Challenges and lessons learned to promote indigenous knowledge and practices for sustainable development in Timor-Leste

Action research, also called participatory action research or participatory research, involves participation of local people in research, from the design of the research itself, data collection and analysis, to the practical application of findings. It allows researchers and local people to interact in meaningful ways (O'Reilly 2005). In the context of LINK, action research involves recording and documenting collective knowledge and worldviews of a people, with local community members involved from the beginning, and with the understanding that such research can result in acquisition of information that is useful to both scientists and local people.

As much as possible, the UNESCO activities on LINK in Timor-Leste described above were a result of such processes. Education and awareness-raising materials were developed based on research undertaken by Timorese organizations. For example, knowledge and practices related to fishing methods/traps, and various uses of seaweeds and mangroves, were identified and documented by researchers from the villages, who were trained on conducting research by the community-based NGO. Research results were presented back to the communities, and comments were solicited to verify that the information collected was valid and represented the knowledge of most (if not all) villagers.

After these processes, communities recognized the importance of their knowledge, including traditional ceremonies, and called for their revitalization and transmission to the younger generations. It was clear from meetings with some communities that the author attended, that by having an outsider from an international organization come to their village to valorize their knowledge, they became more proud of their traditional beliefs, which they had previously characterized as "backward". They became aware of the relevance of their knowledge and practices to sustainable development, and were keen to have the training materials widely disseminated to transmit environmentally friendly traditional knowledge and practices to the younger generations.

Promoting the valorization of local and indigenous knowledge, however, is not without its challenges. The challenges are categorized in this paper as those pertaining to knowledge identification and documentation, and those related to methodology.

First, there are many forms of knowledge that are considered private, or in some circumstances, sacred and powerful. The author heard first-hand a story of a *Lia-na'in* who shared a sacred song, and passed away soon afterwards. Such anecdotes are common among many indigenous populations. Therefore, the LINK to be documented and promoted for disaster risk reduction need to be public knowledge that its holders are able and willing to share, and do not affect its sanctity. Second is loss of local and indigenous knowledge. Loss or erosion of local and indigenous knowledge has been noted and documented in many parts of the contemporary world, as a direct result of global changes, specifically globalization and migration. This is especially true in a country where the impacts of globalization are being felt in the remotest of villages, with the positive impacts still slow in coming. More research must take place before LINK is abandoned and lost.

The above challenges affect research on local and indigenous knowledge in general, but are particularly pronounced in Timor-Leste. The second set of challenges pertains to methodology. First, ensuring close communication and monitoring of activities was a particularly notable challenge, since the author, responsible for overseeing activities, was based in Jakarta. In an effort to overcome this challenge, consultants were hired to work closely with the local organizations for some of the projects. There was much room for improvement to this arrangement and thus, the focus of many projects was shifted to focus more on building the capacities of local NGOs. Another notable challenge in Timor-Leste was securing participation of marginalized members of society, especially women and the illiterate. Much of the LINK were collected from men and community leaders, since most of the researchers were men, and women often did not take part in, speak out, or actively participate in many of the meetings and FGDs. In the future, it would be necessary to ensure gender parity, considering that women's knowledge is integral to promoting disaster risk reduction, since they are the most vulnerable and suffer disproportionately higher mortality during disasters.

Conclusions

From the activities implemented under UNESCO's LINKS programme in Timor-Leste, I conclude that promoting and valorizing local and indigenous knowledge can lead to sustainable use and management of land, sea, and resources, reduce communities' vulnerability to disasters, and help them to better adapt to climate change. I assert that local and indigenous knowledge need to be acknowledged as an important resource in development programmes in Timor-Leste. Valorizing LINK will also be a factor in facilitating community ownership of the development process. In order to harness LINK to move the country towards sustainable development, it is important that such knowledge be:

- acknowledged, transmitted and practised by communities;
- dynamic and adapt over time (to cope with changes, such as climate); and
- integrated with scientific knowledge.

There are a few caveats in promoting the valorization of LINK. First, there are aspects of local and indigenous knowledge that can be an obstacle in achieving sustainable development, especially when such knowledge is taken out of its context, i.e., the ecosystem, worldviews and beliefs within which they developed. Second, measures must be taken to ensure that LINK does not reinforce prejudices existing within communities, especially those pertaining to women. Third, it is necessary to avoid romanticizing LINK, as this can reduce its reliability (CBD, 2003). Fourth, local and indigenous knowledge is not static, but dynamic and complex, and often links natural, social, and cultural worlds (Cruickshank, 2005). In this regard, care should be taken so that the focus is not simply on 'ancient' practices.

I maintain that the first step in any activity to use local and indigenous knowledge for communities' sustainable development should be action research to identify and document such knowledge. All stakeholders need to be willing to work together in this process, which requires sufficient time to build trust. Moreover, all stakeholders must understand that this is a two-way learning process. It is necessary to obtain a better understanding of such knowledge, before we can work out ways to effectively use them.

I believe that closer cooperation and dialogue between researchers on Timor-Leste, especially academics and development organization professionals, is key to promoting the international recognition of local and indigenous knowledge as an important resource in development programmes.

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Corn breeding for downy mildew resistant in East Timor

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Introduction

The tropical disease of downy mildew (DM), caused by the *Peronosclerospora sorghi*, is most prevalent in warm and humid regions. It has affected maize production in the Americas, South East Asia and Africa (Ullstrup et al., 1969; Exconde, 1974; Frederiksen et al., 1977; Kim et al., 2003). The DM disease has been controlled successfully by resistant cultivars. However since 2004, severe infections of DM were observed at the research stations and farmers' fields in Liquisa region of East Timor (Kim, 2004, unpublished). The same symptoms were also observed in Aileu, Betano and Lospalos in 2005, 2009 and 2010, respectively (Kim, 2005, 2009; Nabais et al., 2010). The highly infected plants exhibited symptoms of stiff, yellowish with narrow pale leaves, crazy top and no cobs formation. Only tolerant plants showed better recover with good ears and grain yield. Thines et al. (2008) reported different spices of *Peronosclerospora sacchari* on sugarcane (*Saccharum* sp.) in Lospalos in 2004. We also found symptoms of Northern corn leaf blight caused by *Exserohilum turcicum* at Aileu Research Station (2006) and farmers' field in the high land farming near the Same region in 2009. At the Loes Research Station, symptoms of Southern corn leaf blight (*Bipolaris maydis*) was found in our new genotypes trials field (Nabais et al. 2010).

Incidences of DM infection are poorly understood. Infected plants with slight symptoms are considered to be susceptible. This is a common misunderstanding, that a plant must be totally free from any pathogen infection. Our breeding principle is called 'co-survival breeding' or co-environmentally friendly breeding'. Tolerant plants control DM partially and are inherited quantitatively. It is about 95% control and considered as "horizontal resistance" (Kim et al. 1977).

Breeding DMR cultivars is considered the most sustainable, economic and environmentally friendly way of tackling DM problem. Host plant tolerance breeding is an easy and economical means of controlling DM disease of maize (Ajala et al., 2003; Cardwell et al., 1997). Tolerance sources developed in Southeast Asia have been successfully deployed and utilized to control DM throughout the world. They appear to be effective against different *Peronosclerospora* species and are stable under a wide range of environmental condition (Frederiksen et al., 1970).

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[4] Ibid.
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
Fig.1.A. DM infection at Loes Research Station (2004). Fig.1.B. DMR genotypes tested at LoesResearch Station (2008). Fig.1.C. DMR lines selected at Loes Research Station (2008). Fig.1.D. Southern corn leaf blight (*Bipolarismaydis*) infection on new cultivars tested at Loes Research Station (2008).

Materials and methods

Materials tested at Loes Research Station in 2009 and 2010

Experiment materials of DMR and non-DMR were obtained from the Gene Bank of Kyungpook National University (KNU), South Korea. The DMR source populations were DMR-ESR-Y, DMR-SR-Y (IITA), Suwan 1, Suwan 5 (Thailand) and NAI (East Timor), non-DMR from tropical and temperate regions. Genotypes were developed at KNU Farm in Kunwi and Loes Research Station (CPL) by inbreeding and selection to find DMR elite inbred lines. Materials selected were from selfing fourth (S_4) lines developed in both East Timor and Korea from 2005 to 2009. Inbred lines were developed in both East Timor and Korea to shorten the breeding cycle.

We used random mating and partial diallel crosses among the lines with similar flowering times at KNU Farm/Kunwi and CPL-East Timor during summer season in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Two sets of DMR trials compost with code KE (Korea-East Timor) 36 crosses and DM (Demonstration) 41 crosses were made. Material crosses and their parent lines were tested on December 24th, 2008 and June 17th, 2009 at the Loes Research Station in East Timor and KNU Farm in Kunwi, respectively. The parental lines of 36 genotypes were test crossed with 4 testers: Suwan 1, Suwan 5, Sele and NAI. We developed 42 crosses and tested with the 4 testers with entry code No. TL (Timor Leste) at Loes station on February 5th, 2010. Different trial materials from IITA such as EV-LSD- (Late Mature, Yellow-Grain Varieties)-MO5-2, RUVT (Regional Uniform Variety Trial) Early-MO5-4, RUVT Extra Early-M5-05, Hybrid Maize Trial

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(Yellow)-For MO5-7 and Mid Altitude Inbred Lines Evaluation Trial-MO5-9 were also included. However, the data presented in this paper is only on the trials with Entry No. KE, DM and TL in East Timor.

All field trials were designed in 1 m length, 75 cm wide row with randomized complete block design (RCBD) with three replications. Seeds were planted in 25 cm between hills with 2-3 seeds per hill. Thinning was done to keep only two plants per hill. We did not apply fertilizer or pesticide in East Timor. Crops were established and managed according to the standard institute recommendations and normal farmer practice.

Investigation

The investigations were done toward the important agronomic traits, such as plant height (PH), earn height (EH), tassel length (TL), commercial value (Co.V.), DMR, ear length (EL), kernel row length (KRL), ear diameter (ED), kernel row numbers (KRN), kernel/s per row (KperR) and ear weight (EW). Data was measured with tools such as calibrated pole, vernier calipers, ruler and balance. Data analysis was done by using a Statistical Analysis Software (SAS 9.1) 2005 program.

All nurseries were exposed to a natural infection of DM. Tolerance scores were taken two and four weeks prior to flowering. DM tolerance ratings were made on determining tolerance based on 1 to 9 rating score (Ajala et al. 2003, Kim et al. 2003). Details of the DM infections were rated as follows: 1 = a few infection, highly tolerant (1-5%); 2 = a mild infection, but normal growth with a clear tolerance (6-10%); 3 = some infection, tolerance (11-20% infection); 4 = 21-40% infection, lots of infection of DM, shows some tolerance; 5 = 41-60% of infection, difficult to classify either tolerant or susceptible; 6 = 61-70% infection, lots of infections, show susceptible symptoms; 7 = 71-80% infection, considerable damage; 8 = 81-90% infection, highly significant yield loss and 9 = 91 - 100% infection, plant death.

To estimate the level of host plant tolerance, overall breeding value of the materials, here called 'commercial value' (Co.V.) of plant aspects, agronomic traits (lodging and disease and insect tolerance) and yield potential were rated based on 1 to 9 rating scale, 1= being very outstanding, 9= very poor). Kim at al. (2008) stated that the commercial value is highly correlated positively with final grain yield. The level of score from 1-9 has negative value which 1 = excellent and 9 = very poor. Commercial value (Co.V.) is the simple evaluation criterion for major traits that eliminate mean of breeding traits include tolerance to major biotic stress (disease and insect), and abiotic (lodging, drought, N deficiency) stresses, general adaptation, good agronomic traits and yield potential (Kim, 2007, unpublished). When the breeders deal with thousands of materials, they often do not have time to estimate several trait values in detail because of time and resource limitations.

Results

Experiment 1: 41 genotypes of KE (Korea-East Timor) and 2 local checks tested for DMR

    a) Downy mildew infection
Genotypes of KE exhibited different responses on DM infection from less infection (tolerant) to highly infection (susceptible). Forty three genotypes showed highly significant different (*P=0.001: 2.0)*. Among of the genotypes crosses between DMR x DMR, DMR x non-DMR and non-DMR x non-DMR were easily distinguished for tolerance and susceptible. Genotypes with one of its parents from DMR sources showed tolerant with good commercial value. It revealed the importance of using DMR source populations as base lines to breed resistant lines. Genotypes of TZSTR 109 x NAI (Entry No. KE-18), (Maek x DMR) x Suwan 5 (Entry No. KE-29), (1010 x ET bulk) x TZSTR 109 (Entry No KE-31 and KE-32), Suwan 5 x TZi 25 (Entry No. 37), and two local collections exhibited tolerant to DM infection (Fig. 2). However, the result of using highly susceptible tester of TZSTR 109 (IITA) showed varied level infection of its offspring. TZi 25 was medium tolerant to DM infection.

Fig 2. DM infection on 43 genotypes tested at Loes Research Station, 2008

High coefficient of variance (CV) indicated that the variation of DM infection among the replications. Experiment with naturally infection always shows variation among the replications. The highest rates of five susceptible genotypes were Entry No. KE-15 (3503 x H5) x TZSTR 109, KE-16 (TZSTR 109 x ((P45 x JLB)), KE-17 (TZSTR 109 x Camb/Viet (*sh*), KE-11 (2K6 ET-Local-2 x TZSTR 109, KE-21 (KV 35 x (DMR x TZSTR 109)).

b) Commercial value (Co.V.)
Commercial value (Co.V.) is an overall breeding aspect of most valuable agronomic trait such as yield, vigorous, tolerant to biotic and abiotic stresses and also lodging. The result of 43 genotypes showed highly significant different (*P=0.001: 1.2), CV: 21.0 %, Mean: 4.2*).

Fig 3. Commercial value of 43 genotypes tested at Loes Research Station, 2008

Entry No. KE-23 (NAI Ⓧ1/3 x TZSTR 109 (small seeds)), KE-37 (Suwan 5 Ⓧ2/3 x TZi 25) and KE-32 (1010 x ET bulk (2) x TZSTR 104 showed high Co.V. than other genotypes including 2 local checks (Fig 3). Entry No. KE-21 ((KV 35 x DMR) x TZSTR 109 (small seeds)), KE-15 ((3503 x H5) x TZSTR 109 (small seeds)), KE-2 (Lao-LVN-10 x TZSTR 109 (small seeds) and KE-40 (MO17 x Suwan 5) exhibited highly susceptible than other genotypes.

c)   Plant height (PH)

Plant height is a quantitative trait controlled by more than one gene. It is easily affected by the environment such as plant density, nutrient, disease infection, water availability and genetic background. The result of 43 genotypes showed highly significant different (*P=0.01: 45.3; CV:6.8* and *Mean: 165.7*). Entry No. KE-42 (Local check 1), KE-37 (Suwan 5 Ⓧ2/3 x TZi 25), KE-29 ((Maek x DMR) x S5) x TZSTR 104)) and KE-24 (NAI Ⓧ2/3 x TZSTR 109 (small seeds)) exhibited the highest plant height than other genotypes (Fig. 4). Five shortest plant heights were Entry No. KE-15 (3503 x H5) x TZSTR 109 (small seeds)), KE-21 (KV 35 x DMR) x TZSTR 109 (small seeds)), KE-10 (38(8A1) x JLB) x TZSTR 109 (small seeds)), KE-19 (TZSTR 109 (small seeds) x TZi 25) and KE-33 (TZSTR 104 x TZi 25).

Fig 4. Plant height of 43 genotypes tested at Loes Research Station in 2008

Experiment 2: Multi-environment test of 24 genotypes of DMR and non-DMR in East Timor and Korea

a) Plant height

Twenty four genotypes were tested in two different ecological zones, East Timor and Korea. Materials were planted during the rainy season in December, 2008 in East Timor and the summer season in June, 2009 in Korea. The result showed no significant difference among the replications ($P= 0.87$), genotypes ($P= 0.09$) in each location and between genotypes versus replications.

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
Fig 5. Environmental effect on plant height of 24 genotypes tested in East Timor and Korea

However, there was highly significant difference (*P= 0.001*) for the environment in East Timor and Korea. Genotypes showed responses on different effect of environmental change. Genotypes with Entry No. KE-37 (S5 Ⓧ2/3 x TZi 25), KE-22 (NAI Ⓧ1/3 x TZSTR 109 (small seeds)) and KE-24 (Camb/Viet (*sh*) x TZSTR 109 (small seeds)) (Fig. 5) exhibited the highest (*P= 0.005*) PH in East Timor were highly affected (*P= 0.001*) by the environment in Korea. Genotypes and environment were significant different (*P= 0.02*) for both places.

b) Ear height

The trait of ear height of 24 genotypes tested in East Timor and Korea showed highly significant different (*P= 0.001*). Genotypes exhibited different responses with no significant at *P= 0.84* for replications and *P= 0.2* for genotypes versus replications. However, genotypes showed highly significant difference at *P= 0.001* for environmental effects and *P= 0.004* for the interaction of genotypes and environment. Among 24 genotypes revealed significant difference at *P= 0.02* for genotypes versus environment.

Fig 6.Environmental effect on ear height of 24 genotypes tested in East Timor and Korea

It is clearly revealed that the location of ear is highly affected by the environment. Genotypes showed different responses due to the environmental effect in East Timor and Korea. Ear height is not a fixed portion of location which ear is attached at the plant (stalk), but it maybe moved to the higher or lower nods that depend on the environment (we did not observe). So, this trait is controlled by many genes.

c) Commercial value

The commercial value was rated from the mean value of the important agronomic traits, such as grain yield potential, disease tolerant, lodging tolerant, vigorous and high yield of dry matter. The result showed highly significant difference at *P= 0.001*. Among the replications and genotypes versus replications were no significant difference at *P= 0.73* and *P= 0.28*, respectively (Table 2.4). Three components such as genotypes, genotypes versus environment and environment showed highly significant different (*P= 0.001*). Entry No. with highest mean for Co.V. for both East Timor and Korea environment were KE-12 (1010 x ET bulk) x TZSTR 109, KE-18 (Camb/Viet (*sh*) x TZSTR 109, Ke-24 (NAI Ⓧ2/3 x TZSTR 109, KE-13 (Myanm (*sh*)/normal x TZSTR 109 (small seeds)), KE-23 (NAI Ⓧ1/3 x TZSTR 109)) and KE-04 (Lao Dud Lcl black x Bisi-2) x TZSTR 109)) showed highest Co.V. than other genotypes (Fig. 7).

Fig 7.Environmental effect on commercial value of 24 genotypes tested in East Timor and Korea

Experiment 3: Yield test of 41 crosses and 2 checks tested at Loes Research Station on January 22nd, 2010

a)   Commercial value

Forty one crosses were developed at KNU Farm during Summer in 2009. We used 4 common cultivars (Suwan 1, Suwan 5, Cele and NAI) of East Timor as testers. Inbred lines were parental lines of KE genotypes. The result showed significant (*P= 0.046*) for two highest Co.V.: TL-37 (ET-39 x Suwan 5) and TL-33 (ET-21 x Suwan 5) (Fig 2.11, Appendix 1). ET-39 and ET-21 were generated from the population of Bisi-2, DMR-ESR-Y and East Timor pop (3066). Other lines exhibited moderate were TL-04 (ET-22 x Cele), TL-14 (ET-43 x NAI), TL-28 (ET-07 x Suwan 5), TL-30 (ET-16 x Suwan 5), TL-31 (ET-20 x Suwan 5) and TL-40 (Suwan 5) (Fig. 8).

Fig 8. Testcross of 41 genotypes and 2 checks tested at Loes Research Station in East Timor

TL-37 and TL-33 were considered the highest yield potential for hybrid corn for East Timor. Inbreeding for parental lines of TL-37 and TL-33 are important to increase the homozygous of inbred lines. Further selection, evaluation and testcross are necessary to screen only desirable plants.

Discussion

Genotypes of KE exhibited different responses on DM infection from less infection (tolerant) to highly infection (susceptible). Genotypes with DMR background exhibited more tolerant with high commercial value. The result showed a correlation between DM infection and Co.V. Plants with highly infection showed highly correlation with Co.V. Plants with highly infection exhibited poor with low yield. However, different lines with non-DMR and DMR also exhibited variations of DM infection. The result showed that genotypes of TZSTR 109 x NAI (Entry No. KE-18), (Maek x DMR) x Suwan 5 (Entry No. KE-29), (1010 x ET bulk) x TZSTR 109 (Entry No KE-31 and KE-32), Suwan 5 x TZi 25 (Entry No. 37), and two local collections exhibited tolerant to DM infection. The result of using highly susceptible tester of TZSTR 109 (IITA) showed varied level infection of its offspring. Breeding for high tolerance cultivars for DM by using adapted cultivars will play a catalytic role to reduce DM spread in the country. Our experiences in DMR breeding showed that breeding high resistance lines is difficult. However, breeding for host tolerance with polygenic system with a threshold nature is possible. Resistance to DM was polygenic and quantitatively inherited (Kim, 2000; Kim et al. 2003, Singburaudom and Renfro 1982).

Tropical Suwan 1, Suwan 5, NAI and Sele showed moderate performance at KNU Farm in Kunwi, South Korea although produced less yield production than new developed genotypes. Betran et al. (2003) stated that tropical corn has a broad genetic base that shows grater genetic diversity than temperate corn. The crossed lines of Mo17 and Suwan 5 with the lowest Co.V. at Loes station in East Timor but exhibited the highest yield at KNU Farm in Kunwi. Tropical materials, however, showed tolerance to the environment at KNU Farm.

The results of the experiment showed that most inbred lines crossed with Suwan 5 exhibited strong performance at Loes station in East Timor. Suwan 5, developed in Thailand, showed a high combining ability. It is considered a good tester for new inbred lines development. Inbreeding for parental lines of TL-37 and TL-33 are important to increase the homozygous of inbred lines. Further selection, evaluation and testcross are necessary to screen only desirable plants.

Conclusion

Downy mildew (DM) is an important disease in East Timor. Breeding by using DMR population (Sele, NAI, Suwan 1 and Suwan 5) is considered the most important breeding for a sustainable, economic and environmentally friendly way of tackling the DM problem. Breeding for high tolerance cultivars for DM by using adapted cultivars will play a catalytic role in reducing DM spread in the country. Breeding to get high resistance lines is difficult. However, breeding for host tolerance with polygenic system with a threshold nature is possible. Depending on the parental genetic background, the gene actions for tolerance of individual plants and means are varied. Our experiences revealed that genotypes with one of its parents from DMR sources showed tolerant with good commercial value (Co.V).

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The challenges of providing "quality education" in Timor-Leste

Marie Quinn and Ritesh Shah

Nations throughout the world identify and shape a vision of teaching and learning for its children through local policy discourse, curriculum documentation and training priorities. In many instances this is increasingly being driven by what has been labelled the 'Global Education Agenda'—specifically the Education for All and Millennium Development Goals—as well as the objectives and interests of donors who come with particular notions of what quality teaching and learning entails (Tarabini 2010). These internationally established benchmarks and frameworks often lack appropriate consideration of the context of implementation, and presuppose a "global consensus" on what quality education should look like in pedagogical practice (Alexander 2008).

This paper explores this tension in the context of Timor-Leste, where the challenge of improving learning outcomes for students has proved significant. The findings suggest that the ways in which teachers and national policymakers in this still new nation interpret what "quality" means in pedagogical practice is quite different to what others, namely external actors, might imagine. Ultimately the paper suggests that envisioning and implementing a quality education system for the benefit of the nation's children requires more strategic work with teachers and policymakers, in order for them to conceptualise what quality might mean in terms of pedagogical practice and particular student learning outcomes.

The paper draws on an analysis of current documents that shape Timor-Leste's articulation of "quality" as well as the authors' respective empirical studies of classroom practice to reflect how teaching and learning is understood by the main agents of education, the teachers.

Global imperatives for improving education quality: priorities and issues

A key influence on education's role, purpose and mandate throughout the Global South has been defined through the Education for All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which set time-bound targets for achievement of particular outputs by 2015. The MDGs are largely concerned with ensuring all children attend schools, articulated through Goal 2 "Achieve universal primary education" (UN 2000) and the target

> Ensure that by 2015 children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

While this goal requires attendance, it does not stipulate the type of education to be provided in schools. The *Education for All (EFA)* goals of the same year (UNESCO 2000) began to prioritise quality as an element of educational systems:

> Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills.

How quality might be understood more generally and why it was to be achieved was outlined in the UNESCO's 2005 *Global Monitoring Report*. This document took up "the quality imperative" as essential for a nation's economic and social growth, outlined below:

> The evidence is clear-cut on the links between good education and a wide range of economic and social development benefits... Empirical work has also demonstrated that high-quality schooling

improves national economic potential. Strong social benefits are equally significant. It is well known that the acquisition of literacy and numeracy, especially by women, has an impact upon fertility. More recently, it has become clear that the cognitive skills required to make informed choices about HIV/AIDS risk and behaviour are strongly related to levels of education and literacy (UNESCO 2005, 19).

In defining quality, the document noted two "principle characteristics":

> the first identifies learners' cognitive development as the major explicit objective of all education systems. .... The second emphasizes education's role in promoting values and attitudes of responsible citizenship and in nurturing creative and emotional development (UNESCO 2005, 17).

At the same time, the emphasis in pedagogy was placed firmly on learner-centred, child-centred, or, in the case of UNICEF programs in many countries, "child-friendly" schooling. For education to be learner-centred, pedagogy,

> ... start[s] with a focus on the learner and place emphasis on the dynamics of teaching and learning (UNESCO 2005, 24).

This association between quality and child-centred approaches to teaching and learning has not come without critique. Tabulawa (2003) argues that the promotion of quality as "values-free", neutral and examples of best practice diffuses a particular "view of the world, about the kind of people and society we want to create through education" (p. 9). It has been noted that it promotes values of individualism, democratic citizenship and liberalisation which may or may not resonate with educators, citizens and policymakers within the country (Nykiel-Herbert 2004; Carney 2010). In this way, Tikly (2004) suggests that the placement of learner-based education as the marker of quality education represents a new form of imperialism.

In order to enact quality education – and learner-centred pedagogy – UNESCO provides a list of focus points for educational policy, starting with teachers, learning time, core subjects and pedagogy and moving through to language, learning materials, facilities and leadership (UNESCO 2005, 17). The focus is on developing teachers to enact the teaching and learning and sound pedagogy, ahead of facilities and materials. It is this focus on pedagogy that Alexander (2008) suggests should frame best practice for teachers and students in seeking school improvement.

Defining quality education in Timor Leste

At the turn of this century, as education globally was being shaped by MDGs and EFA goals, the small nation of Timor Leste was attempting to both conceptualise and rebuild an education system from the legacy of 24 years of Indonesian education and the large scale destruction of infrastructure by departing Indonesian troops in aftermath of the successful vote for Independence in 1999. Understandably, both the successive United Nations administrations and national administrations post-Independence of May 2002 have been largely preoccupied with providing school building and establishing a workforce of people to teach. The current *National Education Strategic Plan* (MoE 2011) outlines the significant growth in the system, with the number of schools steadily increasing along with the number of paid teachers to cope with increased enrolments. This has been an attempt to address the huge bulge in the population of school age children: 41% of the population are aged 0 – 14 years (National Directorate of Statistics 2011). At the primary school level, the number of students to one teacher fell between 2007/8 to 2008/9 from 38 to 29, though this figure is uneven across the six years of primary school, where numbers in Grade One can sit at 45 and above (MoE 2011, 18). Indeed, the authors have regularly sat in classes in this first year of schooling where numbers are over 70 students to a class.

Through its Constitution, the nation identified its vision for creating a strong and resilient country through education:

> Our vision is that by 2020, the East Timorese people will be well educated, highly productive, democratic, self-reliant, espousing values of nationalism, non-discrimination and equity within a global context. (RDTL 2002, 143).

Nearly 10 years later, the strategic plan echoed the UNESCO understandings of quality education and its benefits in identifying the outcomes of education:

> In 2025 the population of Timor-Leste will be educated, knowledgeable and qualified to live a long and productive life, respectful of peace, family and positive traditional values. All individuals will have the same opportunities to access to a quality education that will allow them to participate in the economical, social and political development process, ensuring social equity and national unity. (MoE 2011, 10).

Since Independence, Timor Leste's Ministry of Education (MoE) has developed policies and other documents to define and implement practices to realise such visions, without significant results for student learning. The strategic plan acknowledges the failure of education over the years since independence to provide a quality education to the children on Timor-Leste, suggesting that while strategies for improving students' access to primary education have, been effective, learning outcomes in schools have been poor. This is graphically illustrated in the enrolment pattern for students across basic education, where only 27% of those who begin Grade One complete Grade Nine (MoE 2011, 19 - 20). On average, it takes a child in Timor-Leste 11.2 years to complete the six years of primary school with the highest repetition rates occurring in Grade One, suggesting that students are not provided with strong foundational skills and strategies needed for learning.

The failure of children in the early years of schooling has been evident in various assessments carried out nationwide. The Early Grade Reading Acquisition (EGRA) assessment of 2009 (World Bank 2009) reported – in the report's own words – "worrying" (p. 2), results for children in Grades 1 – 3. In reading, 70% of children in Grade 1 could not read a single word in the test paragraph, continuing into Grade Two with 40% unable to read a word, and 20% in Grade Three. What is significant here is that these results were almost identical, whether students completed the assessment in Tetum or in Portuguese. Rather than being an issue of language, EGRA illustrates that the failure of children being taught to read, in any language. It should also be noted that these results are consistent with those conducted earlier across the two languages in Mathematics and Language (Vine 2007) that produced similarly low progress for students in Grades Three and Five. Ultimately such results suggest that children are attending school but learning very little, an issue of quality of pedagogy and instruction rather than a matter of educational access.

The Ministry of Education, however, suggests that the causes for poor learning outcomes are to be found in elements largely external to the classroom, with no acknowledgement that teaching and learning processes might be the core issue. The following are suggested reasons for poor outcomes:

i.   difficulties in terms of **access** to school, since many children live far from any schools;
ii.   the fact that many **parents do not appreciate** the importance of having their children educated, sometimes due to the **low education level of the families** themselves;
iii. **financial difficulties by the parents** preventing them from being able to afford the "hidden costs" of education (uniforms, other materials, etc);
iv.   **inadequacy of school buildings** (especially lack of water, bathrooms);
v.   **violence** in schools
(MoE 2011, 20 **emphasis** added).

While the strategic plan does later comment on the under-preparedness of teachers to teach the curriculum, to not consider that the quality of teaching might have an effect on students' ability to progress through the education system appears to be a significant misunderstanding of the role of the teacher and the basis for quality itself. There are, in fact, larger questions that need to be addressed when considering the long-time failure of students in the primary school system, including: the issue of teachers' ownership and uptake of

the pedagogies espoused by the curriculum and policy documents and the quality and nature of training that teachers have received over recent years.

To illustrate this, the authors draw on their own research into classroom activity and the ways in which teachers have been supported to make the changes into new pedagogy and practice (Quinn 2011; Shah 2013). In both research projects, reported in various places (Quinn 2007, 2011, 2013; Shah 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012, 2013, forthcoming) the strategies that teachers regularly exhibited in the classroom were closer to what teachers had experienced under earlier transmission models than what child-centred approaches might encourage. Teachers regularly lectured to the class, with the input of children as low as 1% of the talk in some classrooms (Quinn 2011). More worrying than the mere amounts of talk were the patterns of talk: children were not asked to build new understandings, but to replicate the teacher's or curriculum notes, orally and in written forms (Quinn 2013; Shah 2011b).

A key issue behind this is teachers' lack of understanding and ownership about the Ministry's new definition of what quality teaching and learning entails. Elsewhere, Shah (2011a, 2011b, 2013, forthcoming) convincingly demonstrates the sometimes ambivalent, resistant, or ignorant stances teachers take to approaches to teaching and learning that might better engage children. International research would suggest that to change this paradigm a focussed and determined training regime would be necessary, one that models best practice, allows teachers to observe and self-reflect on their own practice, and receive school-based continuous support to do so (see for example Timperley et al 2007).

Yet most of the MoE training packages for teachers have provided models of training that do not support teachers using quality teaching and learning in classrooms. Despite Article 49 of the Base Law of Education (MoE 2008) stipulating that teachers must undergo only training that is "based on methodological practises similar to the ones educators and teachers must use in pedagogic practise", training has been characterised by large numbers of participants in one room for many days at a time, adjusted over the years to smaller group activities, but rarely characterised by learner-centredness. Training continues to be developed around materials that are presented and read to participants in a lecture style, with little opportunity to work with the material or develop teaching skills in the classroom (see Shah 2011c). The fact that most training takes place in the stand-down times between teaching periods mitigates against teachers being able to implement ideas before learning anew, and the centralised provision of training limits relevance to particular groups of teachers.

Some models of teacher support have attempted to change this cycle of training and practice, specifically the Norwegian Refugee Councils' Compact Teacher Training (CTT), and UNICEF's *Eskola Foun* project. Both have seen trainers working at school sites with teachers and demonstrating new techniques directly with students and some strategies suggest teachers attempting to incorporate more student-focussed learning activities into their lessons: opportunities to talk in a group before submitting written answers; some use of student' own work for models and display; some experimentation and recording in science. However, instances tend to be based on individual teacher's understanding of practice, rather than a change in the wider systemic approach to teaching and learning. The final evaluation of the CTT noted,

> in the absence of ongoing monitoring and feedback for the teachers trained across the 30 sites, [it is unlikely] that behaviours, attitudes and skills gained from the CTT will be sustained (Shah & Leneman 2010, 6)

The evaluation found that while teachers had in many instances embraced and maintained symbols of quality pedagogy – such as group work, games and hands-on activities – underlying patterns of pedagogy which undermine children's effective participation in the classroom prevailed.

The challenge here is to ensure teachers understand the principles and rationales for changed practice, not merely the geography of change: moving students into groups or erecting learning corners – just two of the target behaviours of this program - will not ensure changed practice and learning for students. As seen in the proposed National Quality School Standards Framework (MoE 2010), "effective learning environments" were to be observed where "learning corners are set up" and "student work is

displayed", but with no indication of how the corner or displayed work would encourage learning or link to the curriculum. More confused was the standard for "child-centred pedagogy" which stated that "Children's work books are well set out, neat and corrected by the teacher" and that "Student's work is checked for accuracy and completion", hardly indicators from any measure of child-centeredness. While these standards ultimately were not adopted, they illustrate the confusion that exists in the minds of policy-makers as to what quality and child-centred might actually mean in classroom practice, in Timor-Leste and more widely.

Planning for better quality

As the 2015 deadline for the MDGs becomes ever-closer, scrutiny of Timor-Leste's education system has become more focused. However, it is unfortunate that the strategic plan's "solutions" for the primary sector pay scant attention to teaching and learning, with buildings and materials fore-grounded as has been so often the case in MoE documents. The four areas identified are:

> Access and Enrolment
> Teaching Quality
> Curriculum.
> School Management (MoE 2011, 78)

While it appears quality in teaching and learning is toward the top of the priorities, the description of this aspect tends to be more preoccupied with the systems of regulating teaching rather than the activity itself:

> the establishment of **improved systems and practices in service and pre-service teacher training** and **in human resource management** (MoE 2011, 78, **emphasis** added)

Teaching quality is equated with having management and systems of training rather than what goes on in the classroom and the important building of knowledge that is mediated by the teacher.
In accordance with the plan, in 2013 the MoE has undertaken a large review and revision in-country of the 2005 national curriculum for primary school. The rationale for the Ministry's current revision (as noted in the ToR) is that

> [the 2004 curriculum] is a document written in another country by people in another country, and was created without real consultation and collaboration with Timorese children, families and teachers, and therefore has limited relevance to the actual situation in Timor-Leste.

This is a point reiterated in AusAID's (2013, 28) education sector support design document where it is noted that,

> According to the MoE, while cursory references are made to certain social structures and cultural norms, the depth of content is weak, and there is no clear guide or syllabus to help teachers understand the often dense and unstructured material…Textbooks currently available tend to be written in Portuguese, and are European-focused and not adapted to the Timorese environment. When schools do have textbooks or readers, they are often unused due to low teaching skills and teacher confidence.

The curriculum revision provides an opportunity for the education sector to begin a much-needed conversation about what quality means in education, specifically the forms of teaching and learning that are most relevant, and will provide quality outcomes for children. We contend that focus must be maintained in not just producing new guidelines and materials, but also supporting teachers in the years that follow to bring such resources into practice.
        In providing a vision of basic education, the MoE references (MoE 2011, 12) the four key components of learning, first alluded to in the Delors report—that of *learning to know, learning to do,*

learning to live together, and learning to be (Delors 1996). In addressing quality in Timor Leste, the questions to ask as part of this revision process might be:

> What should Timorese children know?
> What should Timorese children be able to do with knowledge/what skills do they need?
> How should Timorese children live together? In their community? In their country? In the world?
> What will Timorese children be?

It is only by answering such questions can the matter of deciding what learning content is most critical be answered. An equally important component of such a revision should ensure adequate opportunity to re-examine *how* teachers might support students to realise this content, keeping in mind the actual reality of teachers' experiences, backgrounds and knowledge. Rather than stressing merely the symbols of pedagogical change, new forms of implementation support to teachers would need to allow them ample opportunity to reflect, revise and improve their practices based on ongoing school-based support. From this, too, would emerge the materials, infrastructure and resourcing that are needed to facilitate successful curriculum implementation, keeping in mind that this may vary from school to school.

Timor-Leste cannot continue to merely take on what Jansen (2001, 2002) refers to as the "borrowing" of symbols and images of reform, namely the rhetoric of "new" and "quality" and "learner-centred", without clear understandings of these particular meanings or implications. Instead, the education system needs to focus on what happens in classrooms to help Timorese children learn. Quality education will only really be realised through the elevation of pedagogy as an issue for immediate and thoughtful consideration.

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Heritage, agro-biodiversity and the local populations: Some examples from the use of palm trees in East Timor

Dominique Guillaud[1], Laure Emperaire[2]
and Patricia Bustamante[3]

The diversity of cultivated plants was created and maintained by traditional populations and represents a cultural, as well as a biological, heritage. This agro-biodiversity is crucial for the connection between culture and agriculture, two fields of public policies that most of the time function independently. This project, inspired by an experience in Brazil which involved the Brazilian Ministry of Culture and IRD, evokes the possibilities of setting up an innovative relationship between the local people and the scientific institutions, and its prospects for East Timor. It provides a method that emphasizes the structural elements of this agricultural diversity, such as the palm trees and other associated plants.

Agro-biodiversity in East Timor

This approach combines questions about food independence, conservation of biodiversity and heritage. In the first instance, it concerns the question of food security: since the Indonesian occupation, rice has been recommended to enhance the self-sufficiency of East Timorese people, and has been developed in many suitable areas (lowlands and alluvial plains); the estimated surface planted in rice is 38,000 ha (Ministry of Agriculture). Rice cultivation creates a risk of loss of the agricultural biodiversity, which runs parallel to cultural diversity, a base for sustainable development.

Rice (of various types, rain-fed or irrigated) has been adopted in some parts of East Timor as a staple, and although introduced at different times in history, is overall a "recent" plant.[4] For some decades the promotion of rice was seen as an efficient solution to food shortage and nutrition issues, but there is a risk that, as with corn (*Zea mays*, an American plant that has been adopted in almost all the cultivation systems of the country), there might be some loss of agro-biodiversity and of the knowledge associated with it.[5] The question arises of what can be done to protect this knowledge and the plants themselves?

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[3] Patricia is an agronomist, MSc Genetics, PhD Biochemistry. Her research is on the conservation of Plant Genetic Ressources at Embrapa, Brazil. She works on the complementarity between in situ and on farm conservation.

[4] Even in groups who seem to have incorporated rice in their agrobiodiversity a long time ago, such as the Bunaq (Friedberg *pers. comm.*).

[5] The interviews conducted in several localities in East Timor suggest that the development of rice cultivation entails the replacement or dormance of some other cultivated or spontaneous plants. There are also frequent examples of the replacement of a cultivated plant by another in the agriculture of the region, eg on Nias, where the "american" sweet potato has invaded the fields, replacing yam in the cropping system, and taking over its local name (Guillaud, Forestier 2010,78).

Recent approaches have emphasized the concept of agro-biodiversity, which we define here as the diversity of cultivated or collected plants; often, this diversity has been elaborated on the long term by local populations. Agro-biodiversity therefore can be considered as the diversity of cultivated plants that has been obtained through the action of humans, and whose innumerable expressions can be found throughout the world. This diversity is created through social processes that are common in the Southeast Asian region and in nearby Oceania: it has been witnessed for instance in Vanuatu (Caillon 2005; Muller 2009) where the cultivars of tubers are commonly exchanged from one group to another, each group having its own diversity and enriching it with the varieties of other groups. In some societies, the stock of cultivated plants follow a special line, for instance the line of the women, who can be in charge of the cultivation of specific plants, or who inherit the plots of land for a specific culture. In every case, this agro-biodiversity refers to a social process, and is closely dependent on the way the society is organised.

In some other cases the agricultural practices of some groups consist of enriching their cultivars with some wild varieties, in order to plant as many different cultivars as possible, and obtain a diversified stock of available cultivars as to avoid the risk arising from the specialisation on one local variety only. Yet another phenomenon encountered in East Timor is the fact that some plant varieties have been returned to the wild by humans, and represent a stock of foraging resources that can tamper the usual production of the fields.

A specific knowledge is also associated with all these plants, wild or cultivated. It can refer to where and when to find those plants in the wild, how to cultivate them, or to technical *savoir-faire* (how to treat them to get rid of the acrid or irritating substance in it, how to get starch out of the pith of a tree…). It can also concern their medicinal or ritual uses, their place in the local cosmology or its social and symbolic significance, *etc*. Since the signature of the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992, this traditional ecological knowledge is an essential element of *in situ* biodiversity conservation, implying, notwithstanding all the debates around this idea, that indigenous communities guarantee in some way the sustainability of such conservation.

All these practices and knowledge, whether technical, social, symbolic and in all cases related to human activity and organisation, mean that elements considered as biological, such as biodiversity or agro-biodiversity, can be shaped by local populations and represent something that can be considered as their "heritage", tangible and intangible, to be handed down to coming generations.

With the first settlement dated more than 40,000 years, one can imagine that in East Timor, the human interactions with the environment are old and intense, even with relatively limited populations, and that the current landscape is in many places the product of these interactions. Some examples can be found in present-day landscapes: "sacred forests" are maintained as reserves of biodiversity in many communities; savannah formations have probably been created and maintained by fire; and in the other extreme, more recent, many landscapes have been colonized by invasive plants such as *Lantana camara* or *Chromolaena odorata.*

East Timor, lying between a world dominated to the West by rice (Asia), and to the East by tubers (Oceania), is a great place to study this agro-biodiversity, which relies on a large variety of plants: some rice and a lot of tubers, and also other plants that, until recently, served as staple for the populations during very long periods: wild tubers, palm trees, *etc*. As Fox (1977, 17) opposed "*the intensive wet-rice cultivation of the densely populated inner islands of Indonesia*" to the "*diverse, multicrop, dry-field cultivation of the less populated outer islands*", he mentioned that this typology neglected "*a yet minor but increasingly important, ecological system in the outer islands*" of the Indonesian arch, described as a "*highly specialized form of gathering*" based on palm-trees. In East Timor, some communities rely on this "*savannah-based palm agro-ecosystem*" (Monk et al. 1997), which is everywhere combined or confronted to swidden agriculture. In all the communities, palm-trees and tubers are described as crucial to the livelihoods of groups in ancient but also in more recent times (famine periods, and Indonesian occupation).

Palm trees in East Timor, especially *Corypha utan*

Palm trees appear at the centre of various systems of subsistence: there is never a palm tree very far away in Timor. Some of these palm trees, such as coconut (*Cocos nucifera*) and betelnut (*Areca catechu*) trees, are well known in the region or even have a tropical world-wide distribution. In the country, there are also a few species of palm trees that are interesting, although they are not part of an endemic biodiversity: there have been more or less scattered or maintained by human communities on the island. *Borassus flabellifer* (*akadiru* in Tetun) and *Arenga pinnata* are both exploited for their sap, used as a drink. *Borassus* is well known, notably through the works of Fox (1977) who reported that on the island of Roti there was a season when the *Borassus* sap was the only "food" available. This sap is used to make a nutritious wine (*tua' mutin*), which can be afterwards distilled to obtain a stronger alcohol. According to Fox, *Borassus* savannahs have been gradually formed by the repetition of slash-and-burn practices and they appear as an anthropic formation. *Arenga pinnata*, exploited with more or less the same techniques, provides the *tua' metan*, a more bitter and stronger wine which gave the tree its Tetun name[6].

Although *Borassus* has attracted most of the academic attention in the region, there is in East Timor another very important and extremely common palm species: *Corypha utan* (the *gebang* or *gewang* palm). This tree has two names in Tetun according to the use envisaged: *akar* (as food from the starch) or *tali*[7] (as use of the palms for roofing, *etc*.). The tree is also tapped for wine but actually its uses are multiple, and as for *Borassus,* nothing is wasted of it (Monk *et.al.* 1997). It really appears as a "plant of civilization": *Corypha* leaves are used to make roofs and basketwork, the ribs of the palm are used for the construction of houses, probably for various instruments, and also for its thorns, as fencing against the cattle. Most importantly, it provides a sago flour which is today known as a popular dessert.

In Insular Southeast Asia in general, there are several palm trees that provide sago (ie starch), the most documented one being *Metroxylon sago*, found in abundance in the island of Mentawai (off West Sumatra's coast), or on the Northern coast of Papua New Guinea. Such a tree, growing in the lowland marshes, was probably more common in past times, before the introduction of rice, as shown for instance in Sumatra's East coast lowlands (Manguin 2006); it has left traces in many places in Indonesia, where it is still used for roofing and a little bit for sago, but one can reckon that is was formerly an important staple in most lowlands.

Corypha utan in East Timor is adapted to the ecological conditions of a dryer climate. In some areas, it is the main staple food and accompanies fish or meat in everyday meals. In other regions, it is a food used during the gap between two harvests, or a famine food, to which people resort regularly due to the climatic variability.

Corypha groves (and sometimes what are left of them) are located to the foothills and lowlands below an altitude of 100 m (figure 1). Above that, one can still find some *Corypha,* but they seem to be less productive for starch. It can accept rather salty soils, and on significant areas along the coast one finds it in dense groves. It seems to grow spontaneously, although reforestation occurred some decades ago in the foothills of Baucau (N. Oliveira *pers. comm.*). It might not be a tree that is planted but the grove has to be taken care of, or protected. The presence of relict and current *Corypha* groves throughout East Timor shows the importance of this culture that has probably known an even greater importance in ancient times.

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[6] Some parts of the trunk of *Arenga Pinnata* are aslo used as a staple.
[7] *Tali* might be linked with the name of *Borassus* of Sanskrit origin (*tala*). Fox (1977, 204) mentions that *ta'al* is used in Madura, *tal* in Lombok and *ta'a* on Bima to call a *Borassus* tree. It probably shows that a name can travel and be transferred to another plant with similar uses.

Figure 1 : Approximate distribution of *Corypha utan – akar* groves in East Timor

There is an important technical knowledge associated to *Corypha*. The rather long process to obtain starch out of the pith has been identified in the villages of Badari (Suco Luca Aldeia Omobot) and of Migir (Suco Atabae); apparently, it does not show great variations from one place to another. The tree is ready for processing when the palms have fallen off the trunk; then it is felled, barked, cut in big sections and taken back home, often by using a rolling system. There, the pith is cut into chunks that are suspended for a few days over a fire to dry, or into flakes that are sun-dried. Dry akar can be stored for a few months, or immediately consumed. When so, the pieces of pith are grinded in a boat-shaped mortar, with the use of drumsticks held by one to eight people, depending on the size of the mortar. The aim is to separate the fibre from the starch. The starch is then sieved in a container made of basketry, placed in a mat (today a plastic canvas) and mixed with water, to obtain a paste that slowly decants on the bottom, allowing to get rid of the water in excess.

When ready, the paste is wrapped into a *butak* (a package of *Corypha* leaves) and can be stored for a few days. There are different ways to prepare it: the paste can be spread between two ceramic plates, and placed near the fire for cooking. Special bamboo spoons are used to manipulate the plates. It can be steamed in a leaf basket over an earthen pot; or placed in a flat leaf basket directly into the ashes. The cooking techniques seem linked to two different industries: a vegetal one, involving all the basketry made with the leaves of the same tree, and a ceramic one.

The specific shape of the mortar, whose size varies but whose form remains approximately the same throughout the island, and the successive stages of the treatment, indicate an elaborated technique, but which has not much in common with other sago producing techniques such as the one applied to *Metroxylon sago*[8]. The origin of such a process and its antiquity are yet to be researched.

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[8] Which is the same for instance in Northern Papua and in Mentawai.

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Yields and subsistence systems based on *Corypha* exploitation

Each family in the researched villages seem to have access to thousands of trees, and the only limitation to this culture is the investment of time required to fell and process the trunk. This observation questions the yields: a trunk is cut into sections of 0.6 to 1 m, giving 5 to 10 sections for each tree. Each section provides 12-24 *butak*, each *butak* providing a meal for 5 people. Each tree can therefore give 300 to 1200 meals; that is an average of more than two months of food for a family of 5. Processing a whole tree, which can be done whenever ready, independently of any special season, requires more or less 2 weeks for 2 persons, thus providing in theory two months of starch food.

Corypha apparently allows villagers in some regions to provide more than half of their food, the rest being mainly corn, sometimes rice. In the region of Luca on the Southern coast, in 2007, it provided some villages with 3 months of food/year. In Migir, West of Dili on the North coast, it provided half the food of the year (2013). This evokes Fox's observations in the island of Roti, asserting that under the climatic and soil conditions of the region, the palm-based system could support higher populations densities than slash-and-burn agricultural systems based on rice, corn, etc,[9] Moreover, the same author suggests that the collapse of swidden economies would provide the basis for palm-tapping systems, the deterioration of the condition of slash-and burn agriculture giving rise to the exploitation of palm-savannah (1977, 51-52)[10]. However, the traces of *Arenga Pinnata*, *Borassus flabelliber*, *Corypha utan* (and *Metroxylon sagu*[11]) in archaeological layers older than 40 000 years in the easternmost tip of Timor (Oliveira 2008, 235) seems to confirm the antiquity of palm exploitation, and could, rather than a definitive conversion, evoke a swing from one system to the other and *vice-versa*, according to soil, climatic, socio-politic and demographic conditions through time. This idea has yet to be explored as the current trend in East Timor today seems to be a return to swidden or irrigated agriculture, coupled with the increasing allocation of *Corypha* zones to other activities. In the grove west of Baucau, the production of sago has been completely abandoned over the past two or three years, and a large part of the land cleared of palm trees has been assigned to rice production. Other areas may suffer the same fate with industrial development, tourism activities, or other projects. In general, sago production is in strong decline, the hardness of the processing being the main reason mentioned for this abandon, but the image of sago as a poor person's food might also be an explanation. More generally, as Fox (1977, 206) notices for *Borassus*, the solutions recommended until now in agriculture always turn towards a disuse of palm-trees economies, which do not fall within the standards of development.

An additional point is that the use of *Corypha-akar* in a subsistence system is never exclusive: today it is often associated with corn, beans, and other ancient plants such as tubers, or rice. The combinations of different plants can be a response to diverse environments: eg wetlands or drier areas. In the limestone area of Balibo, West of the country, the occasional use of *akar*[12] is associated to the culture and harvest of peas including *Cajanus cajan,* different varieties of "wild" beans named *koto* ; and *maek* or *mahé* is a tuber (*Amorphophallus* spp.) described everywhere as an important ancient staple. Many other plants such as yams, wild or cultivated, and taro are also involved in the subsistence system. These combinations are adaptations to specific environmental, but also socio-political and demographic conditions: safety, land availability and accessibility are important issues in food production.

It seems that past societies used a wide combination of collected and cultivated plants. These economies have been revived by the livelihoods imposed to the resistance fighters during the war, depending largely on spontaneous resources.

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[9] However his observations are based on the exploitation of the *Borassus* sap only, not on the food use of *Corypha utan* which in his works is confined to livestock.

[10] One argument for this hypothesis is the lack of mythology and rituals concerning *Borassus* in Roti.

[11] This species has still to be investigated, as the local population seems to know of its existence but no single specimen has been encountered yet.

[12] *Akar* is processed on the coast during food shortage.

The *Corypha* palm groves are managed as a common resource: everywhere people attest that they belong to the community and that their use is free. But this still has to be questioned, as some groups or individuals might be responsible for their management. When a group comes from outside the village and wishes to process an *akar* tree, they have to ask permission locally.

The *Corypha-akar* displays a number of advantages: it involves no chemical nor other input; it can grow on marginal lands, often salty and unsuitable for other cultures. It has a lot of additional uses (as other palm trees do) for construction, basketry, tools, etc. The symbolic of the plant, the myths associated to it, if any, its origin and social significance are still to be researched, but it offers a promising field of research.

Cultural Heritage: A new prospect to the conservation of Agrobiodiversity

How to protect these systems? There is an opportunity to learn from an experiment conducted in Brazil by local associations and the National Institute for Historic and Artistic Heritage (Brazilian ministry of Culture) with the participation of scientific institutions such as the IRD, which allowed the traditional agricultural system of the Rio Negro to be classified in 2010 as Brazil intangible heritage. This system is based on cassava with a strong connexion between the social system and the construction of agro-biodiversity. It is a highly dynamic system, which relies on a network where varieties are exchanged.

The context of this registration was the erosion of agro-biodiversity and of the knowledge associated to it; the expansion of agricultural models which did not take into account cultural diversity; and, mainly, the lack of recognition and protection of the cultural and ecological value of the traditional agricultural systems. Such context is also relevant for East Timor.

In the case of the Rio Negro in Brazil, the system was organised around cassava. In East Timor one has to define the structuring element in order to protect the system with the social values and knowledge associated to it. This implies interviews and mapping, field trips in order to inventory the cultivated and collected plants, and the analysis of the relations between the society and the plants, including the identification of the exchange networks of plants. Biodiversity conservation is in fact a very complex issue, as it questions the species to identify and collect for preservation, which refers to *ex situ* conservation. But there is always a need for *in situ* conservation as well, which must rely on the combination of plants in a given subsistence system. The knowledge involved in a subsistence system can be technical, symbolic, culinary, and it is sometimes linked to identity; commonly shared, it represents the common heritage of local communities.

Finally, questions of governance are important in conservation. Local populations have to be involved in the process as they are the curators of the subsistence system, but the dominance of some actors on the conservation process has to be avoided. In the case of *Corypha*, the collective appropriation of the groves could be considered contrary to the global tendency to privatisation. Moreover, the exploitation system of *Corypha* is on some points opposed to the one based on rice: *akar* is collectively owned, individually felled, while rice implies to some degree a hierarchical organisation for water irrigation. Both plants correspond to two rather different systems of thought. The question as how to combine them at the scale of a country might represent some challenge, but the issue of self-sufficiency should not exclude that of heritage.

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The influence of sex, age and season on child growth in Ossu sub-district, Timor Leste, 2009-2012

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Despite a recent decline in child mortality in Timor-Leste, the prevalence of child undernutrition remains high. Undernutrition negatively impacts children's growth, cognitive and social development and has long term consequences for adult disease risk and economic productivity (Victora 2008; Dewey and Begum 2011; Adair et al 2013). Child nutrition is a result of food availability and parental care practices and the broader social, economic and environmental conditions that influence these factors (United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 2013). We study child growth as a function of family composition, resources and location within four local communities in the sub-district of Ossu, Viqueque district.

Anthropometric measures of height and weight provide useful information about a child's present and past nutritional status. Height for age indicates prior long-term nutrition with inadequate height for age (stunting) reflecting chronic undernutrition from an early age. In contrast weight for height, expressed as body mass index (BMI), reflects a child's current nutritional state (Waterlow et al 1977; de Onis 2001, p75). Inadequate weight for height (wasting) is a sign of acute undernutrition and is associated with a significantly elevated mortality risk (UNICEF 2013). Weight for age is a good indicator of general undernutrition and is useful for assessing young children in cross sectional studies (Waterlow et al 1977). The most recent Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey (National Statistics Directorate (NSD), Ministry of Finance and ICF Macro 2010) reports prevalence rates of 58% for stunting[6] and 19% for wasting[7] amongst children younger than 5 years.

On a global scale stunting is more common in rural than urban areas (UNICEF 2013) and this is also true in Timor-Leste (NSD, Ministry of Finance and ICF Macro 2010). Rural Timor-Leste families predominantly subsist on seasonal crops such as rice, maize, cassava and banana (Seeds of Life 2007). During the wet season, from November to April, families can experience food shortages (United Nations Food Programme 2005; Lopes and Nesbitt 2012; da Costa et al 2013). Children generally lose weight and body condition but family and individual factors can buffer or intensify the effect of this 'hungry season' on child growth (Judge et al 2012).

Resources and workload may be distributed differently according to age and sex of family members depending on societal and parental preferences. In societies with high infant mortality there may be preferential allocation of resources to older children with proven survival (Clutton-Brock 1991); alternatively older children may buffer younger children by providing child care or by contributing to family resources through work (Meehan 2009; Kramer 2011). In a cross sectional analysis of child growth parameters assessed during harvest in Ossu sub-district, we observed lower weight and BMI in older children relative to children aged 5 or less, but no sex differences were found (Reghupathy et al 2012). The

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[6] Stunting refers to the percentage of children aged 0 – 59 months whose height for age is more than 2 standard deviations below the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards
[7] Wasting refers to the percentage of children aged 0 – 59 months whose weight for height is more than 2 standard deviations below the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards

relative growth of children was related to household composition and community distance from the town centre but not to indices of family crops or livestock (Judge et al 2012).

In the present study we examine patterns of child growth in the four communities over a four year period. Children were measured in July-September (harvest) in 2009 and 2012, and March-May (post rainy season) in 2010 and 2011. In 2010 and 2011 the annual rainy season period of food scarcity was extended due to anomalous climatic patterns impacting planting and harvest (Lopes and Nesbitt 2012; da Costa et al 2013). We examine patterns of short and long term growth over this period according to children's sex and age.

Methods

We initially sampled households with children in Ossu town (n = 48 households) and the rural *aldeias* of Liamida (3 km north of Ossu; n=19 households) and Kai-uai-hoo (7 km north of Ossu; n = 34 households). Sampling followed the nearest neighbour pattern as previously described (Reghupathy et al 2012; Judge et al 2012). In 2011 and 2012, at the request of the community, we expanded to include 12 households in Uaibua (1.5 km west of Ossu). In all cases, household heads were approached to participate in the study and were interviewed following provision of informed consent (see Reghupathy et al 2012 for details of interviews). With consent of the parents, children were then measured. At each time period, feedback was provided to parents on children's growth since last measurement and included verbal information on sources of good nutrition, the importance of breastfeeding, child immunisation and visits to the health clinic.

Over the four year period 250 boys and 227 girls aged 0-18 years from 113 households were measured. At least one repeat measure was obtained on 332 (69.6%) of these children (180 boys and 152 girls) with 114 children (23.9%) having measures for all four years. Reasons for single measures include the addition of new babies and fostered children to households, movement of children to households outside of the study area, temporary absence of child or family at the time of interview due to school, work or holiday, child death and withdrawal of the family from the study. Child movement between households was common; for example between 2009 and 2010, 19% of children had moved residence (either in or out), and from 2011 to 2012 the figure was 14.7%.

Stature, weight, and mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) were measured following standard procedures with participants lightly clothed and without shoes (de Onis et al 2004). Recumbent length was measured for infants unable to stand erect. BMI was calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height (or length) in metres squared. To adjust for the considerable biological influence of sex and age on child size, the anthropometric measures were converted to Z-scores using the WHO anthropometric references (World Health Organization 2007). These Z-scores were then used in all statistical analyses. Any observed age or sex differences in patterns of growth therefore should reflect variation inherent to the Ossu communities. Z-scores are available up to age 19 years for height and BMI and up to 10 years for weight. MUAC is not considered in this paper as Z-scores are only available to 5 years.

Linear mixed models were used to examine age and sex effects over the four sampling periods for each of the three growth measures. Child age was entered as a four category factor. Child identity number was entered as a random effect to allow for repeated measures within the same child over time. For each growth measure we started with a full model including all 2 way interactions between age, sex and sampling period and backward eliminated non-significant interaction terms and independent variables until only significant predictors remained. A probability value (p) less than 0.05 was deemed significant.

This research was approved the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of Western Australia (RA/4/1/2401) and by the Ministry of Health, Timor-Leste (2009-2010) and the Ministry of Health, Timor-Leste Cabinet of Health Research and Development's Technical and Ethical Review Committee (2011-2015). Research was funded by the School of Anatomy, Physiology and Human Biology at The University of Western Australia and by the Australian Research Council.

Results and discussion

Children's standardised weight and BMI were significantly lower during the 2010 and 2011 sampling periods than during 2009 and 2012 (Figures 1 and 2). This is not surprising given that body weight and BMI are sensitive to short term changes in nutritional status and measures in 2010 and 2011 were taken soon after the 'hungry season'. Children experienced further loss of body weight (p = 0.001) and BMI (p = 0.001) from 2010 to 2011. This is of concern given the low base from which they started, and is likely explained by a complexity of environmental and social factors in this primarily subsistence population. Due to extended rains in 2010 associated with *La Niña,* farmers could not burn their land in preparation for planting (Lopes and Nesbitt 2012); burning is the primary mode of maintaining soil fertility from year to year in hill and mountain regions of Timor-Leste (da Costa et al 2013). Farmers expressed uncertainty about the appropriate time to engage in field preparation and planting given the prolonged rains. Maize crops in particular were substantially lower (Lopes and Nesbitt 2012) exacerbating the effects of the 'hungry season' from 2010-2011.

Figure 1. Mean standardised weight-for-age by sampling year and sex for children 0 – 10 years. Error bars represent 1 standard error. Weight during 2010 and 2011 differ from each other and all other years: ab, ac, bc, cd p = 0.001; bd p = 0.002, cd p = 0.038. Weight does not differ by sex of child.

Figure 2. Standardised BMI-for-age by sampling year and sex for children 0-18 years. Error bars represent 1 standard error. BMI during 2010 and 2011 differ from each other and from all other years: ab, ac, bc, cd p = 0.001; bd = 0.01. BMI does not differ by sex of child.

For all years except 2011, children's weight declined with increasing age (Figure 3). Children aged 5+ - 10 years had significantly lower standardised weight than children 2+ -5 years (p = 0.001) and infants aged 2 years or less (p = 0.031). As 2011 was the second year of measurement after the food scarcity period and followed a year of poor agricultural production (Lopes and Nesbitt 2012; da Costa et al 2013), this suggests that while the youngest children experience 'buffering' from the growth impact of poor resources during normal years, years of poor production are not compensated by that buffering. There was no difference in male or female weight across the age groups or years. As is the case for weight, BMI also declined with age (p = 0.001), however, female children experienced less of an age-related BMI decline than males (age x sex interaction p = 0.013; Figure 4).

Figure 3. Mean standardised weight-for-age by sampling year and age group for children 0 – 10 years. Error bars represent 1 standard error. Children aged 5+ - 10 years show significantly lower weight than children 2+ -5 years (p = 0.001) and infants aged 2 years or less (p = 0.031).

Figure 4. Mean standardised BMI-for-age by age group and sex for children 0 – 18 years. Error bars represent one standard error. Males older than 10 years show significantly poorer BMI for age and sex than do females in the same age group and males in younger age groups.

There was no consistent difference in mean standardised height across sampling years (Figure 5) or age groups (Figure 6). Both male and female children were short by international standards, but as a group

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female children were significantly taller for their age (mean z = -2.36 ± 0.08) than their male counterparts (mean z = -2.58 ± 0.08, p = 0.021). National statistics show a higher incidence of stunting amongst boys aged less than five years (60%) than girls (56%; NSD, Ministry of Finance and ICF Macro, 2010). Our data indicate that differences in standardized height increased in the teenage years (Figure 6).

Sex differences in the prevalence of stunting have been observed in other populations. Wamani et al (2007) found a higher prevalence of stunting in male children than female children in a meta-analysis of demographic health surveys from sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, Simondon et al (1998) found a greater teenage height deficit amongst boys (stunted as pre-schoolers) than similarly stunted girls in a longitudinal study of rural Senegalese children. Some studies have posed behavioural explanations for these differences with suggestions of preferential treatment of girls due to women's value in agricultural labour (Svedberg 1990). Adaptive explanations have also been proposed. In resource poor environments natural selection will favour parents who favour females because of their better reproductive prospects (Cronk 1989; Cronk 2007). Rates of child agricultural labour are similar for boys and girls in Timor-Leste; however girls spend more time than boys doing housework and child care related activities (Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste et al 2003). While sex differentials in breastfeeding or immunisation might result in sex differences in growth, there does not appear to be preferential treatment of female children over male children in these behaviours in Timor-Leste (NSD, Ministry of Finance and ICF Macro, 2010). There may be a physiological explanation; while we are measuring growth relative to international standards, those standards are sex specific. In absolute terms male children tend to be bigger than female children and therefore have a higher daily energy requirement (Butte et al 2000). Hence even if the activity levels of male and female children are similar, male children by virtue of their greater body mass may be more adversely affected by limited food availability and thus show greater deviations from expected growth. Future research should examine food distribution among family members and quantify children's energy expenditure, although this is particularly difficult information to acquire.


Figure 5. Mean standardised height-for-age by sampling year and sex for children 0 - 18 years. Error bars represent 1 standard error. On average, Ossu children of all ages are short by international standards; girls are less short for age than are boys.

Figure 6. Mean standardised height-for-age by age category and sex for children 0 – 18 years. Error bars represent 1 standard error. Ossu children of all ages are short relative to international standards and this does not differ by age; males are shorter for age than females.

Short height for age in infancy followed by rapid weight gain later in childhood increases the risk of obesity and adult onset conditions such as heart disease and Type II diabetes (Bateson et al 2004; Gluckman et al 2007). That weight and BMI declines with age in our sample indicates that there is no evidence of 'catch-up' growth in this community to-date. However, with shifts in diet and lifestyle as a consequence of modernisation and a move to a cash economy (e.g. availability of snack foods and television with the introduction of reticulated electricity in 2012) there may be a risk of these conditions in the adult population of the future (UNICEF 2013). Thus addressing the factors that lead to both inadequate linear growth during infancy and early childhood (undernutrition) and later catch up growth (inappropriate nutrition; sedentary lifestyle) will be an important challenge. As the electricity grid allows storage and availability of a wider array of foodstuffs in more distant areas of Timor-Leste, educational campaigns focused on good nutrition in addition to programs to increase availability of foods may become increasingly important.

Conclusion

To our knowledge, this is the first longitudinal anthropometric data set for a community sample in Timor-Leste. Children in these rural communities exhibit reduced growth in the both the short term and the long term. Short term growth limitation related to the growing season becomes long term when environmental perturbations and extreme events disturb the recuperative effects of the harvest season. Male children appear more adversely affected than female children but whether this is due to sex differences in childcare practices, physiological sex differences or a combination of both is not yet clear. While shorter stature and associated lower metabolic requirements may be an adaptive response to nutritionally stressed environments, low BMI and weight for age is indicative of current nutritional stress and this is particularly evident amongst older children. Understanding the reasons for sex and age differences in growth will be important for targeted programs to improve child nutritional status.

The predictions of more extreme weather events associated with climate change, together with a rapidly changing way of life, present important challenges to improving the nutritional and growth

outcomes of rural Timorese children. The longitudinal data presented in this study provide a basis to assess the outcomes of future interventions to improve community food security, child health and nutritional status.

Acknowledgements

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How long will the Petroleum Fund carry Timor-Leste?

Charles Scheiner[1]

Oil and gas provided more than 95% of Timor-Leste state revenues[2] and comprised 81% of GDP (RDTL DGS 2013) in 2012. Income from exporting non-renewable petroleum wealth is channelled through the Petroleum Fund, which contains US$16 billion. Many believe that the Fund will pay for state activities after the oil and gas fields are exhausted, which could happen within six years, but the Petroleum Fund may be empty by 2025.[3] Timor-Leste has about a decade to use its finite oil resources to underpin long-term prosperity and development.

As in all countries, decision-makers in Timor-Leste need solid information to develop sound policies. Aspirations are essential, but planning should not rely on unrealizable dreams. This paper describes a model that projects how long the Petroleum Fund will be able to finance state activities. The model incorporates historical and projected data, shows the effects of external factors and policy decisions, and tests different assumptions.

When Timor-Leste's state revenues can no longer cover expenses, the nation will enter an 'austerity' phase, with drastic implications for the state and its citizens. This model explores when that will happen and how severe it will be.[4]

Petroleum Dependency and the Resource Curse

Timor-Leste is extremely petroleum-export-dependent because its non-petroleum economy is so small. Although 19% of Timor-Leste's economy is 'non-petroleum,' about half of this is from re-circulated oil and gas money disbursed by the State. When the wells run dry, this will also end.

Timor-Leste's economy and politics are typical of the 'resource curse' (Neves, 2013). In addition to high inflation, growing foreign debt and neglect of non-petroleum sectors, the country imports 33 times as much as it exports (RDTL DGS 2014). Until 2013, its state budget was one of the fastest-growing in the world. Nearly half of state expenditures pay foreign contractors to build infrastructure, while investment in human resources – health and education – is far below international norms. However, the state pays for some overseas education and health care, enabling a select few to escape inadequate local services.

Timor-Leste does not have enough oil and gas to sustain the country for very long. If the non-oil economy hasn't developed when it runs dry in half a generation, many Timorese people who join the majority who already live below the poverty line.

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[2] During 2012 Timor-Leste received $3,559 million from oil and gas revenues, $401m from investing the Petroleum Fund (RDTL MoF 2013), and $136m in other income (RDTL MoF 2013f). Preliminary 2013 figures shows $3,075m from oil and gas, $865m from PF investments (Central Bank 2014), and $147m in other income (RDTL MoF 2014).

[3] Timor-Leste has two producing oil fields. Kitan will stop production in 2016 and Bayu-Undan will cease in 2020 (RDTL MoF 2013b). If the political uncertainties currently preventing development of the Greater Sunrise field are resolved, that field could provide revenues to Timor-Leste for 30 more years, totaling $25-$35 billion, about as much as Bayu-Undan.

[4] The morally challenging decisions about which essential services to cut during austerity are beyond the scope of this paper.

Sustainable budgeting is not a new idea in Timor-Leste

In 2011, Ministry of Finance advisors wrote:

> **Policies are fiscally sustainable if:** there is enough money to pay for expenditures in the long term. The Government is not going to run out of money in the future.
> **Policies are fiscally unsustainable if:** expenditure is too high to be paid for in the long term. At some point in the future the Government will run out of money and will have to sharply reduce expenditure (RDTL MoF 2013c).

Fiscal sustainability has been discussed in Timor Leste since before it set up its Petroleum Fund (PF) in 2005 (La'o Hamutuk 2005a; La'o Hamutuk 2013). The Fund receives all state income related to gas and oil, and invests it overseas, redepositing the return on investment into the Fund. The Fund's rationale was summarized by La'o Hamutuk:

> Our petroleum wealth will have been entirely transformed into money before the middle of this century. If we have not saved and invested it wisely, preparing for our post-petroleum future, our grandchildren's children may endure worse poverty, unemployment, maternal mortality, illiteracy, disease and lack of services than we live with today. This is the experience of people all over the world…. (La'o Hamutuk 2005)

The Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI) benchmark for annual withdrawals is calculated as 3% of the balance in the Fund added to the net present value of expected future revenues from oil and gas fields with approved development plans.[5] Although this was intended to provide investment income after the oil is exhausted, overspending the ESI and difficulty of projecting future oil revenues have made it less certain.

Unfortunately, the ESI is non-binding;[6] it was violated from 2008 through 2012.[7] Fiscal sustainability and inter-generational equity are often invoked by officials, but suggestions for a stronger effort (UNDP 2011; Scheiner 2011; La'o Hamutuk 2012; *Petroleum Economist* 2013) have been unwelcome (RDTL Spokesperson 2011; RDTL Spokesperson 2013) until recently. Nevertheless, the World Bank made it a focus of its new strategy (World Bank 2013).

In May 2013, the Ministry of Finance held public workshops on 'Yellow Road'[8] scenarios for fiscal sustainability (RDTL MoF 2013d). Although they reach similar conclusions to this paper, their recommendations are impractical. Nevertheless, the Government initially tried to limit 2014 appropriations to $1.2 billion, which had increased to $1.5b when the Government proposed its budget to Parliament (RDTL MoF 2013f), which approved that figure in January 2014 (La'o Hamutuk 2014). Although $1.65b was appropriated in the 2013 budget, actual spending during 2013 was under $1.2b.

In mid-2013, Bayu-Undan operator Conoco-Phillips reduced its projection of future revenues by 49%, with production to end four years earlier than previous estimates. This downgrade is reflected in the 2014 budget (although sceptical officials have contracted an independent review and believe that Timor-

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[5] At present, this includes the Bayu-Undan and Kitan fields in the Joint Petroleum Development Area, from which Australia takes 10% of the revenue. As the development plan for Greater Sunrise is not yet approved, it is not included in the ESI calculation.

[6] The ESI rule has been weakened over time due to Government interpretation, legal revision and less prudent oil price projections.

[7] The $1,500m State Budget for 2014 will withdraw $271m more from the PF than the ESI of $632m (La'o Hamutuk 2014, RDTL Ministry of Finance 2013f), although La'o Hamutuk suggested to Parliament that this is unwarranted (La'o Hamutuk 2013b) and the Parliamentary Committee on Public Finances agreed (RDTL Parliament 2013).

[8] Timor-Leste's Government has held internal 'Yellow Road' workshops since 2009, but opened them to the public in 2013. The meaning of the phrase is unknown, although it worryingly resembles the 'Yellow Brick Road' to the sham Wizard of Oz.

Leste has more oil than has been identified). Partly in response, for the first time in history, the Government withdrew less than the Parliamentary limit from the Petroleum Fund during 2013.[9]

When President Taur Matan Ruak promulgated the 2014 State Budget in early February, he wrote Parliament:

> *Once again, I am concerned the persistence of* excessive dependence of government revenue from the Petroleum Fund. *I am absolutely convinced that it is urgent to correct this situation. ... I believe that it is necessary to adopt active policies to diversify economic development...* (RDTL President 2014).

Methodology

The model described in this paper explores four main scenarios. Its predictions are not precise because nobody knows what oil and gas prices will be next week, let alone in 2030. However, by changing the inputs to these scenarios, the model shows how they affect the results.

The model takes an engineering approach: explicit assumptions and clear causal relationships (e.g. higher world oil market prices lead to increased oil revenue and higher costs for fuel). It avoids correlations (e.g. building infrastructure results in GDP growth). It does not estimate macroeconomic indicators like GDP, inflation, poverty or trade balance, but simply projects state income and outgo.

What the model produces

The spreadsheet uses history from 2008 through 2012 (RDTL Ministry of Finance 2013f and 2013g) and La'o Hamutuk projections for 2013, based on the Transparency Portal (RDTL Ministry of Finance 2014). The 2014 information reflects the enacted budget (La'o Hamutuk 2014). For 2015-2066, it makes annual calculations based on the previous year and certain assumptions, yielding the following:

- Government spending for the year, disaggregated into: salaries, transfers, generator fuel, infrastructure operation & maintenance, other goods & services, minor capital, development capital (including major infrastructure projects) and debt service.
- Government revenues for the year, disaggregated into: electricity revenue, taxes the Government pays to itself,[10] other non-oil taxes and fees, Petroleum Fund withdrawals and loans received.
- Petroleum Fund receipts from Bayu-Undan/Kitan, Sunrise oil, Sunrise gas upstream and Sunrise gas downstream.
- Return on investing the Petroleum Fund.
- Based on the above, it calculates outstanding debt, surplus (saved in the Petroleum Fund) or deficit (the severity of 'austerity' spending cuts), Petroleum Fund balance and ESI.

In addition to numbers, the model produces graphs showing a summary, revenues and spending. Calculating is done in dollars-of-the-day, but the graphs can adjust for worldwide inflation.

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[9] The 2013 budget authorized $787m to be withdrawn from the Fund, equal to the Estimated Sustainable Income, but the Government withdrew only $730m, because much more had been withdrawn during 2012 than the government could spend (La'o Hamutuk 2013a). Nevertheless, 2013 ended with $634m in the Treasury account, more than triple the cushion the Government says it needs.

[10] 'Domestic revenue' includes import and corporate taxes paid by Government contractors and suppliers which are added to the cost of the contract. This comprises about one-third of the money taken in from non-oil, non-electricity taxes and fees.

What the model takes in

The model includes three worksheets:

1. **Petroleum revenues.** Deriving annual revenues from Bayu-Undan, Kitan and Greater Sunrise, based on the following inputs:
   - World crude oil market prices, using the US Energy Information Administration (EIA)'s Brent Crude spot price projections (US EIA 2013). Users can choose among low, reference and high cases in five increments.
   - Most petroleum income after 2020 will have to come from Sunrise natural gas, but the value of gas has fallen as non-conventional sources come online (Hofman, 2013, 9). Since the EIA projects gas prices for the US market (not global LNG), the model uses a long-term gas price equal to one-third (or another ratio) of the price of Brent Crude with the same energy content.
   - Bayu-Undan (B-U) has long-term LNG contracts indexed to oil prices, so the model doesn't project gas prices for B-U. However, the model allows enlarging the B-U reserve, which would extend its production. It also optionally includes the earlier, higher, revenue projections.
   - The model also considers when the Sunrise project will be developed, whether its gas will be piped to and liquefied in Timor-Leste, the amount of recoverable gas, and how extraction (upstream) revenues will be divided between Timor-Leste and Australia.[11]

2. **State Budget.** Based on the information above and other inputs (including borrowed income and debt repayments), the model calculates annual revenues and expenditures. A few assumptions and relationships are built in, but the following parameters can be changed:
   - Rate of return on investing the Petroleum Fund (simplified as a fixed percentage over time).
   - Percentage of electricity generation fuel cost recovered from ratepayers by the state electricity utility (currently 15%).
   - Other domestic revenues (taxes and fees). Annual rate of increase can be specified for 2015 and 2030; the model interpolates for 2016-2029.
   - Expenditure to maintain physical infrastructure, as a percentage of the total capital investment to date.
   - Expenditure to build specific mega-projects (Tasi Mane Project components, Dili Airport and Tibar Port).
   - Recurrent expenditure (salaries, transfers, non-fuel goods & services, minor capital). These are given the same percentage increases, specified for 2015 and 2030; the model interpolates.
   - Discount rate for future petroleum revenue (for estimating ESI).

3. **Borrowing and debt service.** Loans are included in state revenues, and debt repayments are included in state expenditures.
   - The model includes $209 million in loans already contracted with the ADB, Japan and the World Bank, and can include $292 million in other loans listed in the 2014 State Budget.
   - It allows other loans which are not yet decided, including for additional roads and the Tasi Mane Project (Suai Supply Base, highway and refinery, but not the pipeline/LNG plant -- the oil companies should pay for that). Amounts, interest and repayment periods can be specified.
   - Timor-Leste could borrow to try to close the budget deficit and hold off austerity. One can specify the dates, loan amount, interest rate and repayment period.

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[11] Under the 2007 Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS) Treaty with Australia, Timor-Leste will get 50% of Sunrise upstream revenues, but if CMATS is terminated, TL would get only 18% under the International Unitization Agreement (IUA). However, if a boundary is established under international legal principles, TL could own 100% of Greater Sunrise (La'o Hamutuk 2014a).

4. **Other assumptions** are hard-coded, but could be tested in the future:
   - Tax revenues from Government imports (3-4%, see note 10).
   - Annual expenditure on unspecified capital projects ($386m in 2014, increasing with global inflation).
   - Population growth (2010 Census 'recommended scenario'; others can be selected) (RDTL DGS 2013b).
   - Electricity usage per citizen (estimated to double between 2013 and 2032).

Results

In each of the following graphs, text at upper left summarizes the assumptions, while the box at upper right summarizes the outcomes. The vertical scale is in millions of US dollars, and the horizontal axis shows years from 2008 to 2040, although the underlying calculations go through 2066. All amounts are in U.S. dollars-of-the day. The background turns grey during austerity -- when desired spending exceeds available money.

The **Base Case** represents a continuation of recent history with a few plausible improvements. It is not prudent enough for planning purposes, but is an optimistic reference for comparison with other scenarios. It makes hopeful assumptions for oil and gas prices and Petroleum Fund investment return, and expects Sunrise gas to be piped to Timor-Leste. It assumes only contracted and budgeted loans and that the Suai Supply Base will be built, but not the South Coast Highway or refinery. Under this scenario, Timor-Leste cannot finance its full budget after 2025, and will have to cut two-thirds of desired spending starting in 2027.

Figure 1. Base Case summary

Oil price: Brent Reference (AEO2013). Bayu-U prod. per GSB2014.

Sunrise plan approved in 2017 with pipe to TL. Sunrise has 5.1tcf gas and TL gets 50% of it. Natural gas is worth 33% as much as oil.

Petroleum Fund investments return 5.0%/yr nominal. During 2012-13 the fund earned 4.8%/yr.

Domestic revenues increase 13.0%/yr now and 16.0%/yr after 2030.
During 2011-2014, these revenues (without EDTL or taxes from the state) increased 13%/yr.
EDTL recovers 25% of fuel cost from users. It recovered 15% in 2012-13.

Expenditures 2014 per OGE 2014, then calculated from LH model. Spending goes up 16.0%/yr now and 10.0%/yr after 2030. In 2011-2014, recurrent spending (excl. EDTL fuel) went up 21%/yr.
Annual maintenance costs 8% of installed capital.
Includes $450m for the Tasi Mane project, $450m for Dili airport and Tibar port.
Includes $511m in contracted and budgeted loans.

Nominal dollars-of-the-day

RESULTS: Peak Petroleum Fund balance of $19 billion in 2019.

Austerity starts in 2026, cutting 66% from planned outlays in 2027-2030.

- • • • Petroleum Fund balance
- ▬▬ Petrol. income (incl. PF return)
- ▬▬ Total expend. (excl. debt serv.)
- ▬ ▬ Domestic revenues
- ▬ Outstanding debt

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Figure 2. Base Case spending

Figure 3. Base Case revenues

Estimating too high is more dangerous than being too cautious, as it can cause irreversible damage when the money is gone -- malnutrition, uneducated children, poverty, death. With prudent assumptions more consistent with recent history[12] -- lower oil prices and investment returns, no Sunrise project, lower non-oil revenues and higher state expenditures -- austerity comes in 2024, two years earlier than the **Base Case**, with much deeper cuts.

Figure 4. Prudent Case summary

On the other hand, more optimistic (unrealistic) assumptions would improve the outcome. If we start with the Base Case but have these wishes granted:

- Higher Bayu-Undan production (using projections from before ConocoPhillips downgraded them in mid-2013)
- World oil prices halfway between EIA's reference and *high* scenarios (a foolhardy assumption)
- Higher long-term gas prices (33% of the value of oil)
- Petroleum Fund investments earn 7% per year (they earned 6.6% in 2013, which was an exceptionally good year)
- Slower growth in expenditures and faster growth in domestic revenues.

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[12] This case uses the average of the low and reference EIA prices, which is what the Ministry of Finance uses to estimate the Sustainable Income. It assume 4% return on Petroleum Fund investments and historical levels of electricity cost recovery and revenue and expenditure growth.

If all this goes well, Timor-Leste gets seven more years (until 2033) before austerity kicks in, and the cuts will be "only" 60%. The summary graph for this "**Foolhardy Case**" is in Appendix Figure A-1.

It is difficult to envision a plausible scenario which does not hit the wall within a generation. The Ministry of Finance's 'Yellow Road' demands immediate salary and other unachievable cuts, and expects the non-oil GDP to continue growing at double-digit rates while the state budget shrinks, which is inconceivable.[13] Although the IMF expected Timor-Leste to follow the Yellow Road (IMF 2013) for the 2014 state budget, political realities forced an immediate detour: less than six months after the Yellow Road workshops, 2014 appropriations were 33% above the targeted value.

However, it is possible for Timor-Leste's Petroleum Fund, known reserves and fiscal discipline to carry the country for more than 30 years, enough time for a strategic, concerted effort to develop non-oil revenues and economic activity. La'o Hamutuk's **Almost Sustainable Case** involves halting the Tasi Mane project, downsizing the Dili airport and Tibar port projects, avoiding further borrowing, accepting a floating LNG plant so that Sunrise development can proceed, and limiting recurrent spending (salaries, transfers and goods & services) to the Estimated Sustainable Income plus domestic revenues. Spending above this level would only be permitted for construction and maintenance of essential capital infrastructure. In this scenario, graphed in Appendix Figures A-2 and A-3, state expenditures in 2025 would be $2.5 billion, about half of the Base Case, requiring significant improvements in efficiency and frugality. In other words, moderate managed reductions today can avert severe forced cuts ten years from now.

Table 1 summarizes the results and assumptions from these four scenarios. **Highlighted bold** shows differences from the **Base Case**.

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[13] All the growth in non-oil GDP since 2006 has been due to petroleum production and government spending. Agriculture has been shrinking in real dollars, while industry remains miniscule and other sectors are stagnant (RDTL DGS 2013).

Table 1. Comparison of four cases

		Base	Prudent	Foolhardy	Almost Sustainable
Results	Pre-austerity budget ($b)	$5.1	$4.6	$9.8	$13.1
	Austerity starts (year)	2026	2024	2033	2050
	Austerity depth (how much must be cut)	66%	94%	60%	8%
	Petroleum Fund (PF) peak amount ($b)	$19	$17	$32	$20
	PF peak (year)	2019	2018	2023	2019
	Total debt service costs ($b)	$0.20	$0.20	$0.20	$0.05
Oil and gas	Oil price assumption (Brent)	Reference case	Avg. Low & Ref	Avg. High & Ref	Avg. Low & Ref
	Bayu-Undan production	2013 projections	2013 projections	2012 projections	2013 projections
	Sunrise gas liquefied where?	Beasu	Not developed	Beasu	Floating
	When Sunrise agreed (year)	2017		2017	2016
Revenues	PF annual investment return	5%	4%	7%	5%
	Annual increase in 2015	13%	12%	13%	13%
	Annual increase after 2030	16%	14%	16%	16%
	EDTL cost recovery (% of fuel outlay)	25%	15%	25%	25%
Spending & loans	'Yellow Road' scenario	2013-14 per OGE 2014, then LH model.	2013-14 per OGE 2014, then LH model.	2013-14 per OGE 2014, then LH model.	Capital + O&M + ESI + domestic revenues
	Annual increase in 2015	16%	20%	16%	Per revenue (~10%)
	Annual increase after 2030	10%	15%	10%	Per revenue (~7%)
	Dili airport & Tibar port invest. ($b)	$0.45	$0.45	$0.45	$0.15
	Tasi Mane project investment ($b)	$0.45	$0.45	$0.45	$0.10
	Loans ($b)	$0.51	$0.51	$0.51	$0.20

The model allows many changes to other assumptions, showing how they affect fiscal sustainability. Table A-1 in the Appendix show that changes in world oil market prices and the size of the Bayu-Undan reserve can advance or delay austerity by at most two years, as well as changing the depth of the spending cuts after austerity begins by up to 8%. The base case assumes a Sunrise pipeline to Beasu; if the project is delayed for six years or more, austerity becomes 22% deeper, but it doesn't come any earlier. On the other hand, if Sunrise is developed soon with floating LNG, austerity is only 4% deeper than it would be if the gas were piped to Timor-Leste. Changes in long-term gas prices and the size of the Sunrise reserve affect austerity by only about 4%.

As shown in Table A-2, if Petroleum Fund investments earn 2% more or less than the base case (5%), austerity comes a year later or earlier, and will be about 4% easier or harsher. Similarly, a change in the annual growth of domestic revenues by 2% would not change when austerity starts, but would make it 3% more or less severe. On the other hand, a 2% change in the rate of expenditure growth would shift austerity by a year, as well as changing its depth by about 10%. If the government were to recover 75% of

electric generation fuel costs from ratepayers (it currently recovers 15%), that would reduce the depth of austerity by 2%.

Table A-3 explores the effects of large infrastructure projects and debt. For the Tasi Mane project, the base case includes the Suai airport and supply base, as those are the only components in the 2014 State Budget. If those were cancelled, the depth of austerity would reduce by 1%. On the other hand, if Timor-Leste spends $2 billion for the South Coast Highway or $4b for an oil refinery in Betano, austerity could come a year sooner and would be 6% deeper. If these projects are financed with loans, austerity gets 3-4% more severe, as debt repayments will be due after the Petroleum Fund is used up.

One way to delay austerity is with debt financing. Borrowing $10 billion during 2025-2027 could delay austerity by two years but would increase the severity of the cuts from 66% to 72%. In other words, there will be 18% less money available during austerity than without loans, as creditors will have first claim on state income.

Conclusion

Without drastic changes, Timor-Leste's Petroleum Fund could be used up as soon as 2023-2026. Although changes in external factors and internal policies can add or subtract as much as five years, the result is surprisingly robust. Higher oil prices and reserve sizes, Sunrise LNG in Timor-Leste, and higher Petroleum Fund investment returns will each add only a year or two. Developing Greater Sunrise (regardless of where the gas is liquefied) could reduce the severity of budget cuts during austerity, but total state revenues will still only cover about one-third of desired outlays.

Slower expenditure and faster revenue growth help, but geometrically growing budgets will inevitably consume finite petroleum wealth. Only the **Almost Sustainable** scenario, which requires stronger fiscal restraint than most countries have been able to achieve, averts austerity for more than one generation.

This version of the model incorporates some key factors, but others would be worth exploring:

- Population impacts as the post-1999 baby boom grows up.
- Local inflation, which is higher than global and stimulated by state spending.
- Additional capital projects and sectors (water, roads, bridges), with variable financing.
- Replacement costs for physical infrastructure.
- More refined recurrent spending, including veterans' and other pensions.
- Additional oil and gas discoveries.

This spreadsheet is 'open source.'[14] We hope that others will deepen this analysis or conduct their own research, and that it will help everyone 'take context as the starting point'[15] for decisions which benefit current and future generations of Timor-Leste's people.

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[14] This spreadsheet, methodological notes and other related materials will be updated regularly and linked to from http://www.laohamutuk.org/econ/model/13PFSustainability.htm

[15] This is Principle No. 1 for 'Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations' (OECD 2007).

Appendix

Figure A-1. Foolhardy Case summary

Oil price: Brent Avg High & Reference (AEO2013). Bayu-U prod. per GSB2013.

Sunrise plan approved in 2017 with pipe to TL. Sunrise has 5.1tcf gas and TL gets 50% of it. Natural gas is worth 33% as much as oil.

Petroleum Fund investments return 7.0%/yr nominal.

Domestic revenues increase 13.0%/yr now and 16.0%/yr after 2030.
EDTL recovers 25% of fuel cost from users.

Expenditures 2014 per OGE 2014, then calculated from LH model. Spending goes up 16.0%/yr now and 10.0%/yr after 2030.
Annual maintenance costs 8% of installed capital.

Includes $450m for the Tasi Mane project, $450m for Dili airport and Tibar port.

Includes $511m in contracted and budgeted loans.

Nominal dollars-of-the-day

RESULTS: Peak Petroleum Fund balance of $32 billion in 2023.

Austerity starts in 2033, cutting 60% from planned outlays in 2034-2037.

- Petroleum Fund balance
- Petrol. income (incl. PF return)
- Total expend. (excl. debt serv.)
- Domestic revenues
- Outstanding debt

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Figure A-2. Summary of 'Almost Sustainable' Case

Oil price: Brent Avg. Low&Reference (AEO2013). Bayu-U prod. per GSB2014.

Sunrise plan approved in 2017 with floating LNG. Sunrise has 5.1tcf gas and TL gets 50% of it. Natural gas is worth 33% as much as oil.

Petroleum Fund investments return 5.0%/yr nominal. During 2012-13 the fund earned 4.8%/yr.

Domestic revenues increase 13.0%/yr now and 16.0%/yr after 2030. During 2011-2014, these revenues (without EDTL or taxes from the state) increased 13%/yr. EDTL recovers 25% of fuel cost from users. It recovered 15% in 2012-13.

Yellow Rd: capital + O&M + ESI + dom.revenues. Annual maintenance costs 8% of installed capital.

Includes $100m for the Tasi Mane project, $150m for Dili airport and Tibar port.

Includes $209m in contracted loans.

Nominal dollars-of-the-day

RESULTS: Peak Petroleum Fund balance of $20 billion in 2019.

Austerity starts in 2050, cutting 8% from planned outlays in 2051-2054.

········ Petroleum Fund balance

▬▬▬ Petrol. income (incl. PF return)

▬▬▬ Total expenditures

▬ ▬ ▬ Domestic revenues

▬▬▬ Outstanding debt

Figure A-3. Revenues in 'Almost Sustainable' Case

Oil price: Brent Avg. Low&Reference (AEO2013). Bayu-U prod. per GSB2014.

Revenues

Nominal dollars-of-the-day

Sunrise plan approved in 2017 with floating LNG. Sunrise has 5.1tcf gas and TL gets 50% of it. Natural gas is worth 33% as much as oil.

Petroleum Fund investments return 5.0%/yr nominal. During 2012-13 the fund earned 4.8%/yr.

Domestic revenues increase 13.0%/yr now and 16.0%/yr after 2030. During 2011-2014, these revenues (without EDTL or taxes from the state) increased 13%/yr. EDTL recovers 25% of fuel cost from users. It recovered 15% in 2012-13.

Yellow Rd: capital + O&M + ESI + dom.revenues. Annual maintenance costs 8% of installed capital.

Includes $100m for the Tasi Mane project, $150m for Dili airport and Tibar port.

Includes $209m in contracted loans.

Austerity starts in 2050, cutting 8% from planned outlays in 2051-2054.

Loans received
Petroleum income
Petrol.Fund return
Tax on gov't spending
EDTL income
Other domestic rev.
Petrol.Fund withdrawal
Spending (excl.debt serv.)
ESI

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Projections for the allocation of expenditures in the Almost Sustainable scenario will require some hard choices, and are beyond the scope of this paper.

The following three tables are described in the main text and show the effects of changing different assumptions from the base scenario.

Table A-1. Effects of changes in petroleum prices and production

Case	Results					Oil and gas					
	Pre-austerity budget	Austerity starts	Austerity depth	PF peak balance	PF peak year	Oil prices (Brent crude)	Bayu-Undan prod.	Sunrise LNG	Sunrise agreed	Sunrise reserve (tcf)	Gas/oil price ratio
Base case	$5.1	2026	66%	$19	2019	Ref. case	2013 est.	Beasu	2017	5.13	33%
Higher oil prices	$5.6	2027	59%	$22	2019	Avg High & Ref.	2013 est.	Beasu	2017	5.13	33%
Lower oil prices	$4.6	2025	74%	$18	2018	Avg Low & Ref.	2013 est.	Beasu	2017	5.13	33%
Larger Bayu-Undan reserve	$6.2	2028	62%	$21	2021	Ref.	2012 est.	Beasu	2017	5.13	33%
Floating LNG for Sunrise	$5.1	2026	70%	$19	2019	Ref.	2013 est.	FLNG	2017	5.13	33%
Sunrise delayed six years or more	$5.1	2026	88%	$19	2019	Ref.	2013 est.	Beasu	2023	5.13	33%
Lower gas prices	$5.1	2026	69%	$19	2019	Ref.	2013 est.	Beasu	2017	5.13	25%
Larger Sunrise reserve	$5.1	2026	62%	$19	2019	Ref.	2013 est.	Beasu	2017	7.00	33%

Table A-2. Effects of changes in investment return, revenue and expenditure growth

Case	Results					Revenue				Expenditure		
	Pre-austerity budget	Austerity starts	Austerity depth	PF peak balance	PF peak year	PF invest. return	Rev. increase 2015-	Rev. increase 2031-	EDTL cost recovery	Annual infra. O&M	Expend. increase 2015-	Expend increase 2031-
Base case	$5.1	2026	66%	$19	2019	5%	13%	16%	25%	8%	16%	10%
7% Petrol. Fund return	$5.6	2027	63%	$22	2019	7%	13%	16%	25%	8%	16%	10%
3% Petrol. Fund return	$4.6	2025	71%	$17	2018	3%	13%	16%	25%	8%	16%	10%
High dom. rev. growth	$5.1	2026	63%	$19	2019	5%	15%	18%	25%	8%	16%	10%
Low dom. rev. growth	$5.1	2026	69%	$19	2019	5%	11%	14%	25%	8%	16%	10%
Hi expenditure growth	$5.2	2025	76%	$19	2019	5%	13%	16%	25%	8%	18%	12%
Lo expenditure growth	$4.8	2027	55%	$20	2019	5%	13%	16%	25%	8%	14%	8%
Recover 75% fuel costs	$5.1	2026	65%	$20	2019	5%	13%	16%	75%	8%	16%	10%

Table A-3. Effects of building large infrastructure projects and debt financing

Case	Results						Project & borrowing			
	Pre-austerity budget	Aus-terity starts	Aus-terity depth	PF peak balance	PF peak year	Debt service costs ($b)	Tasi Mane invest. ($b)	Tasi Mane loans ($b)	Tasi Mane interest rate	Other loans ($b)
Base case	$5.1	2026	66%	$19	2019	$0.2	$0.5	0		$0.5
Cancel Tasi Mane Project	$5.1	2026	66%	$20	2019	$0.2	$0.0	$0		$0.5
Build $2b S. Coast highway	$4.8	2025	72%	$18	2018	$0.2	$2.5	$0		$0.5
Finance highway with loan	$4.8	2025	74%	$20	2019	$1.1	$2.5	$2	4.0%	$0.5
Build $4b Betano refinery	$5.4	2025	72%	$19	2019	$0.2	$4.5	$0		$0.5
Finance refinery with loan	$5.4	2025	77%	$21	2019	$2.9	$4.5	$4	5.0%	$0.5
Borrow $10b to hold off austerity [16]	$6.2	2028	72%	$19	2019	$6.9	$0.46	$0		$10.5

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[16] This example assumes 5% annual interest, 25 years to repay, and a five-year grace period.

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Democratic transition and the transformation of combatants in Aceh and Timor-Leste

Badrus Sholeh[1]

Introduction

The former combatants and guerrillas discussed in this paper were members of paramilitary groups that have been involved in conflicts and wars for almost 30 years in Aceh, Indonesia and about 24 years in Timor-Leste (East Timor). The Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) was established in October 1976 under the leadership of Hasan di Tiro as a continuation of the Darul Islam rebellious movement (Schulze 2003, 242) and later changed its name to Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) [as the author later refers to the Free Aceh Movement, the term should be introduced here] with a military wing, Angkatan GAM (AGAM). Di Tiro claimed that about 5000 combatants were trained in Libya between 1986 and 1989. However, Indonesian intelligence believed this number to be only 583 (Schulze 2003, 244). As a security strategy, a GAM peace negotiator reported in Helsinki that the combatants numbered only 3000 with about 800 weapons. In fact, there were more than thirty thousand combatants in Aceh in 2005 (Yusuf 2013). They also kept hundreds of other weapons and explosives for possible use in case the peace negotiations failed, as happened in 2001 when the Henry Dunant Centre failed to mediate between GAM and the Republic of Indonesia.

Former combatants in Timor-Leste are referred to as 'veterans' and include members of the Clandestine Front who carried out support work for the paramilitary group FALINTIL (Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste) [The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor] in the towns. Some Clandestine Front leaders were FALINTIL members, living covertly, and the Front reported directly to FALINTIL commanders. The student movement RENETIL is a good example of the Clandestine Front in action. Some veterans are now working as non-military activists in government and political parties. FALINTIL has been integrated into the military and police services of Timor-Leste. The current President of Timor-Leste, General Taur Matan Ruak, is a former commander of FALINTIL who became chief of staff of the F-FDTL (Falintil-Defence Forces of Timor-Leste). After some protests due to feelings of discrimination between Western Timorese and Easterners, about 600 military personnel deserted in 2006. This created a national security crisis until 2008, when Major Alfredo Reinado, former commander of the Naval unit of Timor-Leste and a former leader of rebel, was killed during an attack against President José Ramos Horta (Sahin 2010).

This paper will present a comparative discussion of the transformation of combatants and guerrillas in Aceh and Timor-Leste. It will analyse the process of post-conflict democratic transition, in particular, how former combatants are transformed from a paramilitary force to a political movement. In this context, the dynamic of democracy will be seen as a process of transition towards permanent peace. This paper is based on interviews with former combatants, members of parliament and human rights activists in Aceh and the Indonesian capital Jakarta undertaken from 2010 to 2013, and interviews held in Dili, capital of Timor-Leste, in July 2013. It will begin by outlining some experiences of democratic transition in other post-conflict and post-war regions in Asia and Africa. In the second part of the paper, a comparison will be made between democracy in Aceh and Timor-Leste that will examine how former combatants participated in democratisation and peace-building in each of these regions during the 2012 elections.

The discussion will advance two arguments, firstly, that democratic transition in general has been regarded by many election observers as a relatively peaceful process. Although a number of attacks and killings occurred before the April 2012 elections in Aceh, it became peaceful during the voting and after the results of the election were announced. The elections of 2012 in Timor-Leste were also peaceful. Secondly,

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democratic processes are unlikely to be effective in supporting peace-building without prioritising overcoming fundamental economic challenges such as poverty and the slow progress of development, and the transformation of the orientation of former combatants involved in criminal activities. In conclusion, the paper argues that the peaceful democratic transitions achieved in Aceh and Timor-Leste can provide important lessons for peace-building in Asia, Africa and other conflict and post-conflict countries.

Theoretical debates

Immanuel Kant's theory of "perpetual peace" argues that ideals of peace are nothing without realisation. It has been stated that "the irony of peace is the relative ease by which one can define it *a priori* at the same time as it is so difficult to realise" (Rasmussen 2010, 177). Nevertheless, Rasmussen has argued that peace agreements can be a starting point towards lasting and permanent peace. Peace, he believes, should be the ultimate goal of every movement, including the aim of war and military intervention (Rasmussen 2010, 179). The UN Security Council, for instance, could authorise "war in the name of international peace and security" (Rasmussen 2010, 179). Rasmussen's support of the ideology of peace, however, leaves questions about the nature of 'peace'. In Iraq, for instance, despite the democratic transition, deadly attacks still occur against the so-called legitimate government long after the war.

In conflict regions that emerged in Indonesia after the fall of the New Order in 1998, existing fragile relations among ethnic and religious groups escalated into bitter ethno-religious clashes after the 1999 elections, leaving more than 5000 Muslims and Christians dead in Maluku and Poso, Central Sulawesi. Political campaigns and the strategies of different parties created further waves of violence in the conflict regions (Loveband & Yong 2006, 145; van Klinken 2006, 131). After the election results became known, violent attacks broke out in Maluku which have been referred to as 'phase three conflicts' and attracted volunteer fighters from other islands to the region (Sholeh 2007, 146; van Klinken 2007, 89). Ruptures in fragile inter-communal relations in the conflict regions of Maluku and Poso were easily provoked by intensifying shootings that targeted different religious groups. People from different religious communities who used to live together peacefully were forced to separate into distinct Muslim and Christian regions. For many of them the trauma of conflict continues, as religious difference forces clan members, formers neighbours and even family members to live separately.

Due to ethnic, religious and separatist conflicts that occurred after the resignation of President Suharto in 1998, some analysts suggested that Indonesia should move towards developing into a federation. The result of the referendum in Timor-Leste held on 30 August 1999 contributed to a rise in demands for autonomy, accompanied by regional protests and violence, particularly in Aceh and West Papua. Student activists in Aceh mobilised people and campaigned for a referendum on the status of Aceh. On 8 November 1999, several hundred thousand people in Aceh gathered to protest against Jakarta in support of the implementation of Aceh's special political status which had been verbally agreed to by President Abdurrahman Wahid but later revoked by the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian armed forces) (Kingsbury 2006, 10). Although President B.J. Habibie made it clear that a referendum like that of Timor-Leste would not be offered to Aceh (Aspinall & Crouch 2003, 6), Fuad Mardatillah, an Acehnese activist, said that the Timor-Leste referendum was an important inspiration for Aceh students and young activists. The movement in support of Aceh autonomy had as one important outcome the development of peace initiatives between the Free Aceh Movement and the Republic of Indonesia, mediated by the Henry Dunant Centre (Mardatillah 2013).

Some elites who have political interests gain support from their constituents by prolonging anger, hatred and negative sentiments against other groups, which is counterproductive to the essence of peace-building. Some of them have even attacked and killed leaders of other political groups for political purposes, for example, what happened in Aceh approaching the April 2012 elections. The International Crisis Group (2012) warned that Aceh's political violence could affect the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding. Intellectuals and scholars committed to vote for a certain party in Aceh to preserve stability and peace; they said it was dangerous not to vote for the Aceh Party, the dominant party in the province of Aceh. They believed that "the danger of violence would be higher if the Aceh Party lost" (ICG 2012, p. 6).

An increase in killings in late 2011 forced the central government to accommodate the political purposes of the Aceh Party. Major General (ret.) Amiruddin Usman, the Aceh desk coordinator at the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, has said that Jakarta is serious about maintaining reconciliation and peace in Aceh (Afrida 2012). According to Amiruddin, the central government changed its policy towards the Aceh election and allowed the Aceh Party to join the election (Usman 2013). This sense of trauma also appeared in Timor-Leste during the 2012 elections when the people voted for stability and peace.

This suggests that, like democracy, which can generate the participation of the people if they are confident of finding strong representatives, violence in one region can act as a fuse to instigate violence in other regions. Messages of anger from political and community leaders can lead to violence, especially in fragile post-conflict and post-war regions.

Therefore, in other conflict regions like Africa, peace is prioritised over democracy. After three elections between 1992 and 2007 characterised by violent bloodshed, Kenyans changed in their 2013 elections to choose peace over democracy. Long et al. (2013, 142) argued that in the 2013 elections in Kenya "peace is obviously preferable to violence, it does not necessarily indicate a fully democratic process". Lasting peace is also a hard challenge to realise in post-conflict regions in Southeast Asia, particularly in Aceh and Timor-Leste.

Democratic transition

In some post-conflict regions, democracy leads to new types of conflicts, which turn out to be worse than before a peace accord was instituted. African regions experienced such a worsened conflict situation after democratic elections were set up which gave the opportunity for former leaders of combatants and armed militias to participate as candidates for parliament and heads of districts and states. Among the many challenges to peace following elections is the continuation of friction inside former insurgent movements. Leaders of the movement who disagree with the peace accord often create new insurgents and more deadly groups after an election. The Moro Islamic Liberation Movement (MILF), for example, is a group which opposed the peace initiatives and agreements negotiated between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government of the Republic of the Philippines in 1996. However, they eventually made their peace initiatives a few years later and signed an agreement in 2012 including significant steps for implementation of the peace accord. This occurred after the MILF learned from democratic peace-building in Aceh; the MILF leadership sent several representatives of civil society organisations, local government and former insurgent leaders to Aceh to understand how the Free Aceh Movement successfully transformed and how democracy works in Aceh. Although violence continued during elections in 2006, 2009 and 2012 and threatens the quality of democracy in Aceh, it is clear that stability and economic development were achieved after the elections.

The 2012 elections in Aceh and Timor-Leste are important to analyse, particularly in terms of how the dynamics of politics in the regions have contributed to peace-building and reconciliation. It is also interesting to see how former members of armed forces and combatants in both post-conflict regions participated in the elections. The results of the elections show significant victories for former armed forces members and combatants. In Aceh, the former foreign minister of GAM, Zaini Abdullah, in partnership with the former commander of the military wing of GAM, Muzakir Manaf, won the elections with 55.87 % of the votes for their Aceh Party. However, there was a lot of pre-election intimidation by supporters of the Aceh Party. Between 2011 and 2012, former members of GAM have turned to fighting each other and supporting different parties. A series of shootings, bombings and attacks have targeted political figures and their supporters (*The Economist,* 14 April 2012) and about 20 people killed in violence related to the election. Former GAM combatants were involved in the violence and have been charged with up to 19 years in prison under laws of counter-terrorism. A human rights activist has argued that the violence has political motives and therefore should not be categorised as terrorism (Ghozali 2013). Irwandi Yusuf, former governor of Aceh and former chief of information of GAM, was targeted by the group and they twice attempted to kill him. Irwandi said that "this is strongly coordinated by elites of Party Aceh, who are

also former leaders of GAM. They are afraid of fair competition in the 2012 elections against me as an incumbant" (Yusuf 2013).

However, Ayah Banta, former chief of the GAM specialist explosive group from Aceh Utara, has argued that his group's attacks before the 2012 election were purely the result of their disappointment with Irwandi's government policy, which "does not fulfil his own promise to support the prosperity of former combatants" (Advocate member 2013). Shortly after the election, GAM members were arrested and are now imprisoned in Jakarta and Banda Aceh. According to Irwandi Yusuf (2013), former combatants are fragile individuals, especially those who do not have the capacity to compete for jobs and did not have the chance to complete their studies. Many of them did not finish school due to the conflicts and their involvement with GAM.

The dynamics of politics in Timor-Leste have been more positive in democratic consolidation and political reconciliation. After independence was gained in 2002, Timor-Leste struggled with friction among former leaders and particularly division among former members of the armed forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL guerrillas between Westerners (*loromonu)* and Easterners (*lorosae*). Allegations of government discrimination towards FALINTIL veterans created national security threats which led to more than a hundred thousand internally displaced persons. This friction was made worse by antagonism in the political leadership between Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and President Xanana Gusmão (ICG 2006). After the 2007 elections that resulted in a coalition government between Prime Minister José Ramos Horta and President Gusmão, a more peaceful and stable government was created. However, a security threat from deserters continued in 2008. It was reported that the F-FDTL fugitive Major Alfredo Reinado almost killed Prime Minister Horta on 11 February 2008 and President Gusmão's car was shot by Reinado's second-in-command, Lieutenant Gastão Salsinha, an hour after Reinado's attack on Horta (Kingsbury 2008, 33). The friction among FALINTIL veterans is among the challenges that need to be overcome.

Democratic consolidation continued after Prime Minister Gusmão successfully achieved his second term of coalition government in the 2012 election. This consolidation has been further strengthened by the victory of his close aide, Taur Matar Ruak, as President. Stability is also continuing since Prime Minister Gusmão's positive political approach to mandate former Prime Minister Alkatiri to lead the Task Force of a Special Zone of the Social Market Economy in Oecusse Ambeno with the objective of giving a new perspective for the future, especially with regard to economic growth, employment and poverty eradication (Tempo Semanal 2013). As secretary-general of the FRETILIN party, Alkatiri maintains influential leadership at the grassroots level. People see this as the principle of national reconciliation in action among strategic leaders. On the current challenges of Timor-Leste, Gusmão has stated that "we (Timorese) lacked infrastructure, human and financial resources and political experience in democratic governance. Coupled with the impact of trauma, poverty and historical division, the fragile nation of Timor-Leste begin its history with a cycle of unrest and violence" (Gusmão 2012, 208). All leaders of Timor-Leste are obliged to manage a stable and economically independent state of Timor-Leste, which enables it to be an influential member of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Timor-Leste also provides an important lesson for democratic transition in Aceh. Part of this is the foundation of the Commission of Truth and Friendship, which does not meet the ideals of the human rights activists and local government of Aceh. They still propose the foundation of a strong commission of truth and reconciliation with the power of a local judicial process in Aceh.

Conclusion

Democratic transitions in Aceh and Timor-Leste have proceeded quite peacefully compared to those of other post-conflict and post-war regions like Kenya, Africa. Aceh and Timor-Leste are consolidating democracies, with some challenges to overcome in some sectors. Trauma, poverty, unemployment and historical divisions, as warned by Gusmão (2012), are among crucial agenda items in the future for both Aceh and Timor-Leste. The ICG (2011) reported that there are now violent conflicts in Aceh of combatants versus combatants. Irwandi has founded a new party, the Aceh National Party (PNA), which is the strongest

competitor to the current government Aceh Party (PA). The leadership of Aceh combatants is still very influential at the grassroots level. Fewer attacks and killings occurred in Aceh after the 2012 election. However, it has been estimated the violence might increase around the time of the 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections if all political parties do not prioritise peace over politics.

It is the task and obligation of Aceh and Timor-Leste political and community leaders to take their regions towards prosperous, democratic and peaceful futures. Gusmão's strategy of accommodating the political leadership of former Prime Minister Alkatiri is considered by Aniceto Guterres, Member of the National Parliament and Head of the FRETILIN Party fraction, to be a crucial symbol of leadership reconciliation which will greatly impact on the grassroots level (Guterres 2013). The unity of political leaders in Timor-Leste is an important factor in the strengthening of development and peace-building. This is in contrast to the political facts in Aceh, where political frictions are contributing to the slow progress of development. In Aceh, the people are traumatised by threats of violence from former combatants whose commanders and leaders are managing governments in the provinces and districts of Aceh.

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Negotiating a corporeal history: Women's embodied memories of the Indonesian Occupation

Hannah Loney[1]

The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975 resulted in a significant upheaval to daily life within the territory. Over the course of the subsequent occupation, many hundreds of thousands of individuals, families and communities were forcibly displaced, suffered from hunger, detention, torture and ill-treatment, were sexually, politically and economically violated (CAVR 2005, Part 6). As Indonesia consolidated its occupation, the profound alterations inflicted upon material reality engendered particular experiences within and upon the lives and bodies of East Timorese people. This paper will explore East Timorese women's reactions, experiences and recollections *as women* to the physical and emotional circumstances of the Indonesian occupation. It will focus specifically on the female body as one particular site for experiencing, narrating and representing the intimacy of colonial encounters (Canning 1999, 510). This approach is intended to shed light upon broader questions about the role of gender within the interpretation and representation of the occupation, whether women experienced the occupation differently, and whether women remember and narrate their stories in ways that are different to men.

The first section of the paper will look at women's memories of the Indonesian occupation and the role of the bodily form and function within these narratives, including: images of the body, such as injured and dead bodies; the burying of bodies; the reproductive capacity of the female body; and violated female bodies. The second section of the paper will situate these memory trends within broader scholarship on memories through the body as indicative of a uniquely feminine form of expression, drawing particularly on the revelations of French feminist literary theorists from the 1970s. Finally, the paper will provide a suggestion as to the potential of sharing these intimate experiences of conflict as a means for women to come together, in an attempt to come to terms with and to move forward from past experiences of mass violence.

The research draws primarily on oral narratives as sources for historical analysis: both my own interviews with East Timorese women, as well as several published collections of women's oral narratives (Abrantes and Sequeira 2012; Conway 2010; Alves, Abrantes and Reis 2001; Winters 1999a, 1999b; Turner 1992). These interviews were conducted as part of a broader PhD project, which explores East Timorese women's experiences, memories and perceptions of life under Indonesian rule. The material was analysed using a combination of oral history methodologies, including narrative analysis. Such analysis revealed that one of the ways in which the women recalled their life under Indonesian rule was through the medium of memories, images and experiences of and through the body. This paper will explore these articulations and will suggest ways in which the female body can provide additional knowledge of historical experience and, subsequently, lead to a richer and more nuanced understandings of the Indonesian occupation. Whilst the paper refers specifically to the experiences of East Timorese women under Indonesian rule, its use of the body as a source for historical narration, memory and agency can be situated alongside the work of other scholars such as Fatma Kassem, who examines the experiences and historical narratives of Palestinian women who lived on in the State of Israel after 1948 (Kassem 2011).

Images of the body, particularly descriptions of dead and injured bodies, feature in many women's memories of the Indonesian occupation. Such techniques of memorialisation are particularly evident for the period of conventional war, when a large portion of the East Timorese population retreated to the mountainous areas of the territory from December 1975, and ended on 26 March 1979 when the Indonesian military declared the territory to be officially pacified. The immense physical displacement and increasingly

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difficult conditions of life in the mountains resulted in a large number of civilian deaths.[2] The most prominent observations within this context include the loss of family members and relatives, the elderly and children, who could not survive the difficult physical conditions, and the physical manifestations of hunger, thirst and illness. In my interview with Luisa, who was born in Tutuala (Lautém district) in 1959, she spoke about walking from Tutuala all the way to the resistance stronghold of Mount Matebian (Baucau district). On the way, she said, people just died as they were walking and the others had to step over and around their dead bodies. 'Even if it was your mother or father, your husband or your children', she said, 'you just had to keep going because the enemy was coming'.[3]

That people were often continually on the move in an attempt to escape the impending Indonesian forces also meant that these bodies often could not be buried properly. As such, appropriate rituals that dispatch the soul of the dead to the sacred world and facilitate its transformation into an ancestor could not be conducted (Robins 2010, 10). One of my interviewees, Ana, told me that in the mountains above Maubara (Liquiçá district) in 1977, 'People died everyday'. She said, 'people were buried inappropriately. They were wrapped in a cloth ... and put on a hadak [a table or platform made from bamboo], then they were buried'.[4] Kassian, whose story was published in Laura Abrantes and Beba Sequeira's collection, *Secrecy: The Key to Independence*, remembered that sometimes bodies could not be buried at all, and instead just had to be left behind: 'what could we do?', she said, 'We had to leave them behind' (Abrantes and Sequeira 2010, 56). These accounts draw attention to the physicality and visibility of dead bodies, their very public and confronting presence, and the negotiation of cultural practices associated with death that arose from the enforced mobility brought about by the impending Indonesian forces.

The visibility of dead bodies and the lack of sufficient time or resources to conduct bury them correlates with the failure of later attempts to locate the bodies of loved ones that had died in conflict. Although funeral practices vary across the territory, most involve the burial of the body and the construction of a grave site (Robins 2010, 10). After being separated from their families during the significant displacements of the late 1970s and early 1980s, as well as during the violence of 1999 around the Popular Consultation, many people went missing and families to this day are unable to locate their bodies.[5] In my interview with Zelia, who was born in Watulari (Viqueque district) 1979, she recalled her family telling her about the problem of locating bodies in the context of her uncle's death in combat in Same, a member of the *Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste* [FALINTIL – The Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor]. She mentioned that some skeletons had been located at the site of the battle, but that their identity had not yet been confirmed.[6] Bernadete, who was born in Liquiçá (Liquiçá district) in 1986, told me about her uncle who was kidnapped in April 1999 from Liquiçá. She said, 'We never found his dead body until now.' He had been living in the mountains before deciding to come back to the town, and was straight away taken by the *Besi Merah Putih*.[7] 'After that', Bernadete said, 'he just disappeared.'[8] Many men went missing from Liquiçá during the 1999 violence and are suspected dead, but the fact that their families have no bodies nor physical place of burial is an issue of concern for many. The presence or absence of the body within these narratives highlights the body as a physical and thematic continuity within these narratives.

The motif of birth was also raised within women's narratives of life in the mountains. The physical experience of a life on the move impacted upon both the bodily experience of being pregnant and on

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[2] According to the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR) Report at minimum, during the period 1975-1999 84,200 people died due to hunger and illness, although the figure could be as high as 183,000 (Díli: CAVR 2005, 73).

[3] Interview with the author, 24 June 2012, Dili, Timor-Leste.

[4] Interview with the author, 14 July 2012, Liquiçá, Timor-Leste.

[5] The CAVR Report estimated that 18,600 unlawful killings and disappearances occurred from 1974-1999, in Part 7.2, 2.

[6] Interview with the author, 7 June 2012, Dili, Timor-Leste.

[7] *Besi Merah Putih* (BPM), which means 'red and white iron' in Bahasa Indonesia, was a pro-Indonesian militia that operated in Liquiçá district.

[8] Personal communication with the author, 3 July 2013.

birthing practices. Fatma Kassem writes of the way in which Palestinian women whom she interviewed memorized historical events by linking them to 'body time', such as pregnancy and childbirth, – feminine patterns of memory that are directly related to the female body and its various functions (Kassem 2011, 186) – and similar trends were evident in East Timorese women's narratives. Edhina who is interviewed in Michele Turner's collection, *Telling: East Timor, Personal Testimonies*, remembered that during the encirclement campaigns (1977-79), 'Pregnant women were running too, terrified they'd fall and have their babies too early … I saw pregnant women give birth to a baby in the day and if it rains at night [sic] and there is no protection they sit in the mud, the night is cold, and by morning the baby is dead' (Turner 1992, 117). Maria, an East Timorese woman who trained as a midwife in Bali during the occupation, explained to me that in traditional birthing practices, women give birth in private, at home.[9] Edhina's account indicates that during this time, some of the most intimate, personal experiences were removed from the spaces in and routines with which they were traditionally conducted. In my interview with Luisa, she told me about her sister-in-law giving birth under a coconut tree in Lore (Lautem district). She explained that because they didn't have any boiling water, which was usually used to wash the baby and the mother, they had to use cold, unsterilized seawater instead.[10] These embodied experiences reveal some of the practical ramification of enforced dislocation, shedding light on the everyday nature and impact of the violence inflicted by the invasion – the destructive reality of displacement, death, and the loss of loved ones (Banerjee 2004, 128).

As Indonesia consolidated its physical control over the territory, instances of direct, indirect and structural forms of violence were a constant feature of women's daily lives. Many women suffered horrifically at the hands of the Indonesian forces, and their bodies often constituted the locus for acts of military violence. Women were often targeted because they were perceived by the Indonesian armed forces to have a connection to the resistance movement, they were deemed to be non-compliant with military demands, or they were the targets of proxy violence (CAVR 2005, Part 7.7; Carey 2001, 256). There was also a broader dimension to such violence that extended beyond individual torture, punishment, proxy violence and the sexual gratification of the perpetrator. It often contained a specifically political function: that being, to destroy the spirit of the East Timorese people by reinforcing the reality of Indonesian sovereignty over the physical territory, lives and bodies of the East Timorese.

This interpretation draws upon the work of the feminist scholar, Anne McClintock, who writes that modern nation states are profoundly gendered in the sense that the nation is symbolically represented as a woman, conflating political control of a territory with the control of the female body (McClintock 1993, 65). When a territory is occupied, Susan Brownmiller adds, a woman's body often becomes a target for violent penetration and abuse (Brownmiller 1993, 37). The difficulties that Indonesia experienced in attempting to gain control of the 'hearts and minds' of the East Timorese people sheds light upon why the battle for military control implicated the bodies of women so intensely. In *Secrecy: The Key to Independence*, Luciana recalls being questioned by the military. She was told by a Timorese man who worked for the Indonesian military, 'My child, you have to give your body to the military in order to survive. If you don't give your body, you will have to [pay with] your life' (Abrantes and Sequeira 2010, 80). The nature of this incident is for Luciana to exchange her body for that of her own survival, suggesting that her female bodily form can be corrupted, exchanged and conquered as an act of political dominance.

The physical presence of the Indonesian military and their control over the territory was demarcated on the bodies of female victims of torture and sexual violence. This demarcation was sometimes displayed publicly, such as through photographs and graffiti,[11] as was evident in a case of violence that occurred at an unknown location in December 1996 that was reported in a 1998 publication of the Portuguese NGO, *A paz é possível em Timor-Leste* [Peace is possible in East Timor]. The publication described the existence of a photo sequence, taken by the military and smuggled out of the territory, which told of an incident where seven young women were 'raped, tortured and probably executed' (1998, 31). The

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[9] Interview with the author, 3 December 2012, Dili, Timor-Leste.
[10] Interview with the author, 24 June 2012, Dili, Timor-Leste.
[11] See Michael Leach's discussion of the graffiti on the walls of the *Comarca Balide* [Comarca Prison] in Dili (Leach 2009, 150-51).

publication described that *"Stupid heroes"* and *"This is what happens to the enemies of the RI"* [Republic of Indonesia] had been scrawled on the body of one of the victims (*A paz é possível em Timor-Leste* 1998, 31). Such acts reveal the perpetrators' intention as being one of humiliation and torture, but such acts of documentation also suggest that there was a sense of spectacle and display attached.

Descriptions of a teenage girl, Maria Gorete, who was imprisoned, tortured and eventually killed by the military, present another example of the way in which women's bodies were implicated in Indonesian attempts to solidify, extend and physically demarcate their control over the territory. In an interview with the Australian journalist Jill Jolliffe in Lisbon Maria's sister, Betty Sarmento, explained what happened to her sister: 'Maria Gorete … had cigarette [sic] burns on her arms and chest and had had electric shocks applied to her neck, ear and arms' (Jolliffe 1998). These examples contain very obvious violent acts that marked the bodies of women. One of my interviewees, Luisa, who had been violated by the Indonesians while in prison in Dili, talked about the bad things that happened to both men and women under occupation, but that rape was a violation that was specific to women.[12] Whilst the CAVR Report talks about a few isolated incidents where men were sexually violated (CAVR 2005, Chapter 7.7, 16), Luisa suggests that in the social context of the Indonesian occupation, it was understood as a violation that only affected women.[13] There is something specific, therefore, about the way in which the female body features within East Timorese women's memories of life under Indonesian rule. Bodily forms feature within their narratives, but the body is also a site for remembering experiences of life under Indonesian rule. The female body can also be seen as a specific site for understanding the way in which power was generated, practiced and reinforced during the Indonesian occupation.

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The discourse of feminist literary theory, in particular the generation of French feminist critics of the 1970s, such as Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, proposed a feminine form of expression that flows from and through the body: *écriture feminine*. Cixous' 1975 essay, 'The Laugh of the Medusa', is one of the most influential texts within this field because it proposes the idea that, in order to make her herself heard, women must transform the way that femininity is represented in language, by writing the 'un-heard of songs' of her body (Cixous 1976, 876). I suggest that this emphasis on a feminine form of expression, of writing through the body, can be similarly applied to the notion of telling, of remembering and narrating through bodily experiences. In relation to the trauma and physical violence inflicted upon many East Timorese women living under Indonesian rule, the violence can become internalised as a site of memory within the body itself. One of my interviewees, Fatima, who had been violated by Indonesian soldiers near Tasitolu (Dili district), explained the way in which her experience of rape was an enduring part of her sense of self. She said: 'This is the worst thing that happened to me. I will never forget this, even if I have passed away. I hate this... I really, really hate this... Although I have had children I still kept my revenge and hate inside my heart.'[14] This physical experience, experienced through her body, became inextricably connected to her soul. The literary critic Kathryn Robson writes that 'trauma cannot simply be consigned to the past: it is relived endlessly in the present', and this has enduring effects upon the survivor's identity (Robson 2003, 11). She writes that according to most discourses on trauma, 'it is only when the seemingly unspeakable traumatic experience can be transformed into a narrative that the traumatic event can be put in the past' and the survivor can begin to recreate their identity by incorporating the traumatic event into the frame of their life-story (Robson 2003, 11). It is here that this notion of a feminine form of expression, of telling stories *through* the body, can be instructive and empowering.

Speaking to an Australian activist, Rebecca Winters, in Dili in November 1998, a young East Timorese woman called Maria articulated the significance of speaking about trauma in the context of women's experiences of Indonesian rule. She spoke of the way in which East Timorese women 'live amongst violence'; the violence, the trauma, is a part of their everyday lives. Therefore, Maria said, 'it is

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[12] Interview with the author, 24 June 2012, Dili, Timor-Leste.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Interview with Fatima, 23 May 2012, Dili, Timor-Leste.

difficult to get out of the trauma enough to talk about what has happened to them, their feelings, what they went through' (Winters 1999a, 14-15). Although this comment is rooted in the very historical context of the occupation, it reveals the inescapable and often uncommunicable nature of traumatic experience (Herman 1997, 1). Maria stressed talking together as a particular site of expression, to share experiences of conflict, as a means of moving forward. She said: 'I believe we have to start by inviting these women to talk, exchange ideas, encourage them and motivate them … We know that a lot of women continue to live inside their pain. So to talk is good for the spirit' (Winters 1999a, 14-15). Facilitated by the increased freedom that came about as a result of *Reformasi* in 1998, a number of conferences and forums took place in the last few years of Indonesian rule in which East Timorese women came together to share their experiences of trauma and suffering, to provide support and comfort to one another in the face of ongoing violence.

One such example is the inaugural women's conference, *Conferencia Loron Rua Kona Ba Laloek Feto Timor Loro Sae* [Two Day Conference on the Image of East Timorese Women], which was held in Dili on 9-10 November 1998. The conference was organised by *Grupo Feto Foinsa'e Timor Lorosa'e* [GFFTL – East Timor Young Women's Association], with support from the Communication Forum for Women in the East [*Forum Komunikasi Untuk Perempuan Loro Sa'e* – FOKUPERS] and the Organisation of Timorese Women [*Organização da Mulher Timorense* – OMT].[15] It was intended as a forum to discuss what had happened to women under Indonesian rule. For the first time, many women spoke about the abuse that they had suffered. An Australian woman who attended the conference, Jude Conway, recalled hearing, '[s]tories of rape by the military. Stories of women having children to soldiers who never helped with the raising of the children and left to return to their wives in Indonesia. Stories of the widows in Craras village near Viqueque where there are no men left' (Conway 1998). Later, Jude spoke to one participant, Olandina, who 'thought it was important because it was the first time that many women from all over East Timor were able to unite and … to speak out courageously of their experiences' (Conway 1998). One of my interviewees, Zelia, was a young participant in the conference. She reflected on hearing other women talk. She said, 'it was a fantastic experience for us, because as a member of the young generation we learnt a lot from … those women, who were really enthusiastic, [they were] very strong women, very dedicated women'.[16] In the context of these shared experiences, of listening to a traumatic event being transformed into a narrative, another of my interviewees, Mena, explained the importance of being a good listener. She said:

> It is hard for them because we cannot trust each other, and you are still ashamed to share your experience. So you have to learn how to become a good listener and empathize with them. Even if … you are almost crying, but you have to hold [back] your tears to make them strong. Even if your heart is really breaking. When you listen to all these things … you have to show them that you are strong to give support – this is the hardest thing that you have to give.[17]

In this powerful statement, Mena sheds light upon both the importance of sharing stories and building trust, but also on the invaluable role of the listener within this process of narrating, recollecting and communicating past experiences of trauma and violence.

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A common feature within some women's recollections of the Indonesian occupation is the prevalence of memories, experiences and images of the body. Observations of dead and injured bodies were common during the period immediately after Indonesia invaded, when a large portion of the population lived in the mountains, and many were constantly on the move in an attempt to escape the impending Indonesian forces. As a result of these conditions, dead bodies often could not be buried properly, which meant that practices that surrounded everyday life – the burying of bodies – were disrupted. Within this paper, I

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[15] OMT was formed out of OPMT in 1998 to mirror the bipartisan nature of the new umbrella resistance body, CNRT. It was a bipartisan organisation, though with similar aims to OPMT.
[16] Interview with the author, 6 June 2012, Dili, Timor-Leste.
[17] Interview with the author, 30 June 2012, Dili, Timor-Leste.

situated this idea of renegotiated practices alongside later attempts – many unsuccessful – to locate the bodies of loved ones who went missing, particularly during the tumultuous events of 1999. These particular embodied memories are not unique to women; however, the experience of birth, motherhood and sexual violence are ones that are quite specific to women in occupied Timor; thus, the feminine functions of their bodies are, in part, what make these particular corporeal narratives distinctly feminine. In focusing on the way in which the body is implicated within colonial encounters, a more intimate account of historical experience is provided; one that, I argue, is more conducive and responsive to the lived experiences and memories of women. I have also situated these notions of 'memories through the body' within the context of pushes for a feminist form of expression. I have argued that there are instances where women's memories related specifically to their gendered, corporeal bodies – initially to embodied experiences and images of the body – but that women's bodies are also implicated within military occupations and conflict zones as specific sites of highly politicised violence. I suggest that the practices of sharing and listening to one another's stories have been used as a *sphere of agency* by some women within East Timorese society. Embodied experiences and images of the body constitute a useful approach to exploring women's lived experiences because they facilitate an exploration of war, conflict, and military occupation not only as a series of events, but as a presence, as embodied human experiences that are inevitably gendered.

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Marriage exchanges, colonial fantasies and the production of East Timor indigenous socialities in the 1970s Dili

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This paper addresses a colonial controversy about marriage exchanges in 1970s Dili. Retrospectively called "a guerra do barlaque," (the *barlake* war) this controversy has been considered a foundational event of East Timorese nationalism (Araújo 2012) as it brought to the fore opposing positions about local sociality and the ways such a sociality should be respected or managed for civilizational purposes. Not by chance, the acknowledgment of the marriage exchanges as the most iconic institution of the local sociality was at stake and their meanings and effects were considered condensed manifestations of the character of the East Timorese people. According to Abilio Araújo (personal communication), the public debate on the issue in the 1970s was the basis for the emergence of the *Maubere* as the political symbol of national pride and independence in East Timor because the controversy provoked people to develop, for the first time, a systematic and positive approach to local institutions. The fact that people like Abilio Araújo, Nicolau Lobato and Xavier do Amaral were protagonists in the controversy also gives these events a special flavor since they came to be leading figures in East Timorese nationalism.

Inspired by Michel Foucault (1980), Edward Said (1979) and Nicholas Thomas (1994), amongst others, I assume that colonial discourses were government devices whereby certain realities were produced in order to give legitimacy to government practices. Through repetition and claims of authority, the colonial disourses held the potential "[to] create a reality that it appeared merely to describe." (Thomas 1994).

I argue that the attempts to inscribe the *barlake* in the market or in the gift regimes of exchange (Gregory 1982, Appadurai 1986) were a sort of epistemological project from which derived particular images of East Timorese peoples and their sociality in colonial Dili as these attempts appeared in "a guerra do *barlake*." By comparison, the postcolonial debate about marriage exchanges lacks its novelty as it seems to be fostered by the same epistemological anxiety. In addition, I contend that these controversies were critical events by which the complexity of marriage exchanges in East Timor have been reduced to *barlake* or *hafolin* in public space in Dili.

This paper is divided into three main sections. In the first, I present the generative themes around which the controversies are focused. I also correlate what I propose to be called purifying and anti-purifying (Latour 1994) perspectives about the marriage exchanges with the production of various discourses about indigenous East Timorese peoples. In this process, the association of marriage exchanges to different regimes of exchanges seems to have a pivotal role in devising particular images of East Timorese indigenous peoples and their sociality. In the second section, the epistemological practices for legitimizing the opposing perspectives about marriage exchanges are discussed. The resorts to colonial ethnographies, etymological arguments and methodological procedures are pointed out as the tactics used by people in the debate to support their perspectives. In the concluding remarks the relations of continuity in the colonial and post-colonial debates about the *barlake* are highlighted, having as a backdrop my research about marriage exchanges in contemporary Dili.

The politics of knowledge in 1970s Dili

The *barlake* war was triggered by two literary works by Inácio de Moura: the poem *Mulher de Lipa, Feto Timor* and the short novel *Mau Curo e Bere Mau ou o Grande Amor de Cai Buti,* published in 1969 and 1973 respectively. The controversy was presented in three different publications: the colonial newspaper "A voz de Timor", the military bulletin "A província de Timor" and at Seara, the Dili Diocese´s magazine.

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The 1970s controversy was structured in two main positions backed by social actors with distinct origins in colonial Dili. On one hand were Inácio de Moura and Jaime Neves, who published in the colonial newspaper "*A Voz de Timor,*" and who supported the idea that customary marriage in East Timor, which they called *hafolin* or *barlake*, was a market operation by which women were sold. On the other hand were some educated and assimilated East Timorese interloctors like Abilio Araújo, Nicolau Lobato and Xavier do Amaral, who claimed a broader approach to this institution and contended that it wasn´t a commodittization device, but a complex and long term phenomenon by which the reproduction of the East Timorese societies came about.

At first glance, it would be tempting to portray the controversy as one framed by an opposition between colonizer and colonized actors. But, the scenario was much more complex. The fact that Luís Filipe Thomaz, a Portuguese militar and a close relative of Américo Deus Rodrigues Tomás, a former president of Portugal, *was* the editor of the military bulletin "A província de Timor" where all Abilio Araujo´s criticisms of Jaime Neves and Inacio de Moura were published suggests how frontiers of the colonial past were quite blurred. In this context, it is important to note that in the 1973 debate it was Luís Filipe Thomaz who took a position against Moura's narratives about the *barlake*. Moreover, it is clear that Abilio Araujo, Nicolau Lobato and Xavier do Amaral were quite assimilated, sharing most of their classificatory system with their Portuguese interlocutors. Thus, the controversy cannot be reduced to an opposition between colonizers and colonized.

The challenges facing East Timorese women to get married for love was the primary political mover in the colonial criticism towards *hafolin* or *barlake (*De Moura 1969, 1973). The material exchanges that would allow a marriage to take place were understood as a market operation that rendered women as commodities or even as slaves. These exchanges would respond only to the material interests of the bride's family members with no respect for a woman's desires and expectations, eliminating a woman's free choice about whom to marry. In addition, it was contended that traditional marriages were one of the main causes of the submissive position assigns to women in the local societies. The customary marriage was thus seen as an affront to a woman's dignity because it would prevent them from acting as individuals, and make their own choices (De Moura 1969, 1973; Neves 1970; Neves 1970a; Neves 1970b; Neves 1970c; Neves 1970d; Neves 1970e; Neves 1970f).

Opposing this perspective, Abilio Araujo, at first, and later Nicolau Lobato, Xavier do Amaral and Luis Filipe Thomaz argued that the material exchanges that composed the *barlake* did not imply disrespect for a woman's feelings and choice for marriage. Therefore, there was no opposition between *barlake* and marriage for love. Concerns with the maintenance of status and ranking of lineage groups derived from their marriage tactics would be the main constraint on a woman´s will in a marriage arrangement (Thomaz a 1973). In addition, the material exchanges which made up the *barlake* wouldn´t *per se* undermine the condition of women in society. Conversely, the larger the material exchanges between wife-takers and wife-givers the greater the bride's sense of honor. In this perspective, the bride's sense of value and those of the families involved in the marriage would be directly related to the amount of goods exchanged (Araújo 1970; Araújo 1970a; Araújo 1970b; Araújo 1970c; Araújo 1970d; Araújo 1970e; Xavier 1970; Xavier 1970a).

Jaime Neves' and Inacio de Moura´s accounts claimed an understanding of *barlake* by what it would consisted of at the time of the wedding, that is, an exchange of assets for taking a woman in marriage. Oriented by a sort of Western ontology in which things and persons are incommensurable or in which a person's value cannot be converted into material items or monetary amounts (Kopytoff 1986), Neves and Moura looked at customary marriage as a moral outrage. The exchange of goods between wife-takers and wife-givers at the wedding is the fact that feeds most of Neves' and Moura's perceptions about the customary marriage as a market exchange and supports their evaluation of it as an inappropriate and barbaric trade in people, disrespectful of their feelings and emotions.

There was a purification anxiety (Latour 1994) in Neve´s and Moura´s accounts who, by all means, wanted to identify what, after all, the *barlake* consisted of. They were searching for the essence, the core of the traditional marriage, attempting to make sense of it by itself, without considering other factors. The

barlake must be one thing or another; it was inconceivable that it could have various meanings and functions simultaneously (Neves 1970).

From this approach, particular images of East Timorese indigenous people emerge that were deviced to underpin civilizational projects. The supposed animist character of the indigenous religious practices are presented as the reason why they would place so much value on material exchanges for marriage purposes. They are also portrayed (the men, especially) as materialistic and selfish people because they would place more value on the material dimension of a marriage than on people´s feelings and desires. Local folk are also presented as the ones who trade people. These cultural features must be overcome by exposing people to the civilizational process that the colonial endeavor should promote.

Opposing this purification anxiety were the narratives presented by Abilio Araújo, Nicolau Lobato, Xavier do Amaral and Luis Filipe Thomaz. In general, they proposed a more holistic approach to customary marriage, trying to demonstrate its wider character as a central institution whereby various dimensions of the local sociality were negotiated. In fact they fostered a sort of anti-purification position in the debate. In their perspectives, the customary marriage was more of a matrix for negotiation of social life than a thing in itself. All these actors rejected an isolated understanding of the *barlake*. In this context, there would be no opposition between material goods and persons in the making of the marriage. Conversely, the making of the persons, individual or collective persons, would be derived from material exchanges (Araújo 1970a).

These perspectives produce other images of the East Timorese indigenous societies. First and foremost, they are depicted as complex and structured realities ruled by particular forms of organization that are not understandnable from an exclusively rational or Western grasp. They also suggest that women held a high status in East Timorese society given the awareness that social and biological reproduction relied on them. Romantic love is also presented as a phenomenon of the local sociality to which people gave great attention for marriage purposes. The harmonizing effects of customary marriage are pointed out and its potential to include personal desires and interests. The offerings of goods involved in the marriage exchanges are presented as signs of deference to the woman and a source of pride for the families involved. It is asserted that the *barlake* is the most essential institution in the local sociality, and that from which all other social dynamics are derived. In this perspective, the East Timorese people are presented as virtuous, comparable to the more civilized people because of the values they held and celebrated.

Epistemological practices

Despite the various positions held by different actors in the debate, all those involved were mobilized by what we might call an anxiety of knowledge towards the East Timorese indigenous peoples (Neves 1970d). The local practices of social reproduction were often considered a mystery, secret or enigma that needed to be unveiled (Araújo 1970; Neves 1970b; Xavier 1970). In fact, Araújo recalled (personal communication) that "the *barlake* war" inspired a research endeavor for him and his colleagues. The misrepresentation of the *barlake* in De Moura´s narratives led them to a journey of enlightenment and discovery about the local institutions that ultimately triggered a feeling of pre-nationalism.

Independent of the positions held by people involved in the controversy, to legitimate their positions they resorted to very similar epistemological practices. All of them resorted to etymology, colonial ethnographies (those conducted by missionaries and others), methodological arguments and to comparisons to support their respective point of view.

The word *barlake* came to be scrutinized by both parties in the debate. It was believed that its original meaning could unveil its current uses in East Timor. From this perspective, Abilio Araújo proposed that the word came from the Malai words *Ber* joined with *laki*, which signified "to get a husband." Since it signified the process of getting married from the woman's point of view, it was proposed that the *barlake* was not a market operation (Araújo 1970a). Jaime Neves, in turn, based on Osório de Castro´s works, suggested that *barlake* would characterize both the processes of a woman getting a husband or that of a man getting a wife (Neves 1970).

The usages and meanings of words like *sosa* (to buy), *hola* (to acquire) and importantly, *folin* (value), were also explored in the debate. The everyday uses of the question "folin hira?" (how much) in order to learn the monetary value of a good to be bought in the market environment was explored by Jaime Neves to support his and De Moura´s perspectives that the *hafolin* was a market operation. The use of the same word – *folin* – for either the marriage negotiation and for the market environment to denote expectations related to the kind or amount of assets and money to be offered in exchange for a good or for a woman in marriage was seen as a sign that the same regime of exchange, the market regime, framed both phenomena. On the other hand, Nicolau Lobato argued that it was a mistake to translate *halofin* (to give a value) for *sosa* (to buy). He affirms there wouldn´t be dictionary offering this translation. He brought to the fore the fact that the Tetum language had two different words to differentiate distinct ways to get access to particular things. Instead of saying that someone would *"sosa feto"* (buy a woman) the only acceptable way to express to get a wife would be *"hola feto."* The word *sosa* would be used only for assets acquired by means of a market operation. By opposing this perspective, Jaime Neves emphasized that the everyday usage of a word or language did not necessarily respond to its normative meaning or syntax (Neves 1970d).

Another very important resource used to support the contested perspectives on *barlake* were the colonial ethnographies. The citation of missionary ethnographies or of colonial administrators' accounts is pervasive in the controversy. For instance, to oppose Abilio Araújo´s arguments that the literal translation for *berlaki* is "to get a husband," Jaime Neves quoted Osório de Castro. In the same article, the works of Father Laranjeiras, Pinto Correia, Henry O. Forbes, and others, are also quoted to support Neve´s understanding of the marriage exchanges as an obvious market operation (Neves 1970). In response to this perspective and to mark a contrast with it, Araújo quoted Father Ezequial Paschoal´s book *A alma de Timor vista em sua fantasia* which points out the complexity of the marriage practices that could not be easily understood, given the local authorities reluctance to share their knowledge of marriage practices with foreign people (Araújo 1970a).

The fact that some missionary ethnographies attempted to make sense of marriage exchanges using words such as "*doação*" (donation) (used by Father Ezequiel) or "dowry" (used by Padre Artur Basílio de Sá) or even "gift" to contrast it with the hegemonic colonial interpretation about the *hafolin* as a market operation compelled Jaime Neves to speak out on the issue. According to Neves, certain missionary accounts would use such words or invest in these perspectives for benevolent reasons. To keep their moral commitments with East Timorese indigenous peoples the missionaries would lie about the meanings of *hafolin* as a non-market operation. In Neves' view, anyone who considered the customary marriage as something other than a market operation was engaging in sentimental fantasies (Neves 1970d).

During the controversy, in different moments, it is suggested that Abilio Araujo, Xavier do Amaral, Nicolau Lobato or the missionaries fell into romanticism for not recognizing that the women were sold in the customary marriages (Neves 1970; Neves 1970d). This romantic approach would prevent people from striving to emancipate local indigenous people from their ignorant practices (Neves 1970e; Neves 1970f).

The alleged lack of accuracy of the missionary accounts about customary marriage asserted by Jaime Neves suggests that the controversy was shaped by a strategic reading of colonial knowledge. An affirmation was considered inaccurate the moment it challenged the effort at purification made by "A Voz de Timor" or threatened the metanarrative that affirmed that the marriage exchange was a market operation. The controversy was thus shaped by an ambiguous relationship with the colonial knowledge (Neves 1970a).

Methodological arguments also framed the controversy. Broadly speaking, on one hand Jaime Neves celebrated the alleged skills of *"A voz de Timor"* team in using what he considered the modern methods of anthropology and sociology. Authors like Durkhein, Murdok, Radcliff-Brown, Malinowski and even the Brazilian Tales de Azevedo are brought to the fore to show off how well oriented, erudite and up to date the *A voz de Timor* team was by engaging in the debate according to scientific criteria (Neves 1970e; Neves 1970f). The disagreements from their East Timorese interlocutors, in turn, are attributed to their lack of proper methodological training. This inexperience led them to surrender to sentimental and literary arguments that would lack any scientific approach. The East Timorese interlocutors are thus depicted as incipient folklorists (Neves 1970e).

On the other hand, Abilio Araújo and Xavier do Amaral claimed that more than literary or academic knowledge was needed to truly understand the local institutions. An emotional closeness to the local worlds was required to comprehend their institutions (Araújo 1970a; Xavier 1970a). The absence of this intimacy would misguide people in their attempts to rationally understand the local practices. It seems that this narrative was shaped by a sort of nativist ideology or claim that suggested that only people from East Timor could truly understand the local institutions or culture. It is not by chance, therefore, that this rational is similar to the one that fosters nationalism as a political project and that this controversy is considered today as a critical event in the emergence of an East Timorese national awareness. As Michel Foucault (1980) often pointed out, knowledge and power are simply two faces of the same coin.

Final remarks: My comparisons

It goes without saying that the *barlake*'s potential to trigger controversy is not exclusive to the past. Current marriage practices in Dili are strongly influenced by the contested character of this institution that continues to produce opposing perspectives about local sociality. As I have demonstrated elsewhere (Silva, 2010), the current debate among the Dili elite about the marriage prestations is also framed by attempts to inscribe the *barlake* to the market or that of gift regime of exchange, a phenomena that is directly connected with the people's different trajectories of migration and interaction with the colonial powers established in Timor. Broadly speaking, for those who consider the *hafolin* a market exchange, the local indigenous people are an uncivilized, irrational and materialistic group who have still not truly internalized that people and things pertain to different ontologies and cannot be exchanged one for another. On the other hand, those who see the *hafolin* as a form of gift exchange have a more respectful perspective of the local people and their sociality. The *barlake* is considered as a means for establishing rules for social reproduction and for demonstrating respect and consideration. In this view, the local indigenous people are seen as understanding how to foster dignity and an appropriate relation with ancestors and other supernatural agents. In addition, *hafolin* is also seen as a way to honor people´s multiple ritual obligations (Silva, 2012).

Apparently, these distinct outlooks about the *hafolin* would give origin to very diverse forms of marriage practices. During my fieldwork, some of my interlocutors anxiously pointed out that the marriage practices of their families did not involve *barlake* because they have long been civilized people . However, as I have demonstrated in other occasions (Silva 2012a), their marriage practices are very similar to those in which people openly requested the *barlake* or *folin* as a particular gift-function. In fact, it is not rare that the amount of money or assets exchanged in marriages that are not supposed to involve the folin or *barlake* as a particular gift-function to be higher than in those in which a *barlake* explicitly occurs. Even so, people made a point of showing that they hadn´t requested *barlake* or *folin* in their marriage arrangements.

I have risked that this situation is the product of two intertwined colonial events (Silva, 2012a). One of them is related with the remarkable role that the non-adherence to *barlake* and to other customs ("*usos e costumes*") had as a condition for assigning people the status of *assimilado* [assimilated], the highest citizenship status available to local people in the Portuguese colonies until 1954. By denying their engagement in marriage practices mediated by *hafolin* or *barlake,* people emulate practices considered modern and civilized, in both the colonial past as well as in contemporary Dili. Another phenomenon that appears to be influencing this scenario is the colonial interpretations of the indigenous marriage practices in East Timor. Despite the various gift-functions related to marriages, they have been rhetorically reduced to *barlake* or *hafolin* in certain colonial and postcolonial narratives. In this process, "a guerra do *barlake*" seems to have had a leading role. The controversy plot appears to remain silent about the various moments of exchange and of distinct gift-functions that compose the marriage process as social tecnologies of negotiating rights in persons. So, it is not by chance that it is the presence or absence of *folin* or *barlake* that has marked the ways people have handled their marriage practices to produce identification effects in Dili today.

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Transitional gap of governance: Social change and urban vulnerability in post-1999 East Timor

Hiroko Inoue

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on socio-economic changes in post-1999 East Timor, and to elucidate the way in which human vulnerability emerged under the international state-building. This paper draws attention to the 'transitional gap of governance,' or the emerging situation where neither state institutions, nor kin-based community networks, function appropriately to protect the security and welfare of individuals and families. While the legal and institutional framework of the new state has struggled to penetrate the society, rapid socio-demographic changes weakened customary governance, which used to thrive in kin-based communities of East Timor. It is in such a 'gap of governance' where people are left in vulnerable circumstance and a new form of human insecurity emerges.

Since the late 2000s, the state-society relationship has become the centre of the debate in literature. It was seen as critical to better understand the 'success' or 'failure' of international and national efforts to realise sustainable peace in the country. Some commentators have criticised that international statebuilding activities concentrated their focus on the capital city Dili and failed to account for the significance of rural areas where more than 80 per cent of the population resided (Grenfell 2008; Matsuno 2008). Others have also argued that the modernist nature of legal and institutional frameworks ignored the plurality of laws in East Timor and excluded customary governance that thrived at the grass-root level in the country (Grenfell 2006; McWilliam 2008). While drawing upon the body of existing literature, this paper emphasises the significance of the socio-demographic transition triggered by the economic changes under the international statebuilding. Most importantly, this paper points out that weakening of kin-based communities and support networks within the communities have led to a new form of vulnerability among those who reside in urban areas.

State difficulties and customary governance

Statebuilding in East Timor commenced in 1999, when the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor was established by the UN Security Council. Despite the national and international efforts to build autonomous, capable, and legitimate states in the territory, 'success' of statebuilding has appeared to be elusive. Most notably, a series of violent incidents erupted in Dili in 2006 raised serious concerns over the state's ability to contain violence and maintain law and order. Delays in legislative processes, as well as widespread nepotism and corruption, have also raised alarms over the capacity of new state institutions. While the reports and figures indicate the country's miraculous economic growth, the issues of poverty has been observed in both rural and urban areas (Jakarta Post 2013).[1]

The state institutions have also faced difficulties in penetrating into and establishing relationships with the local society. The state judicial system, founded under international auspices, was one such example. The district courts and the court of appeal have continually experienced low levels of activity (World Bank 2006; Low 2007). The majority of citizens placed far more trust in their own local community leaders. These citizens were more likely to trust their village chiefs, rather than institutions of state justice, to deal with problems arising in their lives (The Asia Foundation 2004). The state justice system also failed to deliver appropriate information to the population. The fact that the majority of the rural population had never heard the terms 'court' and 'lawyer' proved they did not have enough information or exposure to the formal justice system (The Asia Foundation 2004). In general, statebuilding processes lagged behind in implementing regulative frameworks and providing public services, particularly in rural areas.

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[1] East Timor has maintained very high economic growth since late 2000s. In 2011, for instance, it recorded a 12 per cent increase in the Gross Domestic Product. (World Bank 2014).

The delay of statebuilding in rural area is often attributed to international and national statebuilding activities, which placed much emphasis upon the reconstruction of the capital city, Dili. Nevertheless, there were other more important background elements that needed to be considered. There was locally-based customary governance, which impeded state institutions from taking root in the society. Living largely subsistence-based agricultural lives, the majority of the population in rural areas reside within kin-based communities. The kin-based communities usually hold unique localised structure of governance; led by hereditary authorities, including the political leader of the landowning linage – commonly called *liurai* – and the spiritual leader – often called *lia nain* – who provides the legitimacy for customary practice of governance. In these communities, the usage of natural resources is regulated by communal rules or *tara bandu*, and the conflicts arising in day-to-day lives are dealt with in community-based conflict resolution mechanisms called *nahe biti* (Ospina and Hohe 2001; Hohe and Nixon 2003; Babo-Soares 2004; Peace and Democracy Foundation 2004; McWilliam 2008). Given that communities in rural areas retain these structures and practices of local governance, the rural society of East Timor is by no means a 'power vacuum', even when the centralised state administrative system was not effectively overseeing it. Moreover, in a sense, the local 'customary' governance is complementing the modern state's administration.

It is important to note that these local governance practices are significantly influenced by social and economic structures of the locality. Local communities continued to revolve around subsistent agriculture and farming, such as raising pigs, goats, and buffalos and cultivating corn, rice, root crops, and vegetables. The small-scale agriculture and farming are usually labour-intensive and require communal support, which often increases the need for co-working in the neighbourhood. Agricultural life is also heavily influenced by the natural environment, such as the annual rainfall cycle and the fertility of the soil. Thus, the members of a community share the risks as well as benefits of the economic activities through co-working. In such a circumstance, the role of kin-based communities is not only to provide a set of local regulatory frameworks, but moreover to provide social security against physical, social, and economic risks in their daily lives (Mubyarto *et al*. 1991).

Social change

This local social arrangement in East Timor, however, has experienced a gradual, but irreversible, change in the face of market-based economic reforms and socio-demographic shifts. In particular, the government's decision to leave agriculture to the private sector has inflicted serious damage to the local small-scale food production and has changed social arrangements in local society. The end of government subsidies to local agriculture, and the influx of cheap agricultural products from other countries, severely damaged the marketability of local agricultural products and caused a decline in agriculture and farming (Engel and Vieira 2011, 10). The decline of local agriculture can be seen, for instance, in the fall of rice production. While East Timor produced over 55,000 metric tons of rice per year in early 1990s, the number fell to an average of 41,000 metric tons by the mid-2000s (Kammen and Hayati 2007). Combined with other factors, such as the failure to maintain irrigation systems and the high cost of inputs for the agriculture, many people have started feeling that agriculture and farming is 'not a good way to make money' (Berlie 2010, 204).

Critically, the decline of local agriculture triggered a large-scale human movement; a number of people, predominantly young men and women, started flooding into the capital city Dili in search of jobs. Together with other factors – including returning refugees choosing to remain in the capital rather than going back to their land of origin, and the world's highest birth rate, backed by the post-conflict baby boom – migration from rural areas contributed to the sharp increase in population of the capital city (Moxham 2008, 13; Belun 2009a). The population of Dili was estimated 123,474 in 2001, but rose to 175,730 in 2004. By the time of national census in 2010, it reached 234,331 (Muggah 2010, 17-18; RDTL 2010). It is estimated that 40 percent of the current population of Dili consists of migrants, most of whom migrated in the late 2000s.

One of the consequences of these socio-demographic changes was the weakening of kin-based collectives and atomisation of human lives in Dili. Even though migrants from rural areas tend to dwell

closely with those who belong to the same ethno-linguistic groups, the cohesiveness of kin-based community is gradually fading in the capital city. In Dili, people have smaller families and have little economic relationships with their neighbours. The inhabitants' communication with community leaders has also declined. In many cases, the members of the population do not know of their own village chief or the members of the village council. Comparing village communities in rural areas, human relationship in communities in Dili has become loosened and more atomised in its nature.[2]

Importantly, the changing nature of local community is reflected in the practices of community governance. The practice of *tara bandu*, for instance, is becoming less popular in urban Dili. When I conducted interviews with village chiefs in 2010, all five village chiefs in urban Dili affirmed that they no longer practiced *tara bandu*. This is a stark contrast with the rural areas where all village chiefs with whom I conducted interviews answered that they maintain *tara bandu* practice.[3] The unpopularity of *tara bandu* in urban Dili is not so surprising given that it is largely a communal regulation over the usage of natural resources in the community, such as trees, water, and soil. People in urban areas tend not to practice *tara bandu* because their lives are more dependent on products from commercial market. Moreover, in the areas where many of the residents are immigrants from other parts of East Timor, they often cannot make *tara bandu* even if they want to. One village chief in Dili told me that they could not create a new *tara bandu* because they were not *rai nain,* or original to the land and do not have proper knowledge about the tradition of the land or *lisan*.

Similarly, changing nature of local communities also affected the practices of community conflict resolution. While most disputes continue to be over human relationships and resources such as land, fewer cases are now being referred to customary justice systems. Some people have begun to question adjudications provided by their community leaders, such as *lia nain*. The outcomes of customary dispute resolutions are being increasingly contested particularly in the urban areas (EWER 2009a; EWER 2009b; EWER 2011). Consequently, an increasing number of community disputes are now attended to by the national police. EWER's study in 2012, for instance, revealed that during the two-month survey period, 60 per cent of incidents that occurred in the territory had police response (EWER 2012). At the same time, given that 36 per cent of incidents in the same survey time were still attended by traditional and local leaders (EWER 2012), it would be appropriate to say that local disputes are dealt with by the state authority in cooperation with local authorities.

Transitional gap of governance and urban vulnerability

The wilting of community ties could mean the weakening of autonomy and the weakening of the ability to effectively support the community members. In rural areas, community members are closely tied and community leaders, such as village chiefs, tend to maintain customary ties with the village population. Not only are communities in rural areas capable of gathering necessary goods within the community itself, they are also capable of conducting necessary activities and holding events at the expense of the community. On the contrary, the communities in the urban areas are not active enough to spontaneously organise events within the community. Instead, many events are planned and organised by the community leaders. They tend to face difficulties without financial support from higher authority.[4]

While community ties are gradually loosening, the state institutions are still fledging, and thus lagging behind in filling the gap created in such a situation. Financial support for village councils has not been sufficient. While village leaders receive small amounts of money to support their living, the village

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[2] Observations from my fieldworks in East Timor, from May to October 2010, and in July and August in 2013.

[3] During my four-month fieldwork in 2010 I conducted interviews with village chiefs in Dili, as well as rural areas. In Dili, I interviewed six village chiefs in Dili, each of which is a representative of a subdistrict. This included village chiefs of Colmera (Subdistrict Vera Cruz), Culfun (Subdistrict Cristo Rei), Bidau Lecidere (Subdistrict Nain Feto), Kampun Alor (Subdistrict Don-Aleixo), Comoro (Subdistrict Don-Aleixo), and Beloi (Subdistrict Atauro). It was only the village chief of Beloi that said that *tara bandu* continued to be active. Nevertheless, subdistrict Atauro is located on Atauro Island, which stands opposite to Dili city. Therefore subdistrict Atauro is not counted in the 'five urban sub-districts' in Dili.

[4] From interviews and observations in 2010 and 2013.

council is still waiting for the state subsidy to be delivered. Moreover, assistance for individuals and families has not been fully realised. It was not until 2008 that the social security payment was distributed to former veterans who had participated in the resistance movement. Although pensions for the elderly and the disabled were finally set up in 2011, there was no unemployment, sickness, or other social benefits until now (World Bank 2013).

Importantly, the lack of governmental support is especially hard for those who reside in urban areas. While rural inhabitants continue to produce much of agricultural and farming products for their own consumption, those who reside in urban areas do not. Therefore, the cost of basic needs is higher in urban areas by 7 to 28 per cent (World Bank and Directorate of National Statistics, 2008). This is indicative of a further rise in the general cost for food, daily commodities and transportation, all of which often badly affect households in Dili. Furthermore, in rural areas, family and kin-based networks continue to provide the most common form of social security against physical, social, and economic risks in daily lives. However, those who reside in Dili are often deprived of such kin-based communities, and thus have less of the social safety-net. As such, people are left in vulnerable situations.

Those exposed to vulnerable situations include young men and women who migrated from rural areas to Dili. Surveys conducted in 2009 and 2010 revealed that about one third of Dili's labour force aged between 25 and 29 were 'unemployed'. Moreover, 60 per cent of male teenagers and around 50 per cent of those between 20 and 24 were also unemployed (TLAVA 2009; Muggah 2010, 55). Post-1999 economic development also created a new gap between those who did well and others who struggled in the last decade. In Dili, some have achieved a living standard at or near the level of developed Western countries – enjoying car rides, satellite television, and once-a-year overseas vacations – while others remain as deprived as before.

Conclusion

This paper has looked into the way in which human insecurity emerged in post-1999 East Timor. It demonstrated that the decline of agriculture and human migration resulted in the weakening of kin-based community and thus, its capacity to provide assistance to the community members. Importantly, however, state institutions are still under construction processes and have not been providing efficient support to those who are in need. This paper argued that it was in such a circumstance or 'gap of governance' where people were left in vulnerable situations.

This paper demonstrated the significance of socio-economic factors in elucidating the emergence of human vulnerability in East Timor. Although the existing literature tends to concentrate on institutional designs and legal frameworks in analysing the successes and failures of statebuilding, it is important to pay more attention to the local society and social changes in understanding the course of international statebuilding. This paper also revealed that, as socio-demographic changes occurred, the nature of local community transformed, and thus the role and the capacity of community-based governance altered. This also allows us to better understand the versatile nature of local society. It is neither static nor homogenous, as is often depicted in the image of 'tradition'.

The economic indicators such as the economic growth rate and the gross domestic production (GDP) are often used to evaluate the welfare situation of the country. This paper, however, demonstrated that even at times of rapid economic growth, individuals and families may fall into vulnerable situations. There are certain groups of people left behind during economic growth, creating disparity among the population. Moreover, these people tend to fall into such a situation that they do not have appropriate support from state authorities or the community. In this light, this paper demonstrated that 'poverty and vulnerability to risk are not the same phenomenon' (RDTL 2006, 19).

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Security across the local and national in Dili, Timor-Leste

Damian Grenfell and Bronwyn Winch[1]

Introduction

Across September and October 2013, Dili experienced a heightened period of insecurity due to a spate of violent incidents. On the evening of the 24 September, two assailants rode through the suburbs of Kampung Alor and Fatuhada stabbing people at random, injuring two people and killing one (*Belun* 2013b; *Suara Timor Lorosa'e* 25 September 2013). Over the following 48 hours, national security actors coordinated their efforts throughout Dili.[2] Security checkpoints were established throughout the capital, and the *Polisi Nasional Timor Leste* (PNTL) met with media outlets as well as with *Xefe Suku* (suku chiefs), disseminating information to the community (*Belun* 2013b). In the subsequent weeks, there was a steady flow of reports circulating about other attacks in the same vein of random, unprovoked stabbings, and it was difficult to ascertain clearly the number of victims. What initially seemed like isolated attacks by drunken youth began to be explained as the coordinated recruitment of civilians into organised crime groups (*Fundasaun Mahein* 2013; UNDSS 2013).

The events across the latter part of 2013 had a tangible effect on the capital's population, not just with an increased security presence on the streets, but with a noticeable impact on the population's mobility (especially from evening on). The concern is not just people's actual security or the reallocation of limited resources in terms of policing, but also a question of a quality of life where people often already live with a high level of precariousness. Of course Dili has been the site of much violence, both during the Indonesian occupation and final withdrawal of TNI and militias in 1999, as well as during the 2006-2008 crisis where widespread violence occurred across the capital, and the latest round of events which of course remain minor in comparison. However, of interest is how the security situation remained relatively contained, as well as how law enforcement actors worked with local leaders to coordinate their efforts.

While there is an existing literature on security and conflict resolution in Timor-Leste, it remains far from comprehensive and there are still many areas of exploration and analysis to be made. Much of it focuses on security sector reform and development.[3] This is consistent with the field of security studies more broadly, which tends often to be state-centric and focused on the legitimacy, performance and capacity of security sector institutions.[4] As authors such as Hameiri point out however, it is insufficient to focus only on these dimensions when it diminishes the other social and cultural aspects of the way security is experienced and achieved (Hameiri 2010, 36). Other areas of analysis with implications for understanding security include those that consider the 2006-2008 crisis and more broadly violence in the capital, including those that focus on economic and socio-demographic factors.[5]

In order to make a small contribution to ongoing debate then, in this article we consider local conceptions of security in the post-crises years with a three-fold contribution; a survey of local

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[1] Damian Grenfell works with the Globalism Research Centre at RMIT University and Bronwyn Winch is currently undertaking an internship with Belun in Dili. Our thanks to our colleagues in the Timor-Leste Research Program (for more information see www.timor-research.org) as well as the insightful comments from the anonymous reviewer.

[2] The Batalhão de Ordem or Public Order Battalion (BOP), Polícia Militar (PM), Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (F-FDTL) and PNTL.

[3] See for example International Crisis Group (2006), Funaki (2009) and Lemay-Herbert (2009).

[4] Chapters One and Two of the OECD's 2011 report on conflict and fragility is a good example of literature that centralises the state in determining the levels of security experienced by a population

[5] By way of example of this literature see Curtain (2006), pp. 6-10 and Neupert and Lopes (2006) pp. 9-15. An article by Moxham and Carapic (2013) very usefully analyses the issue of urban violence in terms of the pressures of integration into the global economy and the strains of state-building

communities in Dili on security and peace, extending discussions away from more state-centric views to show how systems of governance and culture intersect to reproduce security, as well as beginning a process of clarifying how security might be defined and approached within sites of complex social integration. Police or military enforcement *may* create security in an immediate sense with check-points or arrests, but in Timor-Leste (and elsewhere) sustained security relies also on social integration across cultural domains, such as a relative consensus of norms, the dispersal of information via recognised forms of authority, as well as identifiable and meaningful avenues for conflict resolution.[6]

Following a discussion of the methodology, this article will first analyse how people viewed their security in the years following the 2006-2008 crisis. The argument here is that there is a kind of resilience that allows for communities to at least mitigate threats, one that works potentially to contain the risk of violence that we have seen across 2013. However, this needs to be understood in the context of the different ways security is understood and relativised by people. Building on this, the last section of the article argues that security in an urban setting is reproduced not only across different scales of modern governance (at the intersection of the local and national), but also across different patterns of social integration. That Dili is often understood as a modern urban space does not mean, for instance, that customary forms of social regulation do not play a role in enabling security.

Methodology

The statistical data in the article is drawn from a survey conducted in Dili in the first half of 2011, which had the general aim of understanding how people viewed their security in local communities across the capital. Did Dili residents feel secure, and how did they view the role of the state and other actors in the provision of security? These questions gained new importance following the resolution of various outstanding issues relating to the 2006-2008 crisis; namely the closure of refugee camps, a negotiated settlement with the petitioners, the diminished threat of armed groups, and the return of control of policing from United Nations Police (UNPOL) to PNTL in March 2011.[7] While these events suggested the potential for an improved sense of security, the continuing presence of the UN-sanctioned International Stabilization Force did testify to a fear of renewed violence and a sense of a fragile peace.

The survey included a wide-range of questions on authority structures, information sources, people's perceptions of security actors, gender, and prospects for future security. Trained surveyors asked the questions and the surveys tended to be completed in and around people's homes. Most questions used a five-point Likert scale allowing graduated answers from positive to negative. Five sites were chosen across Dili, providing both geographic spread and variation in terms of the impact of the 2006-2008 crisis. Surveys were undertaken within the areas of Comoro, Bairo Pite, Becora, Lahane and Bemori, with an initial response target of approximately 160 surveys in each site. A total of 812 surveys were collected, supplemented by short interviews with community members.

While surveys provide one avenue for gaining insight into how a large group of people are willing to respond to a series of questions, as a method they are limited in their capacity for capturing subjective responses from people. To a significant degree this is because of the limitations of the application of this method in societies that we regard as deeply complex given their uneven levels of social integration. By this we mean that societies hold together essentially different 'ways of being in the world' (what is referred to as ontology, in effect the basic assumptions of existence). In sites such as Timor-Leste different aspects

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[6] In terms of existing literature, this article is more identifiably closer to the work of Anne Brown and her colleagues who have written intelligently on the intersection of culture, governance and peace, albeit without a particular focus on the urban domain. See Brown, Anne *et al* (2010).

[7] See for example the 2009 and 2010 Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessments which speak of the conflict potential of the IDP reintegration process, specifically that the pressure to quickly finish the process meant that not all of the IDPs were accepted back into communities, and also the government's attempts to facilitate dialogue between gangs and armed groups and their negotiation with the petitioners. For an analysis of the crisis and the impact of social change on identity, see also Grenfell (2008)

of social life are dominated by customary, traditional and modern life-worlds, and so in turn it is possible to have an *adat nain* (customary leader), a priest and a police officer, each drawing authority from a different life-world, and all involved in mediating social conflict.[8] The differences between these life-worlds do not necessarily make for unsustainable forms of society, and in fact this article implicitly argues the reverse. However, it does make for complexity, including the ways in which research is done. Thus while surveys offer a way to think on things, results should be treated as a place to start inquiry rather than as an end in itself.

Local security in Dili

Across all five survey sites in Dili, responses were particularly positive when it came to answering questions about security within people's local communities. An overwhelming number of respondents (86 per cent) said they felt secure in the community where they were currently living (Question 8) and 86.5 per cent felt that there was peace in their local community (Question 12). With the intention of understanding the levels of resilience in local conflict resolution processes, Question 20 asked 'If there is a problem in your community, can people find a solution from within their community or not?'. Again, responses were overwhelmingly positive, with 84.1 per cent of people saying they were able to find solutions from within their community (76.1 per cent responding 'definitely yes'; 8.0 per cent responding 'probably yes'). Together, these sets of statistics suggest that communities were seen as sites of relative security buttressed by internal processes that could assist in negating threat.

The very positive responses at first appeared to jar with the observation of daily life while living and working locally in Dili where security appeared to be a constant concern. While there may not have been the high levels of violence of 2006-2008, or the kinds of occasional peaks of public insecurity as per the end of 2013, threats of gang violence, theft, and physical and sexual assault seemed part of daily life. Threats to security did tend to be reflected in survey questions that sought factual rather than subjective value-based responses such as Question 27 which asked people 'Over the last year, have you or your family been victims of crime?'. While the response to this question was a not insignificant 23.2 per cent, either the nature or site of the crime did not however translate into people identifying their communities as insecure or lacking peace. This suggests that post-crisis, people were finding ways to at least mitigate threats from within their communities, and we go on in the next section to argue that *one way* that this was occurring was through a layering of different forms of authority. Before turning to that however, it is worth outlining three intersecting issues that shape how security is understood in Dili and might account in part for the particularly high rates of positive responses.

Firstly, in this survey security (in the above questions 8 to 10) was explained to respondents in terms of 'feeling safe', and breached if there was an obvious threat or attack to body or property (explained by use of examples). The word *seguru* was used, and where necessary explained with alternative phrases/descriptors such as '*senti paz iha*' (is there a peace here), '*hakmatek* (calmness), and the Indonesian '*aman*' (peaceful/secure). However, it is worth noting that the way security was discussed through these interactions had a very public quality to it; security was something outside or beyond the domain of the household. As such, someone may report feeling secure (in this public sense) even though, by way of example, they experience acute levels of violence within the household. This is a point that narrows the definition of security to being a public thing, an important point given for instance recent studies show that 33.8 per cent of ever-married women in Timor-Leste have experienced physical violence (Taft 2013, 3).

Secondly, to understand how security is constituted is not just a matter of how it is categorised, but how it is relativised in terms of the degree in which a sense of threat has been normalised. Survey data does not show the ways people self-regulate social activity to an extent where risk mitigation becomes so normalised that there is little conscious sense of it. For instance, that people responded that their

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[8] These categories and their application to Timor-Leste have been discussed at much greater length in Grenfell 2012 and Carrool-Bell (2013). For the development of the analytical categories and the theoretical foundations, see James 2006.

communities are secure does not mean that people are willing to walk freely at night. Similarly, and from observation while living long-term in East Timorese households, there seem to be internalised norms and social habits. For example, homes are not typically left unoccupied, young women very often leave for and return from school in pairs, and daily movements tend to be mapped across singular trajectories (i.e. between home and market, home and school and so on). Even the ubiquitous kiosk, and gravesites in front yards, are at one level answering to a security dimension of daily life with their close proximity to homes. In the effect of daily habits, such regulatory and conditioned behaviour may become so normalised that it is not seen as answering to threats.

A third factor to consider is the effect of the survey itself. That people are being asked about their community in the wake of significant social turmoil may mean that people respond so as to negate the chance of recriminations from within their communities.[9] Taking this a step further, there is a strong tendency, especially in rural areas, for people to view their community in the context of genealogical and kinship ties (Grenfell *et al* 2009, 17). Even if the community is not 'one family' in an objective sense, communities are seen as being formed around deeply embedded connections as part of an *uma kain* (extended family). While rural-urban migration has resulted in communities in Dili being far more diversified and the density of kinship ties tends to reduce (Trindade & Castro 2007, 30-31), there are still familial and more broadly ethno-linguistic patterns in terms of how people settle in the capital (Scambary 2013, 1939-1940). It is possible that there is a cultural carry-over into the capital where people are particularly unwilling to speak negatively against their communities, as it has the subjective sense of speaking against ones kin.

This contextualisation of how security might be understood is not to detract from the general trend which showed consistently positive responses with regards to people's conceptions of security in their own communities. These statistics suggest a particular form of resilience within local communities in Dili in the years following the 2006-2008 crisis that may have helped contain the kinds of violence seen in 2013. We argue in the next section that this kind of resilience is formed across two domains, one modern across the national and local systems of governance, and one ontological across the customary to the modern.

Security and conflict resolution across difference

Timor-Leste's administrative divisions (district, sub-district, *suku* and *aldeia*) reflect the geographic layers of modern governance across the country, including in Dili. The *suku* typically comprises a cluster of *aldeia* (villages), and in practice *xefe sukus* (*suku* chiefs) tend to constitute a very important element in governance due to their relevance to the daily livelihoods of community members (The Asia Foundation 2012, 9; Jütersonke et al. 2010, 42). This is especially the case as *suku* leaders are seen to be a critical information node (both dispersal and gathering, as per the violence across Dili in late 2013), and often play a negotiation and ceremonial role in the arbitration of conflicts. Police however, in comparison, are given authority in different ways and in turn can *claim* a legitimate monopoly over the use of violence.[10]

Mirroring this national-local governance tendency for coordination, the survey data showed that both sets of actors are seen to be relevant to security provision in communities in Dili. Question 18 asked 'If there is a problem in your local community, do you prefer to call the police rather than the local authorities to assist in its resolution?'. In their responses, a significant number of people indicated that they preferred to call the police to assist in the resolution of problems in local communities (53.9 per cent of people responded 'definitely police', and another 5.4 per cent responded 'probably police', bringing the total to 59.3 per cent). In saying this, a substantial minority of 33.8 per cent still indicated they would prefer

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[9] A similar conclusion was made in another survey which removed questions regarding domestic and sexual abuse as they identified it to be a 'potential catalyst for further violence' and thus could endanger the respondents. See Jütersonke et al. 2010, 38.

[10] Here we are taking a Weberian approach to our definition of the state with the emphasis on legitimation and violence

to either 'definitely' (22.9 per cent) or 'probably' (10.9 per cent) call local authorities.[11] Taken together, this data suggests that in the wake of the crisis different institutional forms—including local governance and the state—were re-integrating with communities in the capital, at least in terms of being seen as systems of authority that could variously assist with threat management.

Important to our argument is that, in balance, we hold the *suku* to be part of a modern administrative system of regulation. While the authority of a *xefe suku* (*suku* chief) often still intersects with customary and traditional forms of social relations, the *suku* as an administrative system of governance was nevertheless introduced through Portuguese colonialism (Hohe 2002, 573) and consolidated in the new national form by state law and with leaders subject to election.[12] In this context, the survey data confirms a tendency to draw on a plurality of security providers—state security actors as well as local leaders—from across a modern spectrum of national and local governance. Why one might be preferred over another could be attributed to a range of factors; nature of the crime (Pigou 2003, 30-31; The Asia Foundation 2008, 47-52), a person's relationship to their community, past experience of police and local authorities, and whether the threat was seen to originate within the community or from beyond it. Whatever the motives, this data suggests either that policing is taking on a particular form where there is a high level of engagement with local governance,[13] or that as institutions such as the PNTL develop community reach (and recover from the crisis), they remain reliant on localised systems of authority in the interim.

Security provision and conflict resolution do not just occur across the national-local spectrum of modern governance, but also encompass authority structures across different social systems, including the customary system of *adat* or *lisan* (customary law). It is not uncommon to hear that 'there is no *adat* in Dili', suggesting that there is an absence of *adat* and customary practices (*Belun* 2013a, 22-23). However, when people were asked in the survey if traditional[14] law was normally used to resolve problems in their community (Question 19), 68.9 per cent of people agreed (60.8 per cent responded 'definitely yes' and 8.1 per cent responded 'probably yes'; by contrast 15 per cent said traditional law is 'definitely' not part of normal practice). There are a variety of ways in which *adat* can be seen to have a social regulatory role in Dili, two of which we will outline here.

Firstly, the most obvious way that customary practices play a role in the production of security is in how it determines both the form and substance of an agreement between parties, as well as in terms of binding that agreement (McWilliam 2007, 1-2). In such instances, *adat* is used together with the modern law of the state, and at times with the church (as an expression of what we call a traditional ontology), in an attempt to bind people into legitimate and sustainable compacts (Grenfell et al. 2009, 110-111; Arnold 2009, 384). This drawing together of different symbolic and cultural elements speaks to the uneven social integration we discussed at the beginning of this piece, in effect suggesting that a practice on its own from within a modern, a traditional or customary ontology, would not be enough to secure a meaningful resolution to conflict.

A second way of understanding the high percentage of respondents who said customary law is often used in conflict resolution in Dili is that practices that are deemed 'tradisional' may in reality be an adapted or less rigid articulation of an act that carries symbolic significance. While this would require more extensive ethnographic work, we suggest here that conflict resolution may occur in a way that is patterned on customary systems, such as through involvement of familial networks (as opposed to a singular victim-perpetrator model of conflict resolution), the use of extensive dialogue in order to find an acceptable solution (resembling *nahe biti* for instance, the practice of unfolding a mat and speaking until an issue is resolved), and the act of drawing in of elder patriarchs to adjudicate. Another example would be how families remain at the centre of negotiations rather than pushing outwards to the state or even the *xefe suco*.

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[11] For Question 18 only 5.5 per cent of people surveyed responded neutrally and just 1.4 per cent had no opinion

[12] República Democrática de Timor-Leste 'Law 3/2009 on Community Leaderships and their Election', http://www.jornal.gov.tl/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Laws/Law%203-2009.pdf, viewed 9 October 2013

[13] It would be very unusual for instance in Australia for a Mayor to be so involved in police operations

[14] Here the use of '*tradisional*' in Tetun suggests acts that could incorporate elements of adat/lisan, though just to make clear when we write in English we use the anthropological category of customary

In this sense, conflict resolution practices feel subjectively close to the customary, and in turn this may have increased the rate of positive responses to questions in this survey.

Conclusion

The response to insecurity in Dili across the end of 2013 reminds us both of the challenges facing post-colonial and post-conflict urban centres such as Dili, as well as demonstrating different ways in which security is re-established and how attempts are made to mitigate threat. From the research discussed here, we have argued that in the wake of the crisis, local communities were seen as sites of relative security by the majority of people, though while that is the case there needs to be careful consideration around the social context of how security is interpreted (and the methods used to undertake research on it). While security can be produced in a whole range of ways, the second part of this essay has argued that one important element in the production of security has been the diversity of actors involved, not only in terms of modern forms of governance involving both local and national actors, but also across customary and modern forms of social integration.

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Australian popular fiction and the moral drama of East Timor

David Callahan[1]

From the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia in 1975 until the referendum on independence in 1999 and up until the present, East Timor has been a place whose destiny Australian governments have felt they have the right to intervene in. Indeed, this assumed right goes back to the invasion of neutral Portuguese Timor by Australian forces in World War II, thereby condemning thousands of Timorese to their deaths at the hands of Japanese soldiers. Of this initial assumption of Australia's agency in East Timor there has been surprisingly little creative remediation, although there has been much and moving commentary in non-fiction. The marginality of Portuguese Timor to Australia in the 1940s may be read both in the decision to invade and in subsequent uninterest in interpreting what is one of Australia's closest neighbours. Although the Indonesian invasion and brutal occupation vastly increased the amount of coverage given to the territory, somehow this too was almost never accompanied by the analytical possibilities of creative work. From Tony Maniaty's anguished representation of the period immediately before the invasion, *The Children Must Dance* (1987), through Gail Jones's theoretically reflective short story 'Other Places' (1992), Bill Green's satire on Australian political immorality, *Cleaning Up* (1993), or Libby Gleeson's book for children *Refuge* (1998), to take some of the registers through which the country was dealt with, East Timor was rarely processed in Australia through the protocols of imaginative narrative (on these texts, see Callahan 2010; 2012a; 2012b).

There have, however, recently been a small number of Australian generic fictions in which East Timor occupies roles of differing narrative and moral significance, roles to some extent instrumentalising the nation in ways that are not always congruent with earlier discourses of solidarity for the country's liberation struggle. Since East Timor broke away from Indonesia in 1999, the four books I will talk about use the country as a site of Indonesian violence in which Australians intervene to counter Indonesian intentions and actions in the service of both East Timorese people and what is imagined to be a generalised support among Australian people for the ethical treatment of the underdog, and for the fabled but vague notion of the fair go. But these books can be seen as using East Timor in the exploration of not always compatible discourses: in the first place, such narratives give Australians the opportunity to construct stories in which Australians help, and this naturally produces narratives set in the period in which Australia actually did help: the referendum and post-referendum period (albeit as a 'Reluctant Saviour', as Clinton Fernandes tells us). At the same time, this form of finally being able to write official Australia into positive roles with respect to East Timor is not all that is going on in these texts. Against a background in which Australia's military have been steadily reassigned value and centrality in the nation's story since the low point of Vietnam, East Timor is potentially just one of a repertoire of scenarios in which Australia's military can reenact the national story of bold yet ethical male heroism in uneasy relationships with the agendas of larger and more powerful allies. After all, Australia is also or has been recently present in other conflict zones, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, and yet almost no fiction has been produced of Iraq by Australians and with Australian protagonists, and most of that with Afghanistan as a setting is for children. East Timor, moreover, offers Australia unique possibilities to explore national and ethical issues. As David Wenham's character says in the Australian-Canadian TV miniseries set in the period of the referendum, *Answered by Fire*, 'East Timor's a little bit different. For Australians anyway,' summing up thirty years of Australian shame over his country's acquiescence in Indonesia's actions and failure to honour the debt contracted during the Second World War.

Anita Bell's *Crystal Coffin* (2001) is chronologically the first such generic fiction, a crossover thriller, partly aimed at a teenage readership, but little differentiated from a more avowedly adult thriller. While there are sequences that take place in East Timor, the majority of the book takes place in Australia.

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Only after seventy pages does East Timor feature, when Jayson Locklin, a nineteen-year-old Australian soldier, decides, against the UN rules of engagement, to take on a group of militia who have captured his unit and murdered civilians. His success in this operation contributes to establishing his credentials in the narrative both ethically and as an intelligent action figure, in a context in which, at the time the book was being written, Australian military action in East Timor was overwhelmingly approved of by the Australian public. At the same time, Locklin's actions demonstrate that sometimes it is necessary to act outside approved guidelines, always a popular mythic strategy of the Australian male hero figure. The affirmation of the moral acuity of the lone vigilante figure commonly functions in this manner: by intervening to aid victims whose suffering and lack of adequate defences from other quarters underline the otherwise unsanctioned but in this case necessary actions of the figure who restores justice. It can be seen, however, that Locklin intervenes not simply in favour of East Timorese but rather to save Australian soldiers, diluting the significance of East Timorese people as victims for whom rules might be broken and danger faced. Indeed, East Timor functions principally as a theatre in which a type of masculine heroism can be enacted in a military engagement. Almost nothing of what Australia is doing in East Timor is explained, although it is legitimate to speculate that a book published in 2001 would not need to explain things given the blanket coverage events in East Timor had received in the Australian media during 1999 and 2000. As if to confirm what Australian actions in East Timor at this time had signified, Locklin comments that he is 'amazed at how helpful people could be [in Australia] at the mention of soldiers who'd been stationed in East Timor' (Bell 2001, 285).

James Phelan's *Fox Hunt* (2006), interestingly, includes a very similar plot element: the protagonist, Lachlan, ignores UN directives and penetrates into West Timor in order to try to save sequestered East Timorese from Indonesian troops and East Timorese pro-Indonesian militia. However, even less of the novel takes place in East Timor, as it attempts a global reach (and readership) in its plot involving a lost Soviet advanced technology weapon, leading to action principally in Chechnya, the U.S., Iran and assorted glamorous European locations. Timor only occurs in two sections. Occurring near the beginning, these chapters nonetheless perform an important function in their authentication once again of the hero as a man who puts saving lives ahead of bureaucracy, the latter generally perceived as heartless and obstructive in sites of humanitarian crisis. Positioning the United Nations as the origin of the obstruction permits Australia to be partially relieved of the blame in a scenario in which individual Australians would do more to help East Timorese if not for administrative obstacles imposed by out of touch bureaucrats from other unspecified countries.

East Timor features much more significantly in Mark Abernethy's thriller *Double Back*, which places the country at the centre of a complex, breathless plot replete with the usual people who are not what they seem, double-crossings and last-minute escapes. Once again East Timor serves as the backdrop for Australian heroism at a time when part of the country (near the border with West Timor) was 'the most dangerous eighty square kilometres in the world right now' (Abernethy 2009, 96), authenticating even more the enactment of the conscience that official Australia lacked for the whole period of the Indonesian occupation. Local people are being used in a facility in the Bobonaro district, the victims of an Indonesian attempt to develop an ethno-bomb which kills the more Melanesian East Timorese in particular. The Australian covert operator Alan McQueen is part of the uncovering of the operation, placing himself in danger more than once in order to find out and produce proof of what is happening there.

The fact that events take place in 1999 around the time of the referendum is not irrelevant. The year represents the time when Australia finally acted in a way that its population wanted over East Timor. It is also no accident that the circulation of information to Australian Ministers and government departments is rendered as problematic: 'The one Australian who was actually on the ground in East Timor was not going to be heard' (Abernethy 2009, 26) we read early on, as Government Ministers flounder and anguish over offending Indonesia. Mac and the novel's credentials are clear: 'When Canberra know-it-alls pushed their arguments for appeasing the Indonesian government, they never quite grasped reality … the appeasers were never going to physically suffer from their own strategy' (Abernethy 2009, 59). It is, of course, a convention of the genre that information circulates badly. That is, it is difficult to find out about things, and then it is difficult to make this information reach who you want it to reach or to be believed or acted on. In

this the genre articulates social divisions that intersect with discourses of class as with discourses of practical activity as opposed to administrative or intellectual activity. As an aid worker on the ground says, 'They're such cowards, those Foreign Affairs bastards' (Abernethy 2009, 176; the worker, Ansell Torvin, transparently representing Lansell Taudevin, Australian aid coordinator in East Timor 1996-1999 and author of the post-conflict memoir *East Timor: Too Little, Too Late*). In the genre's construction of an often physically but always mentally wounded male protagonist it both grants agency and takes it away, in a metaphor of how the action-oriented male is unable to perform his masculinity as competence because he is restricted by the agendas of less masculine men who sit in offices and make diplomatic or business decisions. This, of course, is a convention in many types of male hero genres.

In this context, it takes a maverick figure to represent the conscience of the Australian people as set against the realpolitik, fear and appeasement of the Australian government. Only individuals working against the system, in all of these novels, can act effectively in the case of East Timor, given that the Australian system resists acting either in the interests of East Timor or according to the desires of its own populace (although there are gradations between more or less honourable and perceptive figures). The rebellious male figure is a common icon in both the genre of the thriller and Australian culture in general, so that it is probably too much to expect nowadays a type of colonial-era hero who represents official forces and perspectives in this form of fiction. The investigator in this type of fiction is rather a test of the legibility of the false and manipulative circulation of information in the world, narrative surprise functioning to reveal not simply the protagonist's manipulation by the fallen world, via our manipulation by the narrative, but in addition that ethical standards and objectives are insufficient in a world where the self-maintenance of power has seeped into all spheres and all nations at the expense of human rights or official rhetoric. As Morris Dickstein argues, 'this haunted sense of a tentacular, all-powerful conspiracy catapults the thriller beyond politics into a shallow, helpless fatalism' (Dickstein 2006, 90). That is, whatever the good done by the protagonist, it is against a backdrop of political forces whose priorities cancel any ethics of conviction in favour of a narrowly-defined national interest. This situation also pushes such narratives towards being both nationalistic and anti-nationalistic at the same time, in the sense that individuals do not represent their fallen nations or cultures in stable fashion. An American, supposedly an ally of Australian interests, turns out to be partly behind the Indonesian ethno-bomb, while the facility is finally closed by a Javanese General whose decent old-school ethical standards do not allow him to see his country go down this dishonourable path. Australia, in turn, loses definite contours as a polity given that competing interests and deceit mean that its representatives do not really represent the majority of Australians, leaving the individual protagonist who ostensibly works for his nation adrift in a network of international friends, operatives and connections, suspicious of both obvious enemies and duplicitous Australian officials, a situation that assembles an identity that is Australian but globalised at the same time.

Steven Horne's thriller *The Devil's Tears* was written by an ex-army soldier who had served in East Timor in 2000. However, differently to the other novels, this is a novel mostly telling the story from the point of view of East Timorese people, a strategy which has been found to bring problems of authority when dealing with the trauma of others. From Cesar, a functionary from Dili, and his family, to Leki, a boy who joins Falintil, the novel focuses on the story of local people, as well as on Indonesian officers, and Australians trying to investigate and bring to light evidence of an earlier massacre. In *The Devil's Tears* the ethical connection between motives and actions is seemingly clear: if Australians are only exposed to what is happening in East Timor, this becomes defining in their perception of who is right and and who is wrong. Only negatively positioned characters support the official Australian line on East Timor. Nevertheless, the occupation of the voice of other people's suffering in fiction now occasions doubts with respect to the instrumentalising of that suffering, the transformation of suffering into a spectacle for what is always at some level a form of entertainment. The representational issues change to some extent when the suffering exists as memory rather than as events which are happening now. That is, in the latter case, people who suffer are naturally concerned that their situation is represented in ways they recognise as realistic, but in the first place they want the world to know what is happening, accepting to some degree a certain level of mimetic deficit as long as their story is told. When the suffering passes into memory, however, then questions of who should be telling it, and how, become more acute. As all of these novels are post East

Timorese separation from Indonesia, they fall into the latter category, but none of them reflects upon its use of East Timorese stories. The implicit supposition is that if they are on the popularly approved side, then their representation of the suffering of others is simply showing solidarity with those others' history. There are attempts in most such fictions to ensure that their moral grammar is not conjugated rigidly in terms of nationality, so that there will almost always be a good or more than one good Indonesian, as well as traitorous East Timorese and conniving Australians. Nonetheless, one striking difference between fictions such as these and fictions such as those by literary authors like Gail Jones, Tony Maniaty, Timothy Mo, the Portuguese Pedro Rosa Mendes or East Timorese Luís Cardoso is apparent in the low level of self-consciousness of the former with respect to what might appear an odd decision in the first place: to fictionalise real suffering, real humanitarian issues and very recent history when there are hundreds of thousands of people who have memories of what happened to them, and the moral authority to tell them.

Australian shame over twenty-four years of official obstruction was always attacked in excellent non-fiction, ensuring that governments could not count on the issue fading away. Why, then, transform the events into fiction? The same question has been asked and answered repeatedly over recent years, not least in Australia during the controversy set off by Kate Grenville's comments on the relation between novelists and historians with respect to her *The Secret River* (see Grenville 2005, Clendinnen 2006, Curthoys & Docker 2006). Investigators and commentators in many contexts nonetheless tend to arrive at variations on the same conclusion that fiction possesses the ability to build up explanatory speculations capable of developing connections between characters and events to a level of multi-layered density that may not appeal to our sense of the documentary, but rather serve in the organisation of our general moralities. For Ruth Mayer, to take one example:

> Fictional texts get a better grip on rearrangements and transformations in public discourse than nonfictional accounts, because they map out the world in speculative terms and thus address dimensions of the political unconscious that more solution-oriented political and journalistic approaches to the same phenomena tend to reason away or repress (Mayer 2007, 2).

The absence of self-consciousness in these generic fictions in which East Timor's recent history is depicted leaves them open to the charge of using East Timor for the benefit of their plots rather than working to support East Timor politically. Charitably, on the other hand, they can be seen to be participating in 'the political unconscious' by validating support for the East Timorese people, helping stories about the country to continue to circulate, at the same time as they attempt to underwrite positive roles for Australians in East Timor as implicit compensation for the dirty history of official Australian interference in the efforts of the East Timorese people to gain independence, justice and recognition over more than a quarter of a century.

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Civil society in transition[1]

Janet Hunt and Ann Wigglesworth

Most development literature, including that about Timor-Leste, is concerned with the state and in a post-conflict context, with (re)building the state and creating the nation. Research we have conducted since 1999 focuses on the considerable role that civil society has played throughout this period. This paper traces the transformation of civil society, particularly the emergence of non-government organisations (NGOs), in Timor-Leste and explores the changes that have taken place in this sphere since before independence until the present. It asks, what is the direction for Timorese civil society organisations in the future?

By civil society we mean 'the associations of citizens (outside their families, friends and businesses) entered into voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas and ideologies. The term does not include profit making activity (the private sector) or governing (the public sector)' (Cardoso 2004:13). Howell and Pearce (2001) argue that there are two perspectives about the key role of civil society in development, the mainstream and the alternative approaches. The mainstream view sees the roles of civil society as primarily about service delivery and holding governments accountable. A strong civil society, according to this view, can counter corruption and misuse of aid, as well as build societal consensus, (valuable in peacebuilding) (Tobias 2012) and complement a state with low capacity. An alternative view sees civil society challenging dominant policies of the state and the market and promoting alternative development models. In practice, in a diverse civil society, organisational activities reflect both perspectives, but, as the experience of Timor-Leste demonstrates, there are sometimes different expectations among donors and civil society organisations.

The emergence of Timorese civil society

Timorese civil society emerged in response to the oppressive Indonesian regime. During the Indonesian occupation Timorese civil society can be characterised as clandestine and an assertion of Timorese demands for human rights against repressive military rule. Complementing the FALINTIL military resistance, students, particularly the National Resistance of East Timorese Students (RENETIL), the Organisation of Catholic Youth and Students (OJECTIL), and the Always United Front of Timor (FITUN) played a key role in raising international awareness of human rights violations, and after 1989, courageously protesting on the occasion of significant international visits, such as that of the Pope (1989) and the US Ambassador (1990). Indeed, it was the military crackdown on student protestors that caused the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, now viewed as a critical turning point in the struggle for self-determination.

While a few NGOs had formed considerably earlier, by the early to mid-1990s, a number were operating more openly, often with international support. In an extremely difficult environment they often had to work surreptitiously, playing an uneasy game with the military powers that monitored their movements. In particular, the Catholic Church and human rights NGOs played critical roles communicating with international human rights organisations as the pressure for change built through the 1990s. By late 1998 and early 1999 it was becoming almost impossible for the service delivery NGOs to function normally. Human rights NGOs nevertheless maintained their human rights activism, and with other NGOs, notably Caritas Dili, provided humanitarian support to the thousands of people being displaced by militia violence, a role which they continued after the arrival of the United Nations (UN) in May 1999.

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[1] An extended version of this paper is available online at: http://www.tlstudies.org/

The new international order

The rampage and destruction of September 1999 dramatically affected Timorese civil society organisations. The arrival of the massive international agency response initially led to the almost complete exclusion of civil society from the humanitarian programs in which they had previously been playing a key role. It was only with considerable effort that some NGOs found a role in this changed environment. While some older NGOs were re-established by March 2000, what followed was a flurry of activity as new Timorese NGOs formed, more than quadrupling the 24 NGOs registered in December 1999 within a year (Hunt 2005a). However, there were many organisational capacity issues, including the tenuous links many had with communities they purported to represent (Patrick 2001). By late 2000, local NGOs had re-established the East Timor NGO Forum (FONGTIL) as a means to get their voice heard in an increasingly crowded political and humanitarian space, dominated by the enormous number of INGOs, bilateral donors and UN agencies now on the ground. For a while, the UN and World Bank, which were leading the aid response and managing the transition to independence, actively consulted with civil society players, albeit poorly at times, but until late 2001/early 2002, civil society voices appeared to be influential through various processes.

Indeed, civil society played a key role in educating the population about the election process for the Constituent Assembly, the body charged with developing the nation's constitution which went on to become the first Parliament. The NGO Forum also played a key role in monitoring political party campaigns and election monitoring. Civil society actively lobbied the six-monthly international donor conferences, and engaged as best they could in the very hurried preparation of the National Development Plan. It saw significant roles for civil society in service delivery and livelihood programs as well as advocacy, peace and human rights activities (Planning Commission 2002).

The period from late 2000 to mid-2002 was one in which civil society actively tried to advocate, influence and promote alternative policies and approaches to those being driven by the major international institutions. For example at the six-monthly donor conferences NGOs emphasised a participatory, rural-focussed approach to development and time-frames which would allow people to have a say in the shape of the new nation. Strong activism of women and women's groups was also notable. Policy proposals were advanced from the first National Women's Congress, advocating against gender-based violence and lobbying for women's quotas for the Constituent Assembly to promote political participation. While not achieving the quotas they desired, this activism led to a requirement that one in four candidates fielded by each party should be a woman, later increased to one in three for the 2012 elections (Wigglesworth 2013b).

Independence and democracy – but what role for civil society?

In May 2002 the new East Timorese Government took over the running of the country. Independence had become a reality. But for civil society this presented a new environment. Their relatively significant role in the UN period had been eclipsed and donors now focussed on supporting the new state to function effectively. During the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) period, NGOs in particular lobbied to gain a voice; they achieved some clear avenues for input to decision making through the National Council (Ingram 2012:8) and used active civil society networks and working groups for formulating positions on key issues relating to UN and donor matters. They urged a culture of human rights and non-violence, and tried to set limits to state power while encouraging the state to set limits on other parts of society with a propensity to violence. It was in this period that NGO expectations about their roles in a more democratic setting were crystallised.

However, as the new democratic government settled in over coming years, the limit to NGO influence became evident. By 2004, a study of democracy and advocacy in East Timor found that while NGOs had 'insights and experiences ... valuable for national development and that they have the ear of the people' (CRS 2004:3), there were few channels for them to express their points of view or the views of people they represented. Despite efforts to mobilise citizens for advocacy, their efforts had been relatively unsuccessful because of the centrist nature of government and its weak capacity to respond. A few,

however, had taken advantage of the centrist approach to influence the legislative agenda (e.g. in relation to Domestic Violence legislation). Overall, however, in the early years, Government was ambivalent about NGOs, and NGOs which had only ever experienced the repressive Indonesian government, had no models or blueprints to follow for a different type of relationship with their own government (Hunt 2005b). While some NGOs and NGO people worked closely with particular parts of the new government, others may have found it hard to switch from their formerly oppositional roles, although in fact there was little open criticism of the government. In East Timor, personal relationships, family histories, the legacy of old power structures and resistance involvements all affected the extent of any influence. Relationships were best between NGOs and government personnel where personal relationships had been formed in the resistance between people now working in government and those working in NGOs. But by 2003, it seemed that the line between political society and civil society was beginning to blur as a few NGO people were perceived to be associated with different political parties. In 2006 more complex politics emerged as some NGOs became embroiled in conflict politics. Overall it seemed that in this early period, civil society, which had come to be encapsulated in NGOs, were vocal and critical but had little leverage or capacity to hold government to account. This suggests that the theory of civil society as an accountability mechanism was not borne out in practice here. However, over time, a small number of Timorese NGOs began to develop more influence, acting as watch-dogs over government practices.

Reconciling the old and the new

Many NGOs attempted to promote alternative approaches to development, particularly when they worked collectively through the NGO Forum. The more vocal ones constantly argued for a more participative, human development approach with a strong focus on rural areas, rather than the neo-liberal model promoted by international financial institutions. In this, they were strengthening the first government's position towards these institutions, as the government itself had a strong human development focus, and disagreed with some donor driven economic approaches. NGOs drew attention to the risks of international borrowing and the dangers of the resource curse and some took a 'democracy through development' approach (Racelis 2000), trying to empower people and encourage a more responsive state.

The political crisis which enveloped the country in 2006 resulted in civil society immediately engaging in peace building activities. The NGO Forum established a National Unity Committee to organise a public information campaign, conduct reconciliation programs in the burgeoning IDP camps and monitor the emergency distribution program implemented by international agencies in the camps. Large amounts of money were allocated to peace-building activities by the Timorese government and international agencies, yet Timorese NGOs had difficulty getting support for their activities. During the political crisis, despite some conflict within certain NGOs where political differences among individuals surfaced, civil society activists from east and west worked together to promote peace and reconciliation. NGO initiatives to promote peace and reconciliation were little recognised or supported by the government and, perhaps consequently, by international donors providing emergency funding. Thus NGOs felt that the government wanted to maintain control and disregarded their contribution to peace (Wigglesworth 2013a). Emergency donor funding however enabled *international* NGOs to set up peace building and conflict resolution programs in communities where they had not previously worked. This angered some Timorese NGOs with considerable mediation experience. As well, Timorese activists were concerned that short term solutions were being put in place which often ran parallel to existing, but poorly funded, programs of local NGOs, turning local NGOs into sub-contractors for international agencies' programs rather than continuing their own initiatives (Wigglesworth 2013a).This whole experience had echoes of the exclusion of local NGOs during the 1999 crisis!

Despite this, the crisis was in some ways a defining moment for civil society. New approaches, such as the use of traditional forms of mediation, became widely accepted and an important response to the crisis. Civil society drew on the traditional practice of *nahe biti* (spreading the mat) ceremony, which gained considerable credibility in conflict resolution efforts in the IDP camps in Dili as well as in communities that supported the later resettlement of IDPs. It has been found that within rural communities

traditional processes are generally more accessible, understood and accepted than national legal frameworks.

Another use of traditional practices by civil society organisations has been in response to top-down planning processes. Environmental NGOs have used the customary practice of *tara bandu*, a Timorese resource management system that imposes ritual prohibitions on the use of natural resources. The use of contemporary manifestations of 'traditional' processes re-established and enabled 'outside' concepts to be reformulated through the power of local customs and traditions. Thus while local NGOs are a modern form of associational life in Timor-Leste, they are contributing to the maintenance and renewal of certain customary practices. Some contradictions inevitably emerge between activist NGO values which promote (at least rhetorically) participation and gender inclusiveness, and customary practices which are both hierarchical and usually male-led.

Civil society promotion of gender equality, on the other hand, challenges traditional structures, processes and beliefs particularly in relation to the customary limitations ascribed to women's roles. In Dili, a network of women's organisations, *Rede Feto,* was established in 2001 as an outcome of the first National Women's Congress which saw the need to present a united women's perspective in the political arena and a number of women's NGOs promote gender equality (Wigglesworth 2012).

Gender equality measures were supported by the Gender Affairs Unit of UNTAET in the early years; its staff worked closely with this strong lobby of local women's NGOs. Their activism, eventually supported by the Secretary General's Special Representative (Hunt 2008, Pires 2002), gave Timor-Leste the highest proportion of female parliamentary representatives in Southeast Asia (30 per cent). Nevertheless, Timorese NGOs in the districts continue to be male-dominated, while more educated women concentrate in Dili where they can work as activists freely and effectively. According to FONGTIL, women are largely found in financial roles, and in 'women's' activities such as health and education, but rarely in other positions (Wigglesworth and Soares 2006).

Government and civil society in a cash rich society

Revenues from oil started to flow around 2005-6 making dramatic impacts on Timor-Leste's ability to finance the national budget. La'o Hamutuk reports that oil and gas exports contributed 97 per cent of state expenditures by 2011.[2] At the same time, the withdrawal of the UN at the end of 2012 and the departure of various development agencies reduced funding options for local NGOs. This changed environment had consequences for civil society.

A government Civil Society Fund has been established to make grants to local organisations. These grants are reportedly predominantly allocated to church activities, including church infrastructure, and to social organisations of the church. There is an argument that the Civil Society Fund is reducing criticism of the government as some NGOs feel they can't criticise government if they seek project funding from it.

Decentralisation processes have been established slowly, starting with the Local Development Program (LDP) pilot projects in 2006 to implement locally conceived infrastructure projects. LDP funding enabled sucos to prioritise infrastructural projects which were contracted to the private sector. Community development processes were not supported and NGO skills have been overlooked as a potential resource to strengthen community based organisation. In the post-2012 period transitioning to municipality-level governance, the knowledge and skills of some young educated civil society members has been sought in the process of defining how municipal structures will work.

Many NGO staff who have built skills over years of civil society work have been enticed into better paid government or international organisations leaving serious management and vision vacuums in many organisations. The difficulty of finding good staff and retaining them once they are well trained is a perennial problem of local NGOs globally; it is not a problem exclusive to Timor-Leste.

Since early on, capacity building activities have tended to reflect donor needs rather than develop the broader range of skills and capacities NGOs need to work successfully with communities. Some NGOs

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[2] http://www.laohamutuk.org/

have struggled with maintaining administrative and financial systems and accountability that would enable them to receive continuous donor funding and grow especially as competent staff are quickly lured towards better paid organisations. Donors in Timor-Leste have mostly provided only short term funding, while a lucky few NGOs operate on three-year funding cycles. Overall, only a small number of donors have supported civil society with multi-year grants. Excessive workloads due to constant proposal writing and diverse donor reporting requirements often in English have placed huge demands on the still small number of NGO staff able to do this. In essence, donor funding has become depoliticised now and expectations are higher; donors often view NGOs as subcontractors to fulfil specific inputs of larger projects; a few notable INGOs offer support with the explicit objective to strengthen the local NGO capacity. For many international agencies, and the local NGOs that work with them, the 'service delivery' approach has become the expected role for NGOs. Concern arises if civil society groups playing other roles, such as advocacy or policy development, find it harder to gain ongoing funding.

Future prospects?

The question now is how civil society, and NGOs in particular, will evolve and transform itself in the still-changing environment following the UN mission's departure. A movement which began in response to military repression, which has played some strong advocacy and educational/mobilisation roles among the population, may now find itself largely concerned with service delivery in order to survive institutionally. With some notable exceptions, the advocacy role seems to be reducing, and NGOs may have lost their way a bit, due to significant staff changes within a very changed political and funding environment, in which both donors and the Timor-Leste government are expecting more development activities to be internally funded. There may still be uncertainty and ambivalence within government about how it views the roles civil society can play, as well as some criticism of their advocacy; whilst it may seek to use certain parts of civil society, notably the church and its organs, to deliver services to the population, it may feel more uneasy about the accountability demands from some parts of the NGO movement, as many governments do! The challenge to NGOs is to retain their values and maintain their emphasis on alternative development approaches. NGOs need to continue to seek ways to bring customary practices and modern development into dialogue to develop genuinely Timorese approaches to development which will benefit the poorest people and promote greater equality in the next decade. In particular, NGOs and women will have to reconcile the hierarchical Timorese customary power structures with its ascribed male leadership, with the nation's commitment to gender equality and universal human rights in the context of declining donor funding.

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Festschrift Panel:
Celebrating the work of Helen Hill

Edited by
Clinton Fernandes

"Populist Catholics": Fretilin 1975

Clinton Fernandes[1]

This paper builds on Dr Helen Hill's pioneering 1978 work on East Timorese nationalism by showing the influence of a populist, Catholic intellectual current on Fretilin's leaders, many of whom had been educated in Catholic schools and were practising Catholics. It shows how the 'Communist' label that Indonesia gave Fretilin reflected a pre-Vatican II hostility towards post-Vatican II Catholicism. In doing so, the paper explains why a senior Australian policymaker described Fretilin as 'the sort of party we would have welcomed, even encouraged, anywhere else than in Timor'. It suggests that a productive avenue of research would be a full-scale biographical analysis of the 46 deceased Fretilin Central Committee members.

From January to March 1975, a young Master of Arts student named Helen Hill travelled around East Timor carrying out research on the decolonisation process as it was occurring. She was there at a unique period; ominous events had occurred elsewhere with grave implications for Timor. Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and Indonesian President Suharto had met on 6 September 1974 in Wonosobo, Central Java, and Whitlam had expressed his preference for Timor to join Indonesia. Secret meetings had occurred in Lisbon between Indonesia and Portugal, and the Portuguese attitude had to some extent encouraged the Indonesians to incorporate Timor. An Indonesian destabilisation campaign designed to ensure East Timor's annexation (Operation Komodo) had been in progress since October 1974. Hostile radio broadcasts were emanating from West Timor, and an Indonesian Special Forces team had deployed to Atambua in order to train APODETI fighters.

The month after Helen Hill left, Indonesian Major General Ali Murtopo invited FRETILIN and UDT representatives to Jakarta at the same time but met them separately, stoking the flames of mutual distrust.

The long occupation and war of independence, as well as the interests of powerful states and media commentators, has influenced the way FRETILIN's founders have been portrayed. 46 members of FRETILIN's Central Committee in 1975 did not survive the war of independence. Who were they? What exactly was FRETILIN about in 1975? Were they, as Australian politicians, Indonesian politicians and many academics have said, an embryonic communist grouping that alarmed Indonesia's anti-communist military rulers, or were they something else? We now know, as a result of Australian intelligence records and diplomatic cables that have been declassified progressively in recent years, that the reality was quite different to the image.

Australian intelligence officers and policymakers in the 1970s had made their own assessment of FRETILIN. At the Joint Intelligence Organisation in Canberra (JIO, the forerunner to today's Defence Intelligence Organisation, DIO), Captain John Florent was the main author of an account of the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. Captain Chris Jones would later add to it. Before Captain Florent, Ms. Jenny Herridge handled the East Timor desk in the Office of Current Intelligence from March 1974 until December 1975[2]. At the Department of Foreign Affairs, Michael Curtin was the head of the Indonesia section.

Australian intelligence reported that:

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[1] UNSW Canberra

[2] As an aside, the NSW Coronial Inquest into the Balibo killings erroneously lists Lieutenant-Colonel Geoff Cameron as the Timor desk officer. In fact, Cameron had been a Lieutenant-Colonel in JIO's Directorate of Joint Service Intelligence (DJSI) until his compulsory retiring age. He then joined OCI as a civilian analyst on the Indochina desk. He began reporting on Timor after the invasion, when Jenny Herridge left JIO and went overseas. Peter Gibson was the Indonesian Army Desk Officer within DJSI from February 1974 to March 1977.

> Fretilin's ideology, largely unformed, was a strange blend of ideas imported from Portugal and the former Portuguese colonies in Africa. Within the party there was an awareness of the urgent need to develop a Timorese political identity and format, superimposed on a Catholic base. Most of the 45-member Central Committee were practicing Catholics; of the 10 main Fretilin leaders, at least four attended mass daily. Xavier do Amaral, Fretilin's president and President of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, was educated at the Jesuit seminary at Dare near Dili and later at a seminary in Macau. …
>
> Fretilin was a socialist-oriented party, but few members of the Central Committee seemed familiar with Marxist philosophy. Amaral and Lobato persistently stressed the need to develop a political system best suited to the economic and social environment and to an independent East Timor. They seemed to have been deeply committed to the development of cooperatives in commerce and agriculture as a means of improving the living standards and economic power of the indigenous Timorese. Nevertheless, they insisted that free-enterprise arrangements for Chinese entrepreneurs and foreign business interests would continue indefinitely.[3]

In a secret report, Michael Curtin, Indonesia section at DFA, wrote that Fretilin was 'the sort of party we would have welcomed, even encouraged, anywhere else than in Timor.'[4]

On the one hand, therefore, we see claims that are reported even today that FRETILIN was an embryonic communist grouping that alarmed Indonesia's anti-communist military rulers. And on the other hand, the head of the Indonesia section at Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs writes in a secret report that Fretilin is 'the sort of party we would have welcomed, even encouraged, anywhere else than in Timor.' There is a sharp difference between image and reality.

Fretilin's leaders, almost all of whom were in their twenties, sometimes used florid rhetoric. But their program focused on decolonization, land reform, administrative reform, popular education and the development of small industries based on primary products like coffee. In fact, one of the things that threatened UDT was a Fretilin initiative called 'alphabetizacao' or basic literacy. Many in UDT, which was dominated by conservative, land-owning families, complained that the workers on their coffee plantations and farms were happy and contented, and didn't need to be stirred up by troublemakers with their literacy programs.

The Indonesian New Order's hostility to the prospect of an independent East Timor must be understood in the context of its broader hostility to popular political activity in villages. The New Order regime had adopted an anti-democratic political ideology known as Organicism, which holds that the state and society form an organic unity. There was no room in this ideology for political competition or a democratic opposition. Organicism had been influential among Indonesian legal scholars who drafted the constitution in 1945. They had been influenced by anti-Enlightenment Dutch orientalism, Japanese proto-fascism and elitist Javanese political thought (Bourchier 1996). Under Suharto, Organicism was revived in full measure. Accompanying it was a political concept known as the 'floating mass', whereby 'people in the villages' were not to 'spend their valuable time and energy in the political struggles of parties and groups' but rather to 'be occupied wholly with development efforts.' Accordingly, the people were a 'floating mass' who 'are not permanently tied to membership of any political party' (Murtopo 2003, 45-46).

Thus, opposition to village-level mobilization was a foundational principle of the New Order regime. FRETILIN's commitment to working in the villages and its pursuit of land reform and public education would have been a successful example of a democratic alternative in the middle of the Indonesian archipelago. This is not to say that Fretilin was a model of libertarian political thought; rather, its work in mobilizing the inhabitants of the villages of East Timor was intolerable because the Indonesian public would be able to see a successful alternative to the New Order in their geographic midst. Influential Australian policymakers understood the Indonesian regime's concern. Michael Curtin acknowledged this frankly when he wrote, 'If an independent and politically radicalized East Timor were to make a go of it,

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[3] NAA 13685: JIO 1978
[4] NAA: A1838, 3038/10/2, ii.

with political and economic help not to Indonesia's liking, it would certainly become something for discontented Indonesians to look to.'[5]

What exactly did Helen Hill say about all this at the time? There has, of course, been no history of FRETILIN in the resistance, and no history of FRETILIN's external delegation (the latter probably for a very good reason!)[6]. And Helen's original research had been done as if the thesis was to be on the process of decolonisation as a whole, not on FRETILIN.

But while Helen was in Timor, the leaders of FRETILIN and UDT, most of whom were under the age of thirty, had formed a coalition. Both parties had agreed that East Timor should become independent. Indeed, they had agreed that they would form a transitional government.

Helen writes in her Introduction to the 2002 edition that 'In 1975 there was a sense of excitement, of expectation, among students and youth, a sense of "we can do anything" now that they believed independence was coming.' And Helen's research, with its seven 'themes' of early Fretilin nationalism, is a vital resource for reassessing who the FRETILIN leaders were, what they believed in, what they represented and whether their plan in the 1970s has any relevance for East Timor today.

Helen begins by describing East Timor before April 1974. There is a clarity to her gaze – an unflinching, unsentimental use of primary and secondary sources. She doesn't portray the Portuguese era as a completely happy time; far from it. She quotes a foreign eyewitness who visited East Timor in 1947 and saw forced labour in action, with Timorese labourers being whipped by a Timorese overseer while a Portuguese army Sergeant watched. 'The wounds on the men seemed to indicate that it was a fairly regular occurrence.'

Her analysis of education policy in East Timor under Salazar and Caetano is invaluable, and prefigures her lifelong interest in education as more than simply a transfer of information from teacher to student. She outlines how, even as international pressures forced Portugal to demonstrate a commitment to education in its colonies, it used its education policy to assimilate the East Timorese. She quotes Portuguese educationalist Adriano Moreira: 'Any people, seeking to convert a people of different culture to its own conception of life, has no choice but to turn to a special class, the intermediate, which abandons its traditional culture and makes it its mission to spread the new ways.'[7] Moreira wrote that education policy in Timor was designed 'to create a new class of people, the *assimilados*, who will carry out this task among the rest of the population, on behalf of the Portuguese.

She describes how the Catholic Missions, although 'heavily subsidised by both metropolitan and Provincial governments … still carried out education for the Timorese at much less cost to the government than the State run schools.'

She shows how the *ensino rudimentar*[8], later called *ensino de adaptacao*[9] was inferior to the *ensino oficial* (education provided by the State for European children), but that that was the whole point. In a

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[5] NAA: A1838, 3038/10/1/2, ii.

[6] See for example Dr Juan Federer (2005, 98), who has written of 'disappointments with the not very effective nor too honest leadership of the Fretilin External Delegation.' Federer writes, 'The "Fretilin External Delegation" functioned in Maputo and Lisbon. An Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of East Timor was recognized by Angola as well. Little documentary evidence exists of the work of this Delegation to foster the end of Indonesian occupation of East Timor. As mentioned earlier, they did, however, maintain contacts with leftist groups in various countries during the 1970s and 1980s that opposed the Indonesian occupation of their homeland. Stories of infighting, and misuse of funds donated for the work of the Delegation by well-meaning philanthropists do exist. The Delegation Head had no qualms in using such funds to buy an apartment that he simply turned into his personal property, nor did he later show any misgivings to turn a Portuguese wine exporting business, developed by Japanese supporters with the aim of generating funds for the resistance, into a personal business that made him wealthy. No effective disciplinary action was taken against him. For me, this reflected alarmingly on the prevalent attitudes of the group towards public property and the common good, and on their eventual conduct once they would be in power.'

[7] Moreira was Professor at the Institute for the Study of Overseas Territories in Lisbon. He later became Overseas Minister.

[8] Rudimentary education.

[9] Functional education.

memorable turn of phrase, Helen writes, 'The general aim of the *ensino de adaptacao* was to inculcate in the pupils a generalised feeling for being Portuguese while not giving them too many aspirations.' One would do well to ponder whether this description fits the education system in poorer schools today – both in East Timor and in wealthy countries!

Helen writes that 'the first year in *posto* and *suco* schools run by the missions was a preparatory year aimed at giving the children a grasp of the Portuguese language. Those who did not succeed in this year were severely handicapped in the rest of their education.' Once again, this 35 year-old description has powerful relevance to East Timor today.

Noam Chomsky has written about how reforms in early education can be a major lever of social change, and can lead the way to a more just and free society. Education can be used to encourage a combination of citizenship, liberty and individual creativeness, which means that 'education is not to be viewed as something like filling a vessel with water but, rather, assisting a flower to grow in its own way… in other words, providing the circumstances in which the normal creative patterns will flourish.'

This is worth keeping in mind when reading Helen's description of the curriculum of the next four years in *posto* and *suco* schools. The curriculum, she writes, 'consisted of reading, writing, arithmetic and the history of Portugal. Maps of Portugal hung on the walls of all classrooms, even in the remotest villages. Children were required to commit to memory the rivers, railways and cities of Portugal. Some of the later textbooks depicted life in the African colonies in addition to metropolitan Portugal but always stressing the superiority of the Portuguese way of life. Timorese culture and traditions were not mentioned in the classroom and neighbouring Asian countries rarely mentioned. There was a very high drop-out rate even at the primary school level.'

It's easy to picture many Timorese children sitting in class, bored but having to stifle their boredom, wanting to be elsewhere but forced to endure their daily routine. This happens in many schools in the richer countries too, and it does have a purpose – it prepares you for life as a worker, where what counts is punctuality, ability to stifle boredom and obedience to illegitimate authority.

Helen describes how 'Catholic religious orders, some from countries other than Portugal, ran some larger boarding schools which provided more significant education opportunities for the Timorese who attended them.' She writes that the Jesuit-run school at Soibada, founded in 1904, 'played an extremely crucial role in the education of the Timorese elite' and that 'the Jesuit-run *Seminario de Nossa Senhora de Fatima* at Dare, in the mountains behind Dili was an important centre' too.

Like the rest of Helen's thesis, these important observations should be read closely. We should remember that her thesis is a work of political analysis rather than a work of history. It's now read as a historical piece but that's only because of the passage of time, the oppressive 24-year occupation, the deaths of many of the people mentioned in her study and the shortage of subsequent scholarship in this area. But when it was written, it was a work of political and sociological analysis.

Fretilin's leaders, almost all of whom were in their twenties, were heavily influenced by the intellectual, cultural and political climate of the 1960s. Their teachers in the Jesuit schools had also been influenced by the same atmosphere, and by the Catholic Church's reforms in the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). For more than two decades before the Council, the pope had been the 'deeply authoritarian and antidemocratic' Pius XII (1939-1958). He had remained publicly silent in the face of the genocide in World War II, had excommunicated all members of the Communist party everywhere in the world but 'had not the slightest thought of excommunicating the Catholics Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels and Bormann' (Kung 2001, 177-79). Under his successor, Pope John XXIII, the Council corrected him on almost all decisive points. John XXIII had been an outspoken advocate of international social justice in his 1961 encyclical, *Mater et Magistra*. He had called on the Church to be open to the modern world and to affirm human rights in his 1963 encyclical, *Pacem in Terris*. The Second Vatican Council instructed the faithful that Church resources should serve truth, peace and justice, with special attention to the poor and dispossessed. Many of the future nationalist leaders of East Timor encountered the exhilarating intellectual atmosphere of the Second Vatican Council during their studies in the Jesuit schools, where their teachers critiqued colonialism and introduced their students to new ideas (CAVR 2005, section 7.1, 68). Fretilin's

young leaders absorbed all these lessons, to the annoyance of clerics who had spent the better part of their careers in the time of Pius XII.

Alongside Helen's seven 'themes' of early Fretilin nationalism is clear evidence of a populist Catholic intellectual current that exerted a major influence on Fretilin's early leaders. This is something I wish to explore in my paper. It has not received much scholarly attention, even though the great James Dunn pointed out that most FRETILIN leaders attended mass, some every day, and were upset that they were being refused communion (Dunn 1983). Dunn, a contemporaneous obsever, realised that they were being called communist because they had absorbed the spirit of the Catholic Church's reforms in the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).

As Helen writes in her Introduction to the 2002 edition of her book, 'In 1974 the FRETILIN leaders, despite almost all being Catholics, found themselves at loggerheads with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, which they found to be a legitimiser of colonial rule under the Portuguese.' The Church enjoyed state subsidies, tax exemptions, a privileged position in education and large land grants. Fretilin's leaders, many of them fresh out of the seminary and the ferment of the 1960s, criticized the Church's complicity in Portuguese colonialism, its wealth and its large land holdings. The head of the Church in East Timor was Bishop Dom Jose Joaquim Ribeiro, a conservative figure who was keen to protect the Church's privileged status in East Timor.

It is no accident that the first description of FRETILIN as a communist outfit comes from the Catholic church in Portuguese Timor. Bishop Ribeiro retaliated by describing Fretilin as communists and forbidding Catholics to vote for them (Smythe 2004, 36). His counterpart across the border, Bishop Theodore van den Tillart of Atambua, joined him in describing Fretilin as communists. He informed Australia's Cardinal Knox that Fretilin was receiving help from international communism and had committed extensive human rights abuses. Cardinal Knox subsequently worked in the Vatican (Smythe 2004, 72). The Apostolic Pro-Nuncio in Jakarta, the late Vincenzo Farano, was another Church figure who helped depict Fretilin as communists. He would host dinners for other foreign ambassadors at his official residence in Jakarta. A foreign diplomat who attended these dinners recalled that 'Indonesian officials would pontificate at the table about the Chinese and the Cubans interfering in Timor and the danger it represented to the region. And of course all these other ambassadors were sitting at the table totally ignorant of the situation, lapping this up as information.'[10] In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the Vatican adopted a position that these bishops were pushing. Various missions would come to the Vatican in later years and talk among themselves about how the situation in East Timor ended up as bad as it did. They would say that these clergymen had been partly responsible.

The New Order's hostility to an independent East Timor found its expression in the workings of a group of Indonesian Catholics who were closely linked to the Suharto regime and were instrumental in the decision to invade East Timor. These Catholics came out of the milieu of elite Jesuit schools such as Canisius College (known in Indonesia as Kolese Kanisius) and university student groups such as the Association of the Catholic Students of the Republic of Indonesia (PMKRI).[11] Indeed, following the rise of Suharto, PMKRI – a Chinese Catholic group – renamed itself the Centre for Strategic and Independent Studies (CSIS), which played a crucial role in the invasion of East Timor. PMKRI's principal members renamed *themselves*, choosing non-Chinese names. Many influential Catholic and non-Catholic Indonesians are alumni of Canisius College: politicians Akbar Tandjung, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Marzuki Darusman and Rachmat Witoelar, Jakarta governors Fauzi Bowo and Wiyogo Atmodarminto, Kostrad commander Erwin Sujono, businessmen R. Budi Hartono, Sehat Sutardja, Pantas Sutardja, Peter Gontha and Sofjan Wanandi, Head of CSIS Jusuf Wanandi, political analyst Wimar Witoelar, and many others.

As Liem Soei Liong, the human rights campaigner and alumnus of Canisius College has said,

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[10] J. Federer, Interview June 2009.
[11] Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia.

In those days, the Muslim schools were not very good. Nowadays of course it's different, so you can send your kids to a very good Muslim school, even very good Muslim universities, that have high standards. In those days we were the elite.[12]

Canisius College was established in 1927 by a group of Jesuit priests. It was named after Saint Peter Canisius, a sixteenth century Jesuit who played an important role in defending Catholicism against Protestant reforms in Europe. He was a key figure in the restoration of the Catholic Church in Germany after the Reformation. Peter Canisius was beatified by Pope Pius IX, a pontiff who was an 'unteachable opponent of all liberal movements … in politics, culture and theology' (Kung 2001, 160). It was Pius IX who had introduced the dogma of papal infallibility, and had rejected modern thought:

Clerical associations and Bible societies were condemned; human rights generally were condemned, as was freedom of conscience, religion, and the press, along with civil marriage. Pantheism, naturalism and rationalism, indifferentism and latitudinarianism, socialism and Communism were all condemned without any differentiation among them (Kung 2001, 162-63).

The liberal developments of the Catholic Church's Second Vatican Council in 1964 would not affect Indonesian Catholics for decades. Many Indonesian Catholic priests at the time were heavily influenced by the anti-Enlightenment views of Pope Pius XII, pontiff from 1939 to 1958. This pope had concluded the first international treaty with Adolf Hitler, who had come to power a few months before, thus giving him recognition in foreign affairs. According to the distinguished theologian, Hans Kung, Pius XII was:

aware of the affinity between his own authoritarian – that is, anti-Protestant, anti-liberal, anti-socialist, anti-modern – understanding of the church and an authoritarian fascist and Nazi understanding of the state: here were unity, order, discipline, and the Fuhrer principle at the level of the natural state, just as they were there at the level of the supernatural church (Kung 2001, 178).

In a very real sense, the 'Communist' label that Indonesia gave to Fretilin reflected a pre-Vatican II hostility towards post-Vatican II Catholicism.

Helen Hill's pioneering research points the way ahead for younger historians and political scientists who would like to undertake further research on who the FRETILIN leaders were, what they believed in, what they represented and whether their plan in the 1970s has any relevance for East Timor today. I suggest that a productive avenue of research would be a full-scale biographical analysis of the 46 deceased Fretilin Central Committee members. There would be some surprising fundings. Few today know, for example, that the late Antonio Carvarinho (Mau Lear) had been keenly interested in Althusser's analysis of culture, and had been thinking about how to apply it in the East Timorese context. There is so much more to be uncovered on the 46 deceased Fretilin Central Committee members: Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, Antonio Duarte Carvarino, Vicente Reis, Hamis Basarewan, Juvenal Inacio, Helio Pina, Cesar, Joao Bosco, Domingos Ribeiro, Sebastiao Sarmento, Guido Soares, Inacio Fonseca, Fernando Tchai, Ceu Pereira, Dulce Cruz, Joaquim Saldanha, Artur do Nascimento, Oscar Monteiro, Hermenegildo Alves, Mario Bonifacio do Rego, Sebastiao Montalvao Lais, Leopoldo Joaquim, Afonso Redentor, Diego Moniz, Antonio Pinheiro, Eduardo dos Anjos, Maria Jose Boavida, Natalino Leitao, Jose Maria, Manecas Crus, Guilherme Lere, Antonio Carvalho, Floriano Chaves, Antonio Barbosa, Paulo Rodrigues, Antonio Padua, Jose Andrade Sarmento, Venancio, Mariano Bonaparte, Bernardino Bonaparte Goinxet, Fernando Carmo, Guido Valladares, Borja da Costa, Oscar Sanches, Rosa Muki Bonaparte, Luis Carapina.

And there is also the risk of myth-making, poor research practices and outright falsehoods. To avoid this, it's worth paying attention to the great scholarship of Helen Hill – the clarity of her gaze and her unflinching, unsentimental use of primary and secondary sources. Nor can good research be done without those other remarkable qualities of Helen Hill – her lack of ego, her sense of cooperation with others, and her desire for a more just world.

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[12] Liem Soei Liong, *Interview with Clinton Fernandes*, 18 June 2009, Thornton Heath, UK.

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Helen Hill's contribution to the understanding of early East Timorese nationalism 1974-1975

Michael Leach

In early 1975 a young Masters student from Australia landed in Dili, intending to study the decolonisation process in Portuguese Timor. Instead, she quickly settled on a study of FRETILIN, a new political party, already emerging as a dominant political force in Portuguese Timor as it belatedly decolonised, and as a key vehicle for early East Timorese nationalism. Though her study enjoyed some circulation as a Master thesis[1] from 1978, it was finally published in 2002 as *Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor: Fretilin 1974-1978: the origins, ideologies and strategies of a nationalist movement*. Though only published a decade ago, her text is now quite difficult to locate outside libraries, a fact which some enterprising publisher should reflect upon. It is also worth noting that this work was available in Indonesian some time before it was accessible in its native English: such was the thirst for the relevant information on the early independence struggle among young East Timorese clandestine activists in the late 1990s. As a published work, it first appeared in Indonesian, translated in 1998/9 by RENETIL activists Aderito J. Soares and Nuno Rodrigues along with their Indonesian colleague Nug Katjasungkana, and printed in Dili in 2000 as *Gerakan Pembebasan Nasional Timor-Leste*'.[2]

This paper offers a critical appreciation of Helen Hill's pioneering contribution to the understanding of early East Timorese nationalism from 1974-5. It first overviews Hill's 'seven themes' of FRETILIN nationalism, arguing that were prescient analyses, have stood the test of time. Drawing on interviews, it also suggests one further theme of early East Timorese nationalist discourse.

Background

In the wake of Portugal's Carnation Revolution on 25 April 1974, four new political parties emerged to take different stances on future of then Portuguese Timor. In doing so, they each articulated distinct ideas of an East Timorese political community beyond the Portuguese colonial era. The first to emerge, the *Timorese Democratic Union* (UDT), initially advocated a longer transition to independence in federation with Portugal: a vision of political community which found some support in General General António de Spínola's proposal (during his brief tenure of Portuguese President from May to September 1974) for a Lusophone Federation between Portugal and its smaller colonies. The second party to emerge, with its nucleus in a group of disaffected nationalists in Dili's small educated elite was the *Timorese Social Democratic Association* (ASDT), advocating a rapid transition to independence, and outline a vision of an independent post-colonial nation, and a moderate social democratic program of popular literacy, land reform and raising an anti-colonial nationalist consciousness. Influenced by African anti-colonial movements, the ASDT renamed itself the *Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste* (FRETILIN) by September 1974. With little popular support, but led by a small number of Liruai and with powerful backers in Indonesia, *Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia* (later the *Timorese Popular Democratic Association* APODETI) agitated for integration with Indonesia. With a new President in Portugal by September 1974, Portugal's intention to divest itself of all colonies became clearer: a development which brought FRETILIN's and APODETI's respective positions more in line with the geopolitical realities of the situation, and soon drew the UDT to also support a more rapid tradition to independence, and into a short-lived coalition with FRETILIN by early 1975. Frequently neglected by

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[1] Helen Mary Hill. 1978. Fretilin: the origins, ideologies and strategies of a nationalist movement in East Timor. MA Thesis, Monash University.

[2] Helen Hill. 2000. *Gerakan Pembebasan Nasional Timor-Leste'*. Dili: Yayasan Hak and Sahe Institute for Liberation. Translators: Aderito J. Soares, Nuno Rodrigues and Nug Katjasungkana

historians (cf. Nicol 1978 Hicks forthcoming), a fourth party *The Popular Monarchic Association of Timor* (later *The Association of Timorese Heroes* - KOTA) outlined a different vision of East Timorese political community in which the traditional leadership would take a key role in the future state. Proposing a national parliament of local *Liruai* indirectly electing a 'popular' Monarch, KOTA sought to replicate some traditional elements of *Lisan* at a national level, albeit with a curious set of hybridised modern/ customary institutions.

Themes of early East Timorese nationalism

> The liberation struggle is above all, a struggle both for the preservation and survival of the cultural values of the people and for the harmonization and development of these values within a national framework (Cabral 1970 cited in Hill 2002, 72).

Strongly influenced by African nationalists, such as Guinea-Bissau's Amilcar Cabral, early FRETILIN leaders took the position that anti-colonial nationalism should do two things: it should draw upon popular and traditional values or symbols, but reframe these as the characteristics of unified modern nation or 'people'[3]. They therefore attempted to define an East Timorese national identity in ways which rejected Portugal's late colonial vision that the Timorese were members of a 'pluri-racial' Portuguese community (Ultramar 1970)[4], and which also transcended the local identities of distinct Timorese ethno-linguistic groups.

These 'dual features' can be found in much of early modern Timorese nationalism from 1974-5, and in this regard, Helen Hill's pioneering 1978 study remains the central source for its identification of seven 'themes of FRETILIN's nationalism (2002, pp.70-92). As Hill argues Fretilin rapidly had the task of developing a conventional 'third-wave' nationalism that expressed both *the right to self-determination* (89-90) and *opposition to Portuguese rule* (70-72), rejecting, for example, the UDTs early ideas of federation with Portugal. By the same token, Hill also identified nationalism as *the reassertion of Timorese culture* as another key theme. This mix was evident in the literacy campaigns in vernacular Tetun, using the literacy manual *"Rai Timor Rai Ita Niang" [Timor is our country]* (1975) which focussed on ordinary villagers' lives, and used the lessons as a vehicle for explaining the exploitative nature of colonial social relations, and the case for independence. This was also evident in use of traditional songs with new nationalist lyrics in FRETILIN campaigns, and the use of local languages in campaigning, which quickly saw FRETILIN support rise in the districts, reaching out beyond the small elite contesting power in Dili. The elevation of the nationalist generic 'Maubere' was the prime example of the 'dual character' of East Timorese nationalism, as it "gave new high status to traditional forms of social organization and in particular to democratic aspects of the traditional Timorese society, as ASDT founders saw them" (74). Early nationalist also valorised new heroes, moving beyond the colonial pantheon of 'Heroes of the Portuguese empire'. Thus Hill notes Fretilin early associations with both 1912 Boaventura uprising and, to a lesser extent, the 1959 Viqueque uprising in their campaigns, and early Timorese nationalist historiography such as Abiio Araujo interpreting the long history of the local uprisings from 1642 -1912 as wars of independence (Araujo 1977, Gunn 1999). Nonetheless, the use of traditional symbols was selective, and - as is discussed further below - relations between the Dili-based educated FRETILIN cadre and with traditional authorities were frequently tense and plagued by vastly different reference points.

At the same time, given the rapid movement of geopolitical realities, FRETILN rapidly had to *define East Timor as different from Indonesian Timor* to mobilise nascent nationalist sentiment against APODETIs ideas, and more importantly, against the growing threat of forced integration. FRETILIN nationalists therefore also framing the nation as one irrevocably divorced from west Timor by 400 years of

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[3] These processes has been variously depicted by scholars of nationalism as 'imagining a nation' (Anderson 1983) or by Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) as 'inventing" a national "tradition".

[4] This was expressed in the official *Timor: Pequena Monografia* as: "Portugal constitutes a pluri-racial community based on the equality of all citizens according to law and with respect to the cultural values of all the ethnic groups which comprise it". Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1970.

colonial history and experience, making distinction with Indonesian Timor an additional focus, and branding APODETI as 'neo-colonialist' force (Joint Communique 2). This in effect required a difficult shift in focus from a conventional anti-colonialist narrative to a more complex narrative of the differential impact of Portuguese colonialism on the eastern half of Timor, and its creation of a distinct political community over 450 years. It is this turn of events that gave East Timorese nationalism one element of its distinctive character.

The distinction with Dutch–colonised and Indonesian west Timor drove considerable reflection on the role of Portuguese colonialism in forging a separate national identity, and one notable feature of early Timorese nationalist historiography. *There is little question this was driven by the rising threat of Indonesian as decolonization process commenced.* As Hill notes, both ASDT and UDT were 'incensed' when in El Tari, the governor of west Timor, argued in September 1974 for the 'reunification' of Timor under Indonesian sovereignty, rejecting this primordialist position by noting that Indonesia was a 'recent phenomenon' comparison to the 450 year Portuguese presence, a different colonial power which had created "irreversible" difference between the two communities (Hill 79) by.

At this point it is useful to note a document in Portuguese from the period, unknown to 1970s researchers, which is a relatorio drafted by Alarico Fernandes and Ramos-Horta (1975) written after their visit to Jakarta in early 1975. Marked "private", the document details an internal debate over whether an independent Timor-Leste should associate itself with Southeast Asia or the South Pacific. Making a case for the advantages of "Grupo Pacifico Sul", the authors note a "better ethnic and cultural approximation" with the South Pacific cultures, more progressive regimes, richer countries (in Australian and New Zealand) and most importantly, the fact that the association would "deliver a valid argument against the thesis that Timor-Leste ought to integrate with Indonesia for reasons of geographical continuity, ethnic origin and cultural commonalities" (author's translation 1975, 2).

In addition, Hill identified the theme of *nationalism as national unity* – finding the commonalities that transcended ethno-linguistic groups, as a key concern of early nationalists. As Hill notes, outside the educated elites, and particularly in the rural interior, few saw themselves as East Timorese, and were more accustomed to view others ethno-linguistic groups as foreigners (2002, 77). FRETILIN also saw the division between language groups, reinforced by colonial practices of divide and rule and the transit pass laws, as a critical barrier to developing nationalist sentiment, and as noted above, become a political major theme of literacy program. Thus, for example, the manual focussed on identifying the Portuguese as a common source of oppression. Notably, the manual also included a map of Timor-Leste, allowing illiterate subsistence farmer, perhaps for the first time, to visualise the national territory and, with district capitals marked, their own place in it (Casa Dos Timores 1975, 10), providing a new national frame of reference to the literacy exercise.

Hills' final and related themes of *nationalism as economic advancement of Timorese peasants*, and *freedom from colonial or neo-colonial economic control* were positions evident in Fretilin's early manifestos. These included positions on diversified agriculture over exports to improve diets, and were matched by at least some grass roots activities during their effective interregnum in power from August to December 1975, including most notably Nicolau Lobato's pilot cooperative projects in Bazartete. Cooperative proposals also focused on key popular grievances regarding the low prices at which agricultural surpluses were bought by Chinese merchants (88). Though these programs were never widely deployed, they were popular in the areas they were developed. While wider proposal of 'economic reconstruction' remained on paper, along with the literacy program and the development of health clinics, these were successful in attracting many supporters to the party. This is perhaps an early example of state building linking closely with nation-building – as services provided centrally by state help foster belief in the nation as a locus of political community.

Each of Hill's themes were evident in policy positions in the FRETILIN program of 1975. While recognising Portugal as the only legitimate partner for decolonization (Joliffe 74 REF FRET) it demanded the immediate recognition by Portuguese of 'de jure' independence, the 'gradual elimination of colonial relations and structures', including the forced labour and colonial administrative structures, and the creation of co-operatives, 'which will be the basis of the economic and social life of East Timor' (FRETILIN 1975,

20). It also demanded the 'elimination of the colonialist education system and the fostering of Timorese culture' and the 'fostering of literature and art of various ethnic groups through cultural exchanges' (21). While allowing for the maintenance of 'traditional institutions of justice' (22), it was perhaps above all a clear call for the establishment of modern forms of political participation through 'organizations for workers, women, students and youths to facilitate political participation'.

It is argued below that beyond these seven themes of early East Timorese nationalism identified by Hill, one addition could be made. Alongside Hill's original list was also the idea of *Kore a'an*, or self-liberation, which focussed on the limitations on personal autonomy imposed by traditional and Church restrictions.

Self-liberation: *Kore a'an*

As an early member of the *Popular Organisation of Timorese Women* (Organizacao Popular de Mulher Timor - OPMT) Aurora Ximenes was involved in early FRETILIN campaigns in 1975, and throughout 1975-1978 in the *zonas libertadas*. According to Ximenes, one of the most important positions of early nationalists was to questions those aspects of tradition, colonial social relations, and of Church doctrine which limited the rights of individuals, and particularly women. She identified the concept of *kore a'an*, or 'freeing one's self', as a key theme in FRETILIN social thought in 1975 (Interview with author, 2010):

> This was the language that FRETILIN used... women must liberate themselves from culture... liberate themselves from the customs and traditions that tie them down. Women must free themselves. In order to do this women have to participate in politics, they must be socialised and raise political awareness amongst the people, so that everyone awakens to the need to improve oneself...to change and move forward, and for this we need independence. Because for almost 500 years, Portugal ruled over us and the situation of women remained the same. This is what they said to women, activist women like the students in UNETIM [Association of East Timorese students] … Fretilin started because of these students. Female students and male students began talking about these things.

Ximenes explains that *kore a'an* encompassed a range of challenges to prevailing norms, from opposing the narrow gender roles for women reinforced by Timor's patriarchal society to other practices such as the harassment of single women, and polygamy[5]:

> We began to organise women's groups in order to tell them: "Now you must liberate yourselves from the customs that bind you and prevent you from going out on your own. Now you too can speak, this is your right. You too can leave the house, your safety is assured"… because in the past when women went out on their own people would harass them. So FRETILIN issued an order: "Nobody should harass women. Even if a single woman walks together in a group with five men you must ensure that this woman is not harassed. Whoever harasses this woman will have to come and do a self-criticism. He must come and in front of the people admit: 'Today I harassed a woman'. Women you must be brave and speak up when you have been harassed, insulted or sworn at and say: 'You cannot not speak to me like that'".

In OPMTs view, though the limitations on women's autonomy had been reinforced by colonialism, change would also require a critique of traditional society. In this respect, the idea of *kore a'an* was instrumental to a modernising nationalism, representing a fundamental view of citizen equality and women's active participation which together constituted an important challenge to aspects of custom. As Ximenes commented:

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[5] Regarding polygamy, Ximenes stated: "Another way men suppressed women was through polygamy. Polygamy was when a man marries two, three wives. This means that the first wife is not free. So [Fretilin] policy was to declare... 'Men cannot have more than one wife. If not, the first wife will be unhappy. There will be fights in the home and the rights of one or the other will be oppressed.' So, that's why we called this *'kore a'an'*, personal liberation" (Interview with author, 2010).

There are some places in Timor and some cultures where women are free like in Bobonaro and some parts of Manatuto where their parents also give them rights. They don't just give rights to their sons but also to their daughters. But in most of Timor and to this day discrimination exists. To give women freedom, women must also participate and think "I too must come to the realisation that what we teach in the home is wrong. I don't have education, I am not economically independent" ... So, women must free themselves, but they have to participate in their own liberation and recognise that "Yes, I too have the right to do this or do that". That is what I mean by 'kore a'an', to liberate oneself.

As noted above, the FRETILIN literacy booklet provided the tools for traditional communities to envisage a wider "imagined" community of Timor-Leste, and emphasised the common position of Timorese in relation to both Portuguese colonial authorities, and Chinese traders. An early FRETILIN song, recited to the author by Aurora Ximenes in 2010, highlighted these themes, which were also critical of traditional authorities.

> *Malae ho China naok tein,*
> The Malae [Portuguese] and Chinese are thieves
> *Liurai sira mos beik*,
> the Liurai are ignorant.
> *Ema riku ho matenek sira ne'e bosok ita*
> The rich and educated are making fools of you

As the song indicates, dealing with tradition rural Timorese often proved a difficult area for young *assimilado* nationalists from Dili. Hoping to convert Liurais to their side, and with some success, FRETILIN tread reasonably carefully around traditional authorities, depicting them – at worst - as dupes of colonial authorities rather than as complicit. Aurora Ximenes recalls her experience as a young OPMT activist:

> Back then many Liurai were also uneducated … they didn't understand that others were exploiting Timor. When we went to the mountains and rural areas we would sing our songs ...and sometimes the Liurai would also listen to the words and think: "Yes, it is true, in the past we remained silent in the face of the oppression of our people". But we didn't confront the Liurais directly saying: "You, Liurai, are like this or like that". Their participation in the struggle for independence was also important. …The Liurai were like the servants of the Portuguese among the people but they were too afraid to speak out.… So people sang these songs because that is what they wanted to express, rather than bad-mouthing them …. The Liurai also participated in the struggle for national liberation.

At times it was also clear that they had gone too far. While the literacy campaign was a success for recruitment, as Hill (2002, 108) comments "[h]ostility was aroused in some areas when Fretilin leaders made attacks on the 'sacred' Portuguese flag". Instructively, Fretilin leaders would later realize that a better strategy was to suggest a new *lulik* in the Fretilin flag, rather than to ridicule these attachments as "religious superstition" (2002, 71).

Conclusion

While Helen Hill's important study sits alongside other important primary accounts of the critical 1974-5 period (e.g Jolliffe, Nicol) it remains the work that focussed most closely on a thematic analysis of early East Timorese nationalism. Tellingly, the desire to understand and circulate this type of analysis was substantial in clandestine RENETIL circles in the 1990s, and Hill's work was translated in 2000, appearing first in Indonesian. It has been argued here that one additional theme was that of *kore a'an*, or self-liberation, evident in the way early FRETILIN nationalists and OPMT feminists sought to challenge traditional and Church norms. Helen Hill's contemporary analysis in 1975 remains a far-sighted one which

subsequent study, even given the enormous benefit of hindsight, has tended to validate, even if subsequent splits in the independence movement were yet to become evident.

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How Timor-Leste influenced my academic career: A response to the papers by Michael Leach and Clinton Fernandes

Helen M Hill

I am most grateful to the Timor-Leste Studies Association for deciding to hold this *festschrift* session for me. I am also most grateful to Aderito de Jesus Soares, Nuno Tchailoro Rodriques and Nug Katjasungkana, who found my 1978 Monash Politics Masters' thesis in 1999 and, with my permission, translated it into *Bahasa Indonesia* (Hill 2000) so that by the time I arrived in Dill in 2000 it was being quoted by the UN and others and easy to get published in English (Hill 2002)! The papers by Michael Leach and Clinton Fernandes about my 1978 Master's thesis in Politics provide me with an opportunity to reflect on the impact which writing this thesis had on my life both as an academic, a public commentator and an activist and to try to put into perspective the huge influence which Timor-Leste and its protracted struggle for self-determination has had on my career. In this presentation I plan to reflect on the context of the times in which I decided to embark on the study of Timor, what I have learnt from Timor for other parts of my teaching and research and ponder on some future directions for Timor-Leste studies in the light of these. It is also worth pointing out that two Timorese, Estêvão Cabral and Antero Bendito da Silva have already written PhD theses which expand considerably our knowledge of further aspects of FRETILIN's contribution to the 24 years using mine as a jumping off point (Cabral 2002; da Silva 2009). Two autobiographies by young males involved in the clandestine movement (Pinto & Jardine 1999; Rei 2007) have also been written and many shorter pieces by women who reflect on their experience in the FRETILIN women's organization OPMT (Conway 2009; Fernandes-Alves, Abrantes & Barros dos Reis 2006; Sequeira & Abrantes 2012). Hopefully Timor-Leste studies will develop in such a way as to encourage, support and provide the bibliographic resources for much more research like this to be done before some of the major players become too old or infirm to be interviewed.

The question of how I came to choose the topic of decolonization in Portuguese Timor for my Master's thesis back in 1974 probably requires some explanation. I did not come to the MA straight from my Bachelor's degree, and it barely related to what I had done as an undergraduate at Monash, which had been Sociology, with a major in Politics and an honours thesis on the American sociologist C. Wright Mills (after failing first year Science at University of Melbourne). While working at my first job after graduation, Assistant Lecturer in Humanities at RMIT in 1970, I was fortunate to attend the UN World Youth Assembly in New York as a delegate of the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF), having been an activist in the Australian section of this movement, the Australian Student Christian Movement (SCM).[1] The Assembly was an eye-opening experience for me; despite having been a supporter, at Monash of a campaign to aid the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, I had never met members of liberation movements, and there were many at the Assembly particularly from Africa. It was also the first time I took part in womens' liberation movement discussions then known as 'consciousness-raising'. On my way home I stopped at Beirut and visited Palestinian refugee camps with WSCF members in Lebanon, completely changing my views on the Middle East. I also stopped in Madras (now Chennai) to become part of the Australian delegation at the Assembly of World University Service of which I was a committee member.[2]

All these experiences made me realise that teaching Australian sociology at RMIT was not where I really wanted to be for the rest of my career, and I was fortunate enough to be offered a low- paid internship

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[1] In the late 1960s and early 1970s ASCM and the WSCF had undergone a radicalizing period as a result of mass university expansion, the Vietnam War and other factors described by historian Renate How (Howe 2009).

[2] World University Service (WUS) was an international co-operation organization between staff and students around the world established after World War II as World initially at the initiative of WSCF, the international Catholic students' organization Pax Romana and the World Union of Jewish Students.

in London working for the 'Europe-Africa Project' of the WSCF funded by the United Presbyterian Church of the USA. My participation in the anti-apartheid movement in Australia (Jennett 1989, 107-9) had barely prepared me for all the extra knowledge I would gain, particularly about the Portuguese colonies, right next to South Africa, and which gave added power to the *Apartheid* regime. Members of FRELIMO, PAIGC, and the Angolan liberation movements came regularly into our office and were present at the Europe-Africa student conferences in Italy that I attended. They frequently asked me what I knew about Portuguese Timor, as it was so close to Australia, I had to confess I knew little of Timor; except that it was the cheapest way to leave Australia.

In London I also attended some MA courses at London University's School of Oriental and African Studies in anthropology and economic history of South East Asia, being aware that Australia was located closer to this region than to Africa and that I should learn more about this region, having travelled around Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia and Indonesia immediately after completing my undergraduate study.[3] Through the Association for Radical East Asian Studies (AREAS), I met Carmel Budiardjo and John Taylor, later to become significant activists and writers on East Timor (Budiardjo and Liem 1984; Taylor 1991, 1999; Taylor, Gomes et al 2011). Carmel was about to launch TAPOL, which lobbied, highly successfully, for the release of Indonesian political prisoners. John Taylor, a student of Indonesia, was involved in innovative thinking about Development Theory (Taylor 1979). I also joined the Campaign for Independence in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné-Bissau, almost as large as the anti-Apartheid movement. Portugal was still in the grip of a fascist dictatorship so there was not much movement between the UK and Portugal. When the 'Carnation Revolution' came in April 1974 I was in Africa, on my way back to Australia, and wrote about it for the national weekly *Nation Review* (Hill 1974).

While in Europe I also got to know controversial Paris-based Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett, through conferences on the Vietnam War. Burchett was just beginning to write on the Portuguese colonies in Africa (Hill 1986). I also attended seminars with the legendary Brazilian educator Paulo Freire and his Geneva-based group of Brazilian exiles. He was, at the time based at the World Council of Churches, and working particularly in Tanzania and Chile on reform of education. I arrived back in Australia just as he was on tour here, and successfully gatecrashed his conference with Australian educators! (Hill 1973; Freire 1994, 180).

In 1974 I was offered a tutoring position at Monash with Dr Herbert Feith in an innovative course called 'Politics of the Third World' which covered many of the issues I had studied in London, including the green revolution, inequalities, education and development, peasant movements, the struggle against colonialism, dilemmas of aid, education and development and many others (Purdey 2011, 168). One day Herb asked whether I was considering writing a Masters thesis. While I hadn't yet contemplated enrolling, I told him I was a bit interested in Portuguese Timor. The 'Carnation Revolution' meant that major changes would be taking place there. Herb, a leading scholar of Indonesia who had been barred from the country due to his insistence of looking into human rights issues responded enthusiastically, and wanted to supervise it. Suddenly I realized what a good topic it would be for me. Of course I believed I would be going to Portuguese Timor to observe and write about its transition to Independence! (Purdey 2011, 376).

After reading everything in the Monash library about Portuguese Timor, which didn't take long, the project gained momentum when I received a phone call in August from Herb telling me 'there's a man from Portuguese Timor in Melbourne, you had better try to meet him'. I phoned a hotel in Lygon Street, Carlton, and a couple of days later met Jose Ramos-Horta on his first visit to the southern states of Australia (Hill 1974; Ramos-Horta 1987, 75-6; Freney 1991, 339). Our first meeting in a nearby cafe was an eye-opener. I learnt for the first time of the establishment of the pro-independence Timorese Social Democratic Association - *Associação Social Democratica Timorense* (ASDT) which was working closely with the

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[3] These units were taught by anthropologist Andrew Turton and Malcolm Caldwell, the Scottish Marxist economic historian and founder of the Journal of Contemporary Asia, who was sadly killed in Cambodia by persons unknown on 23 December 1978. Their neo-Marxist approaches and that of John Taylor undoubtedly influenced what I looked for in Timor and my own sociological writings at the time (Hill 1975) although, as Michael Leach pointed out in his oral presentation I did not use much social theory in the thesis.

Portuguese leaders of the Armed Forces Movement *Movimento das Forces Armadas* (MFA), the democratically minded soldiers who had brought about a revolution in their own army to bring an end to Portuguese fascism. The MFA was committed to decolonization of all Portugal's territories as early as feasible and we all knew that they would not be ruling Timor for much longer. Ramos-Horta urged me to come to Timor as early as possible and promised co-operation with his political association and introductions to the other two, UDT and *Apodeti* as well as the Catholic Church and the Portuguese. I became excited that I would actually know someone there when I arrived and set about to prepare. Two Australians I knew had already made their way to Portuguese Timor: Denis Freney, founder of the Sydney-based Campaign for Independent East Timor (CIET) (Freney 1975) and LaTrobe University student Grant Evans of the Australian Union of Students (Evans 1975). Former Australian Consul James Dunn had already been back to Dili and written a report for the Parliament (Dunn 1974) and I had met him in Canberra. In September the ASDT, influenced by the African liberation movements, changed its name to *Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente* – FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor).

The first flight I booked to Timor, on the $40 TAA Fokker Friendship service from Darwin to Baucau, never left; thanks to the arrival of Cyclone Tracy the previous day. I rebooked and I set out on a lengthy voyage via Jakarta, Bali and Kupang to reach Portuguese Timor early in 1975. My three months fieldwork was a whirlwind of visits with Portuguese officials, political party leaders, church leaders, founders of the students, workers and women's groups, and travel in the FRETILIN Landrover to remote parts of the country with some of its leading members including Ramos-Horta, Mari Alkatiri, Nicolau Lobato and Rogerio Lobato. The Timorese Chinese community provided lavish hospitality for the FRETILIN leaders in their restaurants when they travelled, and I was often a beneficiary of that. The country was covered with rainforest and several times we had to wade through swirling rivers, arm-in-arm in waist-deep water, while young Timorese men carried the Landrover on their shoulders. There was an atmosphere of expectancy and optimism throughout the territory as the new leaders of the MFA tried to get local political leaders together to effect a program of decolonization (Hill 2002, 96-138).

However the Melbourne *Age* headline of February 22nd 1975 'Indonesia plans Armed Takeover in Timor' created anxiety and sent two groups hurrying from Australia while I was still there. One was a delegation of Parliamentarians, including Ken Fry and Senators Gordon McIntosh, Arthur Gietzelt and Liberal Neville Bonner (Jolliffe 1978, 251; Viviani 1978/2000; Dunn 1983, 153-7; McIntosh 1983; Fry 1985; Freney 1991, 349). The other was of civil society organizations and included Jill Jolliffe representing the Australian Union of Students, Mark Aarons of the Journalists Union and John Birch of Community Aid Abroad (Jolliffe 1978, 106; Aarons 1992; Blackburn 1993, 97).

Gathering information and views in Portuguese Timor was not as difficult as I thought it would be, despite not speaking Portuguese or any of the Timorese languages. I started studying Portuguese, the language of all the political party leaders whom I interviewed, but usually found someone with enough English to translate. Back in Melbourne I enrolled in an intensive course of Portuguese at LaTrobe University, intending to visit again in the next term break, and was still doing the course when the news of the full-scale invasion came, putting an end both to my thesis topic and effectively preventing me from returning to East Timor for another 24 years. On the day of the Indonesian military assault on Dili, a meeting in Melbourne planned to hear a report from David Scott of CAA, who had just returned from Dili. The Australia-East Timor Association was formed. This organization still exists and I am currently its chair (Freney 1991, 363; Blackburn 1993, 104; Scott 2005, 30). A booklet I wrote in 1976 'The Timor Story' (Hill 1976) ensured that I was excluded as long as the Indonesian army was there. I more or less dropped out of the MA and spent three months in New York helping Jose Ramos-Horta establish the FRETILIN diplomatic office[4], and giving seminars on Portuguese Timor at US universities. At Cornell I met Ben Anderson and Arnold Kohen who later both made a huge contribution to understanding of the Timor issue in the USA (Kohen 1977, 1999; Anderson 1993, 1996). In Europe I revived my contacts from the Europe-

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[4] Others who were involved in assisting the FRETILIN office on a more long-term basis were David Scott, Richard Tanter, Sue Rabbitt Roff and Glenda Lasslett (Scott 2005, 87-96; Purdey 2011, 376-7)

Africa Project to inform them about what was happening in Timor, and spoke at a big conference in Germany with Indonesian exiles in Germany and Timorese students from Lisbon. On returning to Melbourne I was persuaded by Herb Feith that I could resurrect the thesis as a study of the nationalist movement, FRETILIN, its outlooks and strategies.

It is thus pleasing to find, some thirty years later, that there is still such interest in my book, despite the fact that as Michael Leach points out, 'future splits in the independence movement were yet to become evident, and other divisions from 1974-5 period would later be strategically reconciled' (Leach this volume). Both Michael and Clinton have pointed to aspects of the nationalist movement which need more discussion, namely the religious and ideological origins of the ideas the FRETILIN founders proposed and to a further, more identity-related concept of Timorese nationalism additional to those I described in 1978: the concept of *korea'an*, or 'self-liberation'.

I agree with Clinton Fernandes that most of the FRETILIN leaders could be called 'Populist Christians', influenced a great deal by the teachings in Catholic Social Justice they had received from the Jesuits. Naturally, this does not fully explain how they differed from others who had a similar education but who formed or joined other political associations. I found in 1975 that the leaders of all parties, including Apodeti and UDT had a remarkably similar education. As Clinton writes in his 2011 book:

> Leaders tended to come from the same circles: some were from *liurai* families, some were *mestizos* (people of mixed race), while others were wealthy landowners. Several UDT leaders held relatively senior positions in the civil service because they had been members of the *Accao Nacional Popular* (ANP), which was the only legal party during the dictatorship. By contrast, although the FRETILIN leaders had similar backgrounds, many had had run-ins with the Portuguese colonial authorities, or had been denied advancement within the colonial service. Thus, the FRETILIN leaders had no great love of the Portuguese colonial regime. APODETI leaders came from areas that were near the Indonesian border or had other ties to Indonesia (Fernandes 2011, 14).

I would add that the main differences were probably within FRETILIN itself, with those who studied in Portugal, in particular Vicente '*Sah'e*' Reis and Antonio Carvarinho (*Mau Lear*) becoming more radical than those who stayed in Timor, as they were exposed to the ideas of other liberation movements in Portuguese colonies and to ideas such as that of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire in addition to various currents of Marxism. Being a populist Catholic would not necessarily assist with recruitment of rural people to FRETILIN as less than 30% of Timorese were baptized Catholics at the time of the invasion in 1975 (Smyth 2004, 35). Several writers who know more about the Catholic Church than I do, have argued that there was no Liberation Theology in Portuguese Timor, even under the occupation (Hull 1992; Cristalis and Scott 2006). And a careful reading of Patrick Smythe's (2004) book, reveals few influences in Timor, either then or now, of the truly radical Christianity, such as Liberation Theology, which makes use of a Marxist class analysis, which was influential in Latin America. An exception was Father Rocha, a follower of Marxist Columbian priest Camillo Torres, was expelled from Timor at the request of Bishop Ribeiro in October 1974 (Hill 2002, 63).

The figure of Father Martinho da Costa Lopes, the first Timorese Apostolic Administrator in the colony, showed a different face of Catholicism. Initially a conservative, he was right wing enough to represent Timor in the Portuguese Parliament in the 1950s and 60s, as a member of the government party (the only party). While remaining theologically conservative, he opened up his newspaper *Seara* in the 1970s to diverse views, including quite a few from FRETILIN, leading to its closure by the Portuguese authorities (Hill 2002, 53-4). By 1983 he was removed from his position by the Vatican at the request of the Indonesian Bishops who claimed he was a Communist. On his only visit to Australia he was snubbed by most Australian Bishops who found him too close to FRETILIN (Lennox 2000). The career of the much more well-known Bishop Belo followed a remarkably similar trajectory from conservative to being under suspicion for being too close to the resistance (Kohen 1999). 'Populist' might be a better word to describe both these church leaders than 'leftist'. The FRETILIN leaders, on the other hand were mostly on the left, their ideas coming from secular movements, due to their anxiety about the close relations between the Church and the Portuguese state.

It is clear that the Indonesian government continually confused Nationalism (particularly Timorese nationalism) with Communism and defined anyone who disagreed with them as a Communist. It is clear also that even those FRETILIN members who admitted to the title of 'Marxist' (possibly including Mau Lear, Vicente Sa'he, Abilio Araújo and Xanana Gusmão)[5] were often using aspects of it, such as the class analysis and preferential option for the poor advocated by radical clergy, rather than the concept of the vanguard party, and that none of them applied it to FRETILIN as a whole movement. Clinton's suggestion that the biographies of the 46 deceased FRETILIN Central Committee members be a priority for research is a good one. Many of their relatives are still alive and a study of their background, political outlooks and involvement in the struggle would give us a great deal of insight into Timorese society and the impact of nationalism.

Michael Leach takes up the issue of *korea'an*, or 'self-liberation' described by women's leader Aurora Ximenes as 'freeing one's self' from the customs and traditions that tie us down, expressed from a feminist viewpoint but clearly applicable not only to women. This takes me back to the old 'consciousness-raising groups' of the second-wave feminist movement in the USA and Australia and raises the important issue of the role of women in the nationalist movement in the 1970s. In the thesis I quoted Rosa 'Muki' Bonaparte, the founder of the FRETILIN women's organization OPMT, *Organização Popular da Mulher de Timor* (Popular Organization of Timorese Women), whose September 1975 speech had already been published in Australia. She quotes the twin objectives of OPMT as 'firstly to participate directly in the struggle against colonialism, and second, to fight in every way, the violent discrimination that Timorese women have suffered in colonial society' (Bonaparte 1976; Hill 2002, 160). While I regarded this at the time as exemplary and more progressive than the 'women's wings' of most of the African liberation movements, at the time of writing the FRETILIN thesis I had not seriously engaged with the issues of gender and culture in predominantly subsistence societies as I later did in the Pacific.

I have observed in my forthcoming book on Timor-Leste's transition to independence that 'of all the changes that took place during the twenty-four years of Indonesian occupation... one of the most remarkable has been the changing roles of women and changing gender relations' (Hill 2014). This has been accompanied by huge changes in attitude which have emerged, I believe stemming in part from the attitudes, views and policies of the founders of the OPMT which has influenced women and even many male leaders of all political parties, not just FRETILIN, through the intensive work done by Timorese women in the Diaspora as well as inside the country.[6] The question is whether all the male nationalists have reached this awareness as Aurora Ximenes is presumably referring to men as well as women when she speaks of *Korea'an.*

In 1979 I received an offer of a PhD scholarship at the ANU Centre for Continuing Education to work with noted Adult Education specialist Dr Chris Duke, at the time, Honorary Secretary of the International Council of Adult Education then under the Presidency of Paulo Freire, with Canadian Budd Hall, the founder of participatory action research as its Executive Director.[7] I wished to focus on the liberating possibilities of education, and influenced by an outstanding conference I attended at the University of New South Wales in 1976 (Mamak and McCall 1978), decided to turn my attention to the Pacific Islands region as I was not welcome in Indonesia or any ASEAN country and almost no one at the ANU wanted to hear about an independent East Timor! My research in Fiji, New Caledonia and US Trust Territory on non-formal education and development arose out of my previous contact with Brazilian

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[5] See Kammen (2010) and Fernandes (2011, 65) for the view of Marxism espoused by Xanana Gusmão in 1982.

[6] For example Milena Pires, who worked initially in Australia and later in the UK on gender issues throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Pires 1999) was a member of UDT and later PSD in the first Parliament. Since July 2010 she has been a member of the UN's Committee which oversees the CEDAW Convention, the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

[7] Dr Duke was Director of the ANU Centre for Continuing Education, a vibrant section of the ANU engaged in public debate, community education and outreach in the Pacific Islands and Asia through ASPBAE, the Asian and Pacific Bureau of Adult Education. Sadly the ANU did not regard Education as a priority field of research and never made Chris a professor. Before I submitted my thesis he had accepted a position as Professor of Adult Education and later Deputy Vice-Chancellor at Warwick University in the UK. The CCE no longer has academics or PhD students.

educator Paulo Freire, who had inspired the FRETILIN Literacy programs I had visited on horseback with Jose Ramos Horta, Antonio '*Mau Lear*' Carvarino and Vicente '*Sa'he*' Reis in February 1974 (Hill 2002, 109-114). I'll never forget *Mau Lear* and *Sa'he* as we rode away from the FRETILIN literacy school on our Timor ponies; they were full of enthusiasm as they explained their philosophy to me and two Australian journalists. 'We are going to be the best country in Southeast Asia' said *Mau Lear* exuberantly. Thinking of the region at that time, the Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos conflicts only just finished, political prisoners in most Asian countries, no economic development to speak of as yet, perhaps it wouldn't be too difficult to be the best country in ASEAN. I thought of this moment again when reading Clinton's paper: the analysis of FRETILIN by DFAT's Michael Curtin was that 'FRETILIN was the sort of party we would have welcomed, even encouraged, anywhere else than in Timor.' It was, at that stage, an exemplary party, with modest, fair and achievable goals in agriculture and employment, a good sense of co-operation with the Portuguese to move towards independence. Many an Australian colonial officer in PNG probably longed for a party like FRETILIN in the fragmented Trust Territory they were trying to bring to independence as one country at the time.

My Pacific research and participation brought me in contact with other nationalist movements in particular the *Front de Liberation Kanak et Socialiste* (FLNKS) led by Jean Mari Tchibau – sadly killed by one of his own militants in Noumea. There was a time when I believed New Caledonia would become independent before East Timor. It also brought me in contact with the women's movements throughout the Pacific, to the founding of a Women and Development Network of Australia (WADNA) (Melville 1983) and to organizing a group of women to go to the UN's Nairobi Women's conference in 1985. But there was no getting away from Timor. In 1984 Jose Ramos-Horta asked me to arrange for him to speak at the National Press Club in Canberra which I did (Ramos-Horta 1984). In 1985 Pat Walsh of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) arranged for three Timorese women to attend the Nairobi conference so we spent a great deal of our time in Nairobi helping organize meetings and contacts for Emilia Pires, Inés Almeida and Mimi Ferreira. While this group made a solid and timely contribution to the Diplomatic Front, in making women and governments from all regions aware of the nature of the Indonesian occupation and resistance against it,[8] it was women inside the country such as Maria Domingas 'Micato' Fernandes Alves, Laura Abrantes, Beba Sequeira and Filomena Barros dos Reis as well as Milena Pires who made more of a feminist analysis of the nationalist struggle (Fernandes-Alves, Abrantes & Barros dos Reis 2006; Sequeira & Abrantes 2012).

After two years in Fiji following my PhD, working for the Commonwealth Youth Program, I was asked to apply for a tenured position at the newly established Victoria University in the western region of Melbourne to teach Pacific studies. We identified a need among Pacific island students coming to Melbourne for a course for those wanting to work with youth, women, environmental groups and other civil society organizations, and so the BA (Asia-Pacific Community Development) was born. It was not long before Diaspora Timorese found out about this course and began to join it. I will never forget one Timorese student in my class in the early 1990s saying to me 'you were in Timor in 1975 and got your Masters there, what are you doing these days for the Timorese Resistance?' This was Salustiano Freitas, who later organized a conference of Diaspora Timorese in Melbourne to mobilize them to take more of a role in the Diplomatic Front (ETRA 1996). At a seminar where Herb Feith spoke immediately after the fall of Suharto, I met three Timorese academics[9] who seemed determined not to want to waste a moment to push for

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[8] Following their Nairobi experience these three women spoke at many other conferences in the region (Pires 1986; Ferreira 1985; Almeida 1995). A larger group of Timorese women participated in the Beijing women's conference. Emilia and Inés were later to participate in the CNRM conference in Perniche in 1998 but it was probably Milena Pires and Ana Pessoa who had a greater influence on the gender ideas in the final document the '*Magna Carta*'.

[9] These were Faustino Gomes, spending a year in the Anthropology Department at Monash, and boarding with the Feith family, Joao Cancio Freitas, a Masters Student in Business at my own university and Dr Balthasar Kehi, a lecturer at Yarra Theological Union, Box Hill who did not know each other before that meeting but who immediately got together to plan what they could do. Shortly afterwards Joao Cancio was appointed, together with Emilia Pires by the CNRT, to convene a conference on future development planning for Timor, before the Ballot of 1999 (Freitas 1999).

independence, surprising some of the Indonesians present. After that there was no going back to a leisurely life as a Pacific studies or even Pacific Community Development academic. The issues in Timor-Leste seemed so urgent compared to those of the Pacific Islands, even though some of them were facing turmoil as a result of neo-liberal globalization (Hill 2000). Victoria University was offered funding by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer to co-organize a conference on Future Strategic Development Planning for East Timor with the resistance coalition (the CNRT before the Ballot of 1999), and the University appointed me to join Emilia Pires and Joao Cancio Freitas on the committee. The role of Australia at this time has been well documented by many writers, including Clinton Fernandes (2004).

When Timor-Leste became independent Victoria University began to receive scholarship students from Timor. In first semester 2000 I was granted study leave in Timor-Leste and was based at the National University of Timor Loro Sa'e in its first year of operation (Hill 2000). I began to write the book I had intended to write in 1975 on the decolonization of East Timor and its transition to independence. Although never having studied history, I am deeply aware of the need for a historical approach to all problems and value very much the contribution of scholars such as Clinton (who gave a paper on the 1978-79 Famine at the recent UNTL-VU Conference on Future Directions for Food in Timor-Leste). Having come from being a sociologist of a social movement, the nationalist movement in Portuguese Timor, I had drifted both geographically and academically into emancipatory adult education and participatory development. My experience in New Caledonia made me realise that Timor-Leste could be getting much more out of its agriculture with more carefully designed education for farmers such as found in the *Maisons Familiales Rurales* (Hill 1987). This has led me in recent times to an interest in the sociology of agriculture, from the local to the global, and trying to explain the lack of impact of higher incomes on rural livelihoods, in contrast to the Pacific islands, most of which have much less cash than Timor-Leste yet a more adequate standard of living as reflected in their higher Human Development Indices. We are developing a series of small projects involving Timorese and outsiders which I am hoping can become a model of co-operation between academics and practitioners. Timor-Leste studies has a bright future if it continues to engage with Timorese academics, civil society, students and other professionals in cross-disciplinary discussion, debate, collaborative learning and research. The participation in this session at the TLSA conference gave me great inspiration to see large numbers of Timorese and Malae researchers working together and hopefully we can all go on to do even greater things.

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Mengerti Timor-Leste 2013

Diedit oleh
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Investigasi Dan Identifikasi Kuburan Massal Korban Perang Di TImor-Leste

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Latar belakang

Sejarah Timor-Leste ditandai dengan konflik bersenjata berkepanjangan, khususnya pada tahun-tahun 1974-1999 dalam perang kemerdekaan Timor-Leste dan pembebasan tanah air dari penjajahan milter asing. Konflik yang terjadi lebih dari dua dekade berakhir pada akhir tahun 1999 melalui referendum di bawah pengawasan PBB.

Konflik multi-dimensi diperkirakan bahwa konflik bersenjata telah menewaskan sekitar 183 000 itu orang tersebut. Entah dibunuh atau hilang secara ilegal atau mati karena kelaparan dan penyakit dan penyebab lain yang berkaitan dengan konflik (CAVR 2005). Oleh karena itu sejumlah kuburan massal dan situs-situs pembantaian sering ditemukan di beberapa tempat baik di kota atau di hutan. Pembantaian selama dan setelah referendum tidak dapat diperkirakan, namun sekitar 413 kasus telah ditemukan dan diidentifikasi oleh Unit Kejahatan Berat *(Serious Crime Unit)* (CAVR Press Release 27 June 2008).

Tragedi pembantaian Santa Cruz pada 12 November 1991, merupakan salah satu peristiwa tragis yang pernah terjadi dalam sejarah perjuangan Timor-Leste yang diperkirakan 86 orang hilang (Komite 12 Novembru 2010).

Selain itu, sejumlah kasus pembantaian yang tidak dilaporkan telah terjadi selama pendudukan militer Indonesia sehingga seringkali ditemukan situs-situs kuburan massal baik di daerah dekat pemukiman masyarakat maupun di daerah-daerah pegunungan yang merupakan daerah yang terisolasi dan jauh dari jangkaun media.

Sejarah pencarian korban konflik bersenjata

Proses pencarian korban dan situs-situs kuburan massal maupun kuburan individu dilakukan oleh keluarga korban, para anggota veteran, petugas forensik, maupun relawan lain seperti komite 12 November 1991, Comandante Cornelio Gama 'L7'. Operasi lima hari oleh dua batalyon infantery di sekitar distrik sektor timur dalam pencarian tulang para gerilyawan dan kuburannya termasuk korban di pihak sipil (Jolliffe 2003). Pencarian tulang dan dan kuburan yang dilakukan atas inisiatif anggota veteran dan pasukan F-FDTL pada tahun 2003 dengan area pencarian disekitar wilayah (*Rejiaun*) I, II dan III (*Rejiaun*: wilayah yang meliputi Distrik Lautem, Baucau, Viqueque, Manatuto dan Manufahi). Operasi sivil dan militer telah melakukan ekshumasi lebih dari 250 orang yang merupakan korban dalam perjungan pembebasan tanah air dari pendudukan militer Indonesia (Lusa, 2003). Proses identifikasi dari sisa-sisa tulang yang ditemukan didasarkan pada peryataan saksi mata maupun pada barang milik *(personal belongging)* yang ditemukan bersamaan dengan tulang korban *(secundary identification)* serta karakteristik khusus lainnya, terutama gigi yaitu adanya gigi palsu dan atau *dental mulation* (*based on the presumtively identification)*.

Program pencarian kuburan massal dan kuburan individu dilakukan oleh beberapa agensi internasional. Unit Kejahatan Berat (SCU) yang didirikan pada tahun 2000 oleh *United Nations Transitional Autority in East Timor* (UNTAET) melalui *UN Security Council Resolution* 1272 (1999) membentuk *Serious Crimes Unit* (SCU) dengan mandat bertanggungjawab melakukan investigasi dan menyiapkan indicmen ke pengadilan para pelaku yang bertanggungjawab atas kejahatan terhadap kemanusian *(crimes against humanity)* dan kejahatan berat lainnya yang terjadi di Timor-Leste pada tahun 1999. Mandat SCU berakhir pada bulan Mei 2005 dan mengikuti Resolusi Dewan Keamanan PBB 1543 dan 1573, SCU mengakhiri seluruh investigasi pada tanggal 30 November 2004. Kemudian pada tahun 2006 dengan fungsi utama melakukan resume fungsi investigasi bekas Unit Kejahatan Berat Team Investigasi Kejahatan Berat (JSMP 2007).

Pembentukan Team Forensik Internasional (ITF)

Sejak tahun 2008 *Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine (*VIFM) dan *The Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team* (EAAF) membentuk Team Forensik Internasional (ITF) bekerja sama dengan Komite 12 November dibantu oleh Unit Forensik PNTL melakukan ekshumasi situs Tibar yang diduga merupakan tempat kuburan massal 12 November 1991. Selain di Tibar, IFT melakukan ekshumasi di kuburan Hera dan menemukan 16 tulang korban yang diduga merupakan korban tragedi insiden 12 Nobember 1991. Hasil analisis DNA menunjukkan 12 individual terindentifikasi positif (Blau, 2010). Individu yang terindentifikasi positif diserahkan kepada keluarga korban untuk selanjutnya di makamkan kembali.

       Unit Forensik Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste yang di merupakan bagian integral dari *Servisu Investigasaun Kriminal* (SIK) dibentuk oleh UNPOL *(United Nations Police)* sejak tahun 2000. Unit ini bertanggungjawab melakukan *crime scene investigation*, termasuk pencarian dan penggalian situs-situs kuburan massal dan kuburan tersembunyi untuk tujuan investigasi kriminal serta untuk identifikasi yang bertujuan kemanusian *(humanitarian).* Sejak didirikannya, Unit Forensik PNTL bekerjasama dengan berbagai institusi lokal maupun internasional dalam melakukan ekshumasi kuburan para korban perang diseluruh teritori Timor-Leste.

       Unit Forensik PNTL sebagaimana halnya dengan layanan forensik lainya di dunia dalam dalam melakukan investigasi atas kerangka manusia menyusul konflik bersenjata dan situasi lain dari kekerasan bersenjata terdapat dua tujuan utama. Pertama adalah memperoleh *(recover)* dan memeriksa kerangka untuk tujuan investigasi kriminal, termasuk menentukan penyebab dan cara kematian; kedua adalah mengidentifikasi kerangka, dan jika memungkinkan kembalikan ke keluarga korban (Tidball-Binz 2009, 9).

Hipotesis Kuburan Massal Insiden 12 November 1991 di Tibar

Tibar terletak 15 km sebelah barat ibu kota Dili. Sejak tahun 1991 banyak kalangan yang percaya bahwa para korban insiden 12 November 1991 telah dikuburkan secara massal oleh ABRI/TNI (Angakatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/Tentara Nasional Indonesia) beberapa hari setelah insiden. Berdasarkan informasi dari sumber-sumber di Timor-Leste dan atas inisiatif Komite 12 November bekerja sama dengan VIFM, EAAF di bantu oleh tim forensik lokal guna melakukan ekskavasi area Tibar pada tahun 2008. Ekskavasi dilakukan pada dua situs yang disebut Tibar site 1 dan Tibar site 2. Baik di Tibar site 1 maupun di Tibar site 2 tidak ditemukan adanya kuburan massal.

Gambar 1 dan 2 Tiber site 1

Gambar 3 Tibar site 2 sekitar 500 m arah barat tibar site

Kuburan Hera

Kuburan Hera terletak di arah timur ibukota Dili, lokasi ini menurut beberapa saksi ada 19 orang korban dari peristiwa 12 November 1991 telah dimakamkan di kuburan ini sehari setelah kejadian termasuk Jamal, ia adalah salah seorang waratawan asing (warga negara New Zeland) kelahiran Malaysia dan Francisco da Silva (alias Chico Bina Raga), atlet angkat besi. Keluarga Chico percaya bahwa ia (Chico *red*) telah dikuburkan di kuburan Hera sehingga keluarga melakukan penggalian kembali kuburan yang diduga tempat Chico dikuburkan dan mengenakan pakain pada kerangka yang ditemukan di kuburan tersebut. Namun

pada hasil analisis DNA *excluded* (Blau & Fondebrider 2010). Kuburan ini juga pernah digali oleh Komisi Pencari Fakta yang dibentuk oleh Soeharto, Presiden Republik Indonesia.

Gambar 4 foto ekshumasi kuburan Hera

Kuburan Massal di Distrik Viqueque

Distrik Viqueque merupakan salah satu Distrik di mana ditemukan sejumlah kuburan massal tersembunyi. Sebuah kuburan massal di daerah Manu-Boe, Sub Distrik Ossu, ditemukan 8 kerangka. Menurut saksi mata yang juga merupakan TBO (Tenaga Bantuan Operasi) ABRI/TNI memberikan kesaksian bahwa ke 8 orang tersebut adalah tahanan dari Base Camp Viqueque yang dibantai oleh militer Indonesia batalyon infanteri 741.

Menindak lanjuti infomasi ini, para keluarga korban melakukan ekshumasi dan menemukan 8 kerangka dalam satu kuburan dengan posisi tidak teratur. Kerangka dikumpulkan dan dilakukan identifikasi secara *presumtive* (mengira-kira) berdasarkan barang milik yang ditemukan bersamaan dengan kerangka. Ke 8 orang yang diduga hilang di pusat penahanan militer Viqueque pada tahun 1984, mereka adalah: Domingos Salsinha, Abilio Maria Alves, Duarte Azis, Hermenegildo Soares, Abilio Amaral, Manuel Soares, Caetano de Fatima Soares dan Mateus do Rosario. Hasil analisis DNA mengidentifikasi secara positif 2 orang korban yang bukan termasuk dalam kelompok 8 orang yang hilang di *Military Detention Center Base Camp Viqueque* tahun 1984.

Tiga kuburan massal di temukan secara insidenesial di daerah Adarai, desa Beaco, Viqueque. Satu dari ketiga kuburan yang telah digali oleh team forensik telah menemukan 5 kerangka dalam satu kuburan. Sementara dua kuburan lainya yang (berdampingan) diperkirakan antara 5- 6 individu per liang. Secara sepintas, team forensik telah membuka kedua kuburan tersebut untuk memastikannya dan tampak beberapa kerangka terdapat didalam kuburan tersebut. Menurut informasi dari keluarga bahwa sekitar 18 orang telah di bantai oleh ABRI/TNI dan dikuburkan di lokasi itu.

Pencarian kuburan massal/ kuburan individu yang tersembunyi makin hari, makin meluas ke seluruh daerah. Para keluarga korban (orang hilang) dengan inisiatif sendiri mencari anggota keluarganya

yang hilang selama konflik bersenjata. Tidak adanya framework, minimnya sumber daya manusia serta sulit mendapatkan saksi mata, merupakan hambatan dalam upaya pencarian kuburan massal maupun kuburan tersembunyi. Hal ini yang membuat para keluarga mencari anggota keluarganya yang hilang dengan menggunakan cara-cara klasik dan tradisional yakni dengan melakukan acara-acara ritual dengan harapan bahwa mereka akan mendapat petunjuk atau arah untuk menemukan kuburan anggota keluarganya yang telah hilang. Begitu juga dalam proses identifikasi yang dilakukan cenderung mengira-kira *(presumtively identification)* dan secara visual.

Pengenalan secara visual, evidence yang ditemukan bersamaan dengan kerangka *(associated evidence)*, seperti barang milik personal *(personal belonging)*, dan juga dokumentasi, seperti laporan saksi mata, mungkin dapat digunakan untuk presumtive identifikasi atas kasus tunggal dan tanpa *hard scientific identification*, resiko identifikasi salah sangat signifikan (Tidball-Binz 2009, 11). Begitu juga halnya apabila digunakan untuk kuburan massal, resiko identifikasi palsu tidak dapat dihindari dihindari.

Kuburan Massal di Tasi-tolu

Team Forensik Intenational (ITF), Unit Forensik PNTL dan Komite 12 November menemukan dua kuburan massal di daerah tasi-tolu. Dalam kedua kuburan tersebut ditemukan 9 kerangka individu. Para korban diikat kedua tangan dan matanya sebelum dieksekusi yang terjadi sekitar akhir tahun 1970an dan awal tahun 1980an . Melalui DNA analisis dua orang diantaranya diidentifikasi secara positif (Blau & Fondebrider 2010).

Kuburan Massal di Distrik Lautem

Di sebuah bekas pos militer (ABRI/TNI) ditemukan dua kuburan didalamnya terdapat 3 kerangka individual. Menurut Idalia Soares yang merupakan anak dari salah satu korban mengatakan bahwa keluarga korban melakukan penggalian atas dua kuburan yang diduga merupakan kuburan anggota keluarga mereka yang hilang pada tahun 1980. Ekshumasi dilakukan pada tanggal 7 Desember 2009. Setelah setahun lamanya kerangka para korban disimpan dirumah keluarga kemudian diserahkan kepada petugas unit Forensik PNTL dan ITF untuk dilakukan identifikasi lebih lanjut. Dua dari ketiga kerangka diidentifikasi secara positif melalui DNA analisis.

Di desa Home, Sub Distrik Lospalos ditemukan sebuah kuburan massal. Menurut keluarga korban Maleve Guerra bahwa korban tersebut adalah korban pembantaian yang dilakukan oleh pasukan ABRI/TNI Batalyon Infanteri 745 setelah jajak pendapat tahun 1999. Kuburan ini pernah dilakukan ekshumasi pada tahun 2012 oleh UNPOL dan PNTL Distrik Lautem karena ada dua kelompok keluarga berbeda yang saling mengklaim kuburan tersebut. Dengan saling klaim, keluarga korban meminta bantuan Unit Forensik PNTL untuk melakukan ekshumasi dan identifikasi melalui DNA analisis. Team Unit Forensik melakukan ekshumasi dan menemukan 5 kerangka manusia dalam satu kuburan dengan posisi tidak teratur. Hasil pengujian awal menunjukkan bahwa para korban disiksa sebelum dibantai.

Pencarian Kuburan Individual

Dua buah kuburan tersembunyi ditemukan di Area Builelo Lau, aldeia Mausoi, desa Tibar, Distrik Liquica diduga kuburan Pedro Nunes seorang tokoh klandestin dan Remigio Tilman. Menurut João Tavares de Araújo, orang yang menemukan kuburan tersebut. Kedua kuburan ini pernah dibuka oleh Team Forensik dari SCU pada tahun 2001. Dan pada tahun 2008 keluarga korban membuka kembali kedua kuburan. Unit Forensik PNTL diminta oleh keluarga korban untuk melakukan ekshumasi dan identifikasi. Hasil DNA analisis menunjukkan bahwa kedua korban *excluded.*

Pada tanggal 13 september 2012, Pemerintah Timor-Leste melalui wakil Perdana Menteri Fernando Lasama bersama Team forensik PNTL melakukan ekshumasi satu kuburan individu yang terletak di Sub Distrik Atabai, Distrik Bobonaro. Kuburan ini diduga kuburan José da Costa alias Mauhunu, seorang lider Dewan Nasional Perlawanan Timorense (CNRT). Terjadi polemik diantara keluarga dimana terdapat dua

kubu, satu kubu tidak menghendaki untuk dilakukan ekshumasi sehubungan dengan isu politik, sementara kelompok kedua ingin melakukan ekshumasi dan identifikasi dengan melakukan DNA analisis.Hingga saat ini belum adanya kesepakatan antara kedua kelompok keluarga yang berbeda pendapat sehubungan dengan isu kematian Mauhunu.

Ibu kandung Mauhunu sendiri menolak untuk memberikan sampel darah untuk tujuan identifikasi. Alasan penolakan memberikan sampel darah adalah terkait dengan kontroversi pengunsian Mauhunu ke Kupang, Indonesia setelah jajak pendapat 1999.

Polemik kematian Comandante Nino Konis Santana (NKS) juga menyebabkan proses transladasinya terhambat selama 10 tahun. Namun dengan adanya kerjasama yang baik antara keluarga dan pemerintah akhirnya dapat dilaksanankan dengan baik. Pihak keluarga meminta bantuan Unit Forensik PNTL untuk melakukan ekshumasi kuburan Comandante Nino Konis Santana walaupun semua pihak menolak dilakukan pengujian baik secara antropometrik maupun DNA analisis. Meskipun demikian, pengujian antropologis tetap dilakukan dengan menggunakan data-data sekunder yang diperoleh dari orang terdekat dan dicocokkan dengan data atau evidence yang bersamaan dengan kerangka NKS. Identifikasi didasarkan pada komparasi *Post Mortem dental record* dan *Ante Mortem dental record* dan hasilnya identifikasi positif.

Ekshumasi kuburan individu para pimpinan perlawanan sering mengalami berbagai persoalan politik, budaya dan judisial terutama pada kasus-kasus kematian yang kontroversial mulai dari Nicolao Lobato, David Alex, Pedro Nunes, José da Costa dan Nino Konis Santana.

Diskusi

Belum adanya regulasi atau framework yang mengatur tetang ekshumasi kuburan massal maupun kuburan individu korban konflik 1974-1999 sehingga banyak keluarga korban melakukan ekshumasi sendiri atas situs-situs yang duga kuburan anggota keluarganya yang hilang. Beberapa institusi yang melakukan ekshumasi hanya berdasarkan atas permintaan keluarga, pemerintah, termasuk lembaga kejaksaan.

Setelah melakukan ekshumasi, keluarga korban cenderung melakukan identifikasi secara presumtive berdasarkan data-data sekunder yang diperoleh dari saksi mata maupun barang bukti yang ditemukan bersamaan dengan kerangka korban. Indentifikasi secara presumtive dapat disarankan untuk *single-case* namun untuk kasus kuburan massal perlu hindari identifikasi secara presumtive dan perlu dilakukan identifikasi secara ilmiah baik dengan menggunakan metode konvensional maupun modern (analisis DNA). Hal ini perlu adanya suatu mekanisme legal untuk dapat mengatur pihak-pihak yang berhak melakukan ekshumasi dan ataupun identifikasi terutama untuk tujuan kemanusian.

Hasil

Pencarian kuburan massal maupun kuburan individu korban konflik bersenjata masih terus berlangsung, baik dilakukan oleh team forensik berdasarkan permintaan keluarga, pemerintah maupun institusi lainya, namun karena kurangnya saksi mata dan tidak adanya pengakuan dari *perpetrator,* sehingga sulit untuk menemukan kuburan tersembunyi.

Penemuan secara insidensial akan kuburan massal/individu tersembunyi serta kerangka manusia (lengkap ataupun tidak lengkap *(body parts))* di seluruh teritori Timor-Leste. Namun karena minimnya Data Ante Mortem (AMD), SDM serta belum tersedianya fasilitas laboratorium forensik menyebabkan sejumlah kerangka tidak dapat teridentifikasi. SCU telah menguburkan kembali kerangka yang tidak terindentifikasi di pemakaman sementara. Sedangkan kerangka tak terindentifikasi lainya yang ditangani oleh Forensik PNTL dan Team Forensik Internasional dilakukan preservasi dan sambil mencari informasi adisonal. Sekitar 52,78% dari kasus yang ditangani oleh Forensik PNTL dan ITF terdeteksi secara positif melalui DNA analisis. Para korban yang telah terindendifikasi positif, dikembalikan kepada keluarganya untuk dimakamkan kembali secara adat ataupun diserahkan kepada pemerintah RDTL untuk dilakukan pemakaman secara resmi di Taman Makam Pahlawan *(Jardim das Herois)* Metinaro.

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Pengaruh Gaya Kepemimpinan, Budaya Organisasi, Motivasi Dan Kepuasan Kerja Terhadap Kinerja Karyawan Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta

Domingas de Jesus dos Reis

Latar Belakang

Seiring dengan semakin kompetitifnya persaingan bisnis, maka perusahaan dituntut memanfaatkan keseluruhan sumber daya manusia yang dimilikinya untuk menciptakan suatu keunggulan yang inovatif. Di era kompetitif masalah utama yang dihadapi salah satunya adalah rendahnya kualitas penanganan terhadap sumber daya manusia. Jumlah sumber daya manusia yang besar apabila dapat didayagunakan secara efektif dan efisien bermanfaat untuk menunjang gerak lajunya pembangunan berkelanjutan. Koesmono (2005) menjelaskan bahwa memanfaatkan sumber daya manusia secara optimal diperlukan sumber daya yang mempunyai pendidikan yang berkualitas, penyediaan berbagai fasilitas sosial, lapangan pekerjaan yang memadai. Permasalahan bagaimana menciptakan sumber daya manusia yang menghasilkan kinerja yang optimal sehingga tujuan perusahaan dapat tercapai. Kinerja karyawan adalah hasil kerja seorang karyawan selama periode tertentu dibandingkan dengan kriteria yang telah ditentukan dan disepakati bersama.

Menurut Schwab dan Cummings (Summer 1971) dalam review teori tentang *performance and satisfactions*, pada awal telah difokuskan pada riset empiris untuk mengevaluasi dan me-review *theoritical propositions* yang menekankan hubungan antara kepuasan dan kinerja. Ada tiga hal penting patut dipertimbangkan yaitu: 1) bahwa kepuasan mempengaruhi kinerja, posisi yang secara umum diasosiasikan dengan konsep awal hubungan manusia, 2) pandangan bahwa hubungan kepuasan dan kinerja dimoderasi oleh sejumlah variabel, 3) pandangan yang menyatakan bahwa kinerja mempengaruhi kepuasan. Penelitian ini lebih menekankan pada teori yang pertama.

Kepemimpinan berpengaruh terhadap kinerja kelompok untuk mencapai keberhasilan organisasi. Pemimpin mempengaruhi karyawan dengan memberi penghargaan untuk menumbuhkan semangat kerja karyawan. Kemudian karyawan lebih fokus dan bertanggungjawab terhadap tugasnya. Peran pemimpin penting dalam sebuah organisasi, jika pemimpin tidak mampu mempengaruhi, menggerakkan, memfasilitasi bawahannya dengan baik, otomatis sangat berpengaruh terhadap kinerja karyawan.

Menurut Ruvendi, Ramlan (2005), dalam Davis, Keith (1985), gaya kepemimpinan merupakan pola tindakan pemimpin secara keseluruhan seperti yang dipersepsikan oleh para pegawainya. Gaya kepemimpinan pengaruh terhadap kinerja karyawan. Apabila pemimpin dalam kepemimpinannya memberikan perhatian pada kebutuhan bawahannya, seperti memberikan gaji sesuai beban kerja individu, adanya kebijaksanaan memberikan kesempatan kepada karyawan untuk berkembang guna membangun kelompok-kelompok kerja yang efektif dengan tujuan kinerja yang tinggi maka karyawan merasa puas dan kinerja karyawan juga semakin baik. Kemudian pekerjaan yang dibebankan kepadanya dijalankan secara lebih baik dan lebih bertanggungjawab.

Menurut Chen (2004), pencapaian kerja individu dengan hasil kerja yang baik, mencakup kepuasan kerja, maka ada kecenderungan individu untuk tetap bertahan dengan organisasi, dan keterlibatan dalam pekerjaan tergantung kecocokan antar karakteristik individu dengan budaya organisasi. Dengan dukungan nilai-nilai budaya organisasi yang kuat, karyawan merasa lebih nyaman dan puas dalam pengabdiannya guna mencapai tujuan bersama.

Koesmono (2005) menekankan kepuasan kerja sebagai perasaan dan reaksi individu terhadap lingkungan pekerjaannya, sedangkan Robinson & Aprila (2005), mendefinisikan kepuasan kerja merupakan berbagai sikap yang berbeda terhadap komponen-komponen pekerjaan misalnya sikap terhadap pekerjaan itu sendiri, apakah menantang atau tidak terhadap upah, apakah cukup atau tidak. Kepuasan kerja merupakan masalah strategis, karena tidak terpenuhinya kepuasan kerja karyawan berdampak pada hasil kerja yang jelek, dengan kualitas kerja yang rendah dan target perusahaan tidak terpenuhi dan akhirnya

kepuasan kerja berkurang dan kinerja karyawan juga menurun. Apabila ini terjadi, maka perusahaan menghadapi masalah yang sangat serius yaitu hancurnya kegiatan perusahaan.

Hasil penelitan sebelumnya menunjukkan gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi kerja, dan kepuasan kerja serta kinerja karyawan sangatlah penting bagi setiap organisasi terutama organisasi nonprofit. Maka peneliti tertarik untuk mengetahui Pengaruh Gaya Kepemimpinan, Budaya Organisasi, Motivasi Kerja, dan Kepuasan Kerja Terhadap Kinerja Karyawan Tetap Bidang Administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta. Fenomena riil yang terjadi pada Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta,variabel-variabel yang diangkat oleh peneliti masih menemukan banyak kelemahan. Diantaranya, sampai saat ini yang masih menjadi masalah di Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta adalah masalah kepemimpinan dan kepuasan kerja. Disebabkan adanya pergantian pemimpin dengan karakter yang berbeda, kemudian kepuasan kerja yang belum optimal, seperti karyawan tidak puas dengan pekerjaan itu sendiri, sehingga menyebabkan kinerja karyawan bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta menjadi naik turun.

Dari uraian latar belakang penelitian di atas maka dapat dirumuskan permasalahannya, sebagai berikut:

2) Apakah variabel Gaya Kepemimpinan, Budaya Organisasi, Motivasi Kerja, dan Kepuasan kerja berpengaruh signifikan terhadap Kinerja Karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta?
3) Apakah variabel Gaya Kepemimpinan, Budaya Organisasi, Motivasi Kerja, dan Kepuasan kerja secara parsial berpengaruh signifikan terhadap Kinerja Karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta?
4) Variabel apa yang paling berpengaruh diantara Gaya Kepemimpinan, Budaya Organisasi, Motivasi Kerja, dan Kepuasan Kerja Terhadap Kinerja Karyawan Tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta?

Hasil dan Pembahasan

A. Analisis Responden

1. Analisis Deskriptif Karakteristik Responden
Bagian ini akan dibahas mengenai pengaruh gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi dan kepuasan kerja terhadap kinerja karyawan pada Karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta, dengan responden sebanyak 100 orang yang dapat dirinci pada tabel beriku:

Tabel 1 – Deskriptif Karakteristik Responden Berdasarkan Pangkat, Masa Kerja, Jenis Kelamin, dan Pendidikan Terakhir

Pangkat		Masa Kerja				Jenis Kelamin		Pendidikan Terakhir			
II	III	1-7	8-15	16-22	23-32	L	P	SLTA	D III	S1	S2
64	36	28	42	17	13	42	58	47	39	13	1

Sumber: Data Primer diolah (2010)

Karakteristik responden berdasarkan pangkat menunjukkan bahwa mayoritas Karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta termasuk dalam golongan II, sebesar 64,0%. Mayoritas tergolong mempunyai masa kerja antara 8 – 15 tahun. Dilihat dari Jenis Kelamin, mayoritas karyawan perempuan sebesar 58%. Dilihat dari tingkat pendidikan, mayoritas karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta berpendidikan SLTA/ sederajat sebesar 47%.

B. Analisa Variabel

Analisis data yang digunakan meliputi analisis deskriptif dan analisis kuantitatif.

1. Analisis Deskriptif Variabel

Analisis deskriptif untuk mengetahui kecenderungan level gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi, kepuasan kerja dan kinerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta.

a) Analisis variabel gaya kepemimpinan
Gaya kepemimpinan diukur dengan 21 pertanyaan, setelah dirata-rata, sebagai berikut:

Tabel 2 – Distribusi Responden Berdasarkan Gaya kepemimpinan

Interval	Kategori	Frekuensi	Persentase (%)
1,00 – 1,79	Sangat rendah	0	0,0
1,80 – 2,59	Rendah	1	1,0
2,60 – 3,39	Cukup tinggi	17	17,0
3,40 – 4,19	Tinggi	62	62,0
4,20 – 5,00	Sangat tinggi	20	20,0
Total		100	100,0
Rata – rata		3,8629	

Sumber: Pengolahan Data Primer 2010

Dari 100 responden tidak seorang pun (0%) termasuk kategori sangat rendah, 1 orang sebesar (1%) termasuk kategori rendah, 17 orang (17%) termasuk kategori cukup tinggi, 62 orang (62%) termasuk kategori tinggi, dan 20 orang (20%) termasuk kategori sangat tinggi. Rata-rata nilai gaya kepemimpinan sebesar 3, 8629, nilai ini berada dalam rentang 3, 40-4, 19. Kategori nilainya adalah "tinggi". Menunjukkan tingkat gaya kepemimpinan yang diterapkan pada Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta tergolong tinggi.

b) Analisis variabel Budaya organisasi
Budaya organisasi diukur dengan 15 pertanyaan, setelah dirata-rata, sebagai berikut:

Tabel 3 – Distribusi Responden Berdasarkan Budaya organisasi

Interval	Kategori	Frekuensi	Persentase (%)
1,00 – 1,79	Sangat rendah	0	0,0
1,80 – 2,59	Rendah	1	1,0
2,60 – 3,39	Cukup tinggi	13	13,0
3,40 – 4,19	Tinggi	61	61,0
4,20 – 5,00	Sangat tinggi	25	25,0
Total		100	100,0
Rata – rata		3,8927	

Sumber: Pengolahan Data Primer 2010

Dari 100 responden tidak seorang pun (0%) termasuk kategori sangat rendah, sebanyak 1 orang (1%) termasuk kategori rendah, 13 orang (13%) termasuk kategori cukup tinggi, 61 orang (61%) termasuk

kategori tinggi dan 25 orang (25%) termasuk kategori sangat tinggi. Jadi karyawan cenderung memberikan penilaian yang tinggi terhadap budaya organisasi, dengan nilai rata-rata sebesar 3, 8927. Dalam tabel_3 pada kolom interval, nilai ini berada dalam rentang 3, 40 – 4, 19 yang berarti tingkat budaya organisasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta tergolong tinggi.

c)   Analisis variabel Motivasi Kerja
Motivasi diukur dengan 12 pertanyaan, setelah dirata-rata,sebagai berikut

Tabel 4 – Distribusi Responden Berdasarkan Motivasi Kerja

Interval	Kategori	Frekuensi	Persentase (%)
1,00 – 1,79	Sangat rendah	0	0,0
1,80 – 2,59	Rendah	3	3,0
2,60 – 3,39	Cukup tinggi	14	14,0
3,40 – 4,19	Tinggi	56	56,0
4,20 – 5,00	Sangat tinggi	27	27,0
Total		100	100,0
Rata – rata		3,8642	

Sumber: Pengolahan Data Primer 2010

Dari 100 responden tidak terdapat orang (0%) termasuk kategori sangat rendah, sebanyak 3 orang (3%) termasuk kategori rendah, 14 orang (14%) termasuk kategori cukup tinggi, 856 orang (56%) termasuk kategori tinggi dan 27 orang (27%) termasuk kategori sangat tinggi. Jadi karyawan cenderung memiliki tingkat motivasi yang tinggi, dengan nilai rata-rata sebesar 3, 8642. Dalam tabel_4 pada kolom interval, nilai ini berada dalam rentang 3, 40 – 4, 19 yang berarti tingkat motivasi kerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta tergolong tinggi.

d)   Analisis variabel Kepuasan kerja
Kepuasan kerja diukur dengan 14 pertanyaan, setelah dirata-rata,sebagai berikut:

Tabel 5 – Distribusi Responden Berdasarkan Kepuasan kerja

Interval	Kategori	Frekuensi	Persentase (%)
1,00 – 1,79	Sangat rendah	0	0,0
1,80 – 2,59	Rendah	1	1,0
2,60 – 3,39	Cukup tinggi	11	11,0
3,40 – 4,19	Tinggi	63	63,0
4,20 – 5,00	Sangat tinggi	25	25,0
Total		100	100,0
Rata – rata		3,8764	

Sumber: Pengolahan Data Primer 2010

Dari 100 responden tidak seorang pun (0%) termasuk kategori sangat rendah, sebanyak 1 orang (1%) termasuk kategori rendah, 11 orang (11%) termasuk kategori cukup tinggi, 63 orang (63%) termasuk kategori tinggi dan 25 orang (25%) termasuk kategori sangat tinggi. Jadi karyawan cenderung memiliki tingkat kepuasan kerja yang tinggi, dengan nilai rata-rata sebesar 3, 8764. Dalam tabel_5 pada kolom interval, nilai ini berada dalam rentang 3, 40–4,19 berarti tingkat kepuasan kerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta tergolong tinggi.

e) Analisis variabel Kinerja Karyawan

Kinerja karyawan diukur dengan 12 pertanyaan, setelah dirata-rata, sebagai berikut:

Tabel 6 – Distribusi Responden Berdasarkan Kinerja

Interval	Kategori	Frekuensi	Persentase (%)
1,00 – 1,79	Sangat rendah	0	0,0
1,80 – 2,59	Rendah	4	4,0
2,60 – 3,39	Cukup tinggi	16	16,0
3,40 – 4,19	Tinggi	65	65,0
4,20 – 5,00	Sangat tinggi	15	15,0
Total		100	100,0
Rata – rata		3,7558	

Sumber : Data Primer diolah (2010)

Dari 100 responden tidak seorang pun (0%) termasuk kategori sangat rendah, sebanyak 4 orang (4%) termasuk kategori rendah, 16 orang (16%) termasuk kategori cukup tinggi, 65 orang (65%) termasuk kategori tinggi dan 15 orang (15%) termasuk kategori sangat tinggi. Disimpulkan bahwa pada umumnya karyawan cenderung memiliki kinerja yang tinggi dengan nilai rata-rata sebesar 3,7558. Dalam tabel_6 pada kolom interval, nilai ini berada dalam rentang 3,40 – 4,19 yang tingkat kinerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta tergolong tinggi.

2. Analisis Kuantitatif

Analisis kuantitatif digunakan untuk menguji hipotesis ada tidaknya pengaruh gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi dan kepuasan kerja terhadap kinerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta. Pengujian hipotesis dilakukan dengan teknik analisis regresi linier berganda karena tidak terdapat masalah multikolinieritas antar variabel independen, tidak terdapat masalah heteroskedastisitas pada residual dan tidak terdapat autokorelasi. Sehingga perlu pengujian asumsi klasik untuk menjamin bahwa model regresi yang diestimasi layak digunakan. Pengujian hipotesis dilakukan dengan teknik analisis regresi linier berganda untuk mengetahui pengaruh gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi kerja dan kepuasan kerja terhadap kinerja karyawan.

a) Regresi Linier Berganda

Hasil estimasi model regresi dengan bantuan program komputer *SPSS for Windows Release 13* pada tabel berikut:

Tabel 7 – Hasil Regresi Linier Berganda

Variabel Independen	Koef. Regresi	Beta	t_{hitung}	p	Keputusan
Konstanta	-0,735				
gaya kepemimpinan	0,177	0,122	1,122	0,265	Tidak Signifikan
budaya organisasi	0,225	0,177	2,225	0,028	Signifikan
motivasi	0,376	0,339	4,173	0,000	Signifikan
kepuasan kerja	0,385	0,311	3,017	0,003	Signifikan
Variabel dependen : Kinerja $R^2_{adj.}$ = 0,559 F_{hitung} = 32,404 F_{tabel} = 2,422 p = 0,000 (Tolak H_0)					

Sumber: Pengolahan Data Primer 2010

Berdasarkan hasil analisis regresi linier berganda maka persamaan regresinya, sebagai berikut:

$Y = -0,735 + 0,177 X_1 + 0,225 X_2 + 0,376 X_3 + 0,385 X_4$

1. Konstanta (a)

Nilai konstanta diperoleh sebesar -0,735 (negatif) berarti jika harga pada keempat variabel independen gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi kerja, dan kepuasan kerja sama dengan nol maka kinerja karyawan akan sebesar -0,735.

2. Koefisien Regresi Gaya kepemimpinan (b_1)

Koefisien regresi gaya kepemimpinan sebesar 0,177 (positif) berarti bila gaya kepemimpinan meningkat sebesar satu-satuan, maka kinerja karyawan akan naik sebesar 0,177 dan sebaliknya bila gaya kepemimpinan turun sebesar satu-satuan, maka kinerja karyawan akan turun sebesar 0,177, dengan asumsi variabel budaya organisasi, motivasi dan kepuasan kerja sama dengan nol.

3. Koefisien Regresi Budaya organisasi (b2)

Koefisien regresi budaya organisasi sebesar 0,225 (positif) yang berarti bahwa bila budaya organisasi meningkat sebesar satu-satuan, maka kinerja karyawan akan naik sebesar 0,225 dan sebaliknya bila budaya organisasi turun sebesar satu-satuan, maka kinerja karyawan akan turun sebesar 0,225, dengan asumsi variabel gaya kepemimpinan, motivasi dan kepuasan kerja sama dengan nol.

4. Koefisien Regresi Motivasi (b_3)

Koefisien regresi motivasi sebesar 0,376 (positif) berarti bila motivasi meningkat sebesar satu-satuan, maka kinerja karyawan akan naik sebesar 0,376 dan sebaliknya bila motivasi turun sebesar satu-satuan, maka kinerja karyawan akan turun sebesar 0,376, dengan asumsi variabel gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi dan kepuasan kerja sama dengan nol.

5. Koefisien Regresi Kepuasan kerja (b_4)

Koefisien regresi kepuasan kerja sebesar 0,385 (positif) berarti bila kepuasan kerja meningkat sebesar satu-satuan, maka kinerja karyawan akan naik sebesar 0,385 dan sebaliknya bila kepuasan kerja turun sebesar satu-satuan, maka kinerja karyawan akan turun sebesar 0,385, dengan asumsi variabel gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi dan motivasi sama dengan nol.

b) Uji-F

Dalam penelitian ini Uji-F untuk menguji signifikansi koefisien regresi seluruh prediktor di dalam model secara serentak. Rumusan hipotesis nol (H_0) dan hipotesis alternatif (H_a) mengenai pengaruh gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisas, motivasi dan kepuasan kerja secara bersama-sama terhadap kinerja karyawan,sebagai berikut:

H_0: $b_1 = b_2 = b_3 = b_4 = 0$, tidak ada pengaruh gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi dan kepuasan kerja secara bersama-sama terhadap kinerja karyawan.

H_a: $b_1 \neq b_2 \neq b_3 \neq b_4 \neq 0$, ada pengaruh gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi dan kepuasan kerja secara bersama-sama terhadap kinerja karyawan.

Kriteria pengambilan keputusan adalah:

Jika $F_{hitung} \geq F_{tabel}$ maka tolak H_0

Jika $F_{hitung} < F_{tabel}$ maka terima H_0

Uji signifikansi pengaruh gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi kerja dan kepuasan kerja secara bersama-sama terhadap kinerja karyawan, dengan F statistik diperoleh F_{hitung} sebesar 32,404. F_{tabel} dengan

derajat bebas $(db_1) = k = 4$ dan $db_2 = N – k – 1 = 100 – 4 – 1 = 95$ pada taraf signifikansi $(\alpha) = 0,05$ diperoleh sebesar 2,422 Karena $F_{hitung} > F_{tabel}$ (32,404 > 2,422), maka H_0 ditolak dan sebaliknya H_a diterima. Disimpulkan bahwa gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi kerja, dan kepuasan kerja, secara bersama-sama mempunyai pengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta. (Hipotesis 1 terdukung).

c)   Koefisien Determinasi
Koefisien determinasi ganda untuk mengukur kecocokan model persamaan regresi, mengukur persentase total variasi variabel dependen yang mampu dijelaskan oleh variabel independen secara bersama-sama. Untuk keperluan interpretasi, disarankan untuk menggunakan *adjusted* R^2, karena *unadjusted* R^2 (R^2) cenderung berlebihan dalam menggambarkan *goodness of fit* model regresi yang lebih dari satu variabel independen (Gujarad, 1995). Hasil analisis tabel_7 ditemukan koefisien determinasi (adjsuted R2) sebesar 0,559 berarti sekitar 55,9% variasi variabel kinerja karyawan mampu diterangkan oleh keempat variabel independen dalam model yaitu: gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi dan kepuasan kerja. Sedangkan sisanya sebesar 44, 1% diterangkan oleh variabel lain di luar penelitian ini.

d)   Uji t
Uji-t statistik digunakan untuk menguji signifikansi koefisien regresi pengaruh dari masing-masing variabel independen secara individual terhadap variabel dependen.

1.   Pengaruh Gaya kepemimpinan terhadap Kinerja Karyawan
Rumusan hipotesis nol (H_0) dan hipotesis alternatif (H_a) mengenai pengaruh gaya kepemimpinan secara parsial terhadap kinerja karyawan, sebagai berikut:
H_0: $b_1 = 0$, tidak ada pengaruh gaya kepemimpinan terhadap kinerja karyawan.
H_a: $b_1 \neq 0$, ada pengaruh gaya kepemimpinan terhadap kinerja karyawan.
Kriteria pengambilan keputusan adalah:
Jika $t_{hitung} \geq t_{tabel}$ maka tolak H_0
Jika $r_{hitung} < t_{tabel}$ maka terima H_0
        Hasil perhitungan pada table_7 diperoleh koefisien regresi untuk keandalan sebesar 0,177 (positif). Uji signifikansi koefisien ini dengan t statistik diperoleh t_{hitung} sebesar 1,122, t_{tabel} dengan derajat bebas (db) $= N – k – 1 = 100 – 4 – 1 = 95$ pada taraf signifikansi $(\alpha) = 0,05$ diperoleh sebesar 1,973 dan p = 0,265. Oleh karena $t_{hitung} < t_{tabel}$ (1,122 < 1,973) dan p > 0, 05, maka *H_0 diterima dan sebaliknya H_a ditolak*. Disimpulkan bahwa gaya kepemimpinan tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta. (Hipotesis 2 tidak terdukung).

2.   Pengaruh Budaya organisasi terhadap Kinerja Karyawan
Rumusan hipotesis nol (H_0) dan hipotesis alternatif (H_a) mengenai pengaruh budaya organisasi secara parsial terhadap kinerja karyawan adalah sebagai berikut:
H_0: $b_2 = 0$, tidak ada pengaruh budaya organisasi terhadap kinerja karyawan.
H_a: $b_2 \neq 0$, ada pengaruh budaya organisasi terhadap kinerja karyawan.
        Dari hasil perhitungan pada table_7 diperoleh koefisien regresi untuk keandalan sebesar 0,225 (positif) dan t_{hitung} sebesar 2,225, p = 0,028, oleh karena $t_{hitung} > t_{tabel}$ (2,225 > 1,973) dan p < 0, 05, maka *H_0 ditolak dan sebaliknya H_a diterima*. Disimpulkan bahwa budaya organisasi berpengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap kinerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta. (Hipotesis 2 terdukung).

3.   Pengaruh Motivasi terhadap Kinerja Karyawan
Rumusan hipotesis nol (H_0) dan hipotesis alternatif (H_a) mengenai pengaruh motivasi secara parsial terhadap kinerja karyawan adalah sebagai berikut:
H_0: $b_3 = 0$, tidak ada pengaruh motivasi terhadap kinerja karyawan.
H_a: $b_3 \neq 0$, ada pengaruh motivasi terhadap kinerja karyawan.

Dari hasil perhitungan pada table_7 diperoleh koefisien regresi untuk keandalan sebesar 0,376 (positif) dan t_{hitung} sebesar 4,173 dan p = 0,000, dan $t_{hitung} > t_{tabel}$ (4,173 > 1,973) dan p < 0, 05 maka *H_0 ditolak dan sebaliknya H_a diterima.* Disimpulkan bahwa motivasi kerja sangat berpengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap kinerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta. (Hipotesis 2 terdukung).

4.   Pengaruh Kepuasan kerja terhadap Kinerja Karyawan

Rumusan hipotesis nol (H_0) dan hipotesis alternatif (H_a) mengenai pengaruh kepuasan kerja secara parsial terhadap kinerja karyawan adalah sebagai berikut:

H_0: $b_4 = 0$, tidak ada pengaruh kepuasan kerja terhadap kinerja karyawan.

H_a: $b_4 \neq 0$, ada pengaruh kepuasan kerja terhadap kinerja karyawan.

Dari hasil perhitungan pada table_7 diperoleh koefisien regresi untuk keandalan sebesar 0,385 (positif), t_{hitung} sebesar 3,017, dan p = 0,003. Oleh karena $t_{hitung} > t_{tabel}$ (3, 017 > 1, 973) dan p < 0, 05, maka H_0 ditolak dan sebaliknya H_a diterima. Disimpulkan bahwa kepuasan kerja berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta. (Hipotesis 2 terdukung).

e)   Variabel Dominan

Uji dominan, koefisien beta (β) adalah koefisien regresi dalam bentuk standar. Uji koefisien beta digunakan untuk mengetahui variabel independen mana dari variabel gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi kerja dan kepuasan kerja yang mempunyai pengaruh dominan terhadap kinerja karyawan (Norusis, Marija J, 1993).

Estimasi terhadap model regresi berganda tabel_7 diperoleh koefisien beta variabel gaya kepemimpinan sebesar 0,122, koefisien beta variabel budaya organisasi sebesar 0,177, koefisien beta variabel motivasi sebesar 0,339 dan variabel kepuasan kerja sebesar 0,311. Hasil uji koefisien beta yang diperoleh, variabel motivasi kerja nilai koefisien betanya lebih besar dibanding ketiga variabel lainnya, maka disimpulkan bahwa variabel motivasi kerja mempunyai pengaruh dominan terhadap kinerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih Yogyakarta. (Hipotesis 3 terdukung).

C.   Pembahasan

Terbukti gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisas, motivasi, dan kepuasan kerja berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja karyawan. Apabila secara serentak variabel gaya kepemimpinan, budaya organisasi, motivasi kerja, dan kepuasan kerja dirubah, maka akan meningkatkan kinerja karyawan. Artinya gaya kepemimpinan yang diterapkan dirumah sakit panti rapih bisa memuaskan para karyawan, budaya organisasi yang kondusif dan sinergis, motivasi kerja yang tinggi, dan kepuasan kerja yang tinggi, sehingga kinerja karyawan semakin baik atau hipotesis pertama yang diajukan terbukti. Pihak manajemen diharap dapat mempertahankan dan meningkatkan faktor-faktor di atas tanpa mengurangi usahanya yang selama ini telah dilakukan.

Hasil analisis variabel gaya kepemimpinan secara parsial tidak berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja karyawan. Apabila secara parsial salah satu variabel di rubah, maka tidak berpengaruh terhadap kinerja karyawan.Penyebab ketidaksignifikansian karena di Rumah Sakit Panti Rapih peran yang ada relatif tetap artinya semua aktivitas di RSPR dapat dilaksanakan berdasarkan pada prosedur dan SOP yang ada, dan karyawan yang bekerja di rumah sakit Panti Rapih bekerja secara lebih mandiri dan profesional, sehingga secara operasional campur tangan pemimpin menjadi tidak berpengaruh terhadap kinerja karyawan di RSPR tetapi harus diikuti dengan baik. Dikaitkan dengan penelitian sebelumnya, hasil ini tidak sejalan dengan penelitian yang dilakukan oleh Raihan (2006) Staf pengajar FT. UID adalah pengaruh kepemimpinan terhadap kinerja karyawan langsung, secara empiris menunjukkan bahwa ada pengaruh positif dan signifikan variabel kepemimpinan terhadap kinerja pegawai, dan nilai koefisiennya sebesar 0, 898, dengan tingkat signifikansinya sebesar 0, 000, dan $t_{hitungnya}$ sebesar 13, 348.

Hasil analisis variabel budaya organisasi berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja karyawan. Rata-rata responden menjawab setuju dengan budaya yang ada di RSPR, artinya nilai-nilai, norma-norma yang ada di yayasan panti rapih bisa mengikat dan membentuk para karyawan, seperti kejujuran dan

akuntabilitas yang tinggi, kepatuhan dan ketaatan pada aturan, kedisiplinan yang tinggi, sehingga budaya organisasi berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja karyawan RSPR yogyakarta. Hasil analisis melalui hubungan kausalitas menunjukkan bahwa variabel budaya organisasi berpengaruh signifikan terhadap variabel kinerja karyawan sebesar 0, 506.

Hipotesis ke tiga tentang variabel motivasi kerja perpengaruh dominan terhadap kinerja karyawan. Hasil analisis variabel motivasi kerja menunjukkan bahwa motivasi kerja sangat berpengaruh terhadap kinerja karyawan. Ini berarti jika dikaitkan dengan fenomena yang ada di lapangan menunjukkan sistem yang ada di RSPR itu dapat memotivasi karyawan. Seperti halnya karyawan merasa senang dan cocok dengan pekerjaan maupun dengan rekan kerja yang ada di RSPR, sehingga mereka termotivasi untuk bekerja lebih maksimal guna mencapai tingkat kinerja yang lebih baik. Sehingga dapat dinyatakan hipotesis yang diajukan bahwa variabel motivasi kerja berpengaruh dominan terhadap kinerja karyawan terbukti. Hasil analisis penelitian ini sejalan dengan hasil analisis penelitian sebelumnya yang dilakukan oleh Raihan (2006), tentang pengaruh motivasi kerja terhadap kinerja karyawan, yang menunjukkan bahwa motivasi kerja mempunyai pengaruh yang kuat terhadap kinerja pegawai. Nilai korelasinya adalah sebesar 0, 982, dan nilai t_{hitung} 34, 118 $\geq$ t_{tabel} 2, 021.

Hasil analisis menunjukkan kepuasan kerja berpengaruh signifikan terhadap kinerja karyawan. Ini berarti analisis deskriptif karakteristik responden menunjukkan masa kerja karyawan tetap bidang administrasi RSPR rata-rata sudah bekerja antara 8-15 tahun. Misalnya karyawan senang dengan pekerjaan itu sendiri, bisa dapat pengalaman, bisa mengikuti aturan atau norma-norma yang berlaku, dan juga bisa memperoleh gaji yang selayaknya sehingga dapat mempengaruhi kinerja karyawan itu sendiri.

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Membangun Hubungan Damai Indonesia dan Timor-Leste: Kerjasama Negara dan Masyarakat Sipil[1]

Badrus Sholeh[2]

Indonesia dan Timor-Leste Menyajikan sebuah kasus, di zaman modern, sangat unik. Kita tidak enyembunyikan kebenaran, tetapi memilih rekonsiliasi' (Gusmão 2013, h.378).

Pendahuluan

Timor Timur atau kini Timor-Leste merupakan negara tetangga terdekat Indonesia. Tidak hanya karena mereka berbatasan dengan Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur tetapi mereka juga pernah menjadi bagian dari Indonesia antara 1975-1999, sekitar dua puluh empat tahun. Sejak menang jajak pendapat, Timor-Leste menjadi negara berdaulat. Tetapi hubungan dengan Indonesia sudah menjadi pilihan yang tak terelakkan. Tidak saja karena sebagian masyarakat Timor-Leste memiliki kesamaan kebudayaan dengan beberapa komunitas di Timor Barat tetapi juga akan menjadi negara sahabat terdekat. Beberapa fakta juga mendukung persahabatan kedua negara. Pertama, bahasa Indonesia secara konstitusional diakui oleh pemerintah dan negara Timor-Leste sebagai bagian dari bahasa resmi selain bahasa Portugis dan Tetun. Ini juga didukung dengan mudahnya masyarakat Timor-Leste memahami bahasa Indonesia justru tidak melalui sekolah, tetapi lewat televisi. Hampir semua stasiun TV dari Indonesia bisa diakses dengan baik di Dili.

Setelah lebih dari sepuluh tahun berpisah dari Indonesia masyarakat Timor Leste tetap merasa memiliki hubungan khusus dengan Indonesia melalui bahasa Indonesia yang mudah dipahami dan dimengerti oleh masyarakat. Seorang jurnalis televisi di Dili menyatakan bahwa 'Bahasa Portugis cukup susah untuk dipelajari, sementara kosakata bahasa Tetun masih terbatas. Karena itu, jika ingin menjelaskan sesuatu dan tidak ditemukan persamaan katanya, kami gunakan bahasa Indonesia, lebih mudah dan simpel'(Prabowo 2012). Selain pengaruh media televisi, masyarakat terpelajar di Timor Leste juga masih menggunakan buku-buku berbahasa Indonesia sebagai sumber belajar mereka. Toko buku yang ada di Dilli lebih banyak menjual buku-buku ekonomi, kesehatan, politik dan sosial budaya dalam Bahasa Indonesia dari pada bahasa portugis atau bahasa Inggris. Disamping harganya lebih murah, juga memenuhi kebutuhan belajar-mengajar mereka. Buku-buku dan majalah dalam bahasa Tetun mulai digalakkan.

Hubungan people to people ini kemudian 'memaksa' pemimpin kedua negara untuk lebih memilih jalur 'persahabatan' dari pada proses politik dan hukum yang panjang. Apakah proses ini menjadi jaminan atas transisi demokrasi dan pembangunan di Timor-Leste yang damai dan bermartabat? Pertanyaan ini akan menjadi pembahasan strategis yang dikaji lebih lanjut. Kedua, hubungan perdagangan baik formal (pemerintah) maupun informal (masyarakat). Kedekatan masyarakat kedua negara menjadi pesan penting bahwa masyarakat kedua negara bersahabat dekat. Kedekatan ini kemudian dimanfaatkan oleh sebagian mafia di perbatasan Timor-Leste dan Indonesia untuk keluar masuk barang di perbatasan secara illegal.

Artikel ini akan membahas dinamika hubungan antara Indonesia dan Timor-Leste pasca referendum 1999, bagaimana hubungan damai disepakati dan dilaksanakan baik oleh negara maupun masyarakat sipil.

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Kedekatan budaya dan hubungan ekonomi kedua negara 'memaksa' kedua belah pihak mengubur masa lalu yang kelam menuju masa depan yang damai dan saling menguntungkan.

Hubungan Damai Indonesia dan Timor-Leste

Dinamika hubungan Indonesia dan Timor-Leste mengalami proses panjang dan berliku. Pasca reféréndum 1999 hubungan kedua negara berdaulat berlanjut dengan pola berbeda. Dibanyak negara pasca konflik dan perang ada proses pengungkapan kebenaran yang terjadi pada masa konflik dan perang. Langkah ini bagian dari tujuan utama perdamaian dan rekonsiliasi. Karena itu dikenal istilah *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi, KKR) sebagaimana amanat MoU Helsinki 2005 perjanjian antara Gerakan Aceh Merdeka dan Republik Indonesia dinyatakan dalam pasal 2 tentang Human Rights ayat 2: 'A Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be established for Aceh by the Indonesian Commission of Truth and Reconciliation with the task of formulating and determining reconciliation measures' (Kingsbury 2006, h. 203). Hingga kini KKR mengalami *deadlock* akibat belum adanya payung Undang-undang ditingkat nasional. Menurut mantan Gubernur Aceh Irwandi Yusuf bahwa 'tanpa payung hukum ditingkat nasional, maka akan sulit bagi KKR ditingkat Aceh untuk ditindaklanjuti karena akan melibatkan banyak departemen dan lintas sektoral (Irwandi 2013). Kini Qanun KKR sedang diselesaikan oleh Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh (DPRA) dan diperkirakan selesai Desember 2013. Rencananya Qanun KKR Aceh akan dijadikan lembaga permanen untuk mengantisipasi proses peradilan, pengungkapan kebenaran dan rekonsiliasi yang membutuhkan waktu antara sepuluh hingga duapuluh tahun (Aritonang 2013). Tentu saja proses di Aceh harus ditopang oleh keterbukaan dan inisiatif positif dari Jakarta bahwa proses rekonsiliasi semestinya menjadi prioritas pasca Orde Baru dimana banyak konflik etnis, agama dan separatisme membutuhkan kekuatan bersama untuk diatasi. Dinamika di Timor-Leste berbeda dengan mengganti kata 'Rekonsiliasi' menjadi 'Persahabatan'. Ini mencerminkan niat baik khususnya dari Timor Leste untuk lebih mengutamakan kebaikan bagi masa depan pembangunan di Timor Leste yang jauh tertinggal dibandingkan negara Asia Tenggara lainnya.

Terbentuknya Komisi Kebenaran dan Persahabatan (KKP, *The Commission of Truth and Friendship)* Indonesia –Timor-Leste adalah produk politik yang mengutamakan hubungan damai dan saling menguntungkan antar kedua negara: Indonesia dan Timor-Leste. Kiki Syahnakri yang lebih dari satu dekade bertugas sebagai TNI di perbatasan dan di Timor-Timur menyatakan:

> Muara dari pekerjaan KKP adalah persahabatan. Target besar ini hanya bisa dicapai melalui itikad baik dan upaya positif dari semua pihak terutama KKP sendiri melalui proses yang relatif bersih, dengan data akurat, bukti yang valid dan kesaksian yang benar. Intisari dari persahabatan adalah sikap saling menerima, saling menghormati dan saling menghargai dijiwai spirit keadilan, kesetaraan dan perdamaian (Syahnakri 2009, h. 121).

Kiki Syahnakri adalah sedikit diantara tentara yang pernah bertugas dalam operasi di Timor-Leste yang menguasai bahasa Tetun. Melalui Syahnakri banyak orang Timor-Leste bergabung menjadi bagian dari tentara Indonesia. Pandangan Syahnakri tentu diplomatis dengan mendukung proses KKP untuk kebersamaan Timor-Leste dan Indonesia dimasa depan.

Argumen Syahnakri seiring dengan Xanana Gusmão, Perdana Menteri Timor-Leste (2012-2017) yang menyatakan bahwa:

> Timor-Leste dan Indonesia telah memilih jalan yang sama untuk ditelusuri, dengan menatap kedepan! Perdamaian harus dicapai dengan upaya bersama, dimana terdapat saling pengertian tentang kesulitan-kesulitan, pemahaman tentang berbagai masalah yang berdampak terhadap kedua belah pihak, kemauan untuk menyelesaikannya lewat jalan paling layak dan damai, penghormatan terhadap situasi dan kondisi yang dialami masing-masing pihak, dan dialog yang diadakan terus-menerus untuk mempermantap rekonsiliasi! (Gusmão 2013, h. 379).

Perubahan rejim kedua negara dari otoritarian-perang menuju demokrasi damai memaksa para pemimpin kedua negara untuk mengedepankan perdamaian, persahabatan dari pada mengungkap sejarah kelam selama dua puluh empat tahun masa pendudukan Indonesia di Timor-Timur yang menyebabkan ratusan ribu orang meninggal dari kedua negara, khususnya korban dari Timor- Timur. Barangkali para pemimpin kedua negara belajar dari sulitnya pengadilan HAM pasca perang dan konflik diberbagai negara. Kamboja adalah contoh paling menarik dimana hanya beberapa orang saja yang diadili oleh pengadilan HAM Kamboja dan internasional. Bagi masyarakat Kamboja proses peradilan seperti ini tentu tidak fair terutama bagi korban kekejaman Polpot yang membantai masyarakat sipil secara membabi buta demi kelangsungan kepemimpinannya (Soy Sok, 2013). Belajar dari banyak pengalaman pelaksanaan yang tidak adil atas peradilan HAM pasca konflik dan perang, dan terutama demi kepentingan kesejahteraan kedua negara, khususnya Timor-Leste yang baru merdeka untuk kedua kalinya, maka 'persahabatan' lebih bermakna dari pada 'keadilan'.

Dalam persahabatan ada proses rekonsiliasi. Dukungan penuh Indonesia bagi Timor-Leste sebagai calon anggota ASEAN menunjukkan sikap politik Indonesia yang mendukung eksistensi Timor-Leste di dunia internasional. Bagi pemerintah Timor-Leste, pilihan untuk menjadi anggota ASEAN menjadi prioritas utama. Xanana Gusmão menyatakan bahwa 'the membership in ASEAN in a priority for the Timorese State, since we consider that it is extremely important to belong to this family and to extract the emplisit advantages that derive from here: security, stability, economic development and regional cooperation' (Gusmao 2012, h. 154). Perdana Menteri Gusmão yakin bahwa Timor-Leste bisa memberi manfaat sebagai jembatan (*connector)* antara ASEAN dan Forum Kepulauan Pasifik (*the Pacific Island Forum)* dalam melakukan kerjasama lebih luas (Timur 2013).

Persahabatan telah menunjukkan dukungan nyata ditingkat masyarakat sipil dan *grassroot* baik dikalangan pelajar dan pelaku bisnis. Ratusan pelajar dan mahasiswa dari Timor-Leste menimba ilmu di Indonesia. Mereka adalah aset terbaik bangsa untuk membangun hubungan persahabatan sejati. Masyarakat dan pemerintah Indonesia juga menyambut positif dan hangat keberadaan pelajar Timor-Leste di Indonesia dengan menyediakan beasiswa baik dari Kementerian Luar Negeri, Kementerian Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, Kementerian Agama, maupun melalui Perguruan Tinggi di Indonesia. Hanya saja bagi banyak ilmuwan Indonesia, kajian terkait hubungan persahabatan Indonesia -Timor-Leste belum menjadi perhatian penting. Barangkali karena proses ini lebih nampak 'politis' dari pada gerakan dari bawah. Hubungan *grassroot* melalui pendidikan ini bisa menjadi fondasi kuat hubungan antar kedua negara. Melalui mereka hubungan semestinya digerakkan tidak hanya G (government) to G (government) tetapi juga akan lebih bermakna dan berkesinambungan jika P (people) to P (people) diperkuat. Kepada mereka lah hubungan kedua negara akan lebih sunbstansial. Tentu dengan dukungan kuat dari masyarakat internasional.

Hal ini juga diperkuat adanya hubungan budaya dan etnisitas kedua wilayah perbatasan. Menurut Yosef Naiobe dalam laporannya bahwa "Hubungan emosional yang dibangun melalui ikatan perkawinan antara negara Timor-Leste dengan Indonesia menyebabkan sebagian warga yang bermukim di daerah perbatasan kedua negara hidup secara damai dan menyatu satu sama lain" (Naiobe, *Sindonews.com*, 3 September 2013).

Masa Depan "Persahabatan": Tantangan

Hubungan kedua negara mengalami tantangan yang harus dikendalikan secara seimbang dan bertahap. Sejarah dan geografis kedua negara mewarnai hubungan yang tidak mudah. Beberapa tantangan meliputi: sirkulasi perdagangan, kritik pelanggaran HAM dan kriminalitas. Situasi perbatasan yang kontras antara negara baru Timor-Leste dan masyarakat perbatasan Timor Barat di Indonesia menarik perhatian banyak pihak.

Ketergantungan Pemerintah dan rakyat Timor-Leste khususnya pasokan komoditi dari Indonesia membuat hubungan persahabatan tidak seimbang. Fakta ini memaksa pemerintah Timor-Leste lebih memilih untuk melupakan rekomendasi dunia internasional soal pelanggaran HAM yang dilakukan oleh sebagian elit militer Republik Indonesia. Selanjutnya, bagi Timor-Leste Indonesia juga pintu masuk untuk masuk menjadi anggota ASEAN. Sejak awal Indonesialah yang paling serius mendukung negara Timor-

Leste menjadi bagian dari ASEAN. Meskipun hingga kini belum resmi diterima sebagai anggota penuh, karena oleh sebagian pendiri ASEAN Timor-Leste dianggap belum siap terutama dalam kebijakan free trade ASEAN 2015.

Peradilan HAM internasional dalam menangani kejahatan perang seringkali tidak membuahkan hasil sesuai dengan harapan rakyat. Kamboja adalah salah satu contoh terdekat, bagaimana para elit Pemerintah Polpot diputuskan bersalah. Tetapi berbeda dengan kenyataan bahwa hanya segelintir pemimpin dinyatakan bersalah melalui proses peradilan yang sangat lama. Peradilan HAM tidak menjawab harapan masyarakat Kamboja. Gejolak kekecewaan hingga kini masih hadapi. Para pasukan pembantai masa Polpot kini masih hidup bebas ditengah masyarakat yang menjadi korban mereka. Perasaan tidak enak dan kebencian masih menyala diantara masyarakat (Soy Sok, 2013).

Pengalaman Kamboja bisa menjadi pelajaran untuk negara dan daerah pasca konflik dan perang, apakah sangat dibutuhkan proses investigasi untuk membuka kebenaran (*truth*) dan memberi ruang rekonsiliasi terhadap pihak-pihak yang terlibat konflik atau antara pelaku dan korban. Sebagaimana di Aceh, Indonesia, masyarakat korban perang di Timor-Timur kini Timor-Leste juga berharap terutama kapan, dimana dan bagaimana terjadinya pembunuhan atau penyerangan atas diri mereka atau diantara keluarga mereka. Dalam pengalaman yang berbeda di Afrika bahwa kesaksian korban dalam komisi kebenaran melalui verifikasi bisa meningkatkan kesadaran pelanggaran hak asasi manusia sehingga simpati masyarakat terbangun yang bisa menjadi kontribusi kuat bagi *social healing* untuk masyarakat umum pasca perang (Hidayat 2011, h.30-31). Tetapi rekonsiliasi tidak harus selalu melaui proses peradilan. Kompensasi yang memenuhi rasa keadilan bagi keluarga korban juga bisa menjadi alternatif. Bagi masyarakat Timor-Leste yang masih kesulitan ekonomi sangat membutuhkan kebijakan ini. Banyak diantara mereka yang masih tinggal di barak-barak pengungsian di perbatasan Timor Barat seolah terlupakan. Mereka juga menjadi bagian dari proses *healing* ini.

Beberapa bentrokan antar mahasiswa Timor-Leste di Yogyakarta juga disebabkan oleh rasa 'ketidakadilan' antar mahasiswa Timor-Leste (Edy Mahmud 2013). Ketidakadilan yang dirasakan masyarakat Timor-Leste baik yang pro-kemerdekaan dan pro-independen menjadi salah satu 'PR' bagi kedua negara untuk menyelesaikannya secara baik. Setidaknya elit politik dan pemerintah kedua negara memiliki kesepakatan bersama untuk membangun persahabatan yang positif dan membangun kesepakatan ini tentu perlu terus dipantau dan dilaksanakan khususnya yang menyangkut *grassroot* kelompok masyarakat (termasuk pelajar) yang mengalami langsung potensi perpecahan, kekerasan dan bentrokan lapis bawah jika ada rasa keadilan yang masih mengganjal.

Memperkuat Persahabatan

Upaya penguatan persahabatan kedua negara menjadi keniscayaan yang tidak bisa dihindari baik melalui hubungan antar pemerintah maupun masyarakat sipil. Ada beberapa kunci penting yang perlu menjadi perhatian pemerintah Timor-Leste dan Indonesia. Pertama, sejarah 'memalukan' Indonesia soal Timor-Timur harus diubah menjadi energi yang lebih positif bagaimana dulu menjadi keluarga besar kini menjadi tetangga yang tetap harus dijaga hubungan baiknya. Kedua, Indonesia sebagai negara Muslim terbesar di dunia dan satu diantara sedikit negara di Asia yang masuk G-20 (Islam 2011, h.165), perlu menjadi perhatian terutama bagi pola diplomasi Timor-Leste dan sebaliknya. Muslim Indonesia yang moderat dan toleran bisa 'diundang' oleh pemerintah dan masyarakat Timor-Leste untuk mengembangkan nilai-nilai agama yang toleran di Timor-Leste. Masyarakat Timor-Leste juga terus digalakkan untuk belajar di Indonesia baik melalui mekanisme kerjasama beasiswa negara atau pendekatan dengan lembaga-lembaga pendidikan di Indonesia. Dua pola ini akan bisa menjadi 'stimulan' penguat hubungan antar kedua negara.

Hingga kini trauma terbesar sejarah modern Indonesia adalah berpisahnya sebagian wilayah Indonesia. Prinsip Bineka Tunggal Eka (*Unity in Diversity)* menjadi semboyan politik dan budaya yang mengikat beragam suku, agama dan budaya menjadi satu Bangsa Indonesia. Dimata masyarakat Indonesia, 'berpisahnya' Timor-Timur menjadi negara merdeka berdaulat menghantui pemerintah dan masyarakat Indonesia apakah selanjutnya Papua bisa 'di Timor-Timurkan' oleh badan-badan internasional. Kekhawatiran ini muncul kembali pada awal Perdana Menteri Tony Abbott dimana Australia 'dianggap'

memiliki peran penting dalam pemisahan Timor-Timur dari Indonesia. Sejarah gelap ini mesti dikubur, dan diisi dengan lembaran sejarah baru hubungan lebih harmonis, saling menghargai dan positif bagi kedua negara. Keterbukaan pemerintah dan masyarakat Timor-Leste diwujudkan dalam memberi kesempatan kerjsama lebih dekat dengan Indonesia. Misalnya, dalam rekrutmen kenaikan pangkat di kepolisian Pemerintah Timor-Leste mengundang Tim penguji Mabes POLRI untuk menguji para prajurit yang akan naik pangkat. Demikian juga undangan untuk perusahaan Telekomunikasi Indonesia: Telkomsel untuk membuka investasi telekomunikasi di Timor-Leste . Kementerian Pekerjaan Umum juga mendapat kesempatan untuk mengendalikan proyek pembangunan di Timor-Leste. Hubungan saling menguntungkan ini akan memperkuat persahabatan kedua negara (Guterres 2013; da Costa 2013). Hubungan melalui kerjasama peningkatan sumberdaya manusia dan perdagangan juga mendapat tanggapan dari msyarakat khususnya kekhawatiran dominasinya investor dari Indonesia dan negara lain, khususnya China, akan menyingkirkan peran investor dan pengusaha lokal dalam persaingan investasi dan pembangunan di Timor-Leste (*East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin*, 7 Oktober 2013). Persaingan ini akan lebih kuat jika Timor-Leste resmi masuk dalam ASEAN, dan membuka diri dalam perdagangan bebas negara-negara ASEAN. Kesiapan masyarakat lokal membutuhkan kerja keras pemerintah, masyarakat dan terutama lembaga pendidikan di Timor-Leste.

Demikian juga melalui jalur pendidikan dan keagamaan akan memperkuat diplomasi baik secara formal maupun informal. Ratusan pelajar Timor-Leste kini belajar di Indonesia, melanjutkan tradisi pelajar Timor-Timur yang telah menamatkan studi Master dan doktoral di berbagai perguruan Tinggi ternama di Indonesia. Pemerintah Timor-Leste disamping mengarahkan mahasiswa untuk belajar di negara berbahasa Portugis, juga harus mendorong pelajar untuk menimba ilmu di Indonesia demi menjaga hubungan lebih kuat dan harmonis kedua negara. Identitas negara bekas koloni Portugis memang penting untuk Bangsa dan masyarakat Timor-Leste, tetapi keinginan kuat masyarakat untuk belajar di Indonesia harus mendapat dukungan pemerintah. Kedekatan budaya dan geografis memungkinkan masyarakat Timor-Leste meningkatkan kualitas dan pemerataan pendidikan dengan menjaga hubungan pendidikan kedua belah negara. Saya belum melihat aspek ini menjadi perhatian pemerintah. Bahkan cenderung diabaikan dalam mekanisme diplomasi. Rektor Universidade Dili (UNDIL), António Cardoso Caldas Machado yakin melalui kerjasama pendidikan yang lebih erat akan memupuk hubungan yang lebih kuat, harmonis dan berkesinambungan pemerintah dan masyarakat kedua negara. UNDIL secara rutin mengundang Professor dari Indonesia untuk mengajar di Dili, juga mengirim beberapa mahasiswa untuk melanjutkan studinya di perguruan tinggi terbaik di Indonesia (Machado 2013). Yang kurang adalah kesadaran mahasiswa dan pelajar Indonesia atas hubungan ini. Perlu dijalin kerjasama lebih intensif antar komunitas pendidikan Indonesia dan Timor-Leste.

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